Garlet vs. Garlet, 834 SCRA 120, G.R. No. 193544 August 2, 2017
Garlet vs. Garlet, 834 SCRA 120, G.R. No. 193544 August 2, 2017
Garlet vs. Garlet, 834 SCRA 120, G.R. No. 193544 August 2, 2017
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garlet vs. Garlet
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127
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4 Records, pp. 3-11.
5 Id., at pp. 55-64.
6 Id., at p. 12, Certificate of Marriage.
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cation that the same was bought out of the efforts and
finances of the petitioner; and
9. The petitioner likewise admitted that the respondent
was not subjected to psychological examination by the
psychologist sought by the petitioner with qualification that
respondent was given several opportunities to attend the
psychological evaluation but failed to do so.7
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Testifying for petitioner were petitioner herself; Marites
Ereve (Marites), petitioner’s sister who served as the
children’s nanny from 1993 to 2001; and Ms. Nimia
Hermilia C. De Guzman (De Guzman), the clinical
psychologist.
Petitioner and respondent were introduced to each other
by a common friend in 1988. Respondent courted petitioner
and they became close. One day, after partying and
drinking liquor with some friends, petitioner and
respondent lost their inhibitions and indulged in sexual
intercourse. Petitioner became pregnant as a result.
Respondent doubted if he fathered the unborn child and
refused to support petitioner. Respondent urged petitioner
to have an abortion, to which she did not agree. During
petitioner’s pregnancy, respondent did not visit her nor did
he give any financial assistance. After giving birth to
Michael, respondent visited petitioner only once.8
In order to support Michael, petitioner left for Japan to
work for six months as a cultural dancer. Petitioner
temporarily entrusted Michael’s care and custody to her
mother and siblings in Bicol. Upon returning to the
Philippines, petitioner took Michael back to live in Manila.
Petitioner also brought Marites with them to Manila to
serve as the nanny.9 Respon-
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18 Records, p. 508.
19 Id., at p. 334.
20 Id., at p. 335.
21 TSN, June 15, 2006, p. 8.
22 TSN, March 10, 2006, pp. 44-47.
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23 Records, p. 335.
24 TSN, March 10, 2006, p. 48; Records, p. 510.
25 Id., at p. 42.
26 Id., at pp. 49-50.
27 Id., at p. 54.
28 Records, pp. 297-299.
132
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29 Id., at p. 532.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 TSN, June 1, 2006, pp. 11-17.
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134
her milieu such that she sometimes fails to decipher who among
them are merely taking advantage of her generosity/kindness.
Consequently, she easily gets fooled, particularly as she could
really be too trusting.
Assertiveness and strength of character are the least among
her traits but Petitioner always makes it a point to maintain a
positive outlook and disposition in life despite her failures. She is
very sensitive and considerate of the feelings of other people.
Pyschosexual adjustment is basically adequate even if she has
developed a wary attitude towards members of the opposite sex.
Overall analysis of the test data failed to yield traces of any
ongoing psychopathological condition nor of any type of
personality disorder. Thus, Petitioner is still Psychologically
Capacitated to understand, comply and execute her marital
obligations.
The same could not be said as true for the Respondent
who is undoubtedly suffering from the Narcissistic Type of
Personality Disorder, as evidenced by the following
symptomatic behavior:
1. He is unable to maintain his own direction in life without
the financial help and support of other people. He clings to
the Petitioner, who is the breadwinner, sacrificing to be
away from home to be able to build up a stable future, for
his finances. He also maintains an amorous relationship
with different women as a source of added emotional
support, boost of and satisfaction of his self-directed/imme-
diate needs and desires.
2. He is not motivated to work and likewise capitalizes on his
physical assets to attain what he wants to achieve.
3. He is contented with his present lifestyle without thought of
others and has no foresight to prepare for a healthy family,
emotionally and socially. He is
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136
Respondent testified on his own behalf. However, in an
Order36 dated September 14, 2006, the RTC declared
respondent’s direct testimony stricken off the record
because of respondent’s failure to appear for his cross-
examination. After petitioner submitted her
37
Memorandum, the case was deemed submitted for
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decision.
In its Decision dated November 27, 2006, the RTC gave
weight to Ms. De Guzman’s conclusion that respondent was
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The RTC further held that all of the properties which
were acquired during the marriage were bought with
petitioner’s exclusive funds, thus, negating the
presumption of equality of shares between the parties in a
void marriage under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
RTC awarded the custody of the
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39 Rollo, pp. 48-49.
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The RTC denied respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration in its Order dated February 26, 2007.
Respondent’s appeal before the Court of Appeals was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 89142. The Court of Appeals,
in its Decision dated June 21, 2010, reversed the RTC
judgment, reasoning as follows:
[W]e scrutinized the totality of evidence adduced by Yolanda and
found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
Vencidor was psychologically incapacitated.
In essence, Yolanda wanted to equate Vencidor’s addiction to
alcohol, chronic gambling, womanizing, refusal to find a job and
his inability to take care of their children as akin to psychological
incapacity. At best, Yolanda’s allegations showed that Vencidor
was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The
incidents cited by Yolanda did not show that Vencidor suffered
from a psychological malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond.
Yolanda’s portrayal of Vencidor as jobless and irresponsible is
not enough. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of
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Petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the
appellate court on June 28, 2010. Petitioner filed a
motion43 seeking an extension of twenty days, or until
August 2, 2010, within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration on August 2, 2010. However, the Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution44 on August 24, 2010 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of
time, citing the ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon45 that the filing of the motion for extension of time
does not toll the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner seeks redress from this Court through the
instant Petition, grounded on the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN YOLANDA GARLET AND VENCIDOR GARLET TO
BE SUBSISTING. THE COURT OF APPEALS
MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPRECIATED THE
APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CASE.
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II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND CONSEQUENTLY DECREEING
THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED
OUT OF TIME.46
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in (a)
disregarding Ms. De Guzman’s findings for being based
solely on petitioner’s version of events, which was a third
party account; (b) treating petitioner’s evidence as “no
different from hearsay”; (c) finding that the root cause of
respondent’s psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
explained; and (d) declaring the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as valid.
Petitioner argues that based on Marcos v. Marcos,47 it is
not required that the psychologist personally examine the
spouse who is alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. What matters is that the totality of petitioner’s
evidence establish psychological incapacity.
Petitioner asserts that her evidence consists of not just
her testimony, but also those of her witnesses. Petitioner’s
description of her marriage was substantiated by the
statements of respondent’s brother, sister-in-law, and
neighbors, which were incorporated in the Psychological
Report. What is more, the root cause of respondent’s
psychological incapacity had been properly alleged in the
Petition, clinically identified, and proven by Ms. De
Guzman in her testimony and her Psychological Report.
Petitioner points out that the RTC gave considerable
weight to her evidence, and found respondent to be
suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder so
permanent, serious, severe, and incurable that it rendered
respondent incapable of performing his marital obligations.
Considering that the RTC had the opportunity to observe
the
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46 Rollo, p. 6.
47 397 Phil. 840, 850; 343 SCRA 755, 764 (2000).
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Petitioner received a copy of the Decision dated June 21,
2010 of the Court of Appeals on June 28, 2010 and the 15-
day
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Jurisprudence had laid down guiding principles in
resolving cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. In Azcueta v.
Republic,55 the Court presented a summation of relevant
jurisprudence on psychological incapacity, reproduced
hereunder:
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It bears to stress that the burden of proving the nullity
of the marriage falls on petitioner. Petitioner’s evidence
shall still be scrutinized and weighed, regardless of
respondent’s failure to present any evidence on his behalf.
Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage. Tested against the present
guidelines, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that
the totality of petitioner’s evidence is insufficient to
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Petitioner imputes almost every imaginable negative
character trait against respondent, but not only do they not
satisfactorily constitute manifestations of respondent’s
psychological incapacity as contemplated in the Family
Code, petitioner’s averments are riddled with
inconsistencies that are sometimes contradicted by her own
evidence.
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Even assuming that respondent initially reacted
adversely to petitioner’s pregnancy with Michael, it would
appear from respondent’s subsequent actuations that he
had come to accept that he is indeed Michael’s father.
In her testimony, petitioner claimed that her
relationship with respondent was cut off when she got
pregnant; that respondent never visited her during her
pregnancy; and that
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VOL. 834, AUGUST 2, 2017 155
Garlet vs. Garlet
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60 Id., at p. 334.
61 TSN, June 15, 2006, p. 8.
62 Suazo v. Suazo, 629 Phil. 157, 184; 615 SCRA 154, 178 (2010).
63 Q – Now Madam Witness, how did you know that your husband
was not trying to look for a job while you were in Japan?
A – Yes, ma’am. The truth of the matter, my sister told me that he is
always out of the house and frequently drinking and gambling, ma’am.
Q – How did you know that your husband was out all the time and
drinking and gambling while you were in Japan?
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156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garlet vs. Garlet
There is utter lack of factual basis for respondent’s
purported sexual infidelity. Aside from petitioner’s bare
allegations, no concrete proof was proffered in court to
establish respondent’s unfaithfulness to petitioner.
Petitioner failed to provide details on respondent’s
supposed affairs, such as the names of the other women,
how the affairs started or developed, and how she
discovered the affairs. Ms. De Guzman, in
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VOL. 834, AUGUST 2, 2017 157
Garlet vs. Garlet
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68 Villalon v. Villalon, 512 Phil. 219, 227-228; 475 SCRA 572, 582
(2005).
69 578 Phil. 826, 845-846; 556 SCRA 272, 290-291 (2008).
158
That respondent delegated the care for the children to
Marites, petitioner’s sister, does not necessarily constitute
neglect. While it is truly ideal that children be reared
personally by their parents, in reality, there are various
reasons which compel parents to employ the help of others,
such as a relative or hired nanny, to watch after the
children. In the instant case, it was actually petitioner who
brought Marites from Bicol to Manila to care for Michael,
and also later on, for Michelle. Granting that Marites was
primarily responsible for the children’s care, there is no
showing that a serious psychological disorder has rendered
respondent incognizant of and incapacitated to perform his
parental obligations to his children. There is no allegation,
much less proof, that the chil-
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A perusal of the aforequoted verbal exchange between
petitioner and respondent in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos,
though, reveals that respondent only hid petitioner’s money
and jewelry as a desperate attempt to stop petitioner from
leaving him, taking with her the children. In fact,
respondent repeatedly expressed concern about saving
their marriage, offering to return the money and jewelry
back to petitioner as long as they stay together. It was
petitioner who categorically stated that she no longer
wanted to live with respondent, offering to the latter
P300,000.00 cash, the Pila property, the jeepney and the
tricycle, just for respondent to leave their marital home.
Petitioner asserts too that she had been physically
abused by respondent, but offers no substantiating
evidence, such as
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Finally, the Court is not bound by Ms. De Guzman’s
Psychological Report. While the Court previously held that
“there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician,” yet, this is qualified by the phrase, “if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.”72 The psychologist’s findings
must still be subjected to a careful and serious scrutiny as
to the bases of the same,
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We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side — the petitioner — whose
bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the
manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third-party account;
she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a
self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who “believes
that the world revolves around him”; and who “used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
towards him.” Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of “love”;
made a generalization that respondent was a person who “lacked
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse,” and who engaged “in
promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool”; and
finally concluded that the respondent’s character traits reveal
“him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable.”
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-
depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It
failed to identify the root cause of the
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The Court similarly rejected the psychiatric evaluation
report presented by the petitioner in Agraviador for the
following reasons:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution dated August 24, 2010
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 89142 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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