PFR Cases

1st Case
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA,
represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were
married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978
and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began
introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon
made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997

Civil Registrar :
Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at

Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22,
1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said
marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners
prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the
father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the
petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as
a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be
ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order10 of November 29, 2007, they filed the present
petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an
action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals12 and Republic v.
Kho,13 they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the
subject of a petition under Rule 108.14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil
registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they
ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records17 and that the
rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage
as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the
petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in
a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before
the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits
received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while
the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners
are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the
latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as
the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral
attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth
records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents
were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely
innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant
of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Marriage Contract, records, p. 8.
2
Certificate of Live Birth, id. at 9.
3
Id. at 10.
4
Id. at 11.
5
Report of Death, id. at14-15.
6
Id. at 16-17.
7
Certificate of Marriage, id. at 19-20.
8
Id. at 1-7.
9
Penned by Presiding Judge Nilo M. Sarsaba; id. at 93-101.
10
Penned by Presiding Judge Nilo M. Sarsaba; id. at 122-123.
11
G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 127.
12
G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001, 367 SCRA 110.
13
G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 177.
14
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. ─ Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) change of name.
15
Art. 412 of the Civil Code. No entry in a civil registrar shall be changed or corrected without a judgment order.
16
Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963. March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488.
17
See p. 11 of petition, rollo, p. 21.
18
Art. 171.
"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only
in the following cases:
"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
2nd Case

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas
lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that
he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for
validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took
place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify
from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no
record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL –
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage
to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts
to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the
crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing
Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995
and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document
attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a
marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The
mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against
this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by
the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent
in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws
are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition
of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of
a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage
license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract
marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to
note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner,
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity
of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s
basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second
marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has
ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for
the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage,
contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void,
constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity.2 As early as
the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the
rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by
way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express
provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound
by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until
judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the
decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and
legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first
marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family
Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may
be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state
that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a
subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were
contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt
the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be
considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the
Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily
to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity
to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity
which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of
the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the
earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity.
Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial
declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to
assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as
if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First,
psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither
the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage
(i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of
relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as
evident.11 It would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void
if it were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike
the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No.
8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36,
celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code.
The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that
marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity
remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such
marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy.
Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that
a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has
declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has explained that for a person to be held
guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of
a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has
been contracted without the necessary license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the
second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances,
however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the
perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for
bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential
or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that
ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not
negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of
the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is
no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
Footnotes
1
TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11.
2
Record, p. 78.
3
Record, p. 84.
4
TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9.
5
Record, pp. 1-2.
6
Id., p. 66.
7
TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6.
8
Id., pp. 6-7.
9
Id., pp. 7-8.
10
Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162.
11
Rollo, p. 7.
12
Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE. Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.
13
Rollo, pp. 7-16.
14
Id., pp. 16-18.
15
Record, p. 85.
16
Record, p. 84.
17
Record, p. 148.
18
Record, p. 149.
19
Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992, 205 SCRA 337, 343, citing People v.
Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126.
20
Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional Trial Court of Argao,
Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 43).
21
Record, pp. 16-18.
22
Family Code, Art. 41.
23
24
Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family Code,
Articles 2 and 3.
25
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full — or half-blood.
26
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse
or his or her own spouse.
27
Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996.
28
VITUG,
1
Article 349, Revised Penal Code.
2
Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033.
3
100 Phil 1033.
4
See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.
5
Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327.
6
143 SCRA 499.
7
145 SCRA 229.
8
I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage even for
purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that the marriage, at least ostensibly,
has taken place. For instance, no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when either or both
parties have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a "no" marriage situation or when the prior
"marriage" is between persons of the same sex.
9
Deliberations of the family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996.
10
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
11
One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity merely renders a
marriage voidable, not void.
12
De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et. Al., 109
Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al., 144 Phil. 1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil 246; People vs. Lara,
51 O. G. 4079.
13
People vs. Lara, supra.
14
De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.
3rd Case

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto
parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally,
married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never
issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the
Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July
2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider
the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage
License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage
License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly,
the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of
the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s
claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice
and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as
part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their
children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and
the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and
that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found
that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and
the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the
properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership
of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate
proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos.
N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621,
194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,
194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B.
Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila
are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s
money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an
accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except
for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties
shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and
Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of
Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the
case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her
evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally
still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed
despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was
no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and
void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish
that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by
them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under
his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof
of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-
109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall
be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common
and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first
marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had
waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s
decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her
evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to
the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008.
Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and
28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial
court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin
who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority
of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case.
Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements
were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail
to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her
right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite
the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that
Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning
the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an
inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay
and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage
could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to
present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked
this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to"
her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and
that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real
property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in
the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed
that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City
did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier,
Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of
the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out
by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the
society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which
stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth
certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were
supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered
by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made
their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious
are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous
marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands"
that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title
"married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited
the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella
practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part
of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we
have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s
continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing
the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the
case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012.
1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Estela M. PerlasBernabe
with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan,
concurring.
3
Id. at 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and
Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
4
Id. at 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella.
5
Records, Vol. 2, p. 461.
6
Id. at 122-123.
7
Id. at 124-128.
8
Id. at 40.
9
See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 353.
10
Id.
11
Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
12
Article 35 of the Family Code states:
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
13
14
Id. at 459.
15
Id. at 460.
16
Rollo, p. 112.
17
Id.
18
19
Id. at 66.
20
Supra note 12.
21
Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
xxxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxxx
22
Rollo, p. 40.
23
Id. at 112-113.
24
See Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7 September 2011, 657 SCRA 330.
25
26
Id. at 23.
27
Id. at 24-26.
28
Id. at 27-28.
29
Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).
30
Id.
31
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, 27 July 2010, 625 SCRA 684.
32
Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, 27 September 2010, 631 SCRA 312.
4th Case

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced
an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked
petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the
advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
"without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because
she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued
that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the
former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang
only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos
in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like
Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos
long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the
indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of
a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and
wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered
their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her
marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She
attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the
testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain
attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware
of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second
marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage
license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license,
because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it
is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without
completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the instant
Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards
petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence
supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should
have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the
commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous
marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances,
as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second
spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as
a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1)
when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of
him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was
the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in
the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with
bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC,
which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of
bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law,
writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already
bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be
that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is
that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which
has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term,
to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six
months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it
as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case,
petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the
validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage
license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that
their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six
months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified
that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited
with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked
him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met
Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four
years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show
that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of
them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years
before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of
Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that
they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks
to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing
that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing
individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath,
adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action appears
to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the
courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her
marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years
prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well
that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second
marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19
August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage.
In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly
illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court
cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 56-70, 72-73; the CA Decision dated 21 September 2011 and Resolution dated 5 January 2012 were
penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Elihu
A. Ybañez, concurring.
2
Id. at 75-83, 85-86; the RTC Decision dated 21May2010 and Order date 24 June 2010 were penned by Judge
Celso 0. Baguio of RTC Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija.
3
Id. at 88; Certificate of Marriage issued by the Civil Registry of Nueva Ecija.
4
Records, p. 1.
5
Id. at I 17; hi' Certificate of Death showed that he died during the pendency of the case on 28 November 2001.
6
Rollo, p. 87; Marriage Contract between Nicanor Santos and Estela Galang.
7
Id. at 57-58; CA Decision, pp. 2-3.
8
Id. at 80; RTC Decision, p. 6. See also records, pp. 269-270, 117; the appointment papers of petitioner showed
that she worked as a faculty member of Divina Pastora College, and the Death Certificate of Nicanor Santos
indicated that he was a laborer.
9
Id. at 83; RTC Decision, p. 9.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 86; RTC Order, p. 2.
12
Id. at 70, 73; CA Decision, p. 15, CA Resolution, p. 2.
13
No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079.
14
Id. at 152-169; Comment filed on 23 August 2012 by the Office of the Solicitor General.
15
G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012, 684 SCRA 315.
16
159-A Phil. 771 (1975).
17
111 Phil.291 (1961).
18
Supra note 16, at 775.
19
Rollo, pp. 64-68, CA Decision dated 21 September 2011, pp. 9-13; rollo, pp. 80-81; RTC Decision dated 21 May
2010, pp. 6-7.
20
People v. Arcilla, 326 Phil. 774 (1996).
21
supra note 17, at 293.
22
Luis B. Reyes, the Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two, p. 979, Volume II (2012) citing Viada, 3 Cod.
Pen. 274.
23
Revised Penal Code, Art. 52.
24
Act No. 4103 (1965).
25
De la Cruz v. Ejercito, 160-A Phil. 669 (1975), Zapanta v. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227 (1962), Merced v. Diez, 109
Phil. 155 (1960), and People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). .
26
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648 (2000).
27
Rollo, p. 77, RTC Decision, p. 3; records, pp. 311-312, Motion for Reconsideration filed by Santiago before the
RTC, pp. 2-3.
28
29
Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan, 242 Phil. 519 (1988).
30
People v. Flores, 442 Phil. 561 (2002).
31
Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553 (2008).
32
The TSN dated 13 June 2002, p. 3 reflected that petitioner met Santos in 1996; but according to the TSN dated
10 August 2004, she clarified in her additional direct testimony that she met Santos in 1993. In both cases, she
only knew Santos for less than five years prior their marriage on 29 July 1997.
33
Id. at 4.
34
Id. at 7-8.
35
TSN, 24 October 2002, p. 14.
36
I d. at 2.
37
Records, p. 88. Certified True Copy of the Certificate of Marriage between Nicanor F. Santos and Leonila G.
Santiago.
38
Tenebro v. CA, 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
39
Id. at 744.
40
Republic v. Albios. G.R. No. 198780, 16 October2013.
41
Manuelv. People, 512 Phil 818, 851 (2005).
42
A cabal v. A cabal, 494 Phil. 528 (2005).
43
Muller v. Muller, 531 Phil. 460 (2006).
44
REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 349-352 .Art. 350 punish the crime of illegal marriages as follows: Art. 350.
Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. - The penalty of prison correctional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding
article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. If either of
the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.
45
CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Sec. 2.
46
Supra note 40.
5th Case
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the
judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial
court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively
dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17,
2008.2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an
apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they
moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months
after and was never heard from again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City,
but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends,
but no one gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer
avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo,
despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This
residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of
Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad.20 Neither
did she go to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent
for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the
conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their
children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a
sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the
spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief
of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not
disappear in the first place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of
presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a
sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive
death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it
cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina
under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final,
and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud
in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent
acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a
real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis
supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false
allegations in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years.
There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general
circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's
petition to declare her presumptively dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were
false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals
sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the
July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in
October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and
before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on
her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second
marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence
of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the
present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by
reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of
the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent
marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if
the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that
the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the
validity of the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage
in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally
an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage and
the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered
valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death,
lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare
his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when
he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the
Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage
does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This
court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove
the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but
also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in
such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for
bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome
of an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not
suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe,* JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1829 dated October 8, 2014.
1
Rollo, pp. 23, 27-29, 35-36.
2
Id. at 62.
3
Id. at 27.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 28.
10
Id. at 27-28.
11
Id. at 28.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 18.
14
Id. at 37-45.
15
Id. at 40.
16
Id. at 40, 42.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 40-41.
19
Id. at 42.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 43.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 41.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 23.
28
Id. at 23-24.
29
Id. at 25.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 16.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 16-17.
35
Id. at 57-67.
36
RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 1.
37
38
Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
39
Id. at 890.
40
Rollo, pp. 39^0.
41
Id. at 39.
42
Id. at 40-41.
43
Id. at 41-43.
44
Id. at 41.
45
Id. at 37-45.
46
47
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
48
See also A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 282 (2004).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
520 Phil. 249 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
52
The applicable law in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon was the Civil Code, although there was a short discussion
on the relevant Family Code provisions.
53
Id. at 264.
54
Id., citing A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 285-286
(1999); See also A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 285-286
(2004).
55
Family CODE, art. 41. (A declaration of presumptive death must be based on good faith and on a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead.)
56
FAMILY CODE, art. 41.
57
FAMILY CODE, art. 41.
58
FAMILY CODE, Art. 35(4) and 41; Rev. Pen. Code, art. 349.
59
See A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 283 (2004).
60
520 Phil. 249, 264 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division], citing A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES:
COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 282 (1999); See also A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES:
COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE vol. 1, 284 (2004).
61
A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE: OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 284 (2004).
62
FAMILY CODE, art. 43
The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate, and their
custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding. . .
63
Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 833-835, 836-837 (2005) (Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
64
See A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 4, 2003)
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES
....
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, (n)
....
See also Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 27, 34 [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division] wherein
this court explained that:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commencedafter March 15,
2003. (Emphasis in the original)
The subsequent marriage in this case took place in 2008.
65
(In Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 577 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division], this court ruled
that a real party in interest may file an action to nullify a marriage.)
6th Case

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give
love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not
faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was
already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the
petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution
of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also
learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between
the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial
court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that
respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The
trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another
man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las
Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property
and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner
argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in
the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of
the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of
the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until
they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles
40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are
the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership
apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Rollo, pp. 28-34. Penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.
3
Id. at 45-46.
4
Id. at 34.
5
Id. at 46.
6
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective 15 March 2003.
7
328 Phil. 1289 (1996).
8
Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr, 460 Phil. 445 (2003).
10
Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be
considered legitimate and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the
court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse
by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith
as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable;
and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable.
11
Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
12
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932 (1998).
13
Article 88 of the Family Code.
14
Article 105 of the Family Code.
15
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
16
Supra note 7.
7th Case

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,

vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA
QUIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where children are born and
molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened
when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their children.
Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to
questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks
that we vacate and set aside the Order2 dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In
lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of
the decree of legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein
petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of
plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be
severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed
Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties,
namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children
and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
[₱]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of
the Rule on Legal Separation.6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution7 which the trial court granted in its Order dated
December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the
immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED."8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9 which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums
stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine
Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we
command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required by
law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in
part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.10
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the amount of ₱46,870.00,
representing the following payments:
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses.11
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the
RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order13 dated August 31, 2006, which held that the
phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts."14 The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to
any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.15 The dispositive
portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting
the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he
has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 on September 8, 2006.
Consequently, the RTC issued another Order18 dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of
forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article
102 of the Family Code.20
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21 praying for the correction and reversal of
the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,22 the trial court had changed its ruling again and
granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to
reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE
BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING
THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977?
CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET
PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED
RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the
respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when
the Motion for Clarification was filed.24 Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed
on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration."26
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said,
"The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution."27 In other
words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's
decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day
period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and
executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for
reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an
order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial
court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7,
2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the "net profits earned." From
the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005. For
270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the
time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has become final and executory. A
judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within
such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case
or modify a judgment that became final.28
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it
can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for
clarification. He said that "a void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any
right nor any obligation."29 But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes
void?
"A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the parties or both."30 In other words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a
case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.31
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction
over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court
of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital
status and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together.32 The Rule on Legal Separation33 provides
that "the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or
the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner."34 In the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the date of filing of the
petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes
were served upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the
Complaint on January 9, 2001.35 Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has
jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since
it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if
the modification is meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.36 In fact, we have
ruled that for "[as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise
thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal."37 Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's
remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has
already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. What we
can only do is to clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has
already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who is not his
wife;38
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;39
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership;41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;42
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession;43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse;44
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and pursuant to Article
116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved;45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were living together;46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that
respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these properties;48
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121 of the Family
Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling ₱503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by these
properties;49
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate properties which
can satisfy his share for the support of the family;50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);51
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally
between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime;52
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children;53 and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of ₱19,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00.54
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues
for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102.
He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines
net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case.
We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner
and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the
operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement,
the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains.55 Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or
upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the petitioner and of the
respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry."56 The husband and wife
also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.57
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already
the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other law."58
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership violated
when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier adverted to, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the spouses. If the
provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code."59 In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between
the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired
vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife."60 Thus,
since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over
half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the
Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive
application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,61we
define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder,
or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural
justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of
property.62(Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The
Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also explained:
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right
has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if there is
due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.65 In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner
prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances
and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties.66 Second, when
the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting
what the trial court termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.67 Thus, the petitioner cannot
claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only in the
provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family
Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits,
which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However,
if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries,
or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the
Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation
case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right
claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a
mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears
that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs.69 (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable
law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.70 The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice
of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and
executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.71
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case since the parties' property
relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court's
Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the
products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting
the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the
Family Code, which defines "net profits" earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of
the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in the conjugal partnership of
gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in the absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations between the parties and
the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to
the property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the
provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to
Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution."72 Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the
difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the
Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and the conjugal
partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties.
And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.73
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the
absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient,
the separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the
separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets,
which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.74
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market value of the properties at
the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the
debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of
the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then
results to the net profits.75
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article
102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate properties, thus, the
remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its market value at the time of
the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the properties which
remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will be
subtracted from the "market value at dissolution."
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the absolute
community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and
respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting
totality constitutes the "net profits."
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them,
what will be divided equally between them is simply the "net profits." However, in the Decision dated October
10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article
102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered
into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family
Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining "net profit." As earlier explained, the definition of "net
profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership
regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, "the
husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage."76 From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has
his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.77
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies
in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for
the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used
for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with
Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and
their separate properties.78 In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties
when they married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in
equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;81 and if the community is enriched at the expense of the
separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners
shall be made.82
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the
debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the
conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable.83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned
to each of them.84 In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have
no separate properties,85 there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered
part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.86 However, since the trial court found the petitioner
the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus,
we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already
did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED.
Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296 The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 7-35.
2
Penned by Judge Eduardo S. Casals; id. at 115-122.
3
Id. at 36.
4
Id. at 36-57.
5
Id. at 56-57.
6
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
7
Rollo, p. 185.
8
Id. at 59.
9
Id. at 58-59.
10
Id. at 59.
11
Id. at 60.
12
Id. at 61-69.
13
Id. at 70-76.
14
Id. at 75.
15
Id. at 74-75.
16
Id. at 75-76.
17
Id. at 77-86.
18
Id. at 87-91.
19
Id. at 90.
20
Id. at 91.
21
Id. at 92-97.
22
Id. at 115-122.
23
Id. at 18.
24
Id. at 143-146.
25
506 Phil. 613, 629 (2005).
26
Id. at 626.
27
Id. at 627.
28
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., v. Milan, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 258.
29
Rollo, p. 166.
30
See Moreno, Federico B., Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1988, p. 998.
31
People v. Judge Navarro, 159 Phil. 863, 874 (1975).
32
R.A. No. 8369, Section 5(d).
33
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
34
Id. at Section 2(c).
35
Rollo, p. 38.
36
Sps. Edillo v. Sps. Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA 590, 601-602.
37
Lim v. Judge Vianzon, 529 Phil. 472, 483-484 (2006); See also Herrera v. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245, 256
(1913), citing Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill., 344.
38
Rollo, pp. 50-51.
39
Id. at 51.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 51-52.
42
Id. at 52 and 56.
43
Id. at 52.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 52-53.
48
Id. at 53.
49
Id. at 53-54.
50
Id. at 55.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 56.
53
Id. at 57.
54
Id.
55
Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 119.
56
Id. at Art. 142.
57
Id. at Art. 143.
58
Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 256.
59
Rollo, p. 29.
60
61
G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010, 626 SCRA 180, 201.
62
Id. at 199.
63
The Court consolidated the following cases: ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The
Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056; Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168207; Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. v. Cesar V.
Purisima, et al., G.R. No. 168461; Francis Joseph G. Escudero v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al, G.R. No. 168463;
and Bataan Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v. Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168730.
64
Id.
65
Rollo, p. 37.
66
Id. at 39.
67
Id. at 55-57.
68
482 Phil. 877-894 (2004).
69
Id. at 890-891.
70
Rollo, p. 55.
71
Malayan Employees Association-FFW v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 181357, February 2, 2010, 611
SCRA 392, 399; Catmon Sales Int'l. Corp. v. Atty. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 236,
245.
72
Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 102(4).
73
Id. at Art. 91; See also Tolentino, Arturo, M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines: Volume One with the Family Code of the Philippines, 379 (1990).
74
Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 102.
75
Tolentino, Arturo, M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines: Volume One with
the Family Code of the Philippines, 401-402 (1990).
76
77
Tolentino, Arturo, M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines: Volume One, 365
(1974).
78
Tolentino, Arturo, M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines: Volume One with
the Family Code of the Philippines, 472 (1990).
79
Rollo, p. 55.
80
Id. at 56-57.
81
82
Id. at Art. 129(3).
83
Id. at Art. 129(4).
84
Id. at Art. 129(5).
85
Rollo, p. 55.
86
8th Case

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012
EFREN PANA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of the spouses has been found
guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the victims' heirs.
The Facts and the Case
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the. Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233.1
On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision2 acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but
finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered
those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court
made an award of P15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00
exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them.3 The decision became final and executory on October 1,
2001.4
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of
levy7 and a notice of sale on execution8 were issued.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the
levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.9 On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the
motion.10 The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.11
Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders, Efren filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 29, 2004 the CA dismissed the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing its assailed orders.12 It also denied Efren’s motion
for reconsideration,13 prompting him to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses
Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
Ruling of the Court
To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the properties of
the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses’ property relations.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they were
married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.14Although
the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the
marriage, they insist that it was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia. The
reasoning goes:
Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. But that fact does not prevent the
application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph, of the Family Code because their property regime is precisely governed by the
law on absolute community. This finds support in Art. 256 of the Family Code which states:
"This code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each over the properties of the
community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accused-spouse may properly be charged against the community as
heretofore discussed.15
The RTC applied the same reasoning as above.16 Efren and Melecia’s property relation was admittedly conjugal under the
Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or
acquired rights are impaired, that property relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect
in 1988. The latter code now prescribes in Article 75 absolute community of property for all marriages unless the parties
entered into a prenuptial agreement. As it happens, Efren and Melecia had no prenuptial agreement. The CA agreed
with this position.17
Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their
conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none
of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code
does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration
of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were
married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal
partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated
reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the
ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;20 (d)
there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the
case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the
wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage
or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate properties.
Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into
absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested
rights to such separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses’ loose admission that absolute community of property governed their
property relation since the record shows that they had been insistent that their property regime is one of conjugal
partnership of gains.22 No evidence of a prenuptial agreement between them has been presented.
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on marriages. The
presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of the conjugal
partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or
upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the
conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family Code states:
"x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256."23
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of
Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122
provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own,24 the above applies.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.25 Those responsibilities are as
follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however,
the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either
spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for
self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for
the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties.1âwphi1
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife,
Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been
covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that
"at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned."
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198
dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in
enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the
indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN** JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Per Special Order 1394 dated December 6, 2012.
** Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order 1395-A
dated December 6, 2012.
1
Records, pp. 20-21; 24-25.
2
CA rollo, pp. 45-70.
3
Records, pages not indicated; Paña v. Judge Buyser, 410 Phil. 433, 450 (2001).
4
CA rollo, p. 74.
5
Id. at 74-75.
6
Original Certificates of Title 9138, 512 and 511.
7
CA rollo, pp. 76-77.
8
Id. at 78-79.
9
Id. at 87-93.
10
Rollo, p. 54.
11
Id. at 55-59.
12
Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and
Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), rollo, pp. 120-123.
13
Rollo, p. 127.
14
Id. at 170.
15
CA rollo, p. 95.
16
Rollo, pp. 56-57.
17
Id. at 121.
18
FAMILY CODE, Art. 66.
19
Id., Art. 67.
20
Id., Art. 128.
21
Id., Art. 136.
22
CA rollo, pp. 88, 91.
23
Muñoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 38, 49-50.
24
Rollo, p. 58.
25
See Muñoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, supra note 23, at 49; Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA
483, 491-492.
26
See People v. Lagrimas, 139 Phil. 612, 617 (1969).
9th Case
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170004, January 13, 2016
ILONA HAPITAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JIMMY LAGRADILLA AND WARLILY LAGRADILLA AND ESMERALDA
BLACER, Respondents.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R.
CV No. 53301 dated October 14, 2003 and October 7, 2005, respectively. The Decision and Resolution affirmed the
Decision4 dated February 13, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, of Iloilo City in Civil Case No.
22150 entitled "Sps. Jimmy Lagradilla and War lily Lagradilla v. Spouses Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan and Esmeralda Blacer
Hapitan, et al." for Sum of Money with Preliminary Attachment and Nullification of Title.
The Facts
Between September to December 1994, respondent Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan (Esmeralda) issued thirty-one (31) United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks in various amounts in the total amount of P510,463.98, payable to the order of
respondent Warlily Lagradilla (Warlily). The checks were dishonored by UCPB for reasons of "account closed" when
presented for payment by Warlily.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 6, 1995, Warlily, with her husband Jimmy Lagradilla (Jimmy), filed a civil case for sum of money against Nolan
(Nolan) and Esmeralda Hapitan, Ilona Hapitan (llona), and Spouses Jessie and Ruth Terosa (Spouses Terosa), with a
prayer that a writ for preliminary attachment be issued against the real property of Esmeralda and Nolan, consisting of a
house and lot, as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that might be recovered.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In their complaint,7 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that they made several demands on Nolan and Esmeralda for the latter to
settle their outstanding obligations. The latter spouses promised to convey and transfer to Jimmy and Warlily the title of
their house and lot, located at Barangay M. V. Hechanova, Jaro, Iloilo City.8The lot was covered by TCT No. T-103227 in
the name of Nolan and Esmeralda.9 Jimmy and Warlily later found out that Nolan and Esmeralda separately executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating Ilona, Nolan's sister, as their attorney-in-fact for the sale of the same
property.10 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that the property was fraudulently sold to Spouses Terosa,11 and that Nolan and
Esmeralda were about to depart from the Philippines with the intent to defraud their creditors; thus, the prayer for the
issuance of preliminary attachment of the house and lot.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Esmeralda filed an Answer with Cross-Claim,13 admitting her indebtedness to Warlily. She alleged that due to the failure
of Nolan, who was a seaman at that time, to send her substantial amounts and on account of the losses she sustained in
her jewelry business, she failed to fund the checks she issued.14Also, although she executed an SPA in favor of Ilona
authorizing the latter to sell the house and lot owned by her and Nolan, she subsequently revoked the said
SPA.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nolan and Ilona denied the allegations of Jimmy and Warlily.16 They argued that the debts were incurred solely by
Esmeralda and were not intended to benefit the conjugal partnership.17 They further stated that Esmeralda has
abandoned her only son with Nolan and that Nolan has filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Esmeralda.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, the RTC, in its Order19 dated March 31, 1995, declared the Spouses Terosa in default for failure to file
their Answer within the reglementary period.
On February 13, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision20, ruling in favor of Jimmy and Warlily. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering the property in question.
Lot 19-A- covered by TCI No. T-103227 and the house thereon, in the name of the defendants Nolan Hapitan and
Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan null and void; consequently, TCT No. T-107509 in the name of the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and
Ruth O. Terosa is ordered cancelled;
2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P510,463.98 with interest at the legal
rate from the filing of this complaint until fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a. P30,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P30,000.00 as attorney's fees;
c. P20,000.()0 as exemplary damages
4. Dismissing the counterclaims.
On the cross-claim, defendants Nolan llapitan, Ilona Hapitan and the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa are
ordered jointly and severally to pay cross-claimant Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a. P30,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P30,000.00 as attorney's fees;
c. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC ruled that the house and lot is part of Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal property, having been built from the
amounts sent by Nolan to Esmeralda as well as the income from Esmeralda's business. As regards the sale of the house
and lot to the Spouses Terosa, the RTC noted that the property was sold through an attorney-in-fact, Ilona. The SPA
provided that the proceeds of the sale of Esmeralda's share in the property shall be applied specifically in payment of
her obligations. This limited authority was acknowledged by Nolan in his SPA to Ilona.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC found that the house and lot was sold at an unreasonably low amount of P450,000.00. The lot's market value
was P290,150.00 and the bill of materials for the construction of the house was P511,341.94. Thus, the minimum
consideration for the property should have been at least P800,000.00. The RTC also found that the SPA was revoked
after Esmeralda knew that the consideration was unconscionably low and that Nolan and his relatives became
antagonistic to her. Further, Ilona turned over the payment to Nolan, but Ilona or Nolan did not pay Esmeralda's
obligations.
On the liability of the Spouses Terosa, the RTC ruled that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove that they
connived and cooperated with their co-defendants Nolan and Ilona to defraud Esmeralda, and also Jimmy and Warlily.
The RTC noted that the Spouses Terosa chose to remain silent because whatever the outcome of the case, they will not
stand to lose anything. In addition, before the sale was consummated, they were informed of the revocation of the SPA
in favor of Ilona.
The parties filed separate Notices of Appeal.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Decision24 dated October 14, 2003, the CA agreed with the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed Decision dated February 13,
1996 in Civil Case No. 22150 of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of lloilo City, said Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.25cralawred
On November 6, 2003, Nolan and Ilona filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Modification26 based mainly on the Affidavit
of Waiver, Quitclaim and Satisfaction of Claim (Waiver)27 dated October 22, 2003 executed by Warlily, which reads:
AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER, QUITCLAIM

AND SATISFACTION OF CLAIM
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, WARLILY LAGRADILLA, of legal age, married and resident of Molo, lloilo City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn
to in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
That I am the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 22150 RTC, Branch 37, Iloilo City which was to the Court of Appeals as CA G.R. No.
CV 53301 against Spouses Nolan Bienvenido L. Hapitan and Esmeralda Blacer, Ilona Hapitan and Spouses Jesse and Ruth
Terrosa for Collection of sum of money and damages;
That today I have fully received from Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan for himself and for the rest of the defendants, the
balance of my total claim against them, which is now only in the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P125,000.00) PESOS, representing the full and complete satisfaction of my claim in the aforementioned Civil Case.
WITH this receipt of such amount, I hereby make remission, release and quitclaim all of whatever claims or causes of
action against aforesaid defendants and consider my claims in the aforementioned Civil Case as fully satisfied including
attorney's fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this 22nd day of October, 2003, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(signed)
WARLILY LAGRADILLA
Plaintiff/Claimant
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(signed) (signed)
ROSARIO F. FLORES ANELYN P. PERAL
In the same motion, they moved that the CA reconsider its finding that: 1) the sale to the Spouses Terosa was
fraudulent, and 2) Esmeralda is entitled to damages.
On November 20, 2003, Jimmy and Warlily, and Nolan and Ilona filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable
Settlement.28 The terms of the Amicable Settlement stater29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
AMICABLE SETTLEMENT
COME NOW plaintiffs-appellees Jimmy and Warlily Lagradilla and defendants-appellants Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan and
Ilona Hapitan assisted by their respective counsels and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following
Amicable Settlement, thus:
1. Plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan and Ilona Hapitan hereby agree to the full,
final and complete settlement of the liability of the latter and that of defendants-appellants Sps. Jessie P. Terosa and
Ruth O. Terosa to the former under the Decision rendered by the court a quo dated February 13, 1996 and affirmed by
this Court in its Decision dated October 14, 2003 with the herein defendants-appellants paying the former the amount
of Four Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P 425.000.00), Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00) in cash
receipt of which is acknowledged by the plaintiffs-appellees Lagradilla in this amicable settlement and the amount of
One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P 125,000.00) received by plaintiff-appellee Warlily Lagradilla as mentioned
in the Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim and Satisfaction of Claim dated 22 October 2003 attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration/Modification dated November 6, 2003 and submitted to this Honorable Court which amount of P
125.000.00 they acknowledge as part payment of the said agreed settlement of P 425,000.00. It is understood that this
payment of defendants - appellants include their share and that of defendant Esmeralda Blacer and defendants -
appellants Terosa.
2. They agree, further, to the modification of the judgment of the court a quo and affirmed by this Court that instead of
its judgment which states -
"Declaring the Deed of Sale in favor of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering the property in question.
Lot 19 - A covered by TCT No. T - 103227 and the house thereon, in the name of the defendants Nolan Hapitan and
Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan null and void; consequently, TCT No. T-107509 in the name of the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and
Ruth O. Terosa is ordered cancelled;
"2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P 520,463.98 with interest at the legal
rate from the filing of this complaint until fully paid;
"3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs:
a.) P 30.000.00 as moral damages;

b.) P 30,000.00 as attorney's fees;
c.) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages
“4. Dismissing the counterclaims.
“On the cross-claim, defendants Nolan Hapitan, Ilona Hapitan and the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa are
ordered jointly and severally to pay cross-claimant Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan:
“a.) P30,000.00 as moral damages;

“b.) P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
“c.) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.”
the terms of the Amicable Settlement in the first paragraph hereof be considered to have modified the terms of the
foregoing Decision and that the Deed of Sale in favor of Spouse Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering the
property in question, Lot 19 – A covered by TCT No. T- 103227 and the house thereon be declared valid and the order
for the cancellation of TCT No. T – 107509 in the name of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa be recalled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the herein parties have signed this Amicable Settlement this 19th day of November 2003 at Iloilo
City, Philippines.
(signed)
JIMMY LAGRADILLA
Plaintiff –Appelle
(signed)
WARLILY LAGRADILLA
Plaintiff – Appelle
(signed)
NOLAN BEINVENIDO HAPITAN
Defendant – Appellant
(signed)
ILONA HAPITAN
Defendant – Appellant
Assisted by:
(signed)
ATTY. EDGAR PRAILE
Counsel for plaintiffs – appellees
(signed)
ATTY. EDUARDO N. REYES,
Counsel for defendants – appellants
Jimmy and Warlily filed a Manifestation and Motion30 dated December 19, 2003. They alleged that on October 28, 2003,
Warlily was approached by Nolan who offered money to settle the case amicably. Considering that she was not assisted
by her counsel, who had died earlier that year, and that she was in difficult financial constraints then, she accepted the
deal of P 125,000.00 for her and her husband to sign a quitclaim or waiver. Further, at that moment, she was not aware
of the fact that the CA had already rendered a decision dated October 14, 2003 as she only knew of the decision on
October 30, 2003. She said that she felt somehow deprived of her rights when Nolan willfully failed to disclose the fact
that the case was already decided by the CA and taking undue advantage of her counsel's absence, hurriedly closed the
deal with her. She further averred that perhaps Nolan was bothered by his conscience when he gave her P300,000.00 on
November 19, 2003.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In response, Nolan and Ilona filed an Answer to the Manifestation and Motion32 dated January 6, 2004. They argued that
Warlily's claim of being deceived rests on dubious grounds as she did not categorically state when she officially received
a copy of the CA Decision. Also, whatever defects there were in the Waiver were cured or rendered moot and academic
by her signing of the Amicable Settlement.
Jimmy and Warlily further refuted Nolan and Ilona's claims in their Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration/Modification and Comment to the Answer to the Manifestation and Motion.33 Jimmy and Warlily said
that the execution of the Waiver was actually done on October 28, 2003, not on October 22. In noting the dates of
receipts of the CA Decision by the counsel for Nolan and Ilona (October 24, 2003) and by Jimmy and Warlily (October 30,
2003), it clearly appears that Warlily was deceived when she executed her Waiver. The execution of the Amicable
Settlement later on November 19, 2003 did not change Warlily's situation as she was never apprised of the import of the
CA Decision. She was also of the impression that she had no counsel at that time as she believed that Atty. Edgar Praile,
who assisted Jimmy and Warlily in the Amicable Settlement, was only a witness that she received P300,000.00 in
addition to the P125,000.00 that she already received.
In their Reply to Opposition and Answer to Comment34 dated January 20, 2004, Nolan and Ilona belied Warlily's claim
that she only knew of the CA Decision on October 30, when the office of Atty. William Devilles, Jimmy and Warlily's
counsel, received a copy on October 23. Moreover, while Atty. Praile signed as a witness to her receipt of P300,000.00, it
was likewise true that Atty. Praile signed as counsel for Jimmy and Warlily in the Amicable Settlement and Motion to
Approve Amicable Settlement dated November 19, 2016.
Meanwhile, Esmeralda filed an Opposition to [the] Motion for Reconsideration/Modification35 wherein she stated that
she is not a party to the Waiver and has no knowledge as to its veracity.36 She further argued that it is incredulous for
Nolan to insist that the CA reverse its decision when such decision is even favorable to him. Only the Spouses Terosa
would suffer from the decision ordering their title cancelled. She averred that the act of Nolan and Ilona merely bolsters
the claim that the alleged deed of sale executed by Nolan and Ilona in favor of the Spouses Terosa is a fictitious and
simulated document intended only to deprive Esmeralda and the creditors of their claims against the conjugal
assets.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Resolution dated October 7, 2005, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration/Modification filed by Nolan and
Ilona.
Hence, this petition by Ilona.
Ilona argues that by virtue of the Waiver, the CA should have, at the very least, reconsidered or modified its Decision
dated October 14, 2003 as Warlily had received from Nolan and Ilona P125,000.00 representing the full and complete
satisfaction of her claim in the civil case.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ilona further argues that in addition to the Waiver, the Amicable Settlement results in the modification of the CA
Decision. This is so because the parties agreed that the P425,000.00 payment received by Jimmy and Warlily is the full,
final and complete settlement of their claims. Thus, Ilona prays to this Court that the terms of the Amicable Settlement
be considered to have modified the terms of the RTC Decision.39Further, the petitioner prays that the deed of sale in
favor of Spouses Terosa conveying the house and lot be declared valid, and that the order for the cancellation of TCT No.
107509 in the name of Spouses Terosa be recalled.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issue
We decide whether the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement can modify the Decision of the CA.
The Courts’ Ruling
The Waiver is invalid
Petitioners anchored their Motion for Reconsideration/Modification on the Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim and
Satisfaction of Claim40 executed by Warlily, which they aver to have rendered the issue of the validity of the transfer of
the property moot and academic. We are not persuaded.
The nullity of the Deed of Sale could not be affected by the subsequent waiver of Warlily. The Court has explained the
nature of a waiver:
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right,
advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed x x
x."chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
[I]t is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege
of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy x x x.41chanrobleslaw
Warlily's Waiver cannot cover the issue of the validity of the sale of the property to the Spouses Terosa since the
property is neither a right nor a benefit she is entitled to. Moreover, the declaration of nullity due to the existence of
fraud was both a finding of fact and of law by the lower courts, and the parties cannot agree amongst themselves and
decide otherwise.
The Amicable Settlement is not valid
The Amicable Settlement, intending to put an end to the controversy between jimmy and Warlily and Nolan and Ilona,
partakes the nature of a compromise agreement. The Amicable Settlement involves two subjects: 1) the payment of the
principal obligation of P510,463.98 to Jimmy and Warlily; and 2) the cancellation of the sale of the house and lot to the
Spouses Terosa.
The Amicable Settlement of the

payment of the debt to Jimmy and
Warlily is not valid
With the payment of P425,000.00, Jimmy and Warlily allegedly released Nolan and Ilona, Esmeralda, and even the
Spouses Terosa from their obligations. Specifically:
1. Plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan and llona Hapitan hereby agree to the full,
final and complete settlement of the liability of the latter and that of defendants-appellants Sps. Jessie P. Terosa and
Ruth 0. Terosa to the former under the Decision rendered by the court a quo dated February 13, 1996 and affirmed by
this Court in its Decision dated October 14, 2003 x x x. It is understood that this payment of defendants-appellants
include their share and that of defendant Esmeralda Blacer and defendants-appellants Terosa.
2. They agree, further, to the modification of the judgment of the court a quo and affirmed by this Court that instead of
its judgment x x xchanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
the terms of the Amicable Settlement in the first paragraph hereof be considered to have modified the terms of the
foregoing Decision and that the Deed of Sale in favor of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering the
property in question, Lot 19 - A covered by TCT No. T -103227 and the house thereon be declared valid and the order for
the cancellation of TCT No. T - 107509 in the name of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa be
recalled.42 (Emphasis supplied)
A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve
their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.43 To have the force of law between the parties, a
compromise agreement must comply with the requisites and principles of contracts.44 Thus, it must have the following
elements: 1) the consent of the parties to the compromise; 2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the
compromise; and 3) the cause of the obligation that is established.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We note that much has been said by the parties on the validity of the Amicable Settlement, specifically on the element
of consent. Jimmy and Warlily consistently maintained that they were deceived into executing the Waiver and the
Amicable Settlement, and that they were not properly assisted by counsel. They insist that the settlement was proposed
and forged by Nolan and llona in bad faith, having advance knowledge of the decision of the CA.
While compromise agreements are generally favored and encouraged by the courts, it must be proved that they were
voluntarily, freely, and intelligently entered into by the parties, who had full knowledge of the judgment.46 The
allegations of Jimmy and Warlily cast doubt on whether they fully understood the terms of the Amicable Settlement
when they signed it. They further argued that they did not fully comprehend the CA Decision in their favor. Thus, it may
be reasonably inferred that Jimmy and Warlily did not give consent to the Amicable Settlement with Nolan and Ilona.
Nolan cannot waive his and

Esmeralda s rights over the house
and lot sold to the Spouses Terosa
The Amicable Settlement, which Nolan signed, aims to recall the lower courts1 finding of nullity of the sale of the house
and lot to the Spouses Terosa. In effect, by agreeing to the validity of the sale, Nolan disposed of or waived his and
Esmeralda's rights over the house and lot, which the lower courts found to be part of their conjugal property.
Such disposal or waiver by Nolan is not allowed by law. Article 12447 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is
void.48 Further, under Article 8949 of the Family Code, no waiver of rights, interests, shares, and effects of the conjugal
partnership of gains50 during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. Clearly,
Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or waiving their rights over the house and lot through the Amicable
Settlement. In fact, she even objected to the Amicable Settlement, as evidenced by her pleadings filed before the courts.
She further expressed disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to reverse its decision when its ruling, saving Nolan and
Esmeralda's conjugal property, is favorable to him.
The invalidity of the Amicable Settlement notwithstanding, we find that it still is evidence of payment by Nolan and Ilona
of P425,000.00. Even Jimmy and Warlily do not deny that they received the said amount. In fact, in their Opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration/ Modification and Comment to the Answer to the Manifestation and Motion51 filed with
the CA, they admitted that they received the amount,52 and even attached a copy of the receipt53 as annex to the said
pleading. The amount of P425,000.00 should therefore be deducted from the total amount due to Jimmy and Warlily.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 14, 2003 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53301 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of P425,000.00
should be deducted from the total amount due to the Spouses Jimmy and Warlily Lagradilla.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 3-13.
2
Id. at 85-104. penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaiio, with Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and then CA
Associale Justice Jose C. Mendoza, concurring.
3
Id. at 159-160.
4
Id at 61-82.
5
Id. at 86
7
Id. at 14-20.
8
Id at 16.
9
Id at 17.
10
Id. at 16.
11
Id at 17.
12
Id at 18.
13
Id. at 45-54.
14
Id at 48.
15
Id at 46.
16
Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim, id at 40-43.
17
Id. at 40.
18
Id. at 41.
19
Id. at 55.
20
Id. at 61-82.
21
Id. at 81-82.
22
Id at 73.
22
Nolan, Ilona. and the Spouses Terosa filed their separate Notice of Appeal on March 1, March 4, and March 5. 1996.
respectively, RTC Records, pp. 220-222.
24
Rollo, pp. 85-104.
25
Id. at 104.
26
Id. at 105-115.
27
Id. at 114.
28
Id. at 121-127.
29
Id. at 124-126.
30
Id. at 128-130.
31
Id. at 128.
32
Id. at 132-134.
33
Dated January 11, 2004. Id at 137-142.
34
Id. at 143-146.
35
Dated January 5, 2004, Id. at 116-119.
36
Id. at 116.
37
Id. at 117.
38
Id. at 9.
39
Id. at 9-10.
40
Id. 114.
41
F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp., G.R. No. 187521, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 302, 322 citing People v.
Donula, G.R. No 79269, June 5, 1991, 198 SCRA 130, 153-154.
42
Rollo, pp. 124-125.
43
Magbamia v. Uy, G.R. No. 161003, May 6, 2005, 458 SCR A 184, 190 citing CIVIL CODE, Art. 2028; Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) v. ALA Industries Corporation, G.R. No. 147349, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 603,
609; Rammmi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85494, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 645, 653-654; Abarintos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 113070, September 30, 1999, 315 SCRA 550, 560; Del Rosario v. Madavag, G.R. No. 118531 August 28
1995, 247 SCRA 767, 770.
44
Magbanua v. Uy, supra at 190-191, citing Regal Films, Inc. v. Conception, G.R. No. 139532, August 9, 2001, 362 SCRA
504, 508; Anacleto v. Van Twest, G.R. No. 131411, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 211, 215; Del Rosario v. Madayag, supra at
767, 770-771.
45
Magbanua v. Uy, supra at 195, citing CIVIL CODE, Art. 1318.
46
Aguslin v. Cruz-Herrera, G.R. No. 174564, February 12, 2014. 716 SCRA42, 54-55.
47
FAMILY CODE, Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the dale of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerers.
(Emphasis supplied)
48
Titan Construction Corporation v. David, Sr., G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 362, 371. See also Aggabao v.
Parulan, Jr. G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 562, 565.
49
FAMILY CODE, Art. 89. No waiver of rights, interests, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during
the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property.
When the waiver lakes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or
annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of
the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to
cover the amount of their credits.
50
FAMILY CODE, Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains.
51
Rollo, pp. 137-142.
52
Id. at 139.
1.1 That plaintiff's receipt of the P425,0000 [P125,000 + P300,000] does not, in any manner, affect the merit of the case
especially as to the finding of this Honorable Court that the transaction of Sale was in fraud of creditors, but on the
contrary, it even bolster plaintiffs' case for why should appellants settle plaintiffs' claim if indeed there is no legal and
factual truism that the sale was really in fraud of creditors.
53
Id. at 142.
RECEIPT
RECEIVED from Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) in cash pursuant
to the Amicable Settlement dated November 19, 2003 in CA. G.R. C.V. No. 53301.
This is also to acknowledge the payment of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00) as payment
pursuant to the said Amicable Settlement received by Warlily Lagradilla per Affidavit of Waiver. Quitclaim and
Satisfaction of Claim dated 22 October 2003.
(signed) (signed)
JIMMY LAGRADILLA WARLILY LAGRADILLA
Witness:
(signed)
ATTY. EDGAR PRAILE
10th Case

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners,

vs.
DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed
in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the respondents owned for want of the written
consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. On July 2, 2004, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69044,1 the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA. They
present as the main issue whether the sale of conjugal property made by respondent wife by presenting a special power
of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent husband in her favor was validly made to the vendees,
who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price, despite the showing by the husband that his signature
on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence from the country.
We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CA’s finding that the vendees were not buyers in good
faith, because they did not exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into the wife’s authority to sell. We hold that the
sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was not merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be
ratified.
Antecedents
Involved in this action are two parcels of land and their improvements (property) located at No. 49 Miguel Cuaderno
Street, Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque City and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
633762 and TCT No. 633773 in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and Dionisio Z.
Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been estranged from one another.
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the property to the petitioners, who initially did
not show interest due to the rundown condition of the improvements. But Atanacio’s persistence prevailed upon them,
so that on February 2, 1991, they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the site of the property. During their meeting, Ma.
Elena showed to them the following documents, namely: (a) the owner’s original copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified
true copy of TCT No. 63377; (c) three tax declarations; and (d) a copy of the special power of attorney (SPA) dated
January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property.4 Before the meeting ended, they paid
₱20,000.00 as earnest money, for which Ma. Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money, whereby the
parties stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional payment of ₱130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b) they would
pay the balance of the bank loan of the respondents amounting to ₱650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991; and (c)
they would make the final payment of ₱700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over the property on March 31, 1991. 5
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of Parañaque
City to verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena in the company of Atanacio and her husband (also a licensed broker).6 There,
they discovered that the lot under TCT No. 63376 had been encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but that the
encumbrance had already been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation.7They noticed that the Banco Filipino
loan had been effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena.8 They found on TCT No. 63377 the
annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of the Los Baños Rural Bank, also effected through an SPA executed by
Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena, coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma. Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a
loan of ₱500,000.00.9
The petitioners and Atanacio next inquired about the mortgage and the court order annotated on TCT No. 63377 at the
Los Baños Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Noel Zarate, the bank’s legal counsel, who related that the bank had
asked for the court order because the lot involved was conjugal property.10
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered ₱130,000.00 as additional down payment on February 4, 1991; and
₱650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
No. 63377 to them.11
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of ₱700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of
absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming
that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong.12 She assured them that the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 as promised. In due time, the petitioners
learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan,
who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.13
At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula.14 For that
meeting, they were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca.15 They recalled that Atty. Parulan "smugly demanded
₱800,000.00" in exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376, because Atty. Parulan represented the
current value of the property to be ₱1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered ₱250,000.00, which Atty.
Parulan declined,16 giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him
that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena.17
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case No. 91-1005 entitledDionisio Z.
Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney
Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the
cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages against the
respondents.
Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.18
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Dionisio A. Parulan,
Jr. and against defendants Ma. Elena Parulan and the Sps. Rex and Concepcion Aggabao, without prejudice to any action
that may be filed by the Sps. Aggabao against co-defendant Ma. Elena Parulan for the amounts they paid her for the
purchase of the subject lots, as follows:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1991 covering the sale of the lot located at No. 49 M. Cuaderno
St., Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by TCT Nos. 63376 and 63377 is
declared null and void.
2. Defendant Mrs. Elena Parulan is directed to pay litigation expenses amounting to ₱50,000.00 and the costs of
the suit.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma. Elena was a forgery, based on its finding that Dionisio had been out of
the country at the time of the execution of the SPA;20 that NBI Sr. Document Examiner Rhoda B. Flores had certified that
the signature appearing on the SPA purporting to be that of Dionisio and the set of standard sample signatures of
Dionisio had not been written by one and the same person;21 and that Record Officer III Eliseo O. Terenco and Clerk of
Court Jesus P. Maningas of the Manila RTC had issued a certification to the effect that Atty. Alfred Datingaling, the
Notary Public who had notarized the SPA, had not been included in the list of Notaries Public in Manila for the year
1990-1991.22
The RTC rejected the petitioners’ defense of being buyers in good faith because of their failure to exercise ordinary
prudence, including demanding from Ma. Elena a court order authorizing her to sell the properties similar to the order
that the Los Baños Rural Bank had required before accepting the mortgage of the property.23 It observed that they had
appeared to be in a hurry to consummate the transaction despite Atanacio’s advice that they first consult a lawyer
before buying the property; that with ordinary prudence, they should first have obtained the owner’s duplicate copies of
the TCTs before paying the full amount of the consideration; and that the sale was void pursuant to Article 124 of the
Family Code.24
Ruling of the CA
As stated, the CA affirmed the RTC, opining that Article 124 of the Family Code applied because Dionisio had not
consented to the sale of the conjugal property by Ma. Elena; and that the RTC correctly found the SPA to be a forgery.
The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.25
Issues
The petitioners now make two arguments: (1) they were buyers in good faith; and (2) the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s
finding that the sale between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners had been a nullity under Article 124 of the Family Code.
The petitioners impute error to the CA for not applying the "ordinary prudent man’s standard" in determining their
status as buyers in good faith. They contend that the more appropriate law to apply was Article 173 of the Civil Code,
not Article 124 of the Family Code; and that even if the SPA held by Ma. Elena was a forgery, the ruling in Veloso v. Court
of Appeals26 warranted a judgment in their favor.
Restated, the issues for consideration and resolution are as follows:
1) Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the
conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
2) Might the petitioners be considered in good faith at the time of their purchase of the property?
3) Might the ruling in Veloso v. Court of Appeals be applied in favor of the petitioners despite the finding of
forgery of the SPA?
Ruling
The petition has no merit. We sustain the CA.
1.
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal

properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code
The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the property
relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the
second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration
over the conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the
administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even
assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan’s counter-
offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.
We do not subscribe to the petitioners’ submissions.
To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them the
entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are
found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper
law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.28
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
Thirdly, according to Article 25629 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided
no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez,30 the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Family
Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would
not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the
petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the
property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not
present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are
acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa,
for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from
Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to
the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property.31
Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting
ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the
written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract
could not be ratified.32
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena
that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and
the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating
that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
2.
Due diligence required in verifying not only vendor’s title,

but also agent’s authority to sell the property
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from
whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.33 The status of a buyer in good faith is
never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.34
Here, the petitioners disagree with the CA for not applying the "ordinary prudent man’s standard" in determining their
status as buyers in good faith. They insist that they exercised due diligence by verifying the status of the TCTs, as well as
by inquiring about the details surrounding the mortgage extended by the Los Baños Rural Bank. They lament the holding
of the CA that they should have been put on their guard when they learned that the Los Baños Rural Bank had first
required a court order before granting the loan to the respondents secured by their mortgage of the property.
The petitioners miss the whole point.

Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may be
disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva,35 the Court erected a standard to
determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with
a seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the consent of the
other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith in such a situation, the
buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the seller’s capacity to sell.36Thus,
the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the
validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse
to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he has relied on the face of the certificate of title to the
property, for he is not required to explore beyond what the certificate indicates on its face.37 In this respect, the
petitioners sufficiently proved that they had checked on the authenticity of TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 with the
Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City as the custodian of the land records; and that they had also gone to the Los
Baños Rural Bank to inquire about the mortgage annotated on TCT No. 63377. Thereby, the petitioners observed the
requisite diligence in examining the validity of the TCTs concerned.
Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was whether or not they had diligently inquired into the
authority of Ma. Elena to convey the property, not whether or not the TCT had been valid and authentic, as to which
there was no doubt. Thus, we cannot side with them.
Firstly, the petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they
did not present evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA
purportedly executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. Had they made the appropriate inquiries, and not simply
accepted the SPA for what it represented on its face, they would have uncovered soon enough that the respondents had
been estranged from each other and were under de facto separation, and that they probably held conflicting interests
that would negate the existence of an agency between them. To lift this doubt, they must, of necessity, further inquire
into the SPA of Ma. Elena. The omission to inquire indicated their not being buyers in good faith, for, as fittingly
observed in Domingo v. Reed:381avvphi1
What was required of them by the appellate court, which we affirm, was merely to investigate – as any prudent vendee
should – the authority of Lolita to sell the property and to bind the partnership. They had knowledge of facts that should
have led them to inquire and to investigate, in order to acquaint themselves with possible defects in her title. The law
requires them to act with the diligence of a prudent person; in this case, their only prudent course of action was to
investigate whether respondent had indeed given his consent to the sale and authorized his wife to sell the property.39
Indeed, an unquestioning reliance by the petitioners on Ma. Elena’s SPA without first taking precautions to verify its
authenticity was not a prudent buyer’s move.40 They should have done everything within their means and power to
ascertain whether the SPA had been genuine and authentic. If they did not investigate on the relations of the
respondents vis-à-vis each other, they could have done other things towards the same end, like attempting to locate the
notary public who had notarized the SPA, or checked with the RTC in Manila to confirm the authority of Notary Public
Atty. Datingaling. It turned out that Atty. Datingaling was not authorized to act as a Notary Public for Manila during the
period 1990-1991, which was a fact that they could easily discover with a modicum of zeal.
Secondly, the final payment of ₱700,000.00 even without the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT No. 63376 being
handed to them by Ma. Elena indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the petitioners. It is true that she
promised to produce and deliver the owner’s copy within a week because her relative having custody of it had gone to
Hongkong, but their passivity in such an essential matter was puzzling light of their earlier alacrity in immediately and
diligently validating the TCTs to the extent of inquiring at the Los Baños Rural Bank about the annotated mortgage. Yet,
they could have rightly withheld the final payment of the balance. That they did not do so reflected their lack of due care
in dealing with Ma. Elena.
Lastly, another reason rendered the petitioners’ good faith incredible. They did not take immediate action against Ma.
Elena upon discovering that the owner’s original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in the possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary
to Elena’s representation. Human experience would have impelled them to exert every effort to proceed against Ma.
Elena, including demanding the return of the substantial amounts paid to her. But they seemed not to mind her inability
to produce the TCT, and, instead, they contented themselves with meeting with Atty. Parulan to negotiate for the
possible turnover of the TCT to them.
3.
Veloso v. Court of Appeals cannot help petitioners

The petitioners contend that the forgery of the SPA notwithstanding, the CA could still have decided in their favor
conformably with Veloso v. Court of Appeals,41 a case where the petitioner husband claimed that his signature and that
of the notary public who had notarized the SPA the petitioner supposedly executed to authorize his wife to sell the
property had been forged. In denying relief, the Court upheld the right of the vendee as an innocent purchaser for value.
Veloso is inapplicable, however, because the contested property therein was exclusively owned by the petitioner and
did not belong to the conjugal regime. Veloso being upon conjugal property, Article 124 of the Family Code did not
apply.
In contrast, the property involved herein pertained to the conjugal regime, and, consequently, the lack of the written
consent of the husband rendered the sale void pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Moreover, evenassuming that
the property involved in Veloso was conjugal, its sale was made on November 2, 1987, or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code; hence, the sale was still properly covered by Article 173 of the Civil Code, which provides that a sale
effected without the consent of one of the spouses is only voidable, not void. However, the sale herein was made
already during the effectivity of the Family Code, rendering the application of Article 124 of the Family Code clear and
indubitable.
The fault of the petitioner in Veloso was that he did not adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his signature and that
of the notary public on the SPA had been forged. The Court pointed out that his mere allegation that the signatures had
been forged could not be sustained without clear and convincing proof to substantiate the allegation. Herein, however,
both the RTC and the CA found from the testimonies and evidence presented by Dionisio that his signature had been
definitely forged, as borne out by the entries in his passport showing that he was out of the country at the time of the
execution of the questioned SPA; and that the alleged notary public, Atty. Datingaling, had no authority to act as a
Notary Public for Manila during the period of 1990-1991.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated July 2, 2004 rendered by the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69044 entitled "Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. vs. Ma. Elena Parulan and Sps. Rex and
Concepcion Aggabao" and "Sps. Rex and Concepcion Aggabao vs. Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. and Ma. Elena Parulan."
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member per Special Order No. 879 dated August 13, 2010
1
Rollo, pp. 55-66; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a Member of this Court), with Associate
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired) and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired) concurring.
2
Id., pp. 174-175.
3
Id., pp. 176-178.
4
Id., p. 23.
5
Id., p. 123.
6
Id., p. 23.
7
Id, pp. 23-24.
8
Id., p. 23.
9
Id., p. 23-24.
10
Id.
11
Id., pp. 24-25.
12
Id., p. 57.
13
Id., p. 110.
14
Id., p. 26.
15
Id., p. 110.
16
Id., p. 26.
17
Id., p. 105.
18
Id., pp. 14-15.
19
Id., p. 56.
20
Id., p. 58.
21
Id., p. 59.
22
Id., pp. 58-59.
23
Id., pp. 59-60.
24
Id., p. 60.
25
Supra, at note 3.
26
G.R. No. 102737, August 21, 1996, 260 SCRA 593.
27
Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed.
28
Alfredo v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 145; Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R.
No. 143826, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 97; Sps. Guiang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998, 291
SCRA 372.
29
Article 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
30
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718.
31
Under Article 1876, Civil Code, a general agency comprises all the business of the principal, but a special
agency comprises one or more specific transactions.
32
Article 1409, Civil Code.
33
Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 97, 107
34
Bautista v. Silva, G.R. No. 157434, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 334, 346; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 321.
35
Id, p. 348.
36
Id, p. 348.
37
Abad v. Guimba, G.R. No. 157002, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 356, 366-367.
38
G.R. No. 157701, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 227.
39
Id., p. 244.
40
Bautista v. Silva, note 34.
41
Supra, note 26.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR

Date of Birth : 01 January 1996

Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular

Father : Pablito S. Braza

Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997

Annotation : "Late Registration"

Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

The Antecedent Facts

The Decision of the Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

No other relief granted.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

Hence, the petition before this Court.

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

THE RTC RULING

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11

In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

The applicability of People v. De Lara

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.