Vancil v.

Belmes
358 SCRA 707 G.R. No. 132223,
June 19 2001

FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian
over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen
Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship
and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of and exercising
parental authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected Belmes' petition. The CA reversed
the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC,
the Court resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should
be his guardian.

ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.

RULING: Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his
guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes' unsuitability. Assuming
that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian.
She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties
of a guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect
the wards.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos

FACTS: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They
visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the
campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James
Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a
reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family
Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a
teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or
omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus,
negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed
to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Furthermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the
minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school
has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the
defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Palisoc v. Brillantes
41 SCRA 548 G.R. No. L-29025
October 4, 1971
FACTS: Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics
students at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess,
an altercation transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident,
Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a
machine with Dominador looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that
Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio
retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to
stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died, the cause of death being “shock due to
traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1)
Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in charge at
the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors and former
sole proprietor of MTI.

ISSUE:Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the
defendant?

HELD: The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held
liable jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a
mere member of the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had
not been properly impleaded as party defendant.

People v. Silvano
309 SCRA 362 G.R. No. 127356.
June 29, 1999

FACTS:The father, David Silvano y Hayag had beensexually abusing her daughter, Sheryl, since
she was 13 years old. Three days after she had turned 16, and on the pretense of punishment for
coming home late, the father raped his daughter. She went to school the next day and did not come
home for two weeks until she reported the incident to the authorities.

ISSUE:WON the appellant is guilty of qualifiedrape punishable by death penalty? YES.

HELD:The fundamental presumption of innocence enjoyed by appellant was overcome with the
requisite quantum of proof; his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Sec 11 of RA 7659
imposes death penalty to qualified rapecommitted by the victim’s parent. The following elements
of rape were proven:i.Sexual congress–the testimony of the victim and the medical report stating
that she is no longer a virgin.

Silva v. CA and Gonzales

FACTS: Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according
to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The
assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped
working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways. Gonzales
refused to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children
in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales
who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect
the moral and social values of the children. On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in
favor of Gonzales. The RTC decision had been reversed and Petitioner-appellee's petition for
visitorial rights is denied as the children concerned are still in their early formative years of life.
The molding of the character of the child starts at home. A home with only one parent is more
normal than two separate houses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father is entitled to visitorial rights to his children?

HELD: The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children). This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.

Madriñan v. Madriñan
527 SCRA 487 GR No. 159374,
July 12, 2007

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal
abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna
subsequently. Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their
2 minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of
their mother’s care. Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that
under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision
asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was
entitled to custody of the minors. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family
courts under RA 8369.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of
minors.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should
has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.

Cabanas v. Pilapil
58 SCRA 94 G.R. No. L-25843;
25 Jul 1974

Facts: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He
likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered
by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco
took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora
Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself
to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that
as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the
insurance policy?

HELD: YES. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit,
and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his
interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the
best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she
was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care
towards the child than an uncle.

Libi v. IAC
214 SCRA 816 G.R. No. 70890
September 18 1992

FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the
latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there
were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of
Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by
CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed
under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising
from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents
for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall
cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he
kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own
key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit
box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying
around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed
to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

Lindain v. CA
212 SCRA 725 G.R. No. 95305.
August 20, 1992.

Facts: Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parcel of registered land which their mother (Dolores) as
guardian, sold for P2,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the spouses Apolonia and Federico.
The latter knew that the sale was without judicial approval but still proceeded with the transaction.
The plaintiffs now contend that the sale is null and void as it was without the court's approval. The
Regional trial Court ruled that the sale is indeed null and void, while upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) confirmed the sale as valid and dismissed the complaint. Hence this petition.

Issue: Does the sale by a guardian of a minor's property require judicial approval?
HELD: YES. Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property
of his minor children does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said
child without judicial approval. And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and
duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of
possession and management. Hence, the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must
proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in
good faith as they knew right from the beginning the the transaction was without judicial approval.
Further, the minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed.

Republic v. Capote
514 SCRA 76 G.R. No. 157043
Feb. 2, 2007

Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of
name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged
that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he
was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him
use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time
Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him]
on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of
how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s
surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his
continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his
status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision
which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties.
The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change
of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.
2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?

Held:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with
all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he
was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall
under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil
registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in
the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.

Mariategui v CA
205 SCRA 675 GR NO. 57062,
January 24, 1992

FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during
his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo,
Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto.
On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice
of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to
a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was
issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Mossesgeld v CA
300 SCRA 464 G.R. No. 111455.
December 23, 1998

Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar
Calasan (married), signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the
child’s name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal
side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and
correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child. The person in
charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth;
hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of
Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of
Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article
176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988,
shall use the surname of their mother.

Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate
son using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration.
Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the
child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed the
decision.

Issue: Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth
of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity?

Held: No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father
admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father,
even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may
legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.

De Guzman v. Perez
496 SCRA 474 G.R. No. 156013,
July 25, 2006 (Case can’t be found)

Republic v. Vicencio
300 SCRA 138 G.R. No. 11263
November 2, 1916
Facts: Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change of surname, from “Vicencio” to “Yu”. She
alleged that she was born to Spouses Pablo Vicencio and Fe Leabres. After a marital spat, Pablo
left the conjugal abode and never returned. The marriage of her parents was later dissolved and
her mother dropped the surname Vicencio. Fe thereafter married Ernesto Yu. Since her childhood,
she had not known much less remembered her real father Pablo, and her known father had been
and still is Ernesto Yu. Despite of which, she had been using the family name “Vicencio” in her
school and other activities. In view of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage and she
had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both by her
classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment. She consulted her step-father
about the petition, and the latter consented to it. The Solicitor General appealed, arguing that there
is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant Cynthia’s change of surname. Such change might
even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that her step-father has
two (2) children with her mother. In the event of her step-father’s death, it is possible that Cynthia
may even claim inheritance rights as a “legitimate” daughter. The Solicitor General opines that
Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because the change of family name to
Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, but Ernesto has not opted for such a remedy.

Issue: May Cynthia be allowed to adopt the surname of his step-father?

Held: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause
for which the change is sought. The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not
persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically
the law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.

Espiritu v. CA
246 SCRA 362 GR 115640,
March 15, 1995

FACTS: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship
of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named
Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got
married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo
and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines
and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD: In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated
from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian
for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was
rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to
stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in
fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their
mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime
of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality
conflicts at least with the daughter.

Gamboa v CA
527 SCRA 380 G.R. No. 174485
11 July 2007

Facts:The mother of a three year old child told the father that she would be taking the child on a
brief vacation. The father later discovered that she and the child would not be returning to the
family home. The father petitioned the Court of Appeals (CA), which granted joint custody of the
child to both the mother and father. This petition by the mother asks the Supreme Court to set aside
this decision of the CA.

Issue and resolution: Custody dispute between the two biological parents of a child. The Court
revoked the joint custody order and awarded sole custody of the child to the mother.

Held: Article 3 of the CRC requires that the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration, and national law, in the same way, provides that the welfare of the child shall be the
primary consideration. A “tender-age presumption” exists in Article 213 of the Family Code, under
which a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. This
presumption can be overturned only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother
is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother
was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her child, therefore there was no
compelling reason to take the child from the mother’s custody.