Son Cui vs .

Anatacia Guapengco

APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT SUSTAINED

FACTS:
The case at bar, involves to the hereditary and conjugal rights of the plaintiffs and
defendants to the property of one Fernando Roxas Tan Tungco, deceased. It is alleged
in the complaint that said Tan Tungco was born in Tangua China in 1853 and that he
married the plaintiff Son Cui in China about a year in 1868 with six sons. On the 21st
day of April, 1892, leaving a last will and testament purporting to have been executed in
July, 1891; that after the death of Tan Tungco three of the sons above named, Tan
Muico, Tan Chujay, and Tan Quico, died intestate and that the four plaintiffs herein are
their only heirs at law; that under said will Leon Guepangco, Antonio Roxas, and the
defendant Atanasia Guepangco were made alternative executors, and that upon the
death of Tan Tungco they took possession of all of his property, both real and personal,
together with all his papers, documents, and books of accounts, and administered said
property until the 25th day of April, 1901.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the three plaintiffs are the legitimate children of Tan Tangco for if
legitimate, their interest would be greater than they otherwise would.

HELD:
The court constrained upon the question of the marriage in China is sustained by the
evidence. In support of this conclusion we desire to call particular attention to the case
of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia (16 Phil. Rep., 137).The fact that the alleged Chinese wife
and her children lived, as they allege, from 1868 to 1908 without having ever presented
any claim against Tan Tungco, that it was sixteen years after his death, and after all his
property had been divided in accordance with his will before the plaintiffs began this
action or made any claim whatever; that the proof of marriage by plaintiffs’ witnesses is
entirely offset by the proofs of the defendants that there could have been no marriage at
the time assigned; and many other facts and circumstances pertinent to this case are
there discussed in full with ample citations of authorities. Wherefore, Upon all the
evidence in this case and upon the authority of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra, the
judgment in this case is affirmed, without special finding as to costs.
 [G.R. No. 6163. March 14, 1912. ]

SON CUI, TAN CHUI TOO ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATANASIA GUEPANGCO Y

LIM, LUISA TAN TUNGCO Y GUEPANGCO ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

O’Brien & DeWitt, for Appellants.

Perfecto Gabriel and Chicote & Miranda, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT SUSTAINED. — Facts, circumstances and evidence

examined and weighed and found insufficient to warrant a reversal of the findings of the
trial court.

2. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; PRESUMPTION OF THE LEGALITY OF MARRIAGE; BURDEN OF

PROOF. — Every intendment of the law leans to matrimony. When a marriage has been
shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the
law raises a strong presumption of its legality — not only casting the burden of proof on the
party objecting, but requiring him throughout, in every particular, to make plain, against
the constant pressure of this presumption, the truth of law and fact that it is illegal and
void.

3. ID.; ID.; PERSONS DWELLING TOGETHER IN APPARENT MATRIMONY. — Persons dwelling

together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

4. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF LEGALITY OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY. — If a ceremony of

marriage appears in evidence, it is presumed to have been rightly performed, and to have
been preceded by all the needful preliminaries.

5. ID.; ID.; ID. — When a marriage has been solemnized according to the forms of law,
every presumption will be indulged in favor of its validity. The ordinary presumption in favor
of the continuance of human life is made to give way to the presumption in favor of the
innocence of a second marriage. It is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF IMPEDIMENTS PRESUMED. — It is settled law that when a
marriage has been consummated in accordance with the forms of the law, it is presumed
that no legal impediments existed to the parties entering into such marriage, and the fact, if
shown, that either or both of the parties have been previously married, and that such wife
or husband of the first marriage is still living, does not destroy the prima facie legality of the
last marriage. The presumption in such a case is that the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, and the burden of proving that it has not rests upon the party seeking to impeach
the last marriage. (Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind., 189.)

DECISION

MORELAND, J. :
It is further alleged in the complaint that Tan Tungco was a Chinese subject at the time of
his death and that his property ought, therefore, to be distributed according to the laws of
China; that under the laws of China the mistress and illegitimate children living outside the
family take nothing, and the daughters are entitled to nothing but support until marriage,
when they may claim the marriage dowry. The plaintiffs pray for a discovery, an
accounting; a receivership; the notation of a lis pendens in the registry of property with
respect to all of the real estate belonging to the estate; that the plaintiffs be declared the
only surviving heirs of Tan Tungco, and as such the legal owners of the original estate of
Fernando Roxas Tan Tungco and the property into which it has been converted; that the
defendants be declared to have held the original property, and the property into which it
has been converted, as well as the rents and profits therefrom, in trust for the plaintiffs;
that the will above referred to be set aside as making an unlawful disposition of the estate
in that it deprives the plaintiffs of the property to which they are entitled under the law and
of which the deceased could not legally deprive them.

The defendants deny generally. As a special defense they allege that Tan Tungco was born
in China in 1842; that he came here when he was 11 years of age and lived here
continuously, with the exception of short journeys made to China, until he was 43 years of
age; that he established his permanent residence and domicile in the Philippine Islands and
acquired a large property and had extensive business interests which he maintained here
until his death; that he was baptized in the Christian faith and afterwards, on or about the
year 1871, being then single, he married the defendant Atanasia Guepangco y Lim; that
they lived together as husband and wife from that time forward until the death of said Tan
Tungco; that the result of that union was the four defendants Luisa, Romana, Cecilia, and
Maria; that Tan Tungco, by the said will of the 15th of July, 1891, named these said children
as his only legitimate children and as his only legal heirs; that after the death of Tan Tungco
an appraisal and inventory of his estate was made and thereafter it was partitioned and
divided in accordance with the will, which partition was approved by the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. Defendants further allege that the plaintiff Son Cui has no
right, interest, or participation whatever in the estate of Tan Tungco, and that the other
plaintiffs, the illegitimate Chinese sons of Tan Tungco, have no other right, interest, or
participation in the property of Tan Tungco than that given them by the will above named.

It is undisputed that Fernando Roxas Tan Tungco was born in the year 1842 in the town of
Cuayan, China; that in the year 1853, when 11 years old, he came to the Philippine Islands;
that he went into business as an industrial partner in a shop on Calle Rosario in the city of
Manila, and subsequently became the owner of the business; that some time in the year
1866 he and the defendant Atanasia Guepangco, although unmarried, began to live
together as man and wife, and a child was born to them on the 13th day of March, 1867, to
whom the name Leandro was given; that in 1869 another child was born, and in 1871 after
three children had been born to them, one of whom died, the parents were married; that a
number of children were born after the marriage; that those children born of that union
whose names do not appear here as defendants are dead, their only heirs at law being the
defendants in this action.

It is also substantially undisputed that the plaintiffs in this action Tan Chui Too, Tan Coco,
and Tan Sioco (Luico) are the sons of Tan Tungco by the plaintiff Son Qui, substantially the
only question being as to whether these children are legitimate or illegitimate. It is admitted
that if they are illegitimate and are not recognized as natural children they have no interest
whatever in the estate of their father under the laws of the Philippine Islands Having been
recognized, however, by Tan Tungco as natural children, it is admitted that as such they are
entitled to the same rights in his property as he gave them in his will. (Civil Code, art. 840.)
The main question to determine, therefore, is whether or not said three plaintiffs are the
legitimate children of Tan Tungco; for if legitimate, their interests would be greater than
they otherwise would.

Upon this question the evidence is hopelessly conflicting. The plaintiffs have presented as
witnesses persons who allege that they saw with their own eyes the marriage performed
between Son Cui and Tan Tungco in Tangua, China, in the year 1868. They have presented
what is termed the marriage contract between the family of Tan Tungco and Son Cui,
bearing date June or July, 1868; they have presented the plaintiff Son Cui, the alleged wife
of Tan Tungco, who testifies to the marriage and to the fact that she lived with her husband
during the short periods that he visited China and that she bore him six children as
heretofore stated.

On the other hand, the defendants introduced evidence tending to show that Tan Tungco
came to the Philippine Islands when he was 11 years old, in other words, in 1853, and that
he never left the Islands until the year 1872 at the earliest. The evidence thus presented
consists in the testimony of the Filipina wife Atanasia, the defendant, and of other persons
who had knowledge of the fact. It also consists of certain data, or the absence of certain
data, in the public records of the Philippine Islands relative to Tan Tungco, which data
should have been matter of public record if Tan Tungco had left the Philippine Islands for
China in the year 1868 as alleged by the plaintiffs. Defendants assert, in the first place, that
from the year 1867 forward no Chinaman was allowed to leave the Philippine Islands
without first obtaining special permission to do so and without procuring also a passport,
which permission and the issuance of which passport became necessarily public records.
Defendants assert, in the second place, that, in the year 1867, Tan Tungco, as did every
other Chinese resident of the Philippine Islands, had what was known in the Spanish law as
a registered residence number; that number remained the same so long as the holder
thereof remained continuously in the Philippine Islands. If, however, he left the Philippine
Islands and thereafter returned, on his return such number was changed and he thereafter
was known under a different registered number.

Basing themselves upon these facts the defendants assert and prove by the public records
themselves and by the testimony of the keeper of those records of that date, that Tan
Tungco was not given permission or a passport to leave the Philippine Islands at any time
during the years from 1867 to 1871, inclusive, and that the registered residence number of
Tan Tungco was the same in 1871 that it was in 1867. These two facts, and the conclusions
drawn from them, are presented by the defendants to substantiate and support the direct
testimony given by the witnesses who declare that Tan Tungco was continuously in the
Philippine Islands from 1853 to 1872, and from such evidence they assert that he could not
have married Son Cui in China in 1868 as the plaintiffs allege.

In this connection it must be remembered that Tan Tungco was one of the prominent
Chinamen of the Philippine Islands, particularly of Manila. He was a large business man, was
a Catholic, had married a Filipina woman, and was one of the first Chinese citizens of
Manila. Only a few years after he married the defendant Atanasia Guepangco he held
various concessions from the Philippine Government, among them the opium concession for
Iloilo, Cagayan, Negros, and Antique, these facts show that he was prominent and rapidly
progressing even before the year 1868. It is not conceivable that a man of such prominence
and so widely known would surreptitiously leave the Philippine Islands for China (as he did
as late as 1871, if the testimony of the plaintiffs be true) without obtaining the consent and
the passport required by law, thus jeopardizing not only his personal position in the
community but his property and business interests. So that, it having been demonstrated
that no passport was issued to Tan Tungco from 1867 to 1871, inclusive, and that during
that time he received no permission whatever to leave the Philippine Islands, and that his
registered residence number was the same in 1871 that it was in 1867, there is presented
for our consideration a fact of striking importance.

In reply the plaintiffs maintain that the testimony of Atanasia Guepangco herself is a
substantial admission upon the part of the defendants that the marriage between Son Cui
and Tan Tungco actually occurred, the only difference between the claims of the plaintiffs
and those of the defendants being as to the year in which it occurred; the plaintiffs claiming
that it occurred in 1868 and the defendants admitting that it occurred in 1883. The oft-
repeated assertion of the plaintiffs that defendants admit the marriage is not supported by
the record. We do not find any admission whatever of the sort, and we are led to the
conclusion that such assertion was based upon the testimony of Atanasia herself in her
declaration as a witness in her own behalf to which we have just referred. She stated in
effect that her husband, upon her urgent request by telegram, returned to the Philippine
Islands about 1882 or 1883 after a few months’ absence in China; that she had been left in
charge of the business by Tan Tungco during his absence; that while he was away she
heard that he had gone there to get married, and being considerably upset over such news
she had at once telegraphed him to return to attend to his own business as she would have
nothing further to do with it; that upon his return, in the perhaps stormy scene which
immediately succeeded his arrival, he made some statements to her indicating, as she
seems to say, that he had recently been married in China, but that he had been forced into
the marriage by his mother, against his will. Another witness for the defense testified to
something somewhat similar. This is the only part of the record so far as we have been able
to discover, which could in any way be tortured into an admission on the part of the
defendants of the marriage of Son Cui and Tan Tungco.

We do not belittle the importance of this testimony. Of its competency and relevancy we
need not speak. Under all the circumstances we hesitate to give it that importance and
weight which the plaintiffs claim for it. We are of the opinion that too much significance
could easily be attached to it by a misunderstanding of its proper setting in this case. It is
admitted, as we have said, and that fact the deceased never attempted to conceal, that he
was maintaining a concubine in China and that he was raising children by her. It is
undoubted that he was maintaining both her and the children and that he went to China
every two or three years for short visits, and, doubtless, lived with that family while there.
Such continuous cohabitation and such relationship, resulting in the creation and rearing of
a family and extending through a considerable period of years, might very readily lead
persons, including Atanasia herself, to speak of the relationship as a marriage and the
persons resulting from those relations as his family. It is well known that such relationships,
carried on for such a long period of time, and the rearing and maintenance of a family, lead
people generally to speak of the parties to that relationship as husband and wife, and the
fruits thereof as the legitimate offspring of the parents. We do not believe, therefore, that
too much stress should be laid upon the fact that Atanasia spoke of Son Cui as the wife of
Tan Tungco, or even the fact that Tan Tungco himself spoke of her as his wife should be
given too much prominence under all the facts and circumstances in this case. Atanasia, it
must be remembered, was testifying to an event which occurred twenty-eight years before,
which was made up of facts and circumstances which she might easily have forgotten and
which she might easily have misunderstood, particularly in view of the fact that her husband
had returned hurriedly at her impatient request and that the relations between the two were
probably considerably strained at the moment. The words which passed between them at
that time were doubtless somewhat thoughtless, may not have been well chosen, were
spoken by a Chinaman to a Filipina, and may not have been measured with that care and
solemnity which characterizes words used after deliberation. These words must be taken in
connection with the fact that Tan Tungco, under far different circumstances and surrounded
by far different conditions, made statements entirely at variance with that upon which the
plaintiffs lay so much stress. (a) At the time of his marriage to Atanasia in 1872 he solemnly
deposed under oath that he was single and had never been married previously, nor had he
ever been engaged to be married theretofore. (b) The will of June 15, 1891, duly executed
by Fernando Roxas Tan Tungco and duly attested and probated, contains the following: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"Fourth. I give and bequeath to my natural children which I have in China, namely, Tan
Luico, Tan Coco, Tan Quico, Tan Muico, and Tan Chujay, and Tan Chui Too the one-third
part of my property, for the reason that I hereby recognize said children as my natural
children in the manner required by law, and for that reason the legacy which I bequeath to
them is all the property which I am able to give them under the law, namely, a one-third
part."c ralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

The fifth clause of the will reads as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"Fifth. I declare, as I have already said, that I am married to Doña Atanasia Quepangco [of
Binondo], of which marriage there have been born various children, those now living being
Romana, Cecilia, Luisa, and Maria, all of the surname Roxas Tan Tungco y Quepangco." c ralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

In this instrument, as is seen, the deceased Tan Tungco states what he evidently believed
to be his true relationship with all of the parties to this action. It was a deliberate
statement; it was made after due consideration of all the facts in the case and after due
deliberation as to the effect which such statements would have upon the rights of the
parties in reference to whom it was made, and with the view that it would probably be the
last word of his life upon that subject. He knew that if that document contained a lie he
would go to his grave with his last act a falsehood and its fruit injustice. Moreover, the
admission, so called, of the marriage, as made by Atanasia in her testimony is not
corroborative of or corroborated by the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses as to the
marriage as it is admitted that the two sets of witnesses were speaking of events happening
fourteen years apart. As between the two statements we are inclined to say that made in
the will is entitled to the greatest consideration, and believe that to it should be given the
greatest weight. To say the least, we are satisfied upon the whole case that the proofs are
such that we can not justly say that the decision of the trial court in that respect is against
their fair preponderance.

We are constrained to believe that the judgment of the court below upon the question of the
marriage in China is sustained by the evidence. In support of this conclusion we desire to
call particular attention to the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia (16 Phil. Rep., 137).
Substantially every word of the opinion in that case is applicable to the case at bar. The
importance of the question at issue; the kind of proof required to establish the alleged prior
marriage when the later marriage is admitted by all; the difficulty on the part of the
defendants of rebutting the testimony relating to the marriage presented by the plaintiffs;
the relationship of the witnesses testifying as to the marriage with the plaintiffs; the
impossibility of effective cross-examination of witnesses; the difference in nationality; the
fact that the alleged Chinese wife and her children lived, as they allege, from 1868 to 1908
without having ever presented any claim against Tan Tungco; that it was sixteen years after
his death, and after all his property had been divided in accordance with his will before the
plaintiffs began this action or made any claim whatever; that the proof of marriage by
plaintiffs’ witnesses is entirely offset by the proofs of the defendants that there could have
been no marriage at the time assigned; and many other facts and circumstances pertinent
to this case are there discussed in full with ample citations of authorities.
Upon all the evidence in this case and upon the authority of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra,
the judgment in this case is affirmed, without special finding as to costs.