This document summarizes several Philippine Supreme Court cases related to marriage validity:
1) Navarro vs. Domagtoy held that a marriage was null and void because the spouse was still married, and affidavits of a spouse's absence were not sufficient proof of death without a formal declaration. A second marriage was valid because it was performed within the judge's jurisdiction per the Family Code.
2) Pugeda vs. Trias found a marriage valid even though it was not recorded, because witnesses testified the couple lived as husband and wife until the wife's death.
3) People vs. Borromeo held that lack of marriage records does not invalidate a marriage if all validity requirements are met, and the
This document summarizes several Philippine Supreme Court cases related to marriage validity:
1) Navarro vs. Domagtoy held that a marriage was null and void because the spouse was still married, and affidavits of a spouse's absence were not sufficient proof of death without a formal declaration. A second marriage was valid because it was performed within the judge's jurisdiction per the Family Code.
2) Pugeda vs. Trias found a marriage valid even though it was not recorded, because witnesses testified the couple lived as husband and wife until the wife's death.
3) People vs. Borromeo held that lack of marriage records does not invalidate a marriage if all validity requirements are met, and the
This document summarizes several Philippine Supreme Court cases related to marriage validity:
1) Navarro vs. Domagtoy held that a marriage was null and void because the spouse was still married, and affidavits of a spouse's absence were not sufficient proof of death without a formal declaration. A second marriage was valid because it was performed within the judge's jurisdiction per the Family Code.
2) Pugeda vs. Trias found a marriage valid even though it was not recorded, because witnesses testified the couple lived as husband and wife until the wife's death.
3) People vs. Borromeo held that lack of marriage records does not invalidate a marriage if all validity requirements are met, and the
This document summarizes several Philippine Supreme Court cases related to marriage validity:
1) Navarro vs. Domagtoy held that a marriage was null and void because the spouse was still married, and affidavits of a spouse's absence were not sufficient proof of death without a formal declaration. A second marriage was valid because it was performed within the judge's jurisdiction per the Family Code.
2) Pugeda vs. Trias found a marriage valid even though it was not recorded, because witnesses testified the couple lived as husband and wife until the wife's death.
3) People vs. Borromeo held that lack of marriage records does not invalidate a marriage if all validity requirements are met, and the
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NAVARRO VS.
DOMAGTOY, 259 SCRA 129
FACTS: Navarro filed charges against Judge Hernando Domagtoy for gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. In relation to the first charges against him, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Tagadan and Borga despite his knowledge that Tagadan is separated from his first wife. He merely relied on the affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar confirming the fact that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7) years giving to the presumption that she is already dead. Second charge against him is that he performed a marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario outside his jurisdiction. The wedding was perfomed at the respondents residence in the municipality of Dapa which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized by the respondent judge are valid under the Family Code.
HELD: First marriage is null and void. Article 41 of the Family Code requires that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. The marriage solemnized has resulted in a bigamous marriage as provided under Article 35 of the Family Code. Affidavits saying that Tagadans wife has not been heard of for almost seven years are not sufficient proof. Second marriage is valid. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7(1), marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the Judiciary within the Courts jurisdiction. Respondent Judge holds jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Maria-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. And also stated in Article 8 of the Family code where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
PUGEDA VS. TRIAS, 4 SCRA 849
FACTS: Maria Ferrer was married to Mariano Trias, who, later on, died. Ferrer then contracted a subsequent marriage. Pugeda and his witness, Ricafrante, testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, Pugeda and Ferrer went to the office of Justice of Peace to ask Ricafrante to solemnize the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer. The marriage was celebrated in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was Salazar and another Prudente. After the usual ceremony, Ricafrante asked parties to sign two copies of marriage contract. He delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of Sanitary Division. However, there was no celebration of the marriage was held because Pugeda was busy campaigning and Ferrer was already on the family way. The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a phostatic copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite in the month of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer existed.
HELD: Witnesses were introduces that after the marriage, Pugeda and Ferrer lived together in the house of the latter. Evidence was also submitted that the first issue was baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Ferrer. The baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of spouses Pugeda and Ferrer. The registry of said birth also states that the father is Pugeda and the mother is Ferrer. Furthermore, it is not denied that Pugeda and Ferrer cohabited as husband and wife until the death of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and wife. After a review of the testimonial and documental evidence, the judge arrived at the conclusion that Pugeda was in fact married to Ferrer. The court cited Art. 53 of the civil code: As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind.
PEOPLE VS. BORROMEO, 133 SCRA 106
FACTS: Elias Borromeo and Susana Taborada were married and their marriage bore one child. On the noon of July 3, 1981, it was reported that Borromeo killed his wife using a kitchen bolo and thus convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. There were witnesses and police officers who testified against him. He claims that he cannot be charged with parricide and should only be liable for homicide, since he was never legally married to the victim on the grounds that the officiating priest testified against it and there was no marriage contract executed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Borromeo can be considered married to the victim and be liable for parricide.
HELD: Yes. The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the marriage registry does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. People living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society. Hence, he can be convicted for the crime parricide.
MARIATEGUI VS CA, 205 SCRA 337
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, he contracted three marriages. With his first wife in 1953, he begot 4 children; with his second wife in, a daughter. Lupo and Felipa, the third wife, were alleged to have been lawfully married sometime in 1930. They had three children. At the time of Lupos death, he left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves said lot. Lupos children by his third marriage now claim that they were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. They pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the children by the third marriage are entitled to successional rights over the said lots.
HELD: Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. A marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co- ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.
TENEBRO VS CA, GR 150158, February 18, 2004
FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. They lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Anjacas also verified that Tenebro was indeed married to Villareyes in the form of a handwritten letter made by Villareyes. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against Tenebro. He denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no wedding ceremony took place to solemnize their union. Furthermore, he argues that his second marriage has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: The prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the first marriage, between Tenebro and Villareyes. Evidence presented was in the form of: 1. a copy of a marriage contract which was solemnized at the Manila City hall before Rev. Torres; 2. Handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas, informing her that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. The subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of Tenebros valid marriage to Villareyes, Tenebros marriage to Ancajas, would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated in 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
RP vs DAYOT, GR 175581 MARCH 28, 2008
FACTS: Felisa and Jose Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall in 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5 years. In 1993, Jose filed a complaint for annulment. He contended that his marriage was a sham as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between them. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa sometime in 1986. He lived in Felisas house as a border. Three weeks later, Felisa requested to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall to claim a package sent by her brother. Upon arrival, a man asked Jose to sign papers so that the package could be released. He refused but Felisa cajoled him. In 1987, Jose discovered that he signed a marriage contract. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. In 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Jose claimed that he did not consent to the marriage with Felisa. Joses sister was put into the stand and she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate. Case was brought to the CA and but the CA did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD: It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio.
CARIO VS CARIO, GR 102569 FEBRUARY 2, 2001
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages, the first was in 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao-Cario with whom he had two offsprings; and the second was in 1992, with respondent Susan Yee-Cario with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. Cario passed away, due to illness, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Yee admitted that her marriage to Cario took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the first marriage is valid considering that Cario and Nicdao contracted marriage w/o marriage license. 2. Whether or not the subsequent marriage is valid since the marriage was contracted w/o first obtaining a judicial declaration of the previous marriage.
HELD: 1. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof renders the marriage void ab initio. There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. 2. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. REPUBLIC VS CA AND CASTRO236 SCRA 257
FACTS: Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the knowledge of Castros parents. Cardenas processed the documents required for the celebration of marriage, including the procurement of marriage license. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD: The court affirmed the impugned decision that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently proves that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Although, the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
NIAL VS BADAYOG, GR 133778 MARCH 14, 2000
FACTS: Pepito Nial was married with Teodulfa Bellones 1974. They had children. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death in 1985. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years thus exempt from securing a marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident in 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void
HELD: The applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit stating that they cohabited for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. The fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. Therefore, Pepitos marriage to Norma is void.