Territorial Disputes in Spratly:

An Assessment of the Philippine

Initiatives

by

Colonel Franco Nemesio M. Gacal

Philippine Army

United States Army War College

Class of 13-03-2013

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14. ABSTRACT
The South China Sea is the subject of conflicting territorial claims among China, Philippines, Vietnam,
Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. While most past confrontations among the claimants took place in words,
recent events indicate that acts, and even military standoffs, are taking centre stage in the South China
Sea territorial disputes. This dangerous development has caused diplomatic rows among claimant
countries. The most-concerned factor is by all means a rising and more assertive China. Unfortunately, the
Philippines is perhaps the first to stand test of China’s massive claims in the South China Sea. Given the
emerging regional security environment in the South China Sea, there is a need for the Philippines to
assess its initiatives on how it is dealing with the maritime dispute in order to make logical and intelligent
recommendations and actions that will gain the respect of the other claimants, contribute to maintaining
peace and regional solidarity, and protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This paper discusses
complex territorial dispute issues that need careful analysis and assessment to avert potential armed
confrontation among concerned countries.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
UNCLOS, Exclusive Economic Zone, ASEAN, Hegemonic War, Kalayaan Island Group, West Philippine Sea
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
OF ABSTRACT
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 42 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area
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 USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Territorial Disputes in Spratly:

An Assessment of the Philippine Initiatives

by

Colonel Franco Nemesio M. Gacal

Philippine Army

Dr. David Lai

Strategic Studies Institute
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of

Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission
on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624
Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher
Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of
Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
 Abstract

Title: Territorial Disputes in Spratly:

An Assessment of the Philippine Initiatives

Report Date: March 13-03-2013

Page Count: 42

Word Count: 7,032

Key Terms: UNCLOS, Exclusive Economic Zone, ASEAN, Hegemonic War,

Kalayaan Island Group, West Philippine Sea

Classification: Unclassified

The South China Sea is the subject of conflicting territorial claims among China,

Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. While most past confrontations

among the claimants took place in words, recent events indicate that acts, and even

military standoffs, are taking centre stage in the South China Sea territorial disputes.

This dangerous development has caused diplomatic rows among claimant countries.

The most-concerned factor is by all means a rising and more assertive China.

Unfortunately, the Philippines is perhaps the first to stand test of China’s massive claims

in the South China Sea. Given the emerging regional security environment in the South

China Sea, there is a need for the Philippines to assess its initiatives on how it is dealing

with the maritime dispute in order to make logical and intelligent recommendations and

actions that will gain the respect of the other claimants, contribute to maintaining peace

and regional solidarity, and protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This paper

discusses complex territorial dispute issues that need careful analysis and assessment

to avert potential armed confrontation among concerned countries.

 Territorial Disputes in Spratly:
An Assessment of the Philippine Initiatives

The South China Sea, the geographical meeting place of Southeast Asia, China,

and the Indian subcontinent, joins the Southeast Asian states with the Western Pacific,

thus, functioning as the throat of global sea routes in this region.1 It is an area with

hundreds of reefs, islets, rocks and shoals, with the majority located in the Spratly and

Paracel chain of islands, all of which are the subject of conflicting territorial claims

among China, Taiwan, and four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

members – Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia.

The overlapping maritime claim in the South China Sea is feared to be “one of

Asia’s potential military flashpoints and tensions have escalated over the past year.”2

The recent events have shown the escalation of military activities in the area and have

caused diplomatic rows among claimant countries. Ensued in the middle of this security

environment is the Philippines, which is facing the overt aggressiveness of the emerging

superpower that is China. Given the nature of the Spratly dispute as a potential

flashpoint and the emerging regional security environment in the South China Sea,

there is a need for an assessment of the Philippine initiatives for the preservation of

peace and stability in the region, being one of the countries that has a major stake in the

area.

This paper will delve into the Spratly issue as a potential flashpoint in the region

considering the strategic importance of the Spratly Islands, the conflicting claims of six

nations including China which is becoming aggressive, and the strategic role of the

United States in the region. The focus of this paper is the evaluation of the measures

being undertaken by Philippines in the preservation of peace and stability in the Spratly
Islands while continuously asserting its claim on the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG).

While the paper will discuss the “ASEAN Way” or the multilateral approach to the

Spratly dispute, it will just deal with the matter as one of the Philippine initiatives to

address this issue. The paper will not focus on providing a uniform option for the

resolution of the dispute as the recommendations that will be presented are specific for

the Philippines, which may or may not applicable for other parties in the dispute.

The Spratly

The Spratly Islands is a mini-archipelago in the South China Sea’s south-eastern

part comprised of more than 100 small islands or reefs which are surrounded by rich

fishing grounds and potentially contain gas and oil deposits. The chain of islands is

wholly and partly claimed by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and the

Philippines. The claimant countries are fighting for the fishing rights, exploration of oil

and gas deposits, and the islands themselves. The fight for sovereignty over the Spratly

Islands over the past decades has led to numerous military skirmishes, harassment and

detention of fishermen, a series of diplomatic rows, and travel bans, as well as strains

on economic relations.

The South China Sea is undoubtedly an important sea lane with more than half

of the world’s supertanker traffic passing through the region’s waters.3 It is now being

seen as an important guarantor of economic strength for the countries surrounding it.

With “roughly two-thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 percent of Japan’s

and Taiwan’s energy supplies and about 80 percent of China’s crude-oil imports come

through the SCS”,4 any havoc in the area that impedes the passage of the much-

2
needed oil would cause disruption in the economies of said nations and the region as

well.

Another reason for the claimants to establish their foothold on the Spratly

Islands is the vast reserves of oil and natural gas thought to be deposited in the seabed

of the disputed water which claimant countries need to support their economy.

According to Wang Yilin, head of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC),

the “region could have as much as 17 billion tonnes of oil and 498 trillion cubic feet

of natural gas” which is enough “to fulfill China’s gas needs for more than a century.”5

Additionally, the area is a rich fishing ground, a haven of maritime ecosystems which

sustain the seafood supply of the surrounding states.

Furthermore, ownership of islands in contested maritime area is considered as

an important part of having control of the sea. The Spratly Islands could serve as a

military outpost to the nation that controls it. The islands are potential locations of navy

and air bases for surveillance activities and military operations.

Historical Claim

Vietnamese claims are based on the continental shelf principle and on history,

using archaeological evidence to bolster sovereignty claims. It was France that claimed

the Spratly Islands (Truong Sa) and the Paracel Islands in the 1930's and included the

islands in the territory of Vietnam while the latter was still part of its colony.6 The entire

Spratly Islands are an offshore district of the province of Khanh Hoa while the Paracel

Islands were seized by China in 1974.

Brunei does not have an explicit claim on any of the islands, but “claims a

maritime boundary extending as far as a median with Vietnam” as part of its continental

3
shelf.7 Brunei declared its maritime boundary with Vietnam an Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ) in 1984, thus, “asserting an implicit claim to Louisa Reef”.8 It is the only country

among the claimants that does not have troops based on the archipelago.

Malaysia has laid claims to the Spratly Islands following its issuance of a map in

1979 based upon the continental shelf principle. It has occupied three islands that it

considers to be within its continental shelf since 1983.9

China practically claims the whole South China Sea. For China, the South China

Sea is a “core national interest.” 10 China regards this region as an integral component

of its territory and a necessary part of its image as an emerging superpower. In 1947,

China produced a map with nine undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands

within those lines.11 China calls the Spratly the “Nansha Islands” and asserts that it has

ample jurisprudential evidence to back up such claim.12 Using historical ownership,

China reasserts its claim to the Spratlys for its “need of natural resources and the desire

to exert a leadership role in the region.”13

Taiwan's claims are similar to those of China. In 1955, Taiwan claimed and

occupied Itu Aba (Taiping Dao), the largest single island among the Spratly Islands.

Since Taiwan’s occupation, a 1,150-meter runway was built on the fortified island and

the Coast Guard Administration forces have been responsible for the protection and

safeguarding of the island.14 The island could serve as a military base in case of war.

The Philippines is claiming only a portion of the Spratly Islands, known as the

Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). Kalayaan is a fifth-class municipality in the province of

Palawan which contains only one village, Barangay Pag-asa. The Kalayaan has a 1.3-

kilometer airstrip that is used both by the military and civilians. Most of the Filipino

4
residents there are fishermen. The claim over the KIG was first made in 1956 by Tomas

Cloma who called the islands “Freedomland”. The sovereignty of the Philippines over

KIG rests upon Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1596 signed on 11 June 1978 by then

President Ferdinand Marcos, and the Republic Act No. 9522, or the Philippine

Archipelagic Baselines Law signed in 2009. By virtue of P.D. 1596, the Philippines

claims the eight islands comprising the KIG as part of Philippine territory on the basis of

historic rights and legal titles.15

Governing Instruments

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that “countries with

overlapping territorial claims must resolve them by good faith and negotiations.”16 The

Philippines signed it on May 8, 1984, while China signed it on June 7, 1996. However,

UNCLOS has not yet resolved ownership disputes in the South China Sea because of

China’s hesitation to solve the dispute in a multilateral setting, intervention from a third

party or international mediation. China maintains its position to resolve the issue only

through bilateral negotiations with other claimant countries.

Another important document which tackles the maritime dispute in the South

China Sea is the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

It was adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN and the People’s Republic of

China during the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on November 04,

2002. The purpose of the DOC is to “promote peaceful, friendly, and harmonious

environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China to enhance peace,

stability, and economic growth and prosperity in the region.”17 It was hoped to serve as

a framework for future talks on the maritime disputes and an initial step towards the

5
framing of a code of conduct based on the “principles of self-restraint and peaceful

settlement.”18 However, for the past 10 years, a legally-binding code of conduct is still

being sought to prevent further military skirmishes among claimant countries.

The Rise of Maritime Security Issues

In addition to maritime row over the Spratly Islands, the South China Sea is also

the location of the disputed Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines

and China have been in a standoff over Bajo de Masinloc or Panatag Shoal,

internationally named Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island in China), since April 08,

2012. The Philippine Navy found eight Chinese fishing vessels were harvesting

endangered marine species.19 However, two Chinese maritime surveillance ships

prevented the Philippine Navy from arresting the Chinese fishermen. Since then, the

Philippine Navy and Coast Guard have been patrolling the area to conduct

reconnaissance.20

The establishment of Sansha as a city of China further makes the South China

Sea volatile.21 With the establishment of Sansha City, China is annexing the Spratly as

its territory. According to Beijing, Sansha City will administer three disputed islands

namely Paracels (Xisha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and Spratly (Nansha). 22 In

response, the Philippines filed a diplomatic protest with China on July 24, 2012 and did

not recognize Sansha City as it covers the KIG.23 Vietnam also took a strong stance

against the establishment of Sansha City.

Of all the territorial claims in the South China Sea, the dispute between Vietnam

and China over the Paracel islands is the most likely to lead to armed conflict. This is

due to the history of the two countries having engaged in naval skirmishes in the South

6
China Sea in 1974 when the Chinese navy gained complete control of the Paracel

islands, and in 1988 when the two fought again a brief naval battle in the Spratlys.24

The maritime row between China and Japan over the Senkaku /Daioyu Islands in

the East China Sea also affects the dynamic relations in the South China Sea. The

tension started when the Japanese government bought three of the eight islands in

Senkaku from private owners on September 12, 2012.25 These uninhabited islands and

rocks are believed to contain vast reserves of gas and oil, lie in important shipping

lanes, and are located in a known fishing area.26 Japan laid its claim to the islands in

1895 while China, as well as Taiwan, has said that these islands have been part of their

territory since ancient times. However, China and Taiwan only pressed their claims in

the 1970s when the prospect of abundant oil in the area emerged.27

The Rise of China

It is the aggressiveness of China that leaves the most resounding impact upon

the rest of the claimant countries and the international community. The whole South

China Sea is acknowledged by the Chinese government as an eminent part of its

national image and claims that it has “indisputable sovereignty” over the area.28

As the region is adjusting to the rise of China as a world power, China is actively

solidifying its presence in the South China Sea and making neighboring countries

uneasy. China was able to build military outposts in the area claimed by the Philippines

and Vietnam. Furthermore, during the standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in April

2012, China rejected Cavendish banana exports from the Philippines citing failure to

pass quarantine tests and has imposed a tighter rule on incoming shipments, though

7
the banana industry in the Philippines had been exporting their goods to China for over

a decade.29

Aside from this, China imposed a tourism ban in 2012 against the Philippines. As

a result, it is estimated that 1,500 Chinese visitors have cancelled their trips to the

Philippines in 2012 amidst the escalating tension over the Scarborough Shoal.30 China

is the third largest trading partner and is the fourth largest source of visitors of the

Philippines. These economic sanctions even if they were not labeled as Scarborough-

related sanctions, are undoubtedly China’s means to rattle the Philippines.

The aggressiveness of China can also be seen in its plan to make the disputed

islands as tourist spots for local visitors. The 10-year tourism development plan for

Sanya City includes the disputed Spratly Islands on a cruise route.31 The plan has again

caused agitation among other states.

In November 2012, the Philippines, Vietnam and India protested when Beijing

issued its new biometric passport with a Chinese map showing the South China Sea

and part of the Indian borders as Chinese territories.32 Further, in December 2012,

concerns were raised in the region and in the U.S. when Hainan province in China

announced that its government would allow Chinese ships to search and repel foreign

ships in the South China Sea.33 Likewise, the European Union and Germany have

expressed concern on the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea with China’s

new rule on boarding foreign vessels.34 While the foreign affairs in Hainan clarified that

Chinese police will only intercept foreign vessels who are engaged in illegal activities, it

nonetheless suggests China’s continuing assertiveness in its claim over the disputed

8
territory. However, a member of the Philippine Senator has said this move by China was

“plainly a provocation and a muscle-flexing as an offshoot of U.S. pivot in Asia.”35

Another consequence of the rising power of China is the ongoing arms race in

the region. Most analysts predict that China will become the largest economy in the

world this century, thus, it has the means and resources to support its military

expenditure. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “China

now ranks second behind the United States in total military spending with Beijing's 2011

defense budget at $142.2 billion.”36 China is now working on the build-up of its blue-

water navy.

China’s aggressiveness has motivated other claimant countries to increase

military investments. Southeast Asian countries are now building up their military

capability with increase in defense budgets to acquire arms, naval and air equipment. 37

For example, the Philippines has started upgrading the capability of its military with the

acquisition of the Navy’s first ever Hamilton38 class cutter, from the United States Coast

Guard in August 2011. Another Hamilton cutter is expected to be turned over to the

Philippines by the U.S. government in 2013.39 President Aquino, in his 2012 state of the

nation address (SONA), said that the Philippines will equip the military for maritime

defense with more than 40 military aircraft along with other weapons to be delivered in

the next two years.40 In November 2013, the Philippines is looking to acquire its first two

missile frigates, Maestrale class frigates, from the Italian Navy which have anti-

submarine capabilities and surface-to-air missiles. 41

Meanwhile, Vietnam is set to receive all of the six Kilo-class submarines which

Vietnam bought from Russia by 2016.42 The said submarines are the quietest

9
submarines in the world and are designed for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare,

general reconnaissance and patrol missions. The acquisition was a US$2 billion deal

signed by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung during his visit to Moscow in December

2009.43

As for Indonesia, the manufacture of three new submarines is already underway

as part of strengthening its maritime border defense.44 Currently, Indonesia has two

German submarines in operations. Thailand, being a significant player in the region,

also has submarine ambitions as seen in the early months of 2011 with the plan to buy

decommissioned submarines from Germany but was out-bid by other countries.45

The rising military power of China is drawing attention from other major powers

especially the United States. Hence, the South China Sea dispute is not limited to the

concerns and interests of the claimant countries. Freedom of navigation in and over-

flight above the South China Sea are the concerns of non-claimant countries including

the U.S. that have big stake in the area. During the 2011 East Asia Summit, “President

Obama and the other leaders already called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute,

following the rule of law and the UNCLOS.” 46

The U.S. has declared that it is in its national interest for “the maintenance of

peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and unimpeded

lawful commerce” in the South China Sea.47 As part of the so-called “pivot to Asia”

strategy, the U.S. will maintain bases in Japan and South Korea, deploy marines, navy

ships and aircrafts to Australia’s Northern Territory, and will deploy 60% of its naval

assets to the Asia-Pacific region by 2020.48 Refuting the allegations that the shift of

strategy is intended to counter China’s rise in the region, Deputy Secretary of Defense

10
Ashton Carter said that the rebalance is “about a peaceful Asia-Pacific region, where

sovereign states can enjoy the benefit of security and continue to prosper”.49 However,

this U.S. shift of focus towards the Asia Pacific has been seen by the Defense

Department of China as a “move not good for regional security and [one that] damages

trust.”50 Hence, the U.S. pivot to Asia-Pacific further complicates the dynamics in the

tension-filled South China Sea dispute. As Dr. David Lai has argued, “there are many

unsettled issues in the U.S.-China relationships, most of which are about the prospect

of China’s projected rise and its impact on the U.S. and the U.S.-led international

order.”51

Another implication of China’s strong economic and military presence in the

regions is that it could undermine the solidarity of the ASEAN. With the ASEAN

members’ economy deeply intertwined with that of China, economic relations with China

are an important factor that affects the actions of the ASEAN members. China is said to

have strong influence on Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia – three of the impoverished

members of ASEAN which consider China as an economic and political ally. China has

given aid to these countries including loans, investments, scholarships, infrastructure

projects, and tourism. Concerns have been expressed regarding the possibility of these

three countries being swayed to support China in the South China Sea maritime

dispute, pushing ASEAN into further division.

Cambodia was accused of supporting China in the maritime disputes while

Myanmar and Laos supported Cambodia to keep the territorial dispute with China out of

the 2012 ASEAN joint communiqué, preventing the passing of this communiqué. With

the failure to pass a joint communiqué for the first time in the 45-year history of ASEAN,

11
accusations were hurled against Cambodia, chair of 2012 ASEAN meetings , for its

alleged support of the interest of China in the maritime disputes. China has pledged

more than $500 million in soft loans and grants for Cambodia.52

During the 21st ASEAN Summit in December 2012, Cambodian Prime Minister

Hun Sen’s statement that the 10 members of ASEAN agreed “not to internationalize”

the dispute was openly refuted by President Aquino.53 The failure of the regional bloc to

make a common stand on the South China Sea dispute is a crippling factor to the

initiative to have a united ASEAN stand in resolving the maritime row.

On the other hand, non-claimant states like Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia

are not keen on taking sides. Treating the maritime dispute as a “difficult issue”,

Singapore encourages moderation on all sides.54 Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Loong

called on all claimants to exercise restraint and for disputes to be resolved peacefully

and in accordance with international law.55 As a country whose economic bloodlines are

the active sea lanes in the South China Sea, Singapore has been wary about the

freedom of navigation and stability in the maritime area and has been careful to remain

neutral.

In the case of Thailand, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra said that as a non-

claimant state, Thailand wants to help in solving the maritime dispute in the South China

Sea.56 As a coordinating country for the ASEAN-China relations, ASEAN members

agreed to let Thailand hold an ASEAN senior officials' meeting to consider the code of

conduct in the South China Sea as an attempt to solve the maritime dispute.57

Having good relations with the US and China, Indonesia has been very active in

patching up the disunity among ASEAN members. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty

12
Natalegawa conducted “intensive shuttle diplomacy” in an effort to restore ASEAN unity

following the failure to issue a joint communiqué.58 Indonesia was delegated to circulate

a draft of code of conduct to the other foreign ministers as part of preparations for the

November 2012 ASEAN Summit.59

Moreover, other major players in the region appear to have stayed neutral about

the territorial dispute to protect their economic ties with China, especially Australia.

Even if Australia is not one of the parties in the dispute, maintaining peace and stability

in the South China Sea is one of its concerns. Australia views the United States as an

important military ally but sees China as an indispensable economic partner. For these

reasons, it is conceivable that Australia might take a neutral stand to keep its economic

ties with China. In its economic policy blue print, “Australia in the Asian Century White

Paper”, the goal of Australia is to become one of the world’s top 10 wealthiest nations

by 2025, joining Qatar, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, and

the United States. 60 Furthermore, Prime Minister Julia Gillard said that Australia’s future

will depend on its choices and engagements in the Asian region. Incidentally, China is

Australia’s largest export market for iron ore and largest source of imports which include

clothing, communications equipment, computers, prams, toys, games and sporting

goods, furniture and televisions. 61

Probable Future Scenarios

After analyzing the Spratlys as a potential flashpoint in the region, the rise of

maritime security issues in the South China Sea, and the implications of the rising

power of China, the following are the likely future scenarios in the area: First, there is a

risk of miscalculations or accidents that could lead to limited confrontations. The existing

13
maritime disputes could lead to dangerous military confrontations considering the dark

history of maritime confrontations in the contested areas. However, it is doubted that

China can sustain military confrontations against all the countries with which it has

maritime disputes without its economy suffering in the process. If China resorts to

military action, other claimant countries may allow or call on the active intervention of

the United States to balance the power of China.

Second, there is a perceived threat attendant to the increase in power-projection

capabilities of China. China’s strong military and healthy economy could make it an

uncontested power in the region. With Asia’s “energy consumption expected to double

by 2030 with China accounting for half of that growth,” China would conceivably protect

its Middle Eastern energy supply which passes through the South China Sea as well as

the energy resources that are said to be in the South China Sea area.62

And lastly, the discovery of much-needed oil and other energy resources in the

area may further raise the possibility of conflict but may also engender more joint

economic endeavors for mutual benefits. With the potential wealth, the probability of

regionalism emerging as a powerful binding tool may help ASEAN in moving towards

joint economic endeavors in this resource-rich area. This regionalism could also be

used in encouraging China to solve the dispute peacefully.

China in Settling Disputes

In dealing with its territorial disputes, China has been consistent in maintaining

bilateral agreement for the resolution of disputes and the avoidance of international

arbitration. While China has maintained of having indisputable claims over the whole

South China Sea, there is a possibility that this position can be negotiated. History has

14
shown that there were instances where China ventured into agreements where it has

relinquished some of its claims in the process of settling some of its territorial disputes.

For example, for closer strategic and economic relations, Russia and China

formally ended their territorial disputes over Yinlong Island/Tarabarov and Heixiazi

Island/Bolshoi Ussuriysky through the signing of an agreement on 21 July 2008.63

Another example is China’s compromise over its border agreements with

Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In 2011, China and Tajikistan ratified their

2002 border agreement. This was hailed by the Government of Tajikistan as a victory

because out of the 28,000 square kilometers of Pamir Mountains area previously

claimed by China, Tajikistan only ceded 1,000 square kilometers. Furthermore, in 1998,

China received 22% of the land disputed under the border agreement with Kazakhstan.

In addition, China and Kyrgyzstan’s border agreement in 1996 gave China 32% of the

land disputed between the two countries.64

One puzzling event, however, was China’s submission of its Partial Submission

Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm in the East China

Sea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf under the UNCLOS in

September 2012.65 China rejected the Philippines’ call for international mediation to

solve the existing territorial dispute over the West Philippine Sea but is now invoking

UNCLOS in its territorial dispute with Japan. This could be an opportunity for the

Philippines in its quest to present the territorial dispute at the UN.

The Philippine Initiatives

The Philippines has initiated diplomatic, political and legal measures with China

and other claimant countries to resolve the territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

15
The Philippine government has been a staunch advocate of a peaceful resolution to

territorial rows through a rules-based approach under the provisions of the UNCLOS. It

is the 11th country to ratify UNCLOS through Batasan Resolution No 121 enacted in

1984.

On April 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic

Act No. 9522, or the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law, which defines the “general

configuration” of the archipelago, including the extended continental shelf (ECS) and

EEZ, to make it more compliant with the UNCLOS.66 The law treats KIG and

Scarborough Shoal as part of a “regime of islands”. 67 Moreover, the legislative

enactment of PD 1596 has confirmed the inclusion of the KIG in the Philippine territory

To address the issue on territorial disputes, the Philippine government is

engaging all claimant countries for a peaceful resolution of the problem. The Philippines

has been consistent in affirming its rights over the claimed territory through confidence-

building measures (CBMs) with other parties to include security talks and the proposed

establishment of a legally binding Code of Conduct.

As part of the Philippines’ diplomatic approach to this dispute, President Aquino

addressed the issue in his remarks before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York

in September 2010 that ““it is in the best interest of the region to transform this potential

flashpoint (South China Sea) into a Zone of Peace, Friendship, Freedom and

Cooperation (ZOPFF/C) through sustained consultation and dialogue.” 68The concept of

the ZOPFF/C is “to define, clarify, and segregate, in accordance with the UNCLOS, the

disputed and non-disputed areas of the West Philippine Sea”. 69

16
 A key component of the Philippines’ diplomatic efforts is its support of the

ASEAN initiatives and mechanisms for the preservation of regional peace and

development. The Philippines has been consistent in pushing for a multilateral approach

to solve the differences among claimants. By forging stronger security alliances with

other ASEAN members and other countries to peacefully solve the disputes, the

Philippines has been persistent in its call to pre-empt offensive military solutions or

provocative measures that would undermine peace and security in the region.

To promote regional cooperation specifically on economic affairs such as joint oil

exploration activities and other economic development efforts, “President Aquino called

for peaceful sharing of resources of Spratly Islands during the 17th Summit of the

ASEAN in Hanoi, Vietnam” held last 28 October 2010.70

Moreover, the Philippines has taken up a defensive posture amidst the increased

tension in the South China Sea. It has been reported that 26 intrusions made by foreign

vessels and poachers in the Philippine territory were left unchecked for the first quarter

of 2012 alone.71 In view of this, the Philippine military is acquiring armaments to protect

and preserve the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The dispute has driven the

Philippines to pursue the modernization of its military. In 2011, funds were released to

support the territorial defense capabilities of the Philippines.72

The Philippines is also leveraging on its defense relations with the United States.

The Balikatan exercises between the U.S. and the Philippines are being conducted to

enhance interoperability between the two military forces and to maintain operational

readiness. Further, the joint military exercises with the U.S. aims “to build a minimum

credible defense posture for the Philippines, and increase its capacity for territorial

17
defense, maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance

and disaster response”.73

Aside from the diplomatic and political initiatives, the Philippine government also

undertook unilateral measures to strengthen its position on the territorial dispute. On

September 05, 2012, President Benigno Aquino III signed Administrative Order (AO) 29

which renamed portion of the South China Sea within its 200nm EEZ as the West

Philippine Sea.74 Thus, the West Philippine Sea is composed of the Luzon Sea as well

as the waters around, within and adjacent to the KIG and Bajo De Masinloc, also known

as Scarborough Shoal. This is an attempt to solidify the Philippines’ foothold in its claim

to the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal.

Another unilateral initiative was the backchannel negotiations done in September

2012 by a member of the Philippine Senate with Chinese officials in Beijing in the hope

of reaching a resolution to the territorial row at the Panatag (Scarborough) shoal.75 The

negotiations were clandestine and were authorized by the Philippine President.

Unfortunately, this initiative did not meet with favorable results since many Philippine

political leaders were against it.

Analysis of Initiatives

Though ASEAN is currently less than united, the regional bloc remains an

important arena in promoting common interests and in crafting important initiatives to

arrive at agreeable solutions. It is an important stage where the Philippines shares its

hopes and aspirations for the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. The Philippines

can be given credit in its persistence in sending the message through ASEAN and the

international community that it will continue to take its stand in defending its territory

18
even though the naval power of the Philippines may pale in comparison with the naval

power of China.

The enactment of PD 1596 which confirmed the inclusion of the KIG in the

Philippine territory and the signing into law of RA 9522 known as the Philippine

Archipelagic Baseline Law have only established domestic laws that can be challenged

before the U.N. These laws require U.N. or international recognition before the

Philippine government can invoke any rights that these laws can provide to the

Philippine government. Since the areas covered by these laws are subject to claims by

other countries, other claimant countries may not recognized these domestic laws as

legally effective until they passed U.N. recognition.

The limited resources of the Philippines could not cover all capability requirement

needed to address the present day challenges in patrolling and securing its claimed

territories. That being said, the Philippines enjoys strong military relations with the

United States through the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1999 US-Philippines

Visiting Forces Agreement. Toward this end, the Philippines is relying on the U.S. to

counter-balance the rising power of China in the region through various military to

military engagements and defense capability upgrade program. However, the level of

commitment of the U.S. in support of the Philippine government over the territorial

disputes cannot be ascertained since the US has declared its neutrality on the issue.

Moreover, there is no clear and declared U.S. policy that the U.S. would defend

Philippine military units in the South China Sea against Chinese aggression. In the

same manner, any involvement of the U.S. in the South China Sea territorial dispute

19
would surely add up to the “many difficult conflicts of interest between the U.S. and

China.”76

At the same time, the Philippines has limited defense capability to protect its

sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Western Command is the primary Philippine

military unit mandated to guard the country’s EEZ against foreign intrusions as well as

to protect oil explorations through naval patrols, intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance.

However, this unit suffers from inadequacy of air and sea power assets since its

activation in 1976.77

Further complicating the issue is China’s assertiveness and its adherence to a

bilateral approach as a means of solving the disputes. This is contrary to the efforts of

the Philippines which is advocating a rules-based and multilateral approach to solve the

dispute. The differences in approach in settling the dispute is thus far the biggest

challenge that has to be resolved by ASEAN and China.

Another initiative of the Philippines that caused temporary setback was the

bilateral backchannel efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the dispute with China.78.

These efforts ran contrary to the previous stand of the Philippines on solving the dispute

multilaterally. Any attempt to resolve the dispute without transparency could potentially

cause suspicion and mistrust within ASEAN. A divided ASEAN would weaken the

foundation of a multilateral approach in settling the dispute.

Additionally, the unilateral action in renaming the disputed territory as West

Philippine Sea may have caused more harm than good with regard to the ongoing

problem. This move has already been strongly criticized by China and Taiwan. A

leading state paper of China said that the name change was a “reckless decision that

20
inevitably caused tension to flare between the Philippines and China.”79 Taiwan, on one

hand, said that it “does not recognize the unilateral move and urged other claimants to

exercise self-restraint so as not to affect peace and stability in the region.”80 There is

always a risk for a unilateral action to run counter to the principle of multilateral

approach as advocated by the Philippines.

Recommendations

China’s assertiveness and rising military power is causing serious security

concerns in the region particularly for the Philippines. The ongoing modernization of the

armed forces in the region as well as the U.S. re-balancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific

region is making the area a military powerhouse that could lead to miscalculations and

accidents.

To maintain peace and stability in the Spratlys, the Philippines must continuously

pursue its foreign policy decisions in the context of ASEAN and must utilize multilateral

and inter-regional organizations to promote common interest.81 The Philippines must

continually urge ASEAN member states to maintain ASEAN centrality and to be united

on all issues of common concern. It must urge all concerned parties including China, to

transform the region into a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation

(ZOPFF/C) and support the pursuit of a legally binding Code of Conduct (COC) in the

region.

Second, the Philippines must collaborate with the ASEAN members to

strengthen the security alliances of ASEAN and other regional players such as Japan,

Australia and the U.S. that share the same view on regional security to pre-empt military

and provocative measures. The complexity of the maritime disputes underscores the

21
importance of unity among ASEAN members and in making ASEAN a reliable bloc that

can make decisions to ensure peace and stability in the region.

Third, to address the alarming aggressiveness of China, the Philippines must

continuously internationalize the territorial dispute with China, putting forward a position

consistent with its national interests. Meaning, the Philippine government must raise the

issue before the U.N. and engage the international community, non-government

organizations and leaders of nations who will be affected by the dispute to gain

international attention. This unification of purpose would help build a coalition of nations

with one voice against the use of force in such disputes and send a strong signal to

China that the international community desires a peaceful resolution of the territorial

row. A strong coalition of free nations supported by the U.N. would pressure China to

adhere to the established international conventions in settling territorial disputes. With a

strong coalition of nations demanding a peaceful resolution of conflict, there is reason to

believe that China would not risk being politically isolated by the international

community. As the former Philippine National Security Adviser Jose Almonte recently

wrote, “No one can stop China from claiming ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South

China Sea—except China itself, or the authoritative power of world opinion.”82

On the other hand, the Philippines must continuously pursue the ASEAN

multilateral approach of settling disputes with Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. These

nations are ASEAN members that give primacy to ASEAN centrality in the settling of

territorial disputes based on international law and ASEAN interests.

Fourth, the Philippines must fast-track the modernization program of its armed

forces to have a credible force and to be able to increase its presence in the areas of

22
KIG and Bajo de Masinloc. Additionally, this program would encourage plans for an

effective and efficient response to incidents at sea. Not intending to cause offensive

actions, the Philippines must have a reliable defensive posture to ensure that the KIG is

protected from any foreign incursions.

In its quest to protect freedom of navigation, it is in the interest of the United

States to have reliable partners in the region while the Philippines needs the support of

the United States to better address maritime security issues. It is in this situation where

the Philippines’ relationship with the United States is undeniably an important factor in

protecting its sovereignty. The formidable defense relation of the Philippines and the

United States rests in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty as well as the Visiting Forces

Agreement of 1999 which increased military cooperation between the two countries.

The annual Balikatan Exercises facilitate the military presence of the U.S. in the

Philippines which could help stabilize escalating confrontations in the region.

Fifth, the Philippines must continuously engage China to ease the tensions

brought about by the territorial dispute. It must always keep its diplomatic

communications with China open to avoid misperceptions on the intentions of the

Philippines that would lead to military miscalculations. Engaging China would facilitate

the maintenance of China-Philippines diplomatic and economic relations.

Sixth, as a responsible member of the international community, the Philippines

must exhaust all confidence-building and conflict-prevention measures to make sure

that the territorial dispute with China will not result in a military collision of powerful

nations at sea. Simply put, the Philippine government must be cautious in its actions so

as not to spark a “hegemonic war”83 between the U.S. and China.

23
 Seventh, the Philippines must be prudent in making unilateral actions. The

renaming of the disputed territories as the West Philippine Sea has caused tension

among major claimant countries. The Philippine government must not forget that it is

advocating for the settlement of the issue based on international law. Renaming said

territory as the West Philippine Sea may preempt the decision of the U.N. or the

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).84 Hence, the Philippines must not

make any move that would unnecessarily heighten tension in the region.

Lastly, the Philippine government must abandon the bilateral backchannel

approach to avoid misinterpretation by the ASEAN members of the Philippines’ sincerity

in resolving the territorial dispute through a multilateral approach. The Philippine

government must always be transparent in its actions and continuously cultivate trust

and respect with the ASEAN members. During these difficult and trying times, it is

important that ASEAN must strengthen multilateral efforts to help each other and that its

unity be preserved.

Conclusion

The overlapping maritime dispute will continue to make the South China Sea a

source of tension unless agreeable and manageable solutions can be reached by the

claimant countries especially China and the Philippines. The economic and strategic

importance of the islands motivates claimant countries to be resolute in their stand and

to solidly affirm their ownership over the Spratly Islands. The maritime disputes have

shaken the relations of the claimant countries and the international community for the

past decades, and the current aggressiveness of China further complicates the

24
problem. The shaky diplomatic relations and history of military skirmishes highlight the

need for a peaceful resolution of the disputes in the South China Sea.

The territorial ambitions and aggressiveness of China is a challenge to the efforts

of the other claimant states in finding a solution to the dispute because of its desire to

solve the dispute bilaterally. The relationship of the Philippines and China will

continually be marred by suspicion because of the existing maritime dispute and

Philippines’ close affiliation with the United States which China sees as a rival in the

region.

The ASEAN, as a regional bloc, would be of great help if as a group, it would

take a unified stand in solving the dispute. The concerned parties must reconcile their

differences to finally arrive at a compromise that would ease the tension and resolve the

territorial issue. Among the concerns requiring urgent action to avoid armed conflict are

the immediate conclusion of the Code of Conduct and avoidance of unilateral actions by

the claimant countries that further escalate existing tensions.

Continued provocations in the disputed territories could ignite military skirmishes

in the South China Sea. With the military build-up in the region, any miscalculation could

spark unprecedented confrontations. Thus, concerned parties must work together to

control and keep things at a level that does not threaten their respective national

sovereignty, disrupt regional stability, or cause international repercussions. Claimant

countries could sidestep sovereignty and instead identify areas of disputes and enter

into joint development agreements or arrangements.

In view of the foregoing, it cannot be denied that the Philippines is facing serious

maritime security challenges and it must address said challenges that affect its territorial

25
integrity and sovereignty. Therefore, the Philippines must help contribute to the

preservation of peace and stability in the Spratly Islands while continuously asserting its

claim on the KIG and Bajo de Masinloc. As President Aquino puts it, “what is ours is

ours, and with what is disputed, we can work towards joint cooperation.”85

Endnotes

1
Robert Kaplan, “The South China Sea Is The Future Conflict: The 21st century’s defining
battleground to be on water,” September/October 2011, 2,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflic
t?page=0,0 (accessed 01 July 2012).
2
Delon Porcalla,“Taiwan slams PHL sea order; China installs markers,” The Philippine
Star, September 14, 2012.
3
“Spratly,” November 07, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly.htm
(accessed 14 July 2012).
4
Kaplan, “The South China Sea Is The Future of Conflict: The 21st century’s defining
battleground to be on water,” 2.
5
Adam Taylor, “There Are 500 Trillion Cubic Feet Of Gas Under Those Disputed Islands In
The South China Sea,” Business Insider, November 9, 2012,
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-reveals-gas-in-south-china-sea-2012-11 (accessed 09
November 2012).
6
“Territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands,” November 7, 2011,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-claims.htm (accessed 14 July 2012).
7
“Brunei,” January 29, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bx.html (accessed 02 February 2013).
8
Ibid.
9
“Territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands,” November 7, 2011,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-claims.htm (accessed 14 July 2012).
10
Andrew Quinn, Reuters, Chris Buckley, Reuters,” China warns US: don’t get involved in
South China Sea disputes,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 04, 2012,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/China-warns-US-don-t-get-involved-in-
South-China-Sea-disputes (accessed 01 December 2012).

26
 11
Li and Li, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note,” 2003,
http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Li%20and%20Li-
The%20Dotted%20Line%20on%20the%20Map.pdf (accessed 02 August 2012).
12
China asserts the following jurisprudential evidences: full and accurate historical data as
early as the Han Dynasty more than two thousand years ago; Chinese people started to
develop and engage in fishing, planting and other productive activities on the Nansha Islands
since its discovery; and the exercise of jurisdiction by the Chinese Government over the Nansha
Islands is also manifested in a series of continued effective government behaviour since the
Tang Dynasty (785-805AD). (“Jurisprudential Evidence To Support China's Sovereignty over the
Nansha Islands”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 17,
2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/t19234.htm, (accessed 04 August 2012).
13
Commander Robert E. Schuetz, The Spratly Island Dispute and Implications for U.S.
National Security, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
June 18, 1996), 6.
14
Agence France-Presse, “Taiwan lawmakers visit contested Spratlys,” April 30, 2012,
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/04/30/12/taiwan-lawmakers-visit-contested-
spratlys (accessed 30 July 2012).
15
PD 1596 organizes the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as one political unit. Section 1
states that ‘Such area is hereby constituted as a distinct and separate municipality of the
Province of Palawan and shall be known as “Kalayaan”.

16
“Country Analysis Briefs-South China Sea,” March 2008,
http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/pdf.pdf (accessed on 30 July 2012).
17
As Point 10 in the DOC states: “The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a
code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region
and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this
objective.” 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, ASEAN Website
http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (accessed 03 August 2012).
18
Ibid.
19
Reuters, “China summons PH envoy over standoff,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 19,
2012.
20
“PH lodges two diplomatic protests,” Malaya Business Insight, July 25, 2012,
http://www.malaya.com.ph/index.php/news/nation/9278-ph-lodges-two-diplomatic-protests
(accessed on 12 August 2012).
21
Sansha City is a tiny island at the geographic center of the disputed South China Sea.
AFP,”Sansha: China’s expanding toehold in disputed sea,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 26,
2012.
22
Aurea Calica and Jaime Laude, “Kalayaan island group integral part of Palawan town-
Palace,” The Philippine Star, June 24, 2012.

27
 23
AFP, “PH summons China envoy over garrison plans in Sansha City,” The Manila Times,
July 25, 2012.
24
“How China Can Avoid Next Conflict,” The Diplomat, June 12, 2011,
http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/12/how-china-can-avoid-next-conflict/ (accessed 16 June 2012).
25
Mark E. Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations
(Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 25,
2012), 1.
26
“Q&A: China-Japan islands row,” BBC News Asia Website,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139 (accessed on 22 September 2012)
27
Ibid.
28
Tarra Quismundo, “Name change a “reckless decision”, say China paper,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, September 15, 2012.
29
According to Stephen Antig, Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association
(PBGEA), said that the rejection came during the standoff. He said that the banana industry in
Mindanao which is made up of 18 companies are afraid that they may lose valuable market in
China. Almost half of the estimated 75 million boxes off bananas exported each year, half goes
to China, making it the largest consumer of Philippine Cavendish bananas. (Dennis Jay Santos,
“Banana exports to be hit by Scarborough dispute –industry insider,” Inquirer Business Website,
May 03, 2012, http://business.inquirer.net/57081/banana-exports-to-be-hit-by-scarborough-
dispute%E2%80%93-industry-insider (accessed on 07 October 2012).
30
Christine Ong, “Philippine tourism industry braced for extended China travel ban,”
Channel News Asia Website, May 14, 2012,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/eastasia/view/1201196/1/.html (accessed on 28
October 2012)
31
Tarra Quismundo, “China plans to turn Spratlys into tourist destination,” Inquirer Global
Nation Website, September 08, 2012, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/49468/china-plans-to-turn-
spratlys-into-tourist-destination (accessed on 29 September 2012)
32
AFP, “Vietnam refuses to stamp new Chinese passport,” The Manila Times, November
28, 2012.
33
Cathy Yamsuan, “New China rules in disputed sea raise alarm in region, US,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, December 03, 2012.
34
“EU, Germany concerned about freedom of navigation in South China Sea,” December
05, 2012, http://www.interaksyon.com/article/49682/eu-germany-concerned-about-freedom-of-
navigation-in-south-china-sea (accessed 06 December 2012).
35
Cristina Mendez, “Mirriam: China dividing ASEAN,” The Philippine Star, December 03,
2012.

28
 36
Agence France-Presse, “China leads rise in Asia military spending: study,” October16,
2012, http://www.interaksyon.com/article/45614/china-leads-rise-in-asia-military-spending-study
(accessed 16 October 2012).
37
Kaplan, “The South China Sea Is The Future of Conflict: The 21st century’s defining
battleground to be on water,” 4.
38
Hamilton is a high endurance cutter with close-in weapon systems. Philippine Navy crew
trained in the US to operate the patrol craft.
39
Mario Mallari, “DND urges government to expedite military upgrade to protect Spratlys,”
The Daily Tribune, February 29, 2012.
40
Delon Porcalla,“Noy won’t budge on sea row: P28B allotted for AFP upgrade,” The
Philippine Star, July 24, 2012.
41
The Maestrale class of frigates was initially commissioned for the Italian Navy in 1982
and will retire on January 2013. They were primarily designed for antisubmarine warfare but are
also capable of fighting on the surface and shooting down aircraft. Equipped with several
electronic warfare systems, these ships also have torpedoes, long-range guns and automatic
weapons. The two Maestrale-class frigates cost P11.7 billion. Tubeza, Philip C. “A first:
Philippines to buy 2 missile warships from Italy—DND,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 3,
2012, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/46263/a-first-philippines-to-buy-2-missile-warships-from-
italy-dnd (accessed on 12 August 2012).
42
“Russian Kilo-class submarine for Vietnam ready,” Thanh Nien News Website, August
15, 2012, http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/pages/20120815-russia-to-launch-first-kilo-
class-submarine-built-for-vietnam.aspx (accessed on 28 October 2012).
43
Ibid.
44
“New Indonesian Submarines Will Inspire ‘Fear’ in Nation’s ‘Enemies’: Defence Ministry,”
The Jakarta Globe Website, August 07, 2012, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/new-
indonesian-submarines-will-inspire-fear-in-nations-enemies-defense-ministry/536197 (accessed
on 28 October 2012).
45
Saksith Saiyasombut, “Thai Navy’s $250M submarine plan scuppered,” Asian
Correspondent Website, March 14, 2012, http://asiancorrespondent.com/78065/thai-navys-
250m-submarine-plan-scuppered/ (accessed on 28 October 2012).
46
Efren Montano, “Aquino proposes zone of peace,” November 21, 2011,
http://www.journal.com.ph/index.php/news/national/17914-aquino-proposes-zone-of-peace
(accessed 01 November 2012).
47
Susan V. Lawrence and David MacDonald, U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues
(Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 2, 2012),
11.
48
By Reuters in Beijing, “China warns US to be careful after Obama’s defence strategy
rethink,” The Guardian Online, January 09, 2012,

29
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/09/china-us-careful-defence-strategy (accessed on 09
September 2012).

See also: “Obama’s first term: pivot to Asia and tweaks to Latin America,”The Guardian
Online, October 21, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/21/obama-foreign-policy-
pivots-asia (accessed on 28 October 2012).
49
Chen Weihua and Zhao Shengnan, “US Asia-Pacific strategy ‘not about China,” China
Daily Online, August 03, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-
08/03/content_15641727.htm (accessed on 09 September 2012).
50
“Chinese defense ministry vows to safeguard maritime rights,” The Manila Times, July
01, 2012.
51
David Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, December 2011), 1.
52
More than $500 million in soft loans and grants has been pledged by China to Cambodia
for this year with four loan agreements for unspecified projects worth $420 million signed on the
first weekend of September when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited China and
another three loan agreements are expected to be signed this year and another $24 million to
be given as a “gift” to be used on any priority project. Furthermore, Chinese investment in
Cambodia totalled $1.9 billion last year, more than double the combined investment by ASEAN
countries and 10 times more than the United States, which is trying to extend its influence in the
region. (Report by Prak Chan Thul; Editing by Alan Raybould and Robert Birsel) “China gives
Cambodia aid and thanks for ASEAN help,” Reuters Online, September 04, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/us-cambodia-china-idUSBRE88306I20120904
(accessed 09 September 2012).
53
TJ Burgonio, “5 nations support PH position on sea dispute,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 22, 2012.
54
Maria Siow, “Crucial for ASEAN to take stand on South China Sea disputes,” Channel
News Asia Online, September 07, 2012,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1224654/1/.html (accessed
on 09 September 2012).
55
Ellen Tordesillas, “A convenient scapegoat,” The Inbox, September 14, 2012,
http://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-inbox/convenient-scapegoat-010557358.html (accessed 15
September 2012).
56
Matthew Pennington, “Thai PM says her woman’s touch might help in South China Sea
diplomacy,” Startribune Online Website, September 26, 2012,
http://www.startribune.com/nation/171437001.html?refer=y (accessed 30 September 2012)
57
“Asean asks Thailand to help solve the S. China Sea row,” Bangkok Post Online,
September 29, 2012, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/314599/asean-asks-thailand-to-
help-solve-s-china-sea-row (accessed 30 September 2012).

30
 58
“ASEAN six-point principles in accord with China’s policy on settlement,” The Philippine
Star Online, July 21, 2012,
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=829895&publicationSubCategoryId=200
(accessed 07 October 2012).
59
Matthew Pennington, “Indonesia seeks rules of road for South China Sea,” The Guardian
Online, September 26, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10455359 (accessed
30 September 2012).
60
Agence France-Presse, “Ambitious Asia plan to power Australia – PM,” Inquirer Online,
October 28, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/297062/ambitious-asia-plan-to-power-australia-
pm (accessed 28 October 2012).
61
“Australia Economy,” Economy Watch Online, March 09, 2010,
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/australia/ (accessed 28 October 2012).
62
Kaplan, “The South China Sea Is The Future of Conflict: The 21st century’s defining
battleground to be on water,” 3.
63
John Chan, “Russia and China settle longstanding territorial disputes,” World Socialist
Online, August 14, 2008, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/aug2008/ruch-a14.shtml (accessed
on 29 October 2012)
64
Sudha Ramachandran, “China plays long game on border disputes,” Asia Times Online,
January 27, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA27Ad02.html (accessed on 28
October 2012)
65
“Japan opposes China's Diaoyu map bid at UN,” September 25, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-09/25/c_131871430.htm (accessed on 10
November 2012) see also: Li Xiaokun and Wang Chenyan, “UN to get shelf submission,” China
Daily Online, September 17, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-
09/17/content_15761207.htm (accessed on 10 November 2012)
66
“Scarborough Shoal Standoff: A Timeline,” Inquirer.net, May 09, 2012,
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal-standoff-a-historicaltimeline (accessed
16 June 2012).
67
Article 121 of UNCLOS states that (1) An island is a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. (2). Except as provided for in paragraph
3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to
other land territory. (3) Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
68
Remarks of President Benigno S. Aquino III at the Council on Foreign Relations, New
York City, September 23, 2010, http://www.gov.ph/2010/09/24/speech-of-president-aquino-at-
the-council-on-foreign-relations-new-york-city/ (accessed 03 Jan 2013)

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 69
Hon. Albert F. del Rosario, “COMMON CHALLENGES, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES-US ALLIANCE,” May 02, 2012,
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/speeches?start=8 (accessed on 18 November 2012).
70
Mong Palatino,“Aquino’s Spratly Islands Call,” The Diplomat, November 01, 2011,
http://the-diplomat.com/asean-beat/2010/11/01/aquinos-spratly-islands-call/ (accessed 06 June
2012).
71
PNA and AFP, “26 intrusions into airspace, territorial waters unchecked,” The Daily
Tribune, July 01, 2012.
72
Hon. Del Rosario, “COMMON CHALLENGES, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES-US ALLIANCE”.
73
Ibid.
74
Fat Reyes. “West Philippine Sea name affirms sovereignty over its territories-DFA,”
Inquirer Global Nation Online, September 13, 2012, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/50104/west-
philippine-sea-name-affirms-sovereignty-over-its-territories-dfa (accessed 22 September 2012).
75
DVM, “Palace: Further backchannel negotiations with China for Pnoy to decide,” GMA
News, September 23, 2012,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/275183/news/nation/palace-further-backchannel-
negotiations-with-china-for-pnoy-to-decide (accessed 12 December 2012).
76
Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, 2.
77
Rene Acosta, “Military’s chief spy pushes security policy for Spratlys,” Business Mirror,
March 13, 2012.
78
Camille Diola, “Trillanes: JPE ‘blundered’ in Brady notes,” Philippine Star Online,
September 24, 2012,
http://www.philstar.com/nation/article.aspx?publicationsubcategoryid=63&articleid=852326
(accessed on 30 September 2012).
79
Tarra Quismundo, “Name change a “reckless decision” says China paper,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, September 15, 2012.
80
AFP, Dellon Porcalla, Pia Lee-Brago,“Taiwan slams PHL Sea order; China installs
markers,” The Philippine Star, September 4, 2012.
81
“Philippine Foreign Policy,” Department of Foregin Affairs,
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/about-the-dfa/philippine-foreign-policy (accessed 02 June
2012).
82
Marites Vitug, “PH-China: It’s all about the rule of law,” January 25, 2013,
http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/20391-ph-china-it-s-all-about-the-rule-of-law (accessed
01February 2013)

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 83
Hegemonic war is defined as “a war between the dominant power and the challenger(s) if
they cannot settle their differences in peaceful ways. It is the primary means great powers use
to resolve the differences in their relations or to create a new international order”. Lai, The
United States and China in Power Transition, 7.
84
“The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an independent judicial body
established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to adjudicate disputes
arising out of the interpretation and application of the Convention.” The Tribunal, International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0 (accessed 12
December 2012).
85
Philippine Paper on ASEAN-China Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation
(ZoPFF/C) in the WPS (SCS), http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/datbase-on-south-china-sea-
study/doc_details/182--philippine-paper-on-asean--china-zone-of-peace-freedom-friendship-
and-cooperation-in-the-scs (accessed 18 Nov 2012)

33