G.R. No. 170112. April 30, 2008.* non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.

DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and ELISEO PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
OCAMPO, JR., petitioners, vs. DEL PILAR ACADEMY the Court of Appeals.
EMPLOYEES UNION, respondent. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Feria, Feria, LaO, Tantoco Law Offices for petitioners.
Labor Law; Labor Unions; The collection of agency fees in an amount Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. for respondent.
equivalent to union dues and fees from employees who are not union NACHURA, J.:
members is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code.—The
collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
fees, from employees who are not union members, is recognized by July 19, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP.
Article 248(e) of the Labor Code, thus: Employees of an appropriate No. 86868, and its September 28, 2005 Resolution2 denying the
collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized motion for reconsideration.
collective bargaining agent may be assessed reasonable fees
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by the recognized Following are the factual antecedents.
collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the
benefits under the collective bargaining agreement. Provided, That
the individual authorization required under Article 241, paragraph (o) Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the
of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of recognized certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and non-
collective bargaining agent. teaching personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR), an
educational institution operating in Imus, Cavite.
Same; Same; When so stipulated in a collective bargaining
agreement or authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the On September 15, 1994, the UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)3 granting salary increase and
the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff. Among the
dues, as agency fees, from the employees’ wages for direct salient provisions of the CBA are:
remittance to the union.—When so stipulated in a collective
bargaining agreement or authorized in writing by the employees ARTICLE V
concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it
to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the SALARY INCREASE
amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees’ wages
for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check SECTION 1. Basic Pay—the ACADEMY and the UNION agreed to
off. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union maintain the wage increase in absolute amount as programmed in
employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the the computation prepared by the ACADEMY and dated 30 June 1994
benefits resulting from the CBA. initialed by the members of the bargaining panel of both parties,
taking into account increases in tuition fees, if any.
Same; Same; No requirement of written authorization from the non- SECTION  2.  The teaching load of teachers shall only be Twenty-
union employee is needed to effect a valid check off.—No Three (23) hours per week effective this school year and any excess
requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is thereon shall be considered as overload with pay.
needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that SECTION  3.  Overloadpay (sic) will be based on the Teachers’
Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring written authorization is Basic Monthly Rate.
inapplicable to non-union members, especially in this case where the
SECTION  4.  The ACADEMY agrees to grant longevity pay as provision on summer vacation leave with pay, DEL PILAR alleged
follows: P100.00 for every 5 years of continuous service. The that the proposal cannot be considered unfair for it was done to make
longevity shall be integrated in the basic salary within three (3) years the provision of the CBA conformable to the DECS’ Manual of
from the effectivity of this agreement. Regulations for Private Schools.4

ARTICLE VI On October 2, 1998, Labor Arbiter Nieves V. De Castro rendered a

VACATION LEAVE WITH PAY Decision, viz.:

SECTION  1.  Every faculty member who has rendered at least six “Reviewing the records of this case and the law relative to the issues
(6) consecutive academic semester of service shall be entitled to the at hand, we came to the conclusion that it was an error on [the] part
11th month and 12th month pay as summer vacation leave with pay. of [DEL PILAR] not to have collected agency fee due other workers
They may, however, be required to report [and] undergo briefings or who are non-union members but are included in the bargaining unit
seminars in connection with their teaching assignments for the being represented by [the UNION]. True enough as was correctly
ensuing school year. quoted by [the UNION] Art. 248, to wit:

SECTION 2. Non-teaching employees who shall have rendered at Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not
least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to fifteen days leave members of the recognized collective bargaining agency may be
with pay.” assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees
paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining
The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union employees, agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under
and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said assessment from the Article [241], paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-
employees’ salaries and wages. DEL PILAR, however, refused to members of the recognized collective bargaining agent.
effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not
amenable to it. As it is, [DEL PILAR’s] unwarranted fear re-individual dues [without]
authorization for non-union members has no basis in fact or in law.
In September 1997, the UNION negotiated for the renewal of the For receipt of CBA benefits brought about by the CBA negotiated with
CBA. DEL PILAR, however, refused to renew the same unless the [petitioners], they are duty bound to pay agency fees which may
provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months summer vacation lawfully be deducted sans individual check-off authorization. Being
leave with pay will be amended by limiting the same to teachers, who [recipients] of said benefits, they should share and be made to pay
have rendered at least three (3) consecutive academic years of the same considerations imposed upon the union members. [DEL
satisfactory service. The UNION objected to the proposal claiming PILAR], therefore, was in error in refusing to deduct corresponding
diminution of benefits. DEL PILAR refused to sign the CBA, resulting agency fees which lawfully belongs to the union.
in a deadlock. The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the case
for voluntary arbitration, but the latter allegedly refused, prompting Anent the proposal to decrease the coverage of the 11th and 12th
the UNION to file a case for unfair labor practice with the Labor month vacation with pay, we do not believe that such was done in
Arbiter against DEL PILAR; Eduardo Espejo, its president; and Eliseo bad faith but rather in an honest attempt to make perfect procession
Ocampo, Jr., chairman of the Board of Trustees. following the DECS’ Manuals. Moreso, it is of judicial notice that in
the course of negotiation, almost all provisions are up for grabs,
Traversing the complaint, DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor amendments or change. This is something normal in the course of a
practices against the UNION. It justified the non-deduction of the negotiation and does not necessarily connote bad faith as each every
agency fees by the absence of individual check off authorization from one (sic) has the right to negotiate reward or totally amend the
the non-union employees. As regards the proposal to amend the provisions of the contract/agreement.
All told while there was error on [the] part of [DEL PILAR] for the first agency fees shall be equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by
issue, [it] came through in the second. But as it is, we do not believe the union members.
that a finding of unfair labor practice can be had considering the lack
of evidence on record that said acts were done to undermine the SO ORDERED.”8
union or stifle the member’s right to self organization or that the
[petitioners] were in bad faith. If at all, it’s (sic) error may have been DEL PILAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the
the result of a mistaken notion that individual check-off authorization CA denied the same on September 28, 2005.9
is needed for it to be able to validly and legally deduct assessment
especially after individual[s] concerned registered their objection. On Before us, DEL PILAR impugns the CA Decision on the following
the other hand, it is not error to negotiate for a better term in the grounds:
CBA. So long as [the] parties will agree. It must be noted that a CBA
is a contract between labor and management and is not simply a I.  IN PROMULGATING THE CHALLENGED DECISION AND
litany of benefits for labor. Moreso, for unfair labor practice to RESOLUTION, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED
prosper, there must be a clear showing of acts aimed at stifling the THE FACT THAT THE ANNUAL INCREASE IN THE SALARIES OF
worker’s right to self-organization. Mere allegations and mistake THE EMPLOYEES WAS NOT A BENEFIT ARISING FROM A
notions would not suffice. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, BUT WAS MANDATED
BY THE DIRECTIVE OF A GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENT; and
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the charge of unfair labor
practice is hereby Dismissed for want of basis. II.  CONSIDERING THE ANNUAL SALARY INCREASE OF NON-
UNION MEMBERS WAS NOT A BENEFIT ARISING FROM THE
SO ORDERED.”5 CBA, THEIR INDIVIDUAL WRITTEN AUTHORIZATIONS ARE STILL
REQUIRED TO ALLOW PETITIONER ACADEMY TO LEGALLY
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) DEDUCT THE SAME FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE SALARY.10
affirmed the Arbiter’s ruling. In gist, it upheld the UNION’s right to
agency fee, but did not consider DEL PILAR’s failure to deduct the The issue here boils down to whether or not the UNION is entitled to
same an unfair labor practice.6 collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so, whether an
individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.
The UNION’s motion for reconsideration having been denied,7 it then
went to the CA via certiorari. On July 19, 2005, the CA rendered the The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues
assailed decision, affirming with modification the resolutions of the and fees, from employees who are not union members, is recognized
NLRC. Like the Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA upheld the UNION’s by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code, thus:
right to collect agency fees from non-union employees, but did not
adjudge DEL PILAR liable for unfair labor practice. However, it Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not
ordered DEL PILAR to deduct agency fees from the salaries of non- members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be
union employees. assessed reasonable fees equivalent to the dues and other fees paid
by the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization required under
GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the NLRC dated April 30, 2004 Article 241, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-
is hereby MODIFIED. Private respondent Del Pilar Academy is members of recognized collective bargaining agent.”
ordered to deduct the agency fees from non-union members who are
recipients of the collective bargaining agreement benefits. The
When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or employees, justifying the collection of, and the UNION’s entitlement
authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code to, agency fees.
and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the
employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union dues, Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-
as agency fees, from the employees’ wages for direct remittance to union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e)
the union. The system is referred to as check off.11 No requirement of makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o),14 requiring written
written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if authorization is inapplicable to non-union members, especially in this
the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from the case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under
CBA.12 the CBA.

DEL PILAR admitted its failure to deduct the agency fees from the As explained by this Court in Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. v.
salaries of non-union employees, but justifies the non-deduction by Hon. Joaquin15 viz.:
the absence of individual written authorization. It posits that Article
248(e) is inapplicable considering that its employees derived no “The employee’s acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective
benefits from the CBA. The annual salary increase of its employee is bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his
a benefit mandated by law, and not derived from the CBA. According pay and the union’s entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis
to DEL PILAR, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the union’s right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory,
(DECS) required all educational institutions to allocate at least 70% but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that
of tuition fee increases for the salaries and other benefits of teaching non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by
and non-teaching personnel; that even prior to the execution of the benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining
CBA in September 1994, DEL PILAR was already granting annual union.”
salary increases to its employees. Besides, the non-union employees
objected to the deduction; hence, a written authorization is By this jurisprudential yardstick, this Court finds that the CA did not
indispensable to effect a valid check off. DEL PILAR urges this Court err in upholding the UNION’s right to collect agency fees.
to reverse the CA ruling insofar as it ordered the deduction of agency WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
fees from the salaries of non-union employees, arguing that such of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86868, are AFFIRMED.
conclusion proceeds from a misplaced premise that the salary SO ORDERED.
increase arose from the CBA.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-
The argument cannot be sustained. Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Contrary to what DEL PILAR wants to portray, the grant of annual Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that benefited the
non-union employees. The UNION has negotiated for other benefits, Note.—A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is more than a
namely, limitations on teaching assignments to 23 hours per week, contract, it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
additional compensation for overload units or teaching assignments the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate—it covers the whole
in excess of the 23 hour per week limit, and payment of longevity pay. employment relationship and prescribes the rights and duties of the
It also negotiated for entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay parties. (United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union-Philippine
for two (2) months for teaching staff who have rendered six (6) Transport General Workers’ Organization vs. Kimberly Clark Phils.,
consecutive semesters of service. For the non-teaching personnel, Inc., 484 SCRA 187 [2006])
the UNION worked for their entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with
pay.13 These provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-union
G.R. No. 85333. February 26, 1990.* Same; Same; Same; Same; Withdrawal of individual authorization is
CARMELITO L. PALACOL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PURA equivalent to no authorization at all; The law does not require that the
FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, disauthorization must be in individual form.—Paragraph (o) on the
MANILA CCBPI SALES FORCE UNION, and COCA-COLA other hand requires an individual written authorization duly signed by
BOTTLERS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents. every employee in order that a special assessment may be validly
checked-off. Even assuming that the special assessment was validly
Labor Standards; Labor Relations; Collective Bargaining; Special levied pursuant to paragraph (n), and granting that individual written
Assessments; Strict compliance with legal requirements regarding authorizations were obtained by the Union, nevertheless there can be
special assessments must be observed.—The respondent-Union no valid check-off considering that the majority of the union members
brushed aside the defects pointed out by petitioners in the manner of had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A withdrawal of
compliance with the legal requirements as “insignificant individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at all.
technicalities.” On the contrary, the failure of the Union to comply Hence, the ruling in Galvadores that “no check-offs from any amounts
strictly with the requirements set out by the law invalidates the due employees may be effected without an individual written
questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not authorization signed by the employees x x x” is applicable. The Union
enough in view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish points out, however, that said disauthorization are not valid for being
the compensation of the union members. Their express consent is collective in form, as they are “mere bunches of randomly procured
required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the signatures, under loose sheets of paper.” The contention deserves no
steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No merit for the simple reason that the documents containing the
shortcuts are allowed. disauthorization have the signatures of the union members. The
Court finds these retractions to be valid. There is nothing in the law
Same; Same; Same; Same; Written resolution of a majority of all which requires that the disauthorizations must be in individual form.
members of the union at a general membership meeting, required for
validity of levy of a special assessment.—As earlier outlined by Same; Same; Same; Same; Payment of services rendered by union
petitioners, the Union obviously failed to comply with the officers, not to be taken from special assessments but from regular
requirements of paragraph (n). It held local membership meetings on union dues.—Of the stated purposes of the special assessment, as
separate occasions, on different dates and at various venues, embodied in the board resolution of the Union, only the collection of a
contrary to the express requirement that there must be a general special fund for labor and education research is mandated, as
membership meeting. The contention of the Union that “the local correctly pointed out by the Union. The two other purposes, namely,
membership meetings are precisely the very general meetings the purchase of vehicles and other items for the benefit of the union
required by law” is untenable because the law would not have officers and the general membership, and the payment of services
specified a general membership meeting had the legislative intent rendered by union officers, consultants and others, should be
been to allow local meetings in lieu of the latter. It submitted only supported by the regular union dues, there being no showing that the
minutes of the local membership meetings when what is required is a latter are not sufficient to cover the same. The last stated purpose is
written resolution adopted at the general meeting. Worse still, the contended by petitioners to fall under the coverage of Article 222 (b)
minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a of the Labor Code. The contention is impressed with merit. Article
union director and not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted 222 (b) prohibits attorney’s fees, negotiation fees and similar charges
to the Company contained no list of the members present and no arising out of the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement
record of the votes cast. Since it is quite evident that the Union did from being imposed on any individual union member. The collection
not comply with the law at every turn, the only conclusion that may be of the special assessment partly for the payment for services
made therefrom is that there was no valid levy of the special rendered by union officers, consultants and others may not be in the
assessment pursuant to paragraph (n) of Article 241 of the Labor category of “attorney’s fees or negotiation fees.” But there is no
Code. question that it is an exaction which falls within the category of a
“similar charge,” and, therefore, within the coverage of the prohibition other items needed for the benefit of the officers and the general
in the aforementioned article. membership; and for the payment for services rendered by union
officers, consultants and others.”2 There was also an additional
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Bureau of Labor proviso stating that the “matter of allocation x x x shall be at the
Relations Commission. discretion of our incumbent Union President.”

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. This “Authorization and CBA Ratification” was obtained by the Union
Wellington B. Lachica for petitioners. through a secret referendum held in separate local membership
Adolpho M. Guerzon for respondent Union. meetings on various dates.3 The total membership of the Union was
GANCAYCO, J.: about 800. Of this number, 672 members originally authorized the
10% special assessment, while 173 opposed the same.4
Can a special assessment be validly deducted by a labor union from
the lump-sum pay of its members, granted under a collective Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the
bargaining agreement (CBA), notwithstanding a subsequent Union submitted documents to the Company stating that although
disauthorization of the same by a majority of the union members? they have ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing or
This is the main issue for resolution in the instant petition for disauthorizing the deduction of any amount from their CBA lump-
certiorari. sum. Later, 185 other union members submitted similar documents
As gleaned from the records of the case, the pertinent facts are as expressing the same intent. These members, numbering 355 in all
follows: (170 + 185), added to the original oppositors of 173, turned the tide in
favor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with a total of
On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force 528 objectors and a remainder of 272 supporters.5
Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union), as the collective
bargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief On account of the above-mentioned disauthorization, the Company,
helpers of the Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of the being in a quandary as to whom to remit the payment of the
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phil-ippines), Inc. (hereinafter questioned amount, filed an action for interpleader with the Bureau of
referred to as the Company) concluded a new collective bargaining Labor Relations in order to resolve the conflicting claims of the
agreement with the latter.1 Among the compensation benefits parties concerned. Petitioners, who are regular rank-and-file
granted to the employees was a general salary increase to be given employees of the Company and bona fide members of the Union,
in lump-sum including recomputation of actual commissions earned filed a motion/complaint for intervention therein in two groups of 161
based on the new rates of increase. and 94, respectively. They claimed to be among those union
members who either did not sign any individual written authorization,
On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to the or having signed one, subsequently withdrew or retracted their
Company the ratification by the union members of the new CBA and signatures therefrom.
authorization for the Company to deduct union dues equivalent to
P10.00 every payday or P20.00 every month and, in addition, 10% by Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of
way of special assessment, from the CBA lump-sum pay granted to Article 241(o) in relation to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code.
the union members. The last one among the aforementioned is the
subject of the instant petition. Article 222(b) provides as follows:

As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated September “ART. 222. Appearances and Fees.—
29, 1987, the purpose of the special assessment sought to be levied
is “to put up a cooperative and credit union; purchase vehicles and xxx xxx xxx
(b) No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind (n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied
arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of upon the members of a labor organization unless authorized by a
the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general
of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may membership meeting duly called for the purpose. The secretary of the
be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by organization shall record the minutes of the meeting including the list
the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
the contrary shall be null and void.” assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessments or fees.
The record shall be attested to by the president;”
On the other hand, Article 241(o) mandates that:
Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz ruled in favor of petitioners in an order
“ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor dated February 15, 1988 whereby he directed the Company to remit
organization.— the amount it had kept in trust directly to the rank-and-file personnel
xxx xxx xxx without delay.

(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special On appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, however, the order of
assessments, attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or any other the Med-Arbiter was reversed and set aside by the respondent-
extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an Director in a resolution dated August 19, 1988 upholding the claim of
employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by the Union that the special assessment is authorized under Article
the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, 241(n) of the Labor Code, and that the Union has complied with the
purpose and beneficiary of the deduction;” requirements therein.

As authority for their contention, petitioners cited Galva-dores v. Hence, the instant petition.
Trajano,6 wherein it was ruled that no check-offs from any amount
due employees may be effected without individual written Petitioners allege that the respondent-Director committed a grave
authorizations duly signed by the employees specifically stating the abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
amount, purpose, and beneficiary of the deduction. she held Article 241(n) of the Labor Code to be the applicable
provision instead of Article 222(b) in relation to Article 241(o) of the
In its answer, the Union countered that the deductions not only have same law.
the popular indorsement and approval of the general membership,
but likewise complied with the legal requirements of Article 241 (n) According to petitioners, a cursory examination and comparison of
and (o) of the Labor Code in that the board resolution of the Union the two provisions of Article 241 reveals that paragraph (n) cannot
imposing the questioned special assessment had been duly prevail over paragraph (o). The reason advanced is that a special
approved in a general membership meeting and that the collection of assessment is not a matter of major policy affecting the entire union
a special fund for labor education and research is mandated. membership but is one which concerns the individual rights of union
members.
Article 241(n) of the Labor Code states that—
Petitioners further assert that assuming arguendo that Article 241(n)
“ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor should prevail over paragraph (o), the Union has nevertheless failed
organization.— to comply with the procedure to legitimize the questioned special
xxx xxx xxx assessment by: (1) presenting mere minutes of local membership
meetings instead of a written resolution; (2) failing to call a general
membership meeting; (3) having the minutes of three (3) local
membership meetings recorded by a union director, and not by the venues, contrary to the express requirement that there must be a
union secretary as required; (4) failing to have the list of members general membership meeting. The contention of the Union that “the
present included in the minutes of the meetings; and (5) failing to local membership meetings are precisely the very general meetings
present a record of the votes cast.7 Petitioners concluded their required by law”10 is untenable because the law would not have
argument by citing Galvadores. specified a general membership meeting had the legislative intent
been to allow local meetings in lieu of the latter.
After a careful review of the records of this case, We are convinced
that the deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings when
not made in accordance with the requirements provided by law. what is required is a written resolution adopted at the general
meeting. Worse still, the minutes of three of those local
Petitioners are correct in citing the ruling of this Court
in Galvadores which is applicable to the instant case. The principle meetings held were recorded by a union director and not by the union
“that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that secretary. The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list of
diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent”8 is the members present and no record of the votes cast. Since it is quite
in accord with the constitutional principle of the State affording full evident that the Union did not comply with the law at every turn, the
protection to labor.9 only conclusion that may be made therefrom is that there was no
valid levy of the special assessment pursuant to paragraph (n) of
The respondent-Union brushed aside the defects pointed out by Article 241 of the Labor Code.
petitioners in the manner of compliance with the legal requirements
as “insignificant technicalities.” On the contrary, the failure of the Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written
Union to comply strictly with the requirements set out by the law authorization duly signed by every employee in order that a special
invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial assessment may be validly checked-off. Even assuming that the
compliance is not enough in view of the fact that the special special assessment was validly levied pursuant to paragraph (n), and
assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members. granting that individual written authorizations were obtained by the
Their express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained Union, nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that
in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed the majority of the union members had already withdrawn their
to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. individual authorizations. A withdrawal of individual authorizations is
equivalent to no authorization at all. Hence, the ruling in Galvadores
The applicable provisions are clear. The Union itself admits that both that “no check-offs from any amounts due employees may be
paragraphs (n) and (o) of Article 241 apply. Paragraph (n) refers to effected without an individual written authorization signed by the
“levy” while paragraph (o) refers to “check-off” of a special employees x x x” is applicable.
assessment. Both provisions must be complied with. Under
paragraph (n), the Union must submit to the Company a written The Union points out, however, that said disauthorizations are not
resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership valid for being collective in form, as they are “mere bunches of
meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary of the randomly procured signatures, under loose sheets of paper.”11 The
organization must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn, contention deserves no merit for the simple reason that the
must include, among others, the list of all the members present as documents containing the disauthorizations have the signatures of
well as the votes cast. the union members. The Court finds these retractions to be valid.
There is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorization
As earlier outlined by petitioners, the Union obviously failed to comply must be in individual form.
with the requirements of paragraph (n). It held local membership
meetings on separate occasions, on different dates and at various
Moreover, it is well-settled that “all doubts in the implementation and negotiations fees and similar charges arising out of the conclusion of
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code x x x shall be a collective bargaining agreement from being imposed on any
resolved in favor of labor.”12 And as previously stated, labor in this individual union member. The collection of the special assessment
case refers to the union members, as employees of the Company. partly for the payment for services rendered by union officers,
Their mere desire to establish a separate bargaining unit, albeit consultants and others may not be in the category of “attorney’s fees
uproven, cannot be construed against them in relation to the legality or negotiations fees.” But there is no question that it is an exaction
of the questioned special assessment. On the contrary, the same which falls within the category of a “similar charge,” and, therefore,
may even be taken to reflect their dissatisfaction with their bargaining within the coverage of the prohibition in the aforementioned article.
representative, the respondent-Union, as shown by the There is an additional proviso giving the Union President unlimited
circumstances of the instant petition, and with good reason. discretion to allocate the proceeds of the special assessment. Such a
proviso may open the door to abuse by the officers of the Union
The Med-Arbiter correctly ruled in his Order that: considering that the total amount of the special assessment is quite
“The mandate of the majority rank and file have (sic) to be respected considerable—P1,027,694.33 collected from those union members
considering they are the ones directly affected and the realities of the who originally authorized the deduction, and P1,267,863.39 from
high standards of survival nowadays. To ignore the mandate of the those who did not authorize the same, or subsequently retracted their
rank and file would enure to destabilizing industrial peace and authorizations.13 The former amount had already been remitted to the
harmony within the rank and file and the employer’s fold, which we Union, while the latter is being held in trust by the Company.
cannot countenance.
The Court, therefore, strikes down the questioned special
Moreover, it will be recalled that precisely union dues are collected assessment for being a violation of Article 241, paragraphs (n) and
from the union members to be spent for the purposes alluded to by (o), and Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code.
respondent. There is no reason shown that the regular union dues
being now implemented is not sufficient for the alleged expenses. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order
Furthermore, the rank and file have spoken in withdrawing their of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated August 19,
consent to the special assessment, believing that their regular union 1988 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, while the order of the
dues are adequate for the purposes stated by the respondent. Thus, Med-Arbiter dated February 17, 1988 is reinstated, and the
the rank and file having spoken and, as we have earlier mentioned, respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. is hereby ordered
their sentiments should be respected.” to immediately remit the amount of P1,267,863.39 to the respective
union members from whom the said amount was withheld. No
Of the stated purposes of the special assessment, as embodied in pronouncement as to costs. This decision is immediately executory.
the board resolution of the Union, only the collection of a special fund SO ORDERED.
for labor and education research is mandated, as correctly pointed
out by the Union. The two other purposes, namely, the purchase of Narvasa, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
vehicles and other items for the benefit of the union officers and the Cruz, J., No part. Related to one of the counsel.
general membership, and the payment of services rendered by union Petition granted; order reversed and set aside.
officers, consultants and others, should be supported by the regular Note.—A clause in a collective bargaining agreement providing that
union dues, there being no showing that the latter are not sufficient to “The company will deduct the Union agency fee from the wages of
cover the same. workers who are not members of the Union, provided the aforesaid
workers authorize the company to make such deductions in writing or
The last stated purpose is contended by petitioners to fall under the if no such authorization is given, if a competent court directs the
coverage of Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code. The contention is company to make such deduc-tion,” is not a permissible form of
impressed with merit. Article 222 (b) prohibits attorney’s fees, union security. (National
G.R. No. 115949. March 16, 2000.* In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior
EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees
SIA, RODOLFO EUGENIO, ISAGANI MAKISIG, and DEMETRIO from the latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union. It
SALAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON SARMIENTO, JESUS has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit
CARLOS MARTINEZ III, ALBERT NAPIAL, MARVIN ALMACIN, of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees.
ROGELIO MATEO, GLENN SIAPNO, EMILIANO CUETO, SALOME
ATIENZA, NORMA V. GO, JUDITH DUDANG, MONINA DIZON, Same; Same; Requisites for the validity of the special assessment for
EUSEBIO ROMERO, ISAGANI MORALES, ELISEO union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation
BUENAVENTURA, CLEMENTE AGCAMARAN, CARMELITA expenses.—Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the
NOLASCO, JOVITA FERI, LULU ACOSTA, CAROL LAZARO, NIDA special assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees
ARRIZA, ROMAN BERNARDO, DOMINGO B. MACALDO, and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written
EUGENE PIDLAOAN, MA. SOCORRO T. ANGOB, JOSEPHINE resolution of the majority of all the members at the general
ALVAREZ, LOURDES FERRER, JACQUILINE BAQUIRAN, membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary’s record of
GRACIA R. ESCUADRO, KRIS TINA HERNANDEZ, LOURDES the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for
IBEAS, MACARIO GARCIA, BILLY TECSON, ALEX RECTO III, check off duly signed by the employees concerned.
LEBRUDO, JOSE RICAFORTE, RODOLFO MORADA, TERESA
AMADO, ROSITA TRINIDAD, JEANETTE ONG, VICTORINO Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s fees may not be deducted or
LASAY, RANIEL DAYAO, OSCAR SANTOS, CRISTINA SALAVER, checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written
VICTORIA ARINO, A.H. SAJO, MICHAEL BIETE, RED RP, GLORIA consent.—Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked
JUAT, ETHELINDA CASILAN, FAMER DIPASUPIL, MA. HIDELISA off from any amount due to an employee without his written consent.
POMER, MA. CHARLOTTE TAWATAO, GRACE REYES, ERNIE Same; Same; Same; A written individual authorization duly signed by
C O L I N A , Z E N A I D A M E N D O Z A , PA U L I TA A D O R A B L E , the employee concerned is a condition sine qua non for such
BERNARDO-MADUMBA, NESTOR NAVARRO, EASTER YAP, deduction.—Even as early as February 1990, in the case of Palacol
ALMA LIM, FELISA YU, TIMOTEO GANASTRA, REVELITA vs. Ferrer-Calleja we said that the express consent of employees is
C A R TA J E N A S , A N G E L I TO C A B U A L , R O B E R TA TA N , required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the
DOMINADOR TAPO, GRACE LIM, GADIANE JEMIE, CHRISTHDY steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No
DAUD, BENEDICTO ACOSTA, JESUSA ACOSTA, MA. AVELINA shortcuts are allowed. In Stellar Industrial Services, Inc. vs. NLRC we
ARYAP, EVELYN BENITEZ, ESTERITA CHU, EVANGELINE CHU, reiterated that a written individual authorization duly signed by the
BETTY CINCO, RICARDO CONNE JO, MANULITO EVALO, employee concerned is a condition sine qua non for such deduction.
FRANCIS LEONIDA, GREGORIO NOBLEZA, RODOLFO
RIVERAL, ELSA SLA, CLARA SUGBO, EDGARDO TABAO, Same; Same; Same; Public respondent did not act with grave abuse
MANUEL VELOSO, MARLYN YU, ABSALON BUENA, WILFREDO of discretion in ruling that the workers through their union should be
PUERTO, FLORENTINA PINGOL, MARILOU DAR, FE MORALES, made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer.
MALEN BELLO, LORENA TAMAYO, CESAR LIM, PAUL —From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public
BALTAZAR, ALFREDO GAYAGAS, DUMAGUETE EMPLOYEES, respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
CEBU EMPLOYEES, OZAMIZ EMPLOYEES, TACLOBAN the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the
EMPLOYEES AND ALL OTHER SOLIDBANK UNION MEMBERS, expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly the
respondents. reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general fund or
account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the
Labor Law; Labor Union; The system of check-off is primarily for the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.
benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees.— SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. On October 2, 1992, private respondents instituted a complaint
Domingo T. Añonuevo for petitioners. against the petitioners and the union counsel before the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of attorney’s
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to reverse fees as well as for quantification of the benefits in the 1992
partially the Order1 of public respondent dated June 3, 1994, in Case CBA.3 Petitioners, in response, moved for the dismissal of the
No. OS-MA-A-8-170-92, which ruled that the workers through their complaint citing litis pendentia, forum shopping and failure to state a
union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the cause of action as their grounds.4
professional services of a lawyer in connection with the collective
bargaining negotiations and that the reimbursement for the On April 22, 1993, Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap of the DOLE-NCR
deductions from the workers should be charged to the union’s issued the following Order:
general fund or account.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Respondents Union
The records show the following factual antecedents: Officers and Counsel are hereby directed to immediately return or
refund to the Complainants the illegally deducted amount of
Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the attorney’s fees from the package of benefits due herein complainants
duly recognized collective bargaining agent for the rank and file under the aforesaid new CBA.
employees of Solid Bank Corporation. Private respondents are
members of said union. “Furthermore, Complainants are directed to pay five percent (5%) of
the total amount to be refunded or returned by the Respondent Union
Sometime in October 1991, the union’s Executive Board decided to Officers and Counsel to them in favor of Atty. Armando D. Morales, as
retain anew the service of Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina (now deceased) as attorney’s fees, in accordance with Section II, Rule VIII of Book II
union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new Collective (sic) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.”5
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Accordingly, on October 19, 1991, the On appeal, the Secretary of Labor rendered a Resolution6 dated
board called a general membership meeting for the purpose. At the December 27, 1993, stating:
said meeting, the majority of all union members approved and signed
a resolution confirming the decision of the executive board to engage “WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents Evangeline Gabriel, et al.,
the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel. is hereby partially granted and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 22
April 1993 is hereby modified as follows: (1) that the ordered refund
As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the shall be limited to those union members who have not signified their
total economic benefits that may be secured through the negotiations conformity to the check-off of attorney’s fees; and (2) the directive on
be given to Atty. Lacsina as attorney’s fees. It also contained an the payment of 5% attorney’s fees should be deleted for lack of basis.
authorization for Solid Bank Corporation to check-off said attorney’s SO ORDERED.”7
fees from the first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees
under the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty. Lacsina On Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent affirmed the said
and/or his duly authorized representative.2 Order with modification that the union’s counsel be dropped as a
party litigant and that the workers through their union should be made
The new CBA was signed on February 21, 1992. The bank then, on to shoulder the expenses incurred for the attorney’s services.
request of the union, made payroll deductions for attorney’s fees from Accordingly, the reimbursement should be charged to the union’s
the CBA benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the general fund/account.8
abovementioned resolution.
Hence, the present petition seeking to partially annul the above-cited Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special
order of the public respondent for being allegedly tainted with grave assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written
The sole issue for consideration is, did the public respondent act with resolution of the majority of all the members at the general
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order? membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary’s record of
the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for
Petitioners argue that the General Membership Resolution check off duly signed by the employees concerned.
authorizing the bank to check-off attorney’s fee from the first lump
sum payment of the benefits to the employees under the new CBA Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked off from any
satisfies the legal requirements for such assessment.9 Private amount due to an employee without his written consent.
respondents, on the other hand, claim that the check-off provision in
question is illegal because it was never submitted for approval at a After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General
general membership meeting called for the purpose and that it failed Membership Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union
to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor Code.10 did not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence
In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior for the validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment for
authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation
from the latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union.11 It expenses. There were no individual written check off authorizations
assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot be
has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit legally deducted by their employer.
of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees.12
Even as early as February 1990, in the case of Palacol vs. Ferrer-
The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 Calleja13 we said that the express consent of employees is required,
(b) and Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code. and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps
outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are
Article 222 (b) states: allowed. In Stellar Industrial Services, Inc. vs. NLRC14 we reiterated
that a written individual authorization duly signed by the employee
“No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind concerned is a condition sine qua non for such deduction.
arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of
the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member These pronouncements are also in accord with the recent ruling of
of the contracting union: Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may this Court in the case of ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union
be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, et al.,15 which
the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to provides:
the contrary shall be null and void.” (Italics ours)
“Premises studiedly considered, we are of the irresistible conclusion
Article 241 (o) provides: and, so find that the ruling in BPIEU-ALU vs. NLRC that (1) the
prohibition against attorney’s fees in Article 222 paragraph (b) of the
“Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special Labor Code applies only when the payment of attorney’s fees is
assessment, attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or any other effected through forced contributions from the workers; and (2) that
extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an no deduction must be taken from the workers who did not sign the
employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by checkoff authorization, applies to the case under
the employee. The authorization should specifically state the consideration.” (Emphasis ours.)
amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.” (Emphasis ours.)
We likewise ruled in Bank of the Philippine Islands Employees Union-
Association Labor Union (BPIEU-ALU) vs. NLRC,16

“. . . the afore-cited provision (Article 222 [b] of the Labor Code) as

prohibiting the payment of attorney’s fees only when it is effected
through forced contributions from workers from their own funds as
distinguished from the union funds. The purpose of the provision is to
prevent imposition on the workers of the duty to individually
contribute their respective shares in the fee to be paid the attorney
for his services on behalf of the union in its negotiations with
management. The obligation to pay the attorney’s fees belongs to the
union and cannot be shunted to the workers as their direct
responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may require the
individual worker to assume the obligation to pay attorney’s fees from
their own pockets. So categorical is this intent that the law makes it
clear that any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void ab
initio.” (Emphasis ours.)

From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public
respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the
expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly the
reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general fund or
account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the
concerned employees other than those mandated by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated
June 3, 1994, of respondent Secretary of Labor signed by
Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—Although the union has every right to represent its members

in the negotiation regarding the terms and conditions of their
employment, it cannot negate their wishes on matters which are
purely personal and individual to them.
G.R. No. 76427. February 21, 1989.* [1987]; and Palencia v. National Labor Relations Commission, 153
JOHNSON AND JOHNSON LABOR UNION-FFW, DANTE SCRA 247 [1987])
MORANTE, MYRNA OLOVEJA AND ITS OTHER INDIVIDUAL Same; Same; Same; Same; A suit to enforce a union constitution
UNION MEMBERS, petitioners, vs. DIRECTOR OF LABOR does not have to be brought against each individual member.—On
RELATIONS, AND OSCAR PILI, respondents. the ancillary issue presented by the petitioners whether or not the
petitioning union members have been deprived of their right to due
Labor Law; Labor Relations; Unions; Union Constitution; The union process of law because they were never made parties to the case
constitution is a covenant between the union and its members and under consideration, we rule that the fact that the union officers
among the members.—We likewise find untenable the argument of impleaded since the inception of the case acted in a representative
the petitioners that the public respondent, in granting financial capacity on behalf of the entire union’s membership substantially
meets the requirements of due process with respect to the said union
aid to the private respondent, in effect, substituted the decision of the members. Moreover, the complaint filed against the union involves
petitioner-union to do otherwise and that in so doing, the public the interpretation of its constitution favoring an aggrieved member.
respondent gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of The members are bound by the terms of their own constitution. A suit
jurisdiction. The union constitution is a covenant between the union to enforce a union constitution does not have to be brought against
and its members and among the members. There is nothing in their each individual member, especially where several thousand
constitution which leaves the legal interpretation of its terms members form the membership.
unilaterally to the union or its officers or even the general
membership. It is noteworthy to quote the ruling made by the public PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor
respondent in this respect, to wit: “The union constitution and by-laws Relations.
clearly show that any member who is suspended or terminated from
employment without reasonable cause is entitled to financial The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
assistance from the union and its members. The problem, however, is Rogelio R. Udarbe for petitioners.
that the constitution does not indicate which body has the power to The Solicitor General for public respondent.
determine whether a suspension or dismissal is for reasonable cause Manuel V. Nepomuceno for private respondent.
or not. To our mind, the constitution’s silence on this matter is a clear
recognition of the labor arbiter’s exclusive jurisdiction over dismissal GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
cases. After all, the union’s constitution and by-laws is valid only
insofar as it is not inconsistent with existing laws. x x x .” The sole issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not
the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Findings of Quasi- that the private respondent is entitled to the financial aid from the
Judicial Agencies; Findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies are compulsory contributions of the petitioner-union afforded to its
generally accorded not only respect but even finality if supported by members who have been suspended or terminated from work without
substantial evidence.—An aggrieved member has to resort to a reasonable cause. The provision for the grant of financial aid in favor
government agency or tribunal. Considering that quasi-judicial of a union member is embodied in the petitioner-union’s Constitution
agencies like the public respondent’s office have acquired expertise and By-laws, Article XIII, Section 5, of which reads:
since their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, their findings of
fact in connection with their rulings are generally accorded not only “A member who have (sic) been suspended or terminated without
respect but at times even finality if supported by substantial evidence. reasonable cause shall be extended a financial aid from the
(See Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. National Labor Relations compulsory contributions in the amount of SEVENTY FIVE
Commission, 154 SCRA 368 [1987]; Riker v. Ople, 155 SCRA 85 CENTAVOS (P0. 75) from each member weekly.” (p. 18, Rollo)
On May 6, 1985, the private respondent, a member of the petitioner- dismissed, appellees are absolved from paying the complainant
union was dismissed from his employment by employer Johnson & anything.” (p. 115, Records)
Johnson (Phil.) Inc., for non-disclosure in his job application form of Both parties moved for reconsideration. The petitioners reiterated that
the fact that he had a relative in the company in violation of company since the private respondent’s termination was for a reasonable
policies. cause, it would be unjust and unfair if financial aid were to be given in
the event that the latter’s case for illegal dismissal is decided against
On July 1985, a complaint was filed by the private respondent him. The private respondent, on the other hand, prayed for the
against the officers of the petitioner-union docketed as NRC-LRD- amendment of the dispositive portion in order that the grant of
M-7-271-85 alleging, among others, that the union officers had financial aid be made without any qualifications.
refused to provide the private respondent the financial aid as
provided in the union constitution despite demands for payment On June 16, 1986, a Manifestation and/or Opposition to the Motion
thereof. The petitioner-union and its officers counter-alleged, in their for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was filed by the private
answer, that the said financial aid was to be given only in cases of respondent stating that he was being discriminated against
termination or suspension without any reasonable cause; that the considering that one Jerwin Taguba, another union member, was
union’s executive board had the prerogative to determine whether the terminated for dishonesty and loss of confidence but was granted
suspension or termination was for a reasonable cause or not; and financial aid by the petitioners while Taguba’s complaint against the
that the union, in a general membership meeting, had resolved not to company was still pending with the National Labor Relation
extend financial aid to the private respondent. Commission.

While the grievance prodecure as contained in the union’s collective The public respondent separately resolved the above motions. On
bargaining agreement was being undertaken, the private respondent, June 26, 1986, an order was issued denying the petitioners’ motion
on August 26, 1985, filed a case for unfair labor practice and illegal for reconsideration. On August 19, 1986, the public respondent
dismissal against his employer docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. modified its decision dated April 17, 1986 and its aforestated order as
6-1912-85. follows:

On September 27, 1985, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin issued an “Considering that complainant Pili is similarly situated as Jerwin
order dismissing for lack of merit the complaint of the private Taguba coupled with the need to obviate any discriminating treatment
respondent against the petitioners for alleged violation of the union to the former, it is only just and appropriate that our Decision dated
constitution and by-laws. 17 April 1986 be modified in such a manner that respondents
immediately pay the complainant the sum of PO.75/ week per union
On appeal, the then public respondent Director Cresenciano B. member to be computed from the time of his dismissal from the
Trajano, on April 17, 1986, rendered the decision assailed in this company, without prejudice to refund of the amount that shall be paid
petition. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads: to Pili in the event the pending case is finally resolved against him.

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of complainant “WHEREFORE, and as above qualified, this Bureau’s Decision dated
Oscar Pili is hereby granted and the Order appealed from is hereby 17 April 1986 and the Order dated 26 June 1986 are hereby modified
set aside. Appellees, therefore, are hereby ordered to pay the to the extent that the respondents are directed to immediately pay
complainant the sum of P0.75/week per union member to be complainant the sum of P0.75/week per union member to be
computed from the time of the complainant’s termination from computed from the time of his termination from his employment until
employment to the time he acquired another employment should his his case against the employer company shall have been finally
complaint for illegal dismissal against the company be resolved in his resolved and/or disposed.” (p. 53, Rollo)
favor; provided, that if his complaint against the company be
Meanwhile, on July 25, 1986, a motion for issuance of a writ of The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows:
execution was filed by the private respondent in order to collect from A— THAT THE DECISION/ORDER IN QUESTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
the petitioners the amount of financial aid to which the former was
entitled. B— THAT RESPONDENT OFFICIAL ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
On September 1, 1986, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
C— THAT WITH RESPECT TO PETITIONING MEMBERS, THEY HAVE BEEN
the public respondent’s resolution dated August 19, 1986 on the
grounds that Taguba’s affidavit cannot support the private DEPRIVED OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
respondent’s claim that he is also entitled to the financial aid provided LAW. (P. 13, Rollo)
in the union’s constitution and that the union cannot be compelled to We find unmeritorious the contention of the petitioners that the
grant the said aid in the absence of a special fund for the purpose. questioned decision and order are contrary to law for being
tantamount to compelling the union to disburse it funds without the
On October 28, 1986, the public respondent through Director Pura authority of the general membership and to collect from its members
Ferrer-Calleja denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration without the benefit of individual payroll authorization.
stating that Article XIII, Section 5 of the union’s constitution and by-
laws does not require a special fund so that all union members Section 5, Article XIII of the petitioner-union’s constitution and by-
similarly situated as the private respondent must be entitled to the laws earlier aforequoted is self-executory. The financial aid extended
same right and privilege regarding the grant of financial aid as therein to any suspended or terminated union member is realized from the
provided. contributions declared to be compulsory under the said provision in
the amount of seventy-five centavos due weekly from each union
On December 18, 1986, a writ of execution was issued by the public member. The nature of the said contributions being compulsory and
respondent in the following tenor: the fact that the purpose as stated is for financial aid clearly indicate
that individual payroll authorizations of the union members are not
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby directed to proceed to the necessary. The petitioner-union’s constitution and by-laws govern the
premises of Johnson and Johnson (FFW) located at Edison Road, relationship between and among its members. As in the interpretation
Bo. Ibayo, Parañaque, Metro Manila to collect from the said union of contracts, if the terms are clear and leave no doubt as to the
through its Treasurer, Myrna Oloveja or to any responsible officer of intention of the parties, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall
the union the amount of Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Twenty control. (See Govenment Service Insurance System v. Court of
Pesos (P20,520.00), more or less representing financial assistance Appeals, 145 SCRA 311 [1986]). Section 5, Article XIII of the said
to complainant under the union’s constitution and by-laws. In case constitution and by-laws is in line with the petitioner-union’s aims and
you fail to collect said amount in cash, you are to cause the purposes which under Sec. 2, Article II include
satisfaction of the same on the union’s movable or immovable
properties not exempt from execution. You are to return this writ “To promote, establish and devise schemes of mutual assistance
within fifteen (15) days from your compliance hereby together with among the members in labor disputes.”
your report thereon. You may collect your legal fees from the
respondent union.” (p. 55, Rollo) Thus, there is no doubt that the petitioner-union can be ordered to
release its funds intended for the promotion of mutual assistance in
On December 24, 1986, the instant petition was filed with prayer for a favor of the private respondent.
preliminary injunction. The temporary restraining order issued by the
Chief Justice on December 24, 1986 was confirmed in our resolution We likewise find untenable the argument of the petitioners that the
dated January 7, 1987. public respondent, in granting financial aid to the private respondent,
in effect, substituted the decision of the petitioner-union to do
otherwise and that in so doing, the public respondent gravely abused The members are bound by the terms of their own constitution. A suit
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The union constitution to enforce a union constitution does not have to be brought against
is a covenant between the union and its members and among the each individual member, especially where several thousand
members. There is nothing in their constitution which leaves the legal members form the membership. If there is any violation of the right to
interpretation of its terms unilaterally to the union or its officers or due process in the case at bar it is as regards the private respondent
even the general membership. It is noteworthy to quote the ruling since the petitioners-union has dispensed with due process in
made by the public respondent in this respect, to wit: deciding not to extend financial aid to the private respondent in the
absence yet of a ruling by the labor arbiter on whether his dismissal
“The union constitution and by-laws clearly show that any member was for a reasonable cause or not.
who is suspended or terminated from employment without
reasonable cause is entitled to financial assistance from the union The remedy of the petitioners is to strike out or amend the
and its members. The problem, however, is that the constitution does objectionable features of their constitution. They cannot expect the
not indicate which body has the power to determine whether a public respondent to assist them in its non-enforcement or violation.
suspension or dismissal is for reasonable cause or not. To our mind, WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is
the constitution’s silence on this matter is a clear recognition of the hereby DISMISSED in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of
labor arbiter’s exclusive jurisdiction over dismissal cases. After all, discretion on the part of the public respondent. The decision of the
the union’s constitution and by-laws is valid only insofar as it is not public respondent dated April 17, 1986 as modified in a resolution
inconsistent with existing laws. x x x.” (BLR decision, p. 2; p. 115, dated August 17, 1986 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
Records) order issued by the Court on December 24, 1986 is SET ASIDE.

An aggrieved member has to resort to a government agency or SO ORDERED.

tribunal. Considering that quasi-judicial agencies like the public
respondent’s office have acquired expertise since their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matter, their findings of fact in connection with
their rulings are generally accorded not only respect but at times
even finality if supported by substantial evidence. (See Manila
Mandarin Employees Union v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 154 SCRA 368 [1987]) Riker v. Ople, 155 SCRA
85 [1987]; and Palencia v. National Labor Relations Commission, 153
SCRA 247 [1987]. We note from the records that the petitioners have
conflicting interpretations of the same disputed provision—one in
favor of Jerwin Taguba and another against the private respondent.

On the ancillary issue presented by the petitioners whether or not the

petitioning union members have been deprived of their right to due
process of law because they were never made parties to the case
under consideration, we rule that the fact that the union officers
impleaded since the inception of the case acted in a representative
capacity on behalf of the entire union’s membership substantially
meets the requirements of due process with respect to the said union
members. Moreover, the complaint filed against the union involves
the interpretation of its constitution favoring an aggrieved member.
G.R. No. 218454. December 1, 2016.* an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union
members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the
PENINSULA EMPLOYEES UNION collection of agency fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article
(PEU),** petitioner, vs. MICHAEL B. ESQUIVEL, DOMINGO G. 248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s
MABUTAS, RANDELL V. AFAN, LOISELLE S. AGUNOD, GEMELO right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-
L. ANSELMO, GERYMY ANCHETA, JOYLY V. ASUNCION, contractual, deriving from the established principle that nonunion
CRESENCIA A. BERMEJO, JOSHUA S. BERSAMINA, LITO S. employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
CALINISAN, RANULFO C. CASTILLO, ENRICO C. CASTRO, employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.
GERARDO R. CASTRO, GLICERIA H. CELIZ, MARIA POLA F.
CORDERO, JORGE MARIO C. CORONADO, DOMINGA C. CRUZ, Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law interpreting Article 250(n) and
JUSTINE CRUZ, RONALD S. DADIA, ARCHIMEDES S. DALISAY, (o) (formerly Article 241) of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates
JOSEF PATRICK P. DE VERA, SERGIO B. DIANE, NONITA M. the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify
DOMINGO, JOSELITO E. EDANG, KRISTINE ANNE A. a valid levy of increased union dues.—Case law interpreting Article
ENGRACIAL, CARLO GILJOSEF A. FORNIER, ELIAS S. GACAD, 250(n) and (o) (formerly Article 241) of the Labor Code, as amended,
MEL GARRIDO, PHILLIP MICHAEL C. GAUDINEZ, SILVERIA B. mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in
GRAN, RODOR D. HEMEDES, BENIGNO A. HONGCO, LEONARD order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are: (a) an
N. LAMBOT, MELECIO D. LAURENTE III, GRACE MILLISCEN L. authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the
LIM, MARIA ALICIA GEZZA D. LLAVE, EULALIA B. LOBATON, members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
WILFREDO G. LOPEZ, GENLIE D. LUCERNA, DOMINGO C. purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting,
MABUTAS III, CARMELITA A. MALIG, NICANOR T. MANGUIAT, which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the
HERVE STEVE A. MARTIN, RODELIO N. MARZO, FLORENCIO A. purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such
MASA, JR., EDINA H. MORALES, SYLVIA M. MORALES, ROBERT assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for
H. NACINO, ANGELO F. ONA, JEFFERSON O. ONG, DENNIS O. check off duly signed by the employees concerned.
RAMOS, DENNIS S. REMBULAT, BENJIE B. REYES, VICTOR
EMMANUEL I. REYES, ANTONIO R. RIOVEROS, MARCELO S. Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Check Off; Jurisprudence
RIPA III, ALLAN T. ROXAS, MARIA B. RUANTO II, RONALD A. states that the express consent of the employee to any deduction in
S A L M O N , A R M A N D O P. S A N T U Y O , B RYA N S . S U N , his compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the
MARYGRACE F. TAMAYO, LORENZVI IRENE U. TAN, MILAGROS steps outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter.—
O. TELOSA, HERMILO R. TUMBAGA, GINA S. UY, and VENICE T. Corollarily, no individual check off authorizations can proceed
VILLAPONDO, respondents. therefrom, and the submission of the November 2008 check off
authorizations becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Agency the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his
Fee; The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps
negotiated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter; however,
employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called “agency PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that
fee” from nonunion members who are employees of the appropriate there is no legal basis to impose union dues and agency fees more
bargaining unit, in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees than that allowed in the expired CBA, i.e., at one percent (1%) of the
paid by union members, in case they accept the benefits under the employee’s monthly basic salary.
CBA.—The recognized collective bargaining union which
successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
to collect a reasonable fee called “agency fee” from nonunion the Court of Appeals.
members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. agreement (CBA) incorporating the dispositions therein (arbitral
Levy Edwin C. Ang for petitioner. award).13 The parties have yet to actually sign a CBA but have, for
Rogelio B. De Guzman for respondents. the most part, implemented the arbitral award.14

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: In March 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN requested15 the OSEC for

Administrative Intervention for Dispute Avoidance16 (AIDA) pursuant
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the to DOLE Circular No. 1, Series of 200617 in relation to the issue,
Decision2 dated February 9, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated May 21, among others, of its entitlement to collect increased agency fees from
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124566, the non-PEU members, 18 which was docketed as OSEC-
which annulled and set aside the Order4 dated March 6, 2012 (March AIDA-03-001-09.19
6, 2012 Order) of the Office of the Secretary (OSEC) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) in OS-AJ-0024-07 The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased
declaring petitioner Peninsula Employees Union (PEU)-National agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no
Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurants and Allied Industries written CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-
(NUWHRAIN)5 entitled to collect the amount of two percent (2%) NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and
agency fees from The Peninsula Manila Hotel Labor Union unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the
(TPMHLU), the former collective bargaining agent,6 and the mandatory requirements for such increase.20
nonaffiliated employees (NAE;7 collectively, non-PEU members),
herein represented by respondents Michael B. Esquivel, Domingo G.
Mabutas, Randell V. Afan, et al. (respondents), retroactively from July The OSEC’s Ruling
2010.
In a Decision21 dated June 2, 2010 (June 2, 2010 Decision), the
The Facts OSEC upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees from
the non-PEU members in accordance with Article 4, Section 2 of the
On December 13, 2007, PEU’s Board of Directors passed Local expired CBA, which was declared to be in full force and effect
Board Resolution No. 12, Series of 20078 authorizing (a) the pursuant to the October 10, 2008 Decision, but only at the rate of one
affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its percent (1%),22 and denied its bid to increase the agency fees to two
individual members thereto; (b) the compliance with all the percent (2%) for failure to show that its general membership
requirements therefor; and (c) the Local President to sign the approved the same, noting that: (a) the October 28, 2008 General
affiliation agreement with NUWHRAIN upon acceptance of such Membership Resolution23 (GMR) submitted in support of the claimed
affiliation.9 On the same day, the said act was submitted to the increase dealt with the approval of the payment of attorney’s fees
general membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members.10 from the CBA backwages, without reference to any approval of the
Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the increase in union dues; and (b) the minutes24 of its October 28, 2008
union dues/agency fees from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) general membership meeting (October 28, 2008 minutes) merely
of the rank-and-file employees’ monthly salaries, brought about by stated that there was a need to update the individual check off
PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its authorization to implement the two percent (2%) union dues, but was
affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.11 silent as to any deliberation and formal approval thereof.25 The OSEC
pointed out that the only direct proof presented for the claimed
Meanwhile, in a Decision12 dated October 10, 2008 (October 10, increase in union dues was the PEU President’s application for union
2008 Decision), the OSEC resolved the collective bargaining membership with PEU-NUWHRAIN26 dated October 29, 2008,
deadlock between PEU-NUWHRAIN and The Peninsula Manila Hotel together with his Individual Check-Off Authorization27 purportedly
(Hotel), ordering the parties to execute a collective bargaining
dated May 11, 2008, which precedes such application and, thus, The Issue Before the Court
cannot be given credence.28
Dissatisfied, PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration,29 attaching The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA
thereto copies of: (a) the July 1, 2010 GMR30 confirming and committed reversible error in ruling that PEU-NUWHRAIN had no
affirming the alleged approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) right to collect the increased agency fees.
union dues from the members’ monthly basic salaries; (b) the
individual check off authorizations31 dated November 26 and 27, The Court’s Ruling
2008 from three (3) members authorizing the deduction of two
percent (2%) union dues from their monthly basic salaries; and (c) The petition lacks merit.
payslips32 of some PEU-NUWHRAIN members purportedly showing The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully
the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from their monthly negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a
basic pay beginning January 2009. reasonable fee called “agency fee” from nonunion members who are
employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount
On March 6, 2012, the OSEC issued an Order33 partially granting equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in
PEU-NUWHRAIN’s motion for reconsideration, and declaring it case they accept the benefits under the CBA.42 While the collection
entitled to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU of agency fees is recognized by Article 25943 (formerly Article 248) of
members beginning July 2010 since the GMR showing approval for the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to
the increase of the union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual,
(2%) was only procured at that time.34 deriving from the established principle that nonunion employees may
not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment
Unperturbed, respondents filed a petition for certiorari35 with the CA, conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.44
docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124566, alleging that the OSEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is
jurisdiction in allowing PEU-NUWHRAIN to collection increased not disputed. However, the rate of agency fees it seeks to collect
agency fees despite noncompliance with the legal requirements from the non-PEU members is contested, considering its failure to
therefor.36 comply with the requirements for a valid increase of union dues,
rendering the collection of increased agency fees unjustified.
The CA’s Ruling
Case law interpreting Article 250(n) and (o)45 (formerly Article 241) of
In a Decision37 dated February 9, 2015, the CA set aside the OSEC’s the Labor Code, as amended, mandates the submission of three (3)
March 6, 2012 Order, and reinstated the June 2, 2010 Decision.38 It documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased
ruled that PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to prove compliance with the union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of
requisites for a valid check-off since the October 28, 2008 minutes do the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting
not show that the increase in union dues was duly approved by its duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes
general membership. It also found the July 1, 2010 GMR suspicious of the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present,
considering that it surfaced only after PEU received the OSEC’s June the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the
2, 2010 Decision disallowing the collection of increased agency recipient of such assessment or fees;46 and (c) individual written
fees.39 authorizations for check off duly signed by the employees
PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration,40 which was, however, concerned.47
denied in a Resolution41 dated May 21, 2015; hence, the present
petition. In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show
compliance with the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy
the “inadvertent omission” of the matter of the approval of the clearly spelled out as having been “discussed and approved.”54 Thus,
deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic as aptly pointed out by the CA: “[i]f indeed majority of the members of
salary of each union member through the July 1, 2010 [PEU-NUWHRAIN] approved the increase in union dues, the same
GMR, 48 entitled “A GENERAL MEMBERSHIP RESOLUTION should have been mentioned in the [October 28, 2008 minutes], and
AUTHORIZING THE DEDUCTION OF TWO PERCENT (2%) UNION reflected in the GMR of the same date.”55
DUES FROM THE MONTHLY BASIC SALARY OF EACH UNION
MEMBER,” which stated, among others, that: Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the
increase in union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%),
1. the General Membership Assembly (Assembly) “approved the as well as the deduction of the two percent (2%) union dues during
deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28,
salary of each union member” during its 8th General Membership 2008, there was nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July 1,
Meeting, as shown in the October 28, 2008 minutes; 2010 GMR. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC in its March 6, 2012
2. “through inadvertence, the [October 28, 2008 GMR] failed to Order, the July 1, 2010 GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of
include the Assembly’s approval of the two percent (2%) deduction of two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning
union dues”; July 2010. The Assembly was not called for the purpose of approving
3. the July 1, 2010 GMR is being issued “to confirm and affirm what the proposed increase in union dues and the corresponding check
was agreed upon during the 8th General Membership Meeting dated off, but merely to “confirm and affirm” a purported prior action which
October 28, 2008.”49 PEU-NUWHRAIN, however, failed to establish.

Corollarily, no individual check off authorizations can proceed

On the other hand, the adverted October 28, 2008 therefrom, and the submission of the November 2008 check off
minutes50 stated, inter alia, that: authorizations56 becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that
the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his
1. “the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be implemented compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps
since PEU was already affiliated with NUWHRAIN [in] 2007”;51 outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter;57 however,
PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that
2. “it was discussed, deliberated and approved by the majority of there is no legal basis to impose union dues and agency fees more
members the (sic) 10% of total CBA backwages through [the than that allowed in the expired CBA, i.e., at one percent (1%) of the
Assembly] resolution authorizing the payment of attorney’s fees.”52 employee’s monthly basic salary.
It is evident from the foregoing that while the matter of implementing
the two percent (2%) union dues was taken up during the PEU- In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in
NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, granting petitioner’s certiorari petition, and finding that the OSEC
2008, there was no sufficient showing that the same had been duly gravely abused its discretion in declaring PEU-NUWHRAIN’s
deliberated and approved. The minutes of the Assembly itself belie entitlement to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-
PEU-NUWHRAIN’s claim that the increase in union dues and the PEU members beginning July 2010. The OSEC’s March 6, 2012
corresponding check off were duly approved since it merely stated Order is patently contrary to law, hence, imbued with grave abuse of
that “the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be discretion correctible through certiorari.58
implemented,”53 meaning, it would still require the submission of such WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February
matter to the Assembly for deliberation and approval. Such 9, 2015 and the Resolution dated May 21, 2015 of the Court of
conclusion is bolstered by the silence of the October 28, 2008 GMR Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124566 are hereby AFFIRMED.
on the matter of two percent (2%) union dues, in contrast to the
payment of 10% attorney’s fees from the CBA backwages which was SO ORDERED.