Definition of Foreign Elements: Facts
Definition of Foreign Elements: Facts
Definition of Foreign Elements: Facts
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff Morada is a flight attendant for defendant SAUDIA’s
MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his airlines based in Jeddah. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted rape by
of Quezon City, respondents. fellow crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi
nationals. The two were eventually arrested and deported back to
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents Saudi Arabia while Morada was transferred to Manila. On various
satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the dates after the incident, Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her
problem could present a “conflicts” case.—Where the factual employer in order to sign documents, purporting to be statements
antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. However, it turned
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could out that a case was in fact filed against her before the Saudi court,
present a “conflicts” case. A factual situation that cuts across which later found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and
states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of tradition.
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception.
Hence, Morada filed this complaint for damages based on Article
21 of the New Civil Code against SAUDIA and its country manager.
Same; Same; The forms in which a foreign element may appear
are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine
national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation.—The ISSUES:
forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the Whether or not the case involves a ‘conficts problem’
parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
contract between nationals of one State involves properties Whether the proper law applicable is Philippine law or the law of
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element
consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident RULING:
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada Is there a ‘conflicts’ case?
with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected
by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a
“foreign element.” The presence of a foreign element is inevitable
since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or Choice-of-law Problem
conception.
Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions:
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some
The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to
parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine
assume a complex form. under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process
is known as “characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that is the “process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the
private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.” The purpose of
that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by “characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as
a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from factual situation, event or operative fact. An essential element of
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or
caused a “conflicts” situation to arise. “point of contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
Applicability of Art. 19 and 21, NCC and Jurisdiction of Quezon City connecting factor or point of contract, such as the situs of the res,
RTC the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.
The Supreme Court held that private respondent aptly predicated
her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 the possible test for the determination of the applicable law. These
gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, violations of Articles 19 and 21 “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could
are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the be any of the following:
municipal forum. 1. The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the 2. The seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found 3. The situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed
that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real
matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided rights are involved;
under Section 1 of RA 7691. Venue was also held to be proper. 4. The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the
Furthermore, jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a
defendant were properly acquired. will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
5. The place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g. the Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of
place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability
power of attorney is to be exercised; have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at
6. The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; liability, we find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most
7. The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are significant relationship” rule, which in our view should be
instituted or done. The lexfori – the law of the forum – is appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the
governed by it; and because the lexfori applies whenever the
most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
8. The flag of the ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts
parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
of affreightment.”
the parties is centered.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving
torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the Over-all injury occurred in the Philippines
place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we
find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged
According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the
in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “relationship” between the parties was centered here, although it
“act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law
faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by
country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights
of the complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below
(herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to
identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
PHASES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION RULINGS:
Hasegawa vs. Kitamura GR No. 149177 No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
FACTS: In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint
for specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable of
In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a
pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the
Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public Works
regional trial court.
and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of
an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura forum non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those
for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that
January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler Road project to Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there
Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road are three phases and each next phase commences when one is
project. But in February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general settled, to wit:
manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-
terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider 1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must
but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues,
for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC the property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair to cause a
of Lipa. defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the question whether the application of a substantive law which will
contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of lex determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be 2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local court
cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the takes cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must
motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the automatically apply. The court must determine which substantive
Supreme Court. law when applied to the merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this
resulting judgment be enforced?
time invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an
inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese nationals
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the
who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand
RTC’s taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a
invokes the trial court’s ruling which states that matters
motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for
connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the
reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the
law prevailing at the place of performance, so since the obligations
proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari.
in the ICA are executed in the Philippines, courts here have
The question of which law should be applied should have been
jurisdiction.
settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed
ISSUE: the interlocutory order denying his MFR.
Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE [ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ] Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in
the earlier labor case.
Principle: the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed
in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,”
judgments. Thus, in the instanceswhere the Court held that the the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the
local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies
laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of
with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be
the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and
proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the compulsory counterclaim.
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have Petitioner asserts that the written contract between
the power to enforce its decision. respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
FACTS: Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a local courts inconvenient forums.
contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to
negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the ISSUE(S):
Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross 1. W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.
receipts. On 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the 2. W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of forum non conveniens.
rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
On 1994, respondent filed before the NLRC, a suit against RULING:
BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. 1. YES.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.The LA ordered On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court
reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it
jurisdiction. may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-
On 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum.
an action for damages before the RTC of La Union. The Complaint This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where
named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED
conferred by the Constitution and the law & by the material FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties
therein. The case file was an action for damages arising from an involved.
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action
and the amount of damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the
RTC. principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial court to
jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the complaint. On the abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
by its voluntary appearance in court. circumstances require the court’s desistance.
(b) NO.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since
the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the Amos G. Bellis.
creation of two separate wills.
Hence, the court affirmed the ruling of the probate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Laws will apply in the
determination of the rights of succession of the illegitimates.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the disposition of the
decedent in his will in which he stated that the Philippine laws will
apply and not his national law was considered illegal and void.
This was in the viewpoint of Article 16 of the New Civil Code
which said that national laws should govern.
Conflict of Laws; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Foreign Laws; Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
International Law; In international law, the party who wants to marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
proving the foreign law.—In international law, the party who ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support
to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of
in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon respondent to child with petitioner.
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), respect to the accused, he being an alien.
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 (2000), has
already enunciated that: True, foreign laws do not prove ISSUE:
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
child under Philippine law?
alleged and proved.
RULING:
Same; Doctrine of Processual Presumption; Foreign Laws; If the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country,
domestic or internal law.—In view of respondent’s failure to prove not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed
by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. B. AGREEMENT OF THEPARTIES
While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
See Cadalin vs. POEA 238 SCRA 721
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved
the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the See HSBC vs. Sherman 176 SCRA 331
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
C. SUBSTANCE VS. PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLE
the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to D. CENTER OF GRAVITY DOCTRINE
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. E. RENVOI DOCTRINE
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its -see Aznar vs. Garcia
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or F. LEX FORI
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is G. APPLICABILITY OF PH LAWS AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
H. PROOF AND AUTHENTICATION OF FOREIGN LAW Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. V. COURT OF APPEALS AND provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES, INC. sought to be proved is “unwritten”, the oral testimony of expert
G.R. NO. 119602 OCTOBER 6, 2000 witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
FACTS: proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as amended,
President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto provides: The record of public document referred to in paragraph
Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Vasquez, evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbor by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
through the Orinoco River. However, the Philippine Roxas ran Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
aground in the Orinoco River, this obstructing the ingress and the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley was unable to sail consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
out. Subsequently, Wildvalley filed a suit with the RTC of Manila officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
against President Lines Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company for foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
damages in the form of unearned profits and interest thereon. the seal of his office.”
The petitioner averred that the Court of Appeals seriously We take note that these written laws were not proven in
erred in disregarding Venezuelan law despite the fact that the the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132, of the Rules of
same has been substantially proved in the trial court without Court. For a foreign public document to be admissible, the
objection from private respondent, and who objection was following requisites are mandatory: (1) it must be attested by the
interposed belatedly on appeal. officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
ISSUE:
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
Is the Venezuelan law applicable to the case at bar? consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his
office.
RULING:
It is not enough that the GacetaOficial, or a book published
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves
by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
Section 24, of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
and proved. A distinction is to be made as to the manner of
Captain Monzon, who attested the document, is the officer who
proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls under
had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or but on appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the reversed the decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal affirmed the NLRC.
of his office accompanying the copy o the public document. No
ISSUE:
such certificate could be found in the records of the case.
Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. vs. RULING:
National Labor Relations Commission,
No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did
537 SCRA 409, October 26, 2007
not present proof as to the existence and the specific provisions of
such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and
FACTS: Philippine labor laws shall be used. In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as
Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi Arabia, sent
a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer specialist.
or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his monthly salary
presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for
shall be $850.00. But five months into his service in Saudi Arabia,
petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter;
Gran received a termination letter and right there and then was
thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
removed from his post. The termination letter states that he was
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a
incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system which is
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
required in his line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we
during his 5 month stay to prove his competence; that he is
apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented
disobedient because he failed to submit the required daily reports
before us.
to OAB. Gran then signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he
is releasing OAB from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal
dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that the
dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the
employment contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor laws
shall govern all matters relating to the termination of Gran’s
employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Gran’s termination due
to incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Gran’s
insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the termination
letter Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed the labor case
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law,
SERVICES, INC., vs. being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of
National Seamen Board,et. Al. Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case.
G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982
But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this
matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or
Principle: Administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not
quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-
bound strictly by technical rules.
settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial
Topic: Proof and Authentication of Foreign Law bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been
the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that
FACTS:
in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death
Napoleon Abordo is an employee of Norse Management CO. while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which
(petitioner) as Second Engineer. He died from apoplectic stroke the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason to
while in the course of employment. He embarks in a vessel of deviate from this well considered policy. Certainly not on technical
Singaporean Registry. Due to his death, Napolean’s wife claimed grounds as movants herein would like us to.
for compensation benefits before National Seamen’s Board
Since National Seamen Board is a quasi-judicial body, then it may
(respondent) alleging that the benefits that she will be receiving
not be bound strictly by the technical rules. Hence, its decision it
shall be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the
using Singaporean Law is valid.
other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should
not be applied because the respondent don’t have a jurisdiction
over Singapore’s Insurance Law, that their responsibility is not
alleged in the complaint and that no proof of the existence of the
Workmen’s Insurance Law of Singapore. Respondent resolve the
case and used the Law of Singapore as basis of the benefits.
Petitioner appealed the resolution before the Ministry of Labor but
it did not receive any favorable consideration. Hence, the current
petition.
ISSUE:
What law shall govern? Philippine law or Singaporean Law?
RULING:
Singaporean Law.
The court ruled that it is true that the law of Singapore was not
alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. And following
TOPIC: CITIZENSHIP AND MODES OF ACQUISITION born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.
CASE: BENGZON VS. HRET
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
FACTS:
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in the said election.
view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a
ISSUE:
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen.” Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the RULING:
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
YES.
As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No.
63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A.
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
“rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces may be reacquired by a former citizen:
of a foreign country.” Whatever doubt that remained regarding his
loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. 1. by naturalization,
Marine Corps.
2. by repatriation, and
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition 3. by direct act of Congress.
of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by **
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed
Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengzon who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
their citizenship due to: repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares VS. Comelec On 27 July 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to
the US right after the wedding. The petitioner gave birth to her
FACTS:
eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16th day of April year 1992 in
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and
found abandoned as a newborn in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo she obtained a US Passport that same year. In April 2004, Poe
by a certain Edgardo Militar on 3rd day of September year 1968. came back to the Philippines in order to support her father’s
Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth to her youngest
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and Emiliano's wife. The daughter. Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and
relatives then reported and registered the child as a founding with Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary Grace 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. Poe returned to the US in July
Natividad Contreras Militar. Grace was adopted by celebrity 2004 with her two daughters. Poe returned in December 2004
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and after knowing her father’s deteriorating condition. The latter died
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces).The petitioner was given and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the funeral
the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar"in her arrangements. Poe wanted to be with her grieving mother that is
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth. The trial court why she and her husband decided to move and reside
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005.
changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary They prepared for resettlement including notification of their
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe" on 13th day of May year 1974. children’s schools, coordination with property movers and inquiry
with Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog.
Although there were annotations placed in the child’s
foundling certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job
found out that their lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of in the US. Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately
Live Birth with a Poe’s new name as well as the name of the secured a TIN while her husband stayed in the US. They stayed
adoptive parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a with her mother until she and husband was able to purchase a
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On February
released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo. 14, 2006, Poe went back to the US to set up the other family
belongings. She commuted back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan.
and husband acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon
Initially, the petitioner was enrolled and pursued a degree in
City where they built their family home.
Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but she
chose to pursue her studies abroad and left for the United States of On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the
America (U.S.) in 1988. Poe graduated in 1991 from Boston Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10,
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. In 1988, she was together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
issued a Philippine passport. three children. The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the
petition on July 18, 2006. She and her children were then
considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August ISSUES:
2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter.
Issue 1: Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of
Issue 2: Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
the MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public in Issue 3: Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted committing material misrepresentations in her COC.
the Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as a
RULINGS:
chairperson of MTRCB. Poe from them on, she stopped using her
American passport. 1. Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born
Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for
Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the
presidency. First, there is a very high probability that Grace Poe’s
US Embassy in Manila.On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul
parents are Filipinos. Grace Poe's physical features are typical of
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective
Filipinos. As a matter of fact that she was abandoned as an infant
October 21, 2010. On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC
in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator saying that she was
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months
99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a
before May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May
circumstantial mevidence of her parents’ nationality. That high
16, 2013. On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
Presidency for the May 2016 elections. She declared that she is a
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To
natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day
assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from
impossible, as the norm.
May 24, 2005.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the Supreme Court pronounced and
There were some petitions filed against Poe because there
said that foundlings are as a natural-born citizens. This is based on
are some issues about her that made her have this case in running
the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
for president. Petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she
Convention manifests that the framers intended foundlings to be
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she stated
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s
that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
natural born considering that Poe is a foundling and (3) Grace
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
Poe’s candidacy should be denied, rejected,or cancelled for
to foundlings, the Supreme Court felt the need to examine or test
committing material misrepresentations in her Certificate of
the intent of the framers.
Candidacy.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with
natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which
the foundling is found.
2. Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi
coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Grace
Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and
not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was
approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree
that an alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino
citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming and somehow an accurate evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US.
Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned
on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
3. No. The COMELEC cannot cancel, deny or reject her Cerftificate
of Candidacy on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for
ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide
upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate
is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her
qualifications. In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court
Grace Poe was pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in
her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.
DJUMANTAN VS. DOMINGO Issue:
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
WON the petitioner’s admission into the country and the change of
her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident are legal
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso
Ruling:
facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from
her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of No, there was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
her extended stay here as an alien. petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
Facts
All such privileges were obtained through misrepresentation.
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
as a contract worker. He embraced and was converted to Islam. On immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s
May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic visa and for permanent residency.
rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on
(Marina and Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration
The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitality extended to who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen,
him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of who is married to another woman.
Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.”
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
1940. In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the
her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory
“concubinage” with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates
Pangasinan against the two. no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to
stay.
This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was
to continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident
Congress may choose to protect it. There is no law guaranteeing
under Section 13(a) of the same law.
aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much
On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
registration.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.
Therefore, the Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated
September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent
resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29,
1991 are REVERSED.
LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A.
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.* No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere
MANZANO and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different process with respect to the termination of their status, for
from dual allegiance.—Dual citizenship is different from dual candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is to terminate their status as persons
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.For with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. CASE DIGEST:
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. FACTS:
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes
the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s
the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those
born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a
the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American
citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is citizenship.
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he
7160, §40(d) and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual
as referring to “dual allegiance.”—In including §5 in Article IV on citizens are disqualified from running for any position.
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its
resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a
Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using possess dual citizenship:
an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine 1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US.
which follow the principle of jus soli;
Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the
age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and 2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers
voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US that country;
citizenship.
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
Hence, this petition for certiorari. former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
ISSUES:
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
1. Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
2. Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
elective office
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
RULING: or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”
Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For process with respect to the termination of their status, for
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. conflicting laws of different states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
Allegiance to the Other Country
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
citizenship. That is of no moment.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
election in a foreign state or participating in an election or his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein
filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
that she is an Australian. having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
ISSUE: Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
RULING: resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality
or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein
including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5,
1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO ISSUE:
G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989
Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yu’s acts constitute a
renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship?
RATIO: Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to RULING:
inference or implication.
YES, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
FACTS: that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a Philippine
capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
citizenship by naturalization on Feb. 10, 1978.
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official
serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine
Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed commercial
documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the
authentication of an appropriate Philippine Consul
Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a Foreign
passport while (at the same time) holding a Filipino citizenship as
well
Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full
knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for A Philippine
citizenship through naturalization he consequently recognizes,
identifies and agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce
‘absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain
true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,".
Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions once
solemnizing said oath and it succeeding consequences should they
be violated.
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER V. GO 25 SCRA 890 Did the respondents lose their Philippine citizenship upon the
performance of certain acts or the happening of certain events in China?
FACTS:
RULING:
The Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner
of Immigration that, on the basis of the findings made by the NBI, the In deciding the question no foreign law can be applied. The
signature of the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on certain respondents are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status
documents, amongst them cable authorization authorizing the must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in
documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which
Thereupon, the Department declared several documents among them provides as follows: “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
the cable authorization to be null, void and no effect and the certificates status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his brothers of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” Under Article IV, Section
were cancelled. 2, of the Philippine Constitution, “Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law,” which implies that the
The Board of Immigration Commissioners ordered that they be
question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be
returned to the to the port where they came or to the country of which
determined by no other than the Philippine Law.
they were nationals, upon the ground that they had been able to enter
this country and gain admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulenty Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic
secured authorization. Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship;
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals and found out
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
that respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a
a foreign country, rendering service to, or accepting a commission in in
Chinese citizen and Emilia Callano a Filipino citizen. Go Chiao Lin and
the armed forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of
Emilia together with the respondents went on vacation to Amoy, China,
naturalization; declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter
but Go died there. Emilia has to return to the Philippines as the maid of
of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman by
Consul Eutiquio Sta. Romana because she was penniless, leaving her
marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband’s
children behind. Subsequently the latter were able to go to Hongkong,
country, she acquired his nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by
where they sought and obtained employment. They applied with the
their alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine
Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for entry into the Philippines as
citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the
Filipino citizens and they were allowed to register in the Consulate as
petitioners lost their former status by reason of such recognition.
Filipino citizens and to travel directly to the Philippines.
However, the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the
Commissioner of Immigration maintain that they were Filipino citizens
when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that citizenship because
they were recognized by their common-law father, they became citizens
of the Republic of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.
ISSUE:
ELEGIBILITY OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS (3)domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a
person independently of his residence or intention.
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and EPHRAIM M.TUNGOL April 18, 2008 We are guided by three basic rules: (1) a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere;(2) domicile, once established,
FACTS: remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can
Jose Ugdoracion and Ephraim Tungol were rival mayoralty have but one residence or domicile at any given time. The general
candidates in Albuquerque, Bohol in the May 2007 elections. rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only
Tungol filed a petition to cancel Ugdoracion’s Certificate when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
of Candidacy contending that the latter’s declaration of eligibility intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a
for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation; that he is new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose.
actually a “green card” holder or a permanent resident of the US.It
In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion’s acquisition of a
appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent US resident on
lawful permanent resident status in the US amounted to an
September 26, 2001 and was issued an Alien Number by the
abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the
USINS. Ugdoracion, on the other hand, presented the following
Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin,
documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the
which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which
residency requirement: (1) a residence certificate; (2) an
is the USA.
application for a new voter’s registration; and (3) a photocopy
of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status. COMELEC
cancelled Ugdoracion’s COC and removed his name from the
certified list of candidates for Mayor. His motion for recon was
denied. Hence, the petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to
the COMELEC.
RULING:
ISSUE:
Is the COMELEC correct in disqualifying the petitioner?
SOBEJANA-CONDON VS. COMELEC public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
FACTS: The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with
she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public
to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning
as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of candidate.
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December After that the decision was appealed to the COMELEC but
5, 2005. the appeal was dismissed in the second division and affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the
"personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective
Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought office does not apply to her.
elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes ISSUE:
and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of
office on May 13, 2010. Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for elective
office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents)
all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for HELD:
quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere
obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which that a candidate is not entitled to the office
foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person
hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants
has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set
"declared that no one had been legally elected president of the rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves
June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president." With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and from among the qualified candidates.
that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54
is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any
have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of legal effect.
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified
candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part
with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for of that voice and must also be respected.
public office.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule
is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
(Emphasis supplied) The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before
through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is
be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count
is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
Facts: Issue:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion
October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 and there amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish
he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother, his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay
Romeo in Brgy Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four
days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic Rulings:
of the Philippines. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his The requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a
same. particular place but must also have personal in such place coupled
From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential with conduct indicative of such intention.
property in the same village. He applied for registration as a voter Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a)
in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
Barangay Captain of Veterans Village opposed the same. Acting on once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
the application, the Election registration Board approved it and one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections voters list. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of failed to prove that he successfully changed his domicile to
Candidacy for Governor of Zambonag Sibugay Province for the Zambonga Sibugay. When he came to the Philippines in November
May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga, it is evident that
due course of to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground that the latter Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship and renounced his
comply with (1) the requirements of R.A 9225 and (2) the one- allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
year residency requirement of the Local Government Code. citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
After hearing, the Second Division of the Comelec ruled Philippines. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a
that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. What matters
complying with the requirements of R.A 9225, he failed to prove is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
the residency requirement for gubernatorial candidate. He failed Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. The evidence
to present ample proof of a Bona Fide intention to establish Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for
Sibugay as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents. inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002 province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
TOPIC: Venue of Estate Proceedings jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
FACTS: of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
Petitioner and Private Respondent are the only sons of late Ignacio court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
Tayag and Andrea Jao who died intestate. Herein, respondent filed appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
a petition for issuance of letter of administration before RTC of
Quezon City, place where the decedent resides at the time of death. In the case at hand, since the decedent resides at Quezon City at
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of the time of his death, then Quezon City is the proper venue to have
improper venue. He argued that the deceased spouses did not the estate proceedings.
reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of
their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery.
ISSUE:
RULINGS:
Quezon.