University of Minnesota Press Cultural Critique
University of Minnesota Press Cultural Critique
University of Minnesota Press Cultural Critique
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Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in
an Age of Technology
Rick Berg
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Losing Vietnam 93
when the NVA unfurled a flag from what had once been the presidential
palace in what had once been Saigon, Vietnam became part of our past.
Our history inherited the ever escalating incident, and Vietnam, which
for the U.S. had always been more a war than a country, faded from our
national, collective attention. Little remained of the war that was an
enduring aspect of many lives during the Sixties and early Seventies.
Still less remained of the country we wasted to preserve. For Ameri-
cans, the experience of Vietnam was one of loss. We lost the war in 1973
and the country in 1975. This loss haunts us.'
But the absence that haunted us in the Seventies is lost to the
Eighties. The war's remains have been resurrected and, like Franke
stein's monster, given new life. Ten years after Saigon's fall and liber
tion, Vietnam has become, if not a commodity, then a resource for th
American culture industry. Publishers and producers are working
for all it is worth. Books on Vietnam, once almost impossible to find
any major chain, now are almost impossible to avoid. New boo
appear regularly; older works, long out of print, have reappeared with
glossy new covers, and mass-market publishers distribute them n
tionwide.
Nor have TV and film producers been slow to exploit the resource.
Although TV has been unable to find an agreeable fictional format for
the Vietnam War, other than the thinly veiled M'A* SH, it has, since
1975, aired a number of documentaries and news specials. But while it
waits for the right fictional vehicle, TV has added the Vietnam vet to its
line-up. Via the magic of the flashback, TV heroes from Miami Vice to
Magnum P.I. have gained a past as well as a quick justification for
mayhem and irreverence. There is even, thanks to Coors Beer, a televi-
sion commerical for those "who paid the price."
Film producers are also cashing in on the expanding market. Holly-
wood is no longer looking away. Capitalizing on the synonymity of
"lost" and "missing," Uncommon Valor (1983), Missing in Action (1984),
and Rambo(1985) have recovered Vietnam, and film audiences every-
where have discovered that what they once imagined lost was only
MIA. Hollywood has even recalled the veterans. But, as the recently
proposed sequel for Billy Jack (1971) implies, the ones they remember
are their own creations. The vets in such films as Search and Destroy
1. This seems as good a place as any to thank the Occidental College students that
participated in the two courses that I have taught on Representations of Vietnam. Both
the Seminar and the English 30 class helped bring this paper to fruition.
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94 Rick Berg
(1981), First Blood (1982), ExterminatorI (1983), and Fleshbum (1983) only
reflect the vets of earlier films like The Losers (1970) or The Visitors (1972).
Even music producers havejoined in.2 Although no Britten or Pen-
derecki has composed a Vietnam Requiem, Country, Rock, Punk, and
New Wave have all made their contributions. From The Clash's "Charlie
Don't Surf" to Paul Hardcastle's "19," from Charlie Daniels's ode to
the flashback, "Still in Saigon," and BillyJoel's "Goodnight Saigon" to
Stevie Wonder's embittered "Front Line," the music industry sings its
sad song of Vietnam to a generation that, because of a long silence,
knows little more about Vietnam and its victims than the media's
revised images. And often the music seems to sing that dependence o
past media images. Other media and their images are the subject of t
music and their videos. The subject of Paul Hardcastle's "19" vid
for example, is not age butjust this interdependence of past and pre
ent representations of the War.3 The subject ofJohn Sayles's video f
"Born in the USA" negates the media-made myths, and supp
Springsteen's lyric by wrenching an image of Vietnam away from th
former media-made doxa and wedding it to a class perspective.
In Country,4 the most recent addition to the growing body of ficti
on Vietnam, exploits this awareness of our dependence on the me
Samantha Hughes, the seventeen year-old heroine, finds herself tryi
to come to terms with a Vietnam that she only experiences as a l
Almost twenty years after, like a female Telemachus, she attempts t
find her lost father and his war, but ends, like Penelope, weaving an
unravelling her inherited texts. Like the child in Tender Mercies (19
Sam Hughes has lost a father, KIAed in his irresponsible adolescen
and has a disturbed Uncle Emmett, ailing from the probable effects
Agent Orange, and an impotent vet lover. She knows nothing of
other than the multitude of representations that signify our loss: h
father's letters and his journal, Springsteen's lyrics and their acc
panying video. Nothing is authentic. Even the MA *S*H episodes
re-runs. She is the subject of distances and displacements. W
2. v. Robert Hilburn, "Pop Breaks Vietnam Silence," Los Angeles Times, 3 Oct. 1
Calendar. But these, of course, are only the most recent additions to the list of
aboutVietnam. If we return to the Sixties, there are the anti-war songs, e.g., Phil
"Talking Vietnam," The Fugs, "Kill For Peace," and Country Joe and The Fi
"Fish Chant."
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Losing Vietnam 95
Emmett finally tells her a war story - one of those ever present horror
stories authenticating the vet while it drives a wedge between him and
the community - Sam can respond only by comparing it to pictures
she has seen. In short, Sam Hughes is today's child suffering yester-
day's trauma. She suffers a modernist nostalgia for authentic experi-
ence. Desiring to know and experience the lost war, she remains un-
satisfied with her representations. Mason has bequeathed our desire
for Nam to the next generation.
Vietnam remains, then, regardless of the ritual cleansings and willed
suspensions of memory, regardless of the many memorials for the
unknown dead and the parades for the soldiers who should have
known better. And while it remains, it stays a problem, or to be more
precise, the remains of Vietnam are problematic. What is left of the
war, its fragments and its ruins, stays unrepressible and endlessly
recuperable. The many mutations mark not merely the continuing
effort to misrepresent what has been lost as merely missing and pos-
sibly recoverable; they also mark the failure of our modes of cultural
representation. None of the transformations satisfy. The illusion, so
necessary to particular values, fails. Vietnam succeeds in challenging
and foiling the ideological apparatus's modes of production. These
ruins and fragments of Vietnam - these mutable, protean images -
compose a history of recuperation that signifies not only our desperate
desire to win the lost war, to conquer and possess it, to make it our own
property, as Benjamin suggests, but also Vietnam's continuing libera-
tion. Our fetishized desire to win defeats us. With each imagined suc-
cess, we only picture our loss.
II
At first America took her loss on the chin, recovering with the slogan
- "peace with honor." And as we watched the P.O.W.s emerge from
the plane in 1973, no one even noticed that America had lost her first
war. Like the P.O.W.s, the country was released, and the release sig-
nified an end, not a loss. The country, war weary, like the returning vets
and P.O.W. s, needed to heal its wounds and forget the trauma - or so
the official and popular rhetoric ran. For the national health and wel-
fare, Vietnam and its effects, the war and its remains, were to be decently
repressed and forgotten, buried like the $300 aluminum coffins.5
5. For a sense of this rhetoric see the various articles in Time; e.g., "The Anatomy of
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96 Rick Berg
At this time, and it seems peculiar now, the war's loss was marked by
its absence from the marketplace. Vietnam was gone. It was unavail-
able in either of the two contending clearing-houses of information
neither the academy nor the culture industry, neither pedagogues nor
producers, classrooms nor TV recalled Vietnam. Whether because of
lack of commitment on the part of the culture industry or because of a
sense of "good taste" on the part of the academy, information about
Vietnam prior to 1980 was spotty. What had been all too present,
almost omnipresent, seemed to disappear. Vietnam's apparent ab-
sence from both markets, the sign of its end, became a simulacrum of
its loss.
For years homes all over the country had been flooded with scenes
from Vietnam.6 TV News shows like ABC Scope, NBC's Vietnam Weekly
Review, and CBS's Vietnam Perspective brought the war home.7 It rushed
into living rooms. But wars in the living room are not unusual. WW II
had been a radio war,8 and like radio TV brought the war home, but
unlike radio it did not so much report the war or even dramatize it
rather, TV witnessed the event actually happening. The family at home
watched the front (not altogether a negligible, geographic metaphor
since it displays our desire to map the war even as we blocked and sub-
divided the country) and witnessed the fire-fights. Parents had the
pleasure of seeing their children or the children of others blown away
right before the weather and just after the sports round-up (or so we
who were fighting the war often imagined this grotesque evening
ritual). The family had what appeared to be an intimate acquaintance
with Vietnam, even though the correspondent's reportage (which
would change during the course of the war) mediated it all.
But what the viewer saw on the nightly news only passed itself off as
direct and objective, and therefore, by the logic of association, un-
mediated and real. The medium of television journalism, with its
quality of self-effacement, created an illusion of reality (an illusion so
a Debacle," Time, 14 April 1975, 16-19; "How Americans Should Feel," Time, 14 April
1975, 27; or "Fed Up and Turned Off," Time, 14 April 1975, 22.
6. MichaelJ. Arlen, The Living Room War(NewYork: Penguin Books, 1982), and The
View From Highway 1: Essays on Television (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1976).
7. Charles Montgomery Hammond, Jr., The Image Decade: Television Documentary:
1965-1975 (New York: Hasting House, 1981), passim.
8. J. Fred McDonald, Don't Touch That Dial: Radio Programming In American Life, 1920-
1960 (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979).
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Losing Vietnam 97
9. v. Steve Bognar, "The Omnipresent Eye: Television News and Special Bulletin,"
Filament 4: 28-46. Also cf J.G. Ballard's short story "Theatre of War," Myths of the Near
Future (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), 118-140.
10. I should make it clear that what I am calling the cinema verite style is a combina-
tion of direct cinema and cinema verite. Direct cinema is that of the observer-
documentarist; it is a form of documentarv. The "direct cinema documentarist took
his camera to a situation of tension .. .; he aspired to invisibility and played the role of
uninvolved bystander." Direct cinema found its truth in events available to the cam-
era. However, one of the problems hanging over the observer-documentarist was the
extent to which the presence of the camera influenced events before it. Therefore prac-
titioners of cinema verite' in France "maintained that the presence of the camera made
people act in ways truer to their nature than might otherwise be the case." Thus thev
acknowleged the impact of the camera, but instead of considering it a liability, they
looked on it as a "valuable catalytic agent, a revealer of inner truth." Erik Barnouw,
Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film (London: Oxford, 1974), 229-262.
11. "Except for rare instances, what is seen on network news is not the event itself
unfolding before the live camera, or even a filmed record, but a story about the event
reconstructed on film selected from fragments from it.... Despite the hackneyed
maxim that television news 'tells it like it is,' presenting events exactly as they occur
does not fit in with the requisites of network news .... A former Saigon bureau chief
pointed out that 'it is considered standard operating procedure for troops to fire their
weapons for the benefit of cameramen. If our cameramen had to wait until a fire fight
with the Viet Cong broke out, we'd have less footage - and perhaps cameramen."
Edward Jay Epstein, News From Nowhere (New York: Random House, 1973), 152-
158.
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98 Rick Berg
Vietnam, however, made a brief return on April 29, 1975 when the
three networks aired Vietnam: A War That Is Finished, Special Report: Seven
Thousand, Three Hundred Eighty-Two Days in Vietnam, and Vietnam: Lessons
Learned, Prices Paid. They were received, however, as interesting, but
unwarranted interruptions.
In 1985, the crews returned. Ted Koppel, perched on a balcony
overlooking Ho Chi Minh City, attempted to interview Le Duc Tho.
The TV cameras watched the troops parade down a major thorough-
fare, and newscasters, those insipid heroes of Vietnam, continued to
exploit the Vietnamese. Between commericals, television even touted
its own technological achievements, showing the viewer how it was
receiving a direct and immediate image from Vietnam via the miracle
of satellites, while also showing those who were looking how television
was again selling itself as an unmediated, therefore objective, window
onto the world. Not many troubled to look, least of all newsmen.
Nor did it seem to trouble newscasters, during most of the ten year
anniversary news specials, that, although there seemed to be a major
revision of the history of the war, the war we saw "beneath" all those
omniscient "voice-overs" was the same war we had always seen. The
same nameless man was summarily executed on the same nameless
street in Saigon. The same nameless bodies were dragged by their heels
from the Embassy, and the same nameless Marines fought in the
streets of Hue. Although the words of the faceless narrators declared a
new understanding, it was obviously one that had little to do with how
the cameras saw and defined the war. According to TVs revisions, the
correspondents might have misunderstood the war, but they under-
stood brilliantly the nature of representations. In the process, TV dis-
played yet another forgotten lesson, learned by Michael Herr, who like
other journalists had gone to Nam to "watch": "you were as respon-
sible for everything you saw as you were for everything you did.""2
III
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Losing Vietnam 99
(1980) and Friendly Fire (1979)13 were made for TV and aired, but
network shows concerning Vietnam have been scarce. In 1985, for
example, CBS spent a million dollars attempting to turn Anthony
Grey's Saigon into a miniseries before they cancelled the project, just as
the networks toyed with projects for sit-coms in the early 80s. But little
came of them: Nam is still an anathema.
During the war, programs like Combat, The Rat Patrol, Garrison's Gorillas,
and Gomer Pyle, U.S.M. C., plus the usual fare of World War II flicks, aire
nightly. Only such a rare exception as The Final War ofOllie Winter ( 196
dared compete with the nightly news version of the war in Vietnam,
and it flopped.14 TV, then, took a lesson from Hollywood. Instead o
airing Nam directly, it pictured Vietnam by representing the veteran.
For instance, in 1969 ABC aired the TV film The Ballad ofAndy Crocker,1
a story about a returning vet who discovers that the "World" has
changed. The film was unpretentious but unusual. Unlike the P.O.W
(Martin Landau) in Welcome HomeJohnny Bristol (197 1) or the three crip
pled veterans in Beg, Borrow, or Steal (1974), who pull off the perfect heist,
Andy Crocker was neither psychotic nor criminal, merely alienate
and marginalized.
For a number of years that was the TV vet. Like his film counterpart
he would play a strung-out, criminal psychotic who could go off at the
sound of a backfire. During the 1974 TV season, for instance, the ve
was seen as a hired killer on Colombo, as a drug-dealing sadistic mur
derer on Mannix, as a suspected, yet innocent murderer on The Streets o
San Francisco, as a shakedown artist on Cannon, and as "a returned hero,
who "blew up himself, his father and a narcotics lab," on Hawaii Five-
0.16 In each instance, the vet threatens law and order, with a criminality
founded on his tour in Nam. Some time would elapse before interven-
ing veterans groups persuaded TV to stop confusing the veteran with
the war; even as the more offensive aspects were muted in the media,
13. Michael J. Arlen, "Surprised in Iowa, Surprised in Nam," The Camera Age:
Essays on Television (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981), 96.
14. MichaelJ. Arlen, "The Networks Continue to Give Us What We Really Want.
We Are Immeasurably Grateful & Utter Little Cries of Help," TheLivingRoom War (New
York: Penguin Books, 1982), 40-45.
15. Tony Lawrence, "Television Review," Daily Variety, 18 Nov. 1969, 29.
16. R. Brewin, "TVs Newest Villain: The Vietnam Veteran," TV Guide, 19 July
1975, 4; Julian Smith, Looking Away: Hollywood and Vietnam (New York: Charles Scrib-
ner's & Sons, 1975), 164.
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100 Rick Berg
the character of the Vietnam vet had been drawn and determined.
Where the early Seventies had depicted him - never her - as a ma
threat to law and order, the late Seventies turned him into an alway
irreverent, slightly crazed, eccentric who was subject to the occasional
flashback. The professional soldiers of a film like Welcome Home, Soldier
Boys (1971), who massacred the town of Hope, New Mexico, became
theA-Team. Now the TV vet works either as a cop, a private eye or, in th
case of Lou Grant, as a photographer for a large metropolitan news
paper, where disguised as the mild-mannered "Animal," he photo
graphs the "World." The former object of representation has becom
the representer. Simon and Simon can even turn the original crazed ve
stereotype into a plot device: the "Phantom" vandalizing an America
theme park is not a demented vet carrying out a psychotic vendett
against his old commanding officer; on the contrary, the phantom vet
has so-calledgood reasons for destroying the park. The criminal threat t
law and order of the early Seventies has become, by the early Eighties, a
vigilante hero, a true "Victor" Charlie, committed to truth and justice.
By the late Seventies, TVs attitude toward Nam had waffled. The
networks even considered projects for sit-coms. 7 MTM developed The
Bureau18 for CBS, which had been interested in an earlier project, Mik
Freit. 9 NBC developed The 6:00 Follies, and ABC tried with Bringing It
Home, which went nowhere, and again with Fly Away Home, whic
ended as a summer movie.20 These projects have a number of simi-
larities. With one exception, The 416, "a comedy pilot about a group of
misfit reserves called to active duty in Vietnam," none dealtwith troop
fighting the war.21 When it came time to find a pilot for a Vietnam sit
com, TV turned, in narcissistic fashion, to the makers of the living room
war. Most of the pilots included not only a major black character (Mike
Freit and The 6:00 Follies) but several photo-journalists (Mike Freit and Fl
Away Home) or news service reporters who were "a conduit for getting
17. Todd Gitlin, Inside Prime Time (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 223-243.
18. Howard Rosenberg, "Merging Comedv With Vietnam," Los Angeles Times, 11
Jan. 1980, pt. 4.
19. Howard Rosenberg, "Mike Freit: The Saga of a Failed Concept," Los Angeles
Times, 3 March 1980, pt. 6.
20. Marvin Kitman, "Fly Away Home, A Story That Won't Quit," Daily Variety, 24
Sept. 1981, 23.
21. Howard Rosenberg, "Mixing HumorWith Vietnam,"LosAngeles Times, 1 lJan
1980, pt. 4.
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Losing Vietnam 101
the word out." What doctors had done for Korea, journalists would do
for Vietnam - display the unvarnished, liberal truth.
But the initial paradox, the ground for all ofM*A "*SH's liberal out-
rage, is not present. It is one thing to be a doctor in the service of the
military since saving lives and taking them are at odds, but it is another
thing to be a correspondent in the service of a war, where newsmen
made reputations reporting that truth had become the "first casualty."
For instance, the central character in the pilotFly Away Home, Carl Dan-
ton (Bruce Boxleitner), a newsreel cameraman, is told: "Forget the big
picture. We're into miniatures. Combat footage is a cinch for the 6
o'clock news."22 Besides the obvious reference to TV's displacement of
film (big picture by miniatures) or even the implied critique of military
propaganda, "The Big Picture," there is also a recognition that TV
news produced a vision of the Vietnam War. Once TV began to repre-
sent what was being reported in Vietnam as untrue, the stereotype of
the committed war correspondent began to unravel.
But for all their failures, these shows offer an insight into TVs
understanding of its relation to Vietnam and its participation in the
war. In these shows, we see TV defining its own flaws, creating its own
dimensions, signifying its own place in history, willing to picture itself
as a technology of production, but not as a site of distribution, or an
intrusion into living rooms where participants become passive viewers
and eye-witnesses. The 6:00 Follies, for instance, a sit-com about the
Armed Forces TV network in Saigon, is about television watching itself.
It is TV seeing itself covering Vietnam and being covered by the war.
According to the show's writers: "The characters oppose the war, but
their opportunities to express that opposition on the air are limited.
They're generally confined to reporting the Army point of view, even
when they know the truth. They do manage to get off a word now and
then but generally their conduit for getting the truth out will be a news
service reporter."23 In this case, TV pictures itself as a maligned and
manipulated technology sending out a version of the war, but not to
some estranged public back "in the world," fixed by TVs evil eye and
turned into voyeurs, but to those "in country." The misinformed
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102 Rick Berg
IV
24. At this point it is worth noting a number of other documentaries; the war it
seems was fought not only with bombs and booby traps but documentaries as well. In
1954 Roman Karmin filmed Vietnam; the NLF did Hun Tho Speaks to The American People
(1965) and The Way to the Front (1969). The North Vietnamese did Some Evidence (1969).
The Cuban director Santiago Alvarez did Hanoi, Tuesday the 13th (1967), 79 Springtimes
(1969), and Laos: The Forgotten War (1967). Another Cuban director, Julio Garcia
Espinosa, did Third World Third World War (1970). Two East German documentaries
were TheJob and Pilots in Pyjamas. Others werejoris Ivens's 1 7th Parallel (1967), Poland's
Fire (1968) directed by Andrzej Brzozowski, Canada's Sad Song of Yellow Skin ( 1970) and
the Syrian film Napalm (1970). For a more complete discussion of these films v. Barnouw,
Documentary, 268-281.
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Losing Vietnam 103
fictional P.O. W (1973) used a documentary style. Still others, likeA Face
of War (1967) and Hearts and Minds (1975), revealed televisions's in-
fluence because they insisted on documenting the real war, the one
seen on TV, whether it was the big picture - the history of American
involvement in Vietnam - or the day to day grind of a Marine grunt
company.
But, unlike the nightly news, A Face of War (1967) and Hearts and Minds
(1975) unwittingly reveal the devices of their intervention. The anthro-
pomorphism of their titles, for example, signals their mediation. What
we see more clearly here than on TV is how the directors, Jones and
Davis, desired the war to look (as if the war had looks, or could ever be an
object of sight). And it was to look like TV. For example, Hearts and
Minds, unlike In The Year of the Pig (1969), or Nick MacDonald's The
Liberal War (1972),25 contextualizes Vietnam not only within TVs pur-
view, but also within a sentimental understanding of American his-
tory. It finds the failures in the brightest and the best, as well as in
certain cultural predilections - in our "hearts and minds," as it were.
The film never suggests that the best and the brightest are hardly separ-
able from the failures and the predilections. Men make history out of
conditions they inherit, and often the conditions are as responsible for
the men as the men are for the failures. Hence a simple changing of
men's minds or hearts, as the film suggests, does not insure success.
This absence of an historical understanding from a film wedded to the
lessons of history is troubling especially when the film ends worrying
the question - will the lessons of Vietnam be recalled in the future?
The future has proven that they have not. As an historical document,
an ideological product, not simply an historical documentary, Hearts
and Minds records some of the reasons why. Witness the film's final
minutes. It ends several seconds after the credits roll over a parade: the
state triumphs - its forces are marshalled and its power flaunted -
children in uniform, Uncle Sam in red, white, and blue all go up the
road; viewers cheer. During this triumph, an incident occurs: some
people on the sidelines are demonstrating - the crowd jeers, paraders
flip off the demonstrators, and the cops roust the protestors by busting
heads. At the film's end, after the credits, we discover that a veterans
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104 Rick Berg
group was protesting forjobs. We see the forces of the state win back
the war by beating back the losers. Vietnam's counter-memory is
marginalized (which oral narratives like Nam and Bloods will later
recover) as the state obscures the "voice" of those who fought in the
war.
26. v. David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today (New York:
Doubleday, 1975), 29-49.
27. Herr, Dispatches, 69.
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Losing Vietnam 105
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106 Rick Berg
Hence Hollywood did and did not look away from the war in Viet-
nam. For Hollywood, Vietnam - both the country and the war -
seemed to be just off-screen, at the edge and on the frontier, always
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Losing Vietnam 107
29. v. Julian Smith Looking Away: Hollywood and Vietnam (New York: Charles Scrib-
ner's and Sons, 1975) and Gilbert Adair, Vietnam on Film (New York: Proteus Publish-
ing, 1981).
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108 Rick Berg
would follow The Green Berets, Apocalypse Now, and Rambo, he arrived
with a mission and a definite goal in mind: he sets out on a patrol to res-
cue his brother.
Regardless of the changes, then, Hollywood continued to imagine
and still remembers our involvement in Vietnam according to a par-
ticular paradigm - the patrol with a definite mission. Hence it imag-
ined the conflict occurring not in a particular place or landscape with a
particular population, history and politics, but in a cinematic frame
with a beginning and an end. The patrol mounts up at some safe origin
and proceeds through enemy territory until it reaches its goal: some-
times a rescue mission, often a surprise attack on an unsuspecting
enemy. Vietnam, for Hollywood and hence for us, became something
to walk through.
Samuel Fuller's China Gate (1957) has a patrol with a mission and an
object: blow up the Commie ammunition dump at China Gate. It also
has Communists with barely repressible sexual habits, an inter-
national French unit, and a small native child and his puppy seeking
refuge with the military. It even has a political endorsement disguised
as a history lesson. China Gate opens with documentary footage of
peasants working in rice fields. A voice-over tells us: "This motion pic-
ture is dedicated to France. More than three hundred years ago,
French missionaries were sent to Indochina to teach love of God and
love of fellow man. Gradually French influence took shape in the Viet-
namese land. Despite many hardships, they advanced their way of liv-
ing and the thriving nation became the rice bowl of Asia." Then we are
told that this prosperous country is now under attack by Moscow's
puppet, Ho Chi Minh. The rest of the film follows the politics of this
opening lesson. Vietnam, like Korea, is a state under seige, where pro-
fessional soldiers like the Americans Brock (Gene Barry) and Goldie
(Nat "King" Cole) go to continue their fight against Communism.
China Gate also has awoman: Lia, or"Lucky Legs" (Angie Dickinson)
as the French call her, is a half-caste hustler with a child, son of the
American Brock. Both she and the boy are caught in the struggle. She
wants the boy to go to America, because she doesn't want him "killed,
carryingagun atfifteen, orbecoming a communist." In order to assure
his safe passage, she agrees to lead a patrol of French Legionnaires to
China Gate, the hidden ammunition dump. Part Asian, part Occi-
dental, Lucky Legs can "pass," and she does so easily, moving through
the two worlds of French occupied towns and Communist fortresses.
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Losing Vietnam 109
On the one hand, she is Lia, wife and mother; on the other, she is
"Lucky Legs," object of desire, signified by particular parts of her
body. She is not the dependent she ought to be. Too often she is pic-
tured as resourceful, independent, and intelligent - walking point
and leading the patrol. As her American husband Brock had dis-
covered, she looked one way but turned out to be another - Lucky
Legs is dangerous. Like the young Vietnamese girl in Go Tell the Spartans
(1978), she is the monstrous unknown other whose looks tell us noth-
ing more than looks deceive.
Not a complimentary picture of Vietnamese women, "Lucky Legs"
is a half-caste whore, with intelligence and a willed independence; but
considering the history of women in Vietnam films, Lia is unusual30
since she anticipates not our continued misunderstanding of the Viet-
namese but the signs of our misunderstanding. On the one hand, she is
both the object and the subject of sight; on the other, she is the site of its
ambivalence. Lucky Legs undermines epistemology's tropes of sight.
Through her we learn not to trust what we see while we learn to look at
the seen and our ways of seeing.
She teaches us, then, how to read the film, for what we see is not what
we get. In one scene, the patrol must pass a Moi village, friendly to the
communists. Lucky Legs will lead them through. She enters the ville
while the patrol waits. In their last ambush the Moi have captured a
phonograph along with a record of La Marseillaise. She asks the Moi
chief if he knows what he is playing; he says he does not, but that it
makes him feel good. He asks, "What is it?" "The song of the people," she
replies. While the patrol passes in the night Lucky Legs, standing on a
platform beneath pictures of Mao, Stalin, and Ho, leads the villagers in
the song of the people. The pictured three would no doubt be pleased
with the ambiguity.
Almost ten years later John Wayne with the same politics, yet with
less assurance and ambiguity, will tell the same story in The Green Berets.
One of the two episodes in the film uses a woman as lure and a VC
General as the object of the hunt. The story, an odd coda, is tagged
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110 Rick Berg
Like its sign, the green beret, which the Vietnamese always associated
with the French, the film flaunts the marks of its own breakdow
Hence its ultimate success. What in essence failed was the viewer, n
the ideological apparatus, for the film itself calls attention to the mean
of its making.
The Green Berets is nothing if not a lecture on the failings of represe
tations and the necessity of "seeing for oneself." From the openin
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Losing Vietnam 111
scene at Fort Bragg, when the squad marches on to instruct the audi-
ence on the "capabilities of the Green Beret," to the briefing scene that
follows, the film insists upon the primacy of sight and the authority of
experience. Col. Kirby John Wayne) tells Beckworth (David Janssen)
on at least two occasions that one cannot really understand Vietnam or
know the war until one sees it. What the film represents and teaches
for, after all, it is only a long lecture - is that the war can be seen
(although what can be seen is left off the screen) and we can know noth-
ing until we see it for ourselves. Seeing is knowing. The Green Berets
claims to tell us, then, that representations are fraudulent, even as it
requires us to look at it as a representation. The film sacrifices its own
validity for its belief in the primacy of experience, and ends by rep-
resenting the "failure of the fantasy-making apparatus."
With the failure (or success) of The Green Berets, the search for knowl-
edge supplants the earlier films' assured sense of a mission. The earlier
films had a direct goal in mind. They knew where they were headed,
and what they wanted. The later films do not even know where they are,
much less why they are. After Wayne's folly, the films become epis-
temological dramas. Each attempts to find a means for knowing and
understanding the war. The Boys in Company C (1978), Go Tell The Spartans
(1978), and Apocalypse Now (1979) all turn, each in its own way, on the
notion of war as an arena of maturation and education, a place where
boys become men, and a realm where lessons are learned, surely in
contradiction with the first lesson learned in war: many boys never
mature into anything other than dead souls. From the imperative of
Ted Post's title (Go Tell The Spartans) to the voice over monologue that
begins The Boys of Company C, the films seem determined to inform and
instruct the audience. But all they tell us, all they can teach is that the
tropes of epistemology fail. Seeing is not knowing. The inexplicable
grunt tic, "there it is," sums up all that is seen and known. Like the
enemy, the war in Vietnam dissipates as an object of sight. It is lost to
the eye, even as our films assert the authority of the eye-witness. Even
in Apocalypse Now, where the war becomes spectacle and the warrior
both voyeur and voyager (hence a metonymy for the camera), there is
nothing in sight but the end. In grand operatic terms complete with the
appropriate apocalyptic tone, we witness the twilight of the idols of
sight.
Ted Post's Go Tell The Spartans (1978) does the same thing less preten-
tiously. Nothing in this film remains unquestioned, unexamined, or
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112 Rick Berg
33. William J. Palmer, "Go Tell The Spartans: The Forgotten Vietnam Film," un-
published paper.
34. cf Guy Hennebelle, "Le Cinema Vietnamien," Ecran 73; and Peter Gessner,
"Films from the Vietcong," The Nation, 24 Jan. 1966, 110-111.
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Losing Vietnam 113
Thus we often leave the films of the war in Vietnam as Willard (Mar-
tin Sheen) leaves the besieged bridge in Apocalypse Now, refusing to hear
or understand. As Willard moves through the trenches, he keeps ask-
ing if anyone knows who is in charge. No one answers. But at the end,
immediately after Roach, the black grenadier, knocks out the noisy but
unseen VC, Willard asks, "Do you know who is in charge?" "Yes,"
Roach answers, then sits down.
The answers have always been lucid, but never clear.
VI
At the end of Go Tell the Spartans, Courcey looks at the wounded VC,
his secret sharer, in the treeline and says "I'm going home, Charlie."
He turns his back on his other and drags his wounded leg off the
screen. After the defeat of The Green Berets, Hollywood, like Courcey,
returned home. Filmmakers moved the war and relocated it in a more
tractable environment. Since the usual mode for producing the war -
documentary as similacrum - was restrictive at best, the ever resource-
ful image makers found another means of(re)presenting the war to the
Americans. As the war continued to escalate, Hollywood discovered
the returning vet, and this synecdoche became the major means of re-
producing the war. The Vietnam vet came to stand for the prejudices
and contradictions that the home folks had about the war, for, after all,
the essential quality of the veteran is that he has internalized the war
and with a stiff upper lip carries it around with him. Thus Hollywood
could take the notion of the returning vet and fill it with the country's
sense ofVietnam. In this way, it freed itself from making pictures about
the war that only reproduced what TV had already shown, while it
maintained the essential characteristic of both the war film and TV
journalism - the eye-witness.
By displacing the war and locating it in the veteran, however, these
films eventually took a peculiar turn. For unlike such films as The Be
Years of Our Lives (1946) or 'Til the End of Time (1946), which imply th
violence is merely part of the returning vet's readjustment perio
films about returning vets made in the late Sixties and early Seventie
share a dominant structural feature: "In each case, he [the vet] is
catalyst for violence if not violent himself."35 Although films like I'll b
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114 Rick Berg
36. Abraham Polonsky, "The Case of David Smith: A Script by Abraham Polonsky,"
Hollywood Quarterly 1 (1945-1946): 185-195.
37. cf. Franklin Fearing, "Warriors Return: Normal or Neurotic?" Hollywood Quar-
terly 1 (1945-1946): 97-109.
38. Smith, 160.
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Losing Vietnam 115
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116 Rick Berg
partners. Even Texas is too small. When the Cadillac throws a rod, they
are confronted with not only the customary dishonest mechanic but a
possible barroom brawl with some World War II vets, who insist that
these veterans were not fighting a war but "just killing civilians."
Finally out of money and gas, the four erupt into violence. Working as a
whole unit with an inexplicable language of their own, they destroy the
town of Hope, New Mexico and massacre its 81 citizens with a pro-
fessional elan that underscores their alienation as it highlights their
camaraderie. Their potential for violence grows with their awareness
of their alienation, usually the mark of education in war films. In a final
shot that obviously alludes to the Kent State massacres, the vets con-
front the National Guard, gas-masked, weapons at the ready. The four
veterans from Vietnam die in black-and-white slow-motion, killed on
the street of a Western town. John Wayne's and John Ford's Western
vision of Nam has come home.
The vet, by 1972, has become the V(i)et Cong. No longer just an
ominous threat and rapist, his potential for destruction and mayhem is
fully realized. Vietnam's veterans have become indistinguishable from
the outlaw bikers of The Born Losers. But what the vet has become is hard-
ly of his own making. In Welcome Home Soldier Boys, one "waitress" tells
Danny Joe Don Baker): "You are what you do." And this film elabor-
ates, like others, on the spectator's view. For the viewer, the vet has
become what he has done. (The ambiguity of the pronoun is in order
but often goes unnoticed.) According to the viewer, their tour has
drawn a line between them and their culture. The Vietnam veteran has
become a transient loser, a marginal, who has toured Hell and re-
turned, not wiser or maturer but as a threat to the American dream.
Always a killer, the vet is seen as one who is infected spiritually and
mentally - never politically - by the senseless genocide in Vietnam,
the continuing murder of women and children. In a war of contain-
ment, he has failed and is contaminated. He is now part of the pro-
blem, a carrier who must be sterilized:
The stewardess comes through the [airplane] cabin, spray-
ing a mist of invisible sterility into the pressurized, scrub-
bed, filtered temperature-controlled air, killing the mos-
quitoes and unknown diseases, protecting herself and
America from Asian evils, cleansing us all forever.39
39. Tim O'Brien, IfI Die In A Combat Zone Box Me Up And Ship Me Home (New York:
Dell, 1979), 203.
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Losing Vietnam 117
40. v. John Kerry et al., The New Soldier (New York: Macmillan, 1971).
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118 Rick Berg
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Losing Vietnam 119
The Deer Hunter (1978) was released the same year as Coming Home,
and both came up for an Academy Award. There was an immediate
controversy. In his syndicated editoral, Peter Arnett compared the
two, calling the latter "an honest attempt to come to terms with the war
in Vietnam," while he called the Deer Hunter "Fascist trash," another
fraudulent Hollywood view of Vietnam that he feared the public was
"interpreting as a deep historical truth."44 The point of the controversy
was clear: one of the two competing films was to be understood as the
"proper" view of Vietnam, because it was approved by Vietnam's
foremost war correspondent; the other was to be disregarded on
account of its apparent politics and propaganda. Like John Wayne,
Arnett condemned one point of view and sanctified the other based
upon what he had seen "in country." Hence The Deer Hunter was dis-
honest, because neither Vietnam nor the Vietnamese "looked" that
way, at least to a liberal reporter.
But what Arnett failed to comment on in his defense of the Viet-
namese was that this film was less about Vietnam and more about the
American community that fought the war. The Deer Hunter was a new
twist in the history of Vietnam films. No one prior to Cimino had
bothered to look at the community that fought the war, just as no one
had troubled to look at the effects the war had on that community.
Admittedly, Cimino's is a vulgar vision, neither idyllic nor middle
class, and founded on a particular reading of American working class
literature. It begins, for instance, like Upton Sinclair's TheJungle, with a
wedding and a reception. Like Sinclair's butchers or Dahlberg's bot-
tomdogs, Cimino's steel workers are brutal, often racist, always sexist,
and rooted in the myths of America and its past. Like Tressall's ragged
philanthropists, who suffer because they cannot see that they are starv-
ing because they are giving away their livelihood, Cimino's workers
unwittingly bear the contradictions of their class rather than fulfilling
its potential. They are hardly class-conscious. They come from a parti-
cular community fraught with contradictions, at a particular time with
a peculiar history, where the desired "unpalatable data relating to the
subjective consciousness of the characters and the objective lines of
force acting on and within the community [which] would insist on
expression" can only be expressed by the viewer, not the viewed.45
44. Peter Arnett, "Vietnam's Last Atrocity" Los Angeles Times, 4 April 1979, sec. 6.
45. Andrew Britten, "Sideshows: Hollywood in Vietnam," Movie 27/28 (Winter
1980/Spring 1981): 2-23.
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120 Rick Berg
VII
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Losing Vietnam 121
and receives his reward: one thousand silver dollars. A gang of thieves
looking for the money feeds the obstinate Charlie's hand to the gar-
bage disposal and kills his wife and son. When Charlie recovers, he sets
out with his groupie to hunt down the killers. He finds them in a
whorehouse south of the border. With another POW, he infiltrates the
house and wreaks havoc on house, gang and hookers. In First Blood
(1983), John Rambo (Sylvester Stallone), long out of the service, re-
turns to a small town after its sheriff has escorted him out. The sheriff
arrests him for vagrancy, and the deputies brutalize him. As Charlie
Ranes did before him, Rambo flashes back to his wartime experience
as a tortured POW. Crazed, he jumps jail and heads for the woods,
where he wreaks havoc on the posse. By the end of the film, Rambo has
destroyed most of the downtown real estate and returns to the waiting
arms of his one-time commander, who just happens to betray him at
least twice before the film ends.
By 1984, then, Charlie is no longer the enemy, or just a perfume or
even a tuna; like the character in the film Charly (1968), he has suffered a
sea change. He is now the veteran gone from bone-dumb grunt to
super-guerilla. The Vietnam veteran of the Eighties, unlike his earlier
incarnations, is a retired, barely re(s)trained, mostly misunderstood,
asexual, Green Beret hero occasionally called Charlie. No longer the
enemy of Welcome Home, Soldier Boys or the ominous rapists of The
Visitors, the vet has come home and is now recognized for what he is:
the long suffering hero apotheosized into Victor Charlie, complete
with politics. The secret sharer of films likeApocalypse Now and Go Tell the
Spartans has emerged, not as an other but as an emanation of the combat
vet. In good shaman fashion, we have stolen, if not the magic of our
enemy, at least his signs.
TakeJohn Rambo. In First Blood, after his escape from jail, he runs
off to the forest, Indian country, where, almost always unseen, he leads
the posse a merry chase. In the sequel, Rambo (1 985), he is again sprung
from jail and is returned to Nam with his bow and arrows. The Indian
(like BillyJack, Rambo is both a Green Beret and part Native Ameri-
can) is returned to "Indian country," the legendary bad bush where
Charlie, in all his invisibility once ran free, and where he again, dis-
guised asJohn Rambo, will wreak destruction, only this time on Soviet
troops. And we will know him by these signs: first - sweat ("no sweat"
is the sign of a bygone era). Today the "good guys" sweat, but back in
1957 when Fuller sent LuckyLegs and her patrol up river, the only peo-
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122 Rick Berg
pie who looked at all as if they were sweating were the crude Commies.
Rambo, however, sweats throughout the film. Second - camouflage:
as all the major texts admit, Charlie was invisible, could not be seen,
turned the ground against us - "Forget the Cong, the trees could kill
you, the elephant grass grew up homicidal, the ground you were walk-
ing over possessed malignant intelligence, your whole environment
was a bath."46 Who can forget our American poet, Rambo, running
free in the American forest or rising up out of the Vietnamese mud or
coming out of the bark of a tree, and not marvel at how literal he
has become?
In these recent twists on Vietnam, we imagine the vet as fully
(re)covered, re(s)trained, and returned to his rightful place, where he
will continue to run through the jungle looking for what America lost
He will continue to fight until he gets it right. The vet of the Vietna
war, now almost ageless, yet well-developed, returns to Nam to re
trieve his lost buddies and our lost honor and return them to the
United States. What we see in films like Missing In Action, Rambo,
Uncommon Valor (as well as Red Dawn [1983], another Vietnam variati
except only well trained American high-school football players
the VC) is not merely the same old marginal vet, unable to make it
America, exiled and returned to Nam where he is "really himse
These films dramatize the mechanisms of our cultural repressi
What is presented is our cultural obsession with "returning."
In the late Sixties we silenced Vietnam, in the Seventies we defend
ourselves from it, and in the mid Eighties we return to it, or it return
us. Like the character in Cease Fire (1985), the country is sufferi
collective flashback. In films like Rambo and Streamers (1984), we ag
prepare for it, (and if Paul Mazursky fulfills his option onJoyride,
will, in the future, return to Nam from the West on bicycles). In oth
like The Killing Fields (1984) and Search and Destroy, our past, in the f
of Southeast Asians, hunts us up.
By 1984, Hollywood has recuperated the veteran, Vietnam, and
war. Like other systems of representation, it has traced its own pro
of recovery. The Stuntman (1982), one of those Hollywood produ
compromising Brechtian self-consciousness, represents how the Drea
Factory recovered both the war and the veteran. In short, we see a f
not merely about film making, but one that displays the fanta
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Losing Vietnam 123
making apparatus. Vietnam will be revised, hence lost and won, be-
cause it will be remade, The Stuntman says, in the image of an older war.
From the beginning when Cameron (Steve Riseback, the actor who
played the brooding rapist in the Visitors) escapes from the cops, until
he confesses his crime to his lover in terms of the usual cinematic
cliches, we see the already established image of the Viet vet. But this
film is a variation, for the vet finds himself in a movie, one about World
War I. To hide from the police, he becomes a blond stuntman, some-
one who not only does other people's dirty work but someone who as
another's double is invisible while he is translated into a body of work.
The irreality of film will capture the alienated vet and his war, translat-
ing him and it into something else, something hardly recognizable,
hardly himself, merely a "blond" shadow warrior, standing in not only
for an actor but also the image of a warrior. No longer alienated, he will
come to stand for our culture's desires and foibles.
An entire history and counter-memory, however, is lost in such a
translation. In 1966 the Puerto Rican artist, Jaime Carrero wrote the
play, Flag Inside.47 It is about a Puerto Rican family and the death of a
son in Vietnam. In the beginning, the family receives word that the cas-
ket will be returned. They prepare a space at home. Around this space
marking the family's loss, the drama takes place. For me, this play
seems paradigmatic of the discourse I have tried to map, as well as the
problems that the discourse as a whole presents. Formally, for ex-
ample, the play fuels any number of interests, everything from the
Heideggerian notion of the metaphysical presence of absence to the
deconstructionist recognition that the breathing in and out of presence
and absence is less important than the play it seems to generate - the
permutations and changes that take place as the discourse attempts to
mute the unavoidable lacuna. But finally the drama's absence from
Nam discourse is itself significant because it represents what has been
lost. With rare exceptions, Vietnam has not been presented as an
aspect of working-class life. It is seldom seem as an experiential and
historical fact in the lives of many working-class and ethnic families. It
is hardly an innocent oversight that the working-class gave up the most
soldiers to the war.
This is not to say that there are no alternative discourses. Far from it.
47. Jaime Carrero, Flag Inside, in Teatro: Flag Inside, Capitan F4C, El Caballo, Pipo Sub-
way No Sabe Reir (Rio Piedras: Ediciones Puerto, 1973), 7-55.
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124 Rick Berg
48. "A dramatic story set in the period of the Vietnam War. An American soldier is
stranded in the jungle with a Vietnamese woman who buries the dead," Program
Notes, 1983 Asian American International Film Festival.
49. Haile Gerima, Ashes and Embers, A Mypheduh Films, Inc. Release, 1982.
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Losing Vietnam 125
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