Butiong vs. Plazo, 765 SCRA 227, August 05, 2015
Butiong vs. Plazo, 765 SCRA 227, August 05, 2015
Butiong vs. Plazo, 765 SCRA 227, August 05, 2015
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the-Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution,[2] dated March
13, 2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107347, which affirmed the Judgment[3] dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217.
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including
his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as
well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family
home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both
located in Nasugbu, Batangas.[4]
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Possession[5] dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in
March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita Tenorio
and other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco
Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr.
Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale,
Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of
sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.[6] The document
actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62 releasing
her and her late husband's indebtedness therefrom.[7] Upon inquiry, the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the
same. When respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of
the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to
enter as the premises were padlocked.
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In their Answer,[9] petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of
lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the
course of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what
they purchased was only the resort.[10] He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement
with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among
others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and
Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the
resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.[11]
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to
petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance
offered by petitioners.as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public who
was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed.[12] The Deed of Sale
was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the
typewritten name "Pedro Riñoza, Husband" on the left side of the document was not
signed.[13] The trial court also observed that both documents were never presented to
the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the subject
properties were still in the names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In addition, the
supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties were not even presented as
witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the documents of
conveyance.[14] On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents, in its
Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo provide:
xxxx
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1991.
With no costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's Judgment in its Decision[16] dated October
31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo
de Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to
July 3, 1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the
case, the resort deed is not a public document and the presumption
of- regularity accorded to public documents will not apply to the
same. As laid down in Tigno, el al. v. Aquino, et al.:
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the resort
deed are void as their signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed to the
Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the Complaining
Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their signatures
were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove the
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Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. It
was alleged that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate,
determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate
of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was for Judicial Partition.
Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the
trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it
ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling
is void and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on
Certiorari for submitting a verification of the petition, a certificate of non-forum
shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant's identities.[18] In its
Resolution[19] dated September 26, 2007, this Court also denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification of
the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final and executory on
October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court.[20]
On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner's motion for leave to admit a
second motion for reconsideration of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering
that the same is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section
4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthermore, petitioner's
letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading the Court to take a second, look at his
petition for review on certiorari and that a decision thereon be rendered based purely
on its merits was noted without action.[21]
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case be rendered based on the
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.merits and not on formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents
had left him just because the verification against non-forum shopping is formally
defective." However, in view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October
31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said letter without action.[22]
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Partial Writ of Execution of
its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims
as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 2009, a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment and Order before the CA assailing the October 1, 2001
Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In its Decision dated March 13, 2009, however,
the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the following
wise:
Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has already become final
and executory and in fact entry of judgment was issued on 31 October
2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the issues to rest, We deem it apropos to
tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a
quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
xxxx
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The pivotal issues before Us are: (1) whether there was a time
during the proceedings below that the Petitioners ever prevented
from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or deception, practiced on
them by Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept
away from the court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the
Respondent?
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of the
Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus:
In fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are
stopped from assailing the Court a quo's lack of jurisdiction.
xxxx
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When the appellate court denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution
dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on
June 10, 2009, invoking the following ground:
I.
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as
"Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations
therein show that the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of
decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding
cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a
court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the
latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil actions and ordinary civil
actions.[25] Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no
effect for having been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the
finding of forgery relates only to the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs
who assented to the conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to
them. Petitioner also denies the findings of the courts below that his parents are
builders in bad faith for they only took possession of the subject properties after the
execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the consideration on the sale.
Petitioner maintains that since respondents' complaint alleged the following causes of
action, the same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition:
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in
Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza has no known legal
indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to
the best interest of all heirs that same be partitioned judicially.[26]
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
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As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their
complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real
estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that
respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one
who is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3)
that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an
account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has
no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent's
estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for
judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it
an action for settlement of estate.
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It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if
testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent,
or refuses the trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then
the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall
appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court.[29] An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted
Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due
from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for
partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.[30] The reason is that where the
deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of
an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of
their possession to which they are immediately entitled.[31]
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro
died without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary
to petitioner'.s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit me
subject properties of the estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate
estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially, by Pereira v. Court of Appeals:[32]
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude
the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has
no" debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to
an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the
estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary
action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they
have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted
that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no
debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to
an action for partition. Where' partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings.[33]
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of
a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by
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law. That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of
estate does not mean that there was a prohibited joinder of causes of action for
questions as to the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their
status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also be
properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.[34] In fact, a complete inventory of
the estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the
estate has no debts.[35] Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated.[36]
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint al$o prayed for the annulment of title
and recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could
very well be achieved in an action for partition,[37] as can be seen in cases where
courts determine the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for the
partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership and
possession of property.[38] In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas,[39] wherein a complaint for
annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety
of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title
of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be improper in the
following manner:
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attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title to
the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the
same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of
ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of the same is necessary in
the resolution of an action for partition, as held in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:[40]
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition
is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on ¦ the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the
real estate in question is in order, x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the
parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the [cjourt after the- parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their
just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question, x x x.[41]
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial court acted without
jurisdiction in entertaining -the action of settlement of estate and annulment of title in
a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for
judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed within the
confines of applicable law and jurisprudence. Under Section 1[44] of Republic Act No.
7691 (RA 7691),[45] amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition
and recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering
that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant petition
for annulment Sf judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone, without the
prayer for judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding
for the determination of the status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may
be dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the
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issue to the trial court and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of
heirship.[46] In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[47] the Court explained:
xxxx
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of action alleged
therein, as well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner
more than ample opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted
to allege lack of jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them.
To repeat, the action filed herein is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of
intestate estate. Consequently, that respondents also prayed for the annulment of title
and recovery of possession in the same proceeding does not strip the court off of its
jurisdiction for asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well
be achieved in an action for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to the heirs who
assented to the conveyance as well as their allegation of good faith, this Court does not
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find any Compelling reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As
sufficiently found by both courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the
documents on which petitioner's claims are based were inadequately proven. They were
undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary public who was not commissioned
as such on the date they were executed. They were never presented to the Register of
Deeds for registration. Neither were the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject
properties presented as witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate, actually
acknowledged the sale of the resort, the circumstances surrounding the same militate
against the fact of its occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed
by Benita undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly
evidencing her receipt of her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a
previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners failed to adequately
substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, their claim
that they had, in fact, purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding
the purported transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took place. In
substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and due execution. They
cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim absolute ownership of the subject lands based
on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and builders in good
faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is building
on is one's own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title.[52] However, in
view of the manifest defects in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should
have been placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several cottages and constructed
improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of good faith cannot be given
credence.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or
mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to rest.
[53] It is a fundamental principle in our judicial system and essential to an effective and
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efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.[54]
Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the most
extraordinary of circumstances.[55] Yet, when petitioner is given more than ample
opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased
judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in
the case at hand, the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below
in the absence of any showing that the same were rendered with fraud or lack of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as
it concerns the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 51354 and No.
51355, and family home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___August 5, 2015___ a Decision, copy attached herewith,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on August 27, 2015 at 1:30 p.m.
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[*] Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per
[*] Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with Associate Justices Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), and Rosalina Asuncion-
Vicente concurring; rollo, pp. 38-48.
[11] Id.
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[24] Id at 21.
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special
rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided
one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
[29] Avelino v. Court of Appeals, et. al., 385 Phil. 1014, 1020 (2000), citing Utulo v.
[30] Id. at 1021; Torres v. Torres, 119 Phil. 444, 447 (1964).
[31] Guico, et. al. v. Bautista, et. al, 110 Phil. 584, 586 (1960), citing Bondad v.
Bondad, 34 Phil. 232 (1916); Fule v. Fule, 46 Phil. 317 (1924); Macalinao v. Valdez, et
al., 95 Phil. 318 (1954); 50 Off. Gaz., 3041; Intestate Estate of Rufina Mercado v.
Magtibay, et al., 96 Phil. 383 (1954).
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[33] Pereira v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 868. (Emphases ours; citations omitted)
[34] Id. at 869, citing Monserrat v. Ibanez, G.R No. L-3369, May 24,1950.
[36] Id.
[37] Pereira v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26, at 869, citing Intestate Estate of
[38] Genesis Investment, Inc. v. Heirs of Ceferino Ebarasabal, G.R. No. 181622,
November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 399; Heirs of Juanita Padilla v. Magdua, 645 Phil. 140
(2010): and Reillo v. San Jose, 607 Phil 446 (2009).
[39] G.R. No. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013, 706 SCRA 73.
[40] G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.
omitted)
[43] Id.
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; x x x."
[45] An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
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Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Approved on
25 March 1994.
[50] Id at 131.
[51] Id.
[52] Cua v. Vargas, 326 Phil. 1082, 1094 (2006), citing Ongsitco v. CA, 325 Phil. 1069,
1077 (1996), quoting Pleasantville Development Corporation v. CA, 323 Phil. 12, 22
(1996), and Floreza v. De Evangelista, 185 Phil. 85, 91 (1980).
[53] Ram's Studio and Photographic Equipment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 542,
550 (2000).
[55] Id.
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