67 People v. Jumawan

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 211833. April 7, 2015.]
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-

New Bataan, Compostela Valley Province , petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL , respondent.
DECISION
REYES , J : p
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court

via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief 1 under
Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring ve years of service as judges of rst-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela
Valley Province, Region XI, which is a rst-level court. On September 27, 2013, he
applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter 2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's O ce of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates
for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic
mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants
and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive O cer, through a letter 3
dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC
en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was
upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to
second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their
current position for at least ve years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for
more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take
recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the
quali cations of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's ve-year
requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution;
and (3) the JBC's ve-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social
Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also
asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10 4
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of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557 5 should not be merely directory and should be fully
implemented. He further alleged that he has all the quali cations for the position
prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has already complied with the
requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution 6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC 7 and
the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) 8 separately submitted their Comments.
Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they essentially stated that the
petition is procedurally in rm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal
protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function
under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus
and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right that
needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated because the
classi cation of lower court judges who have served at least ve years and those who
have served less than ve years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and
(4) there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring ve years of
service as judges of rst-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-
level courts is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to rst
determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and
declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One . The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of
Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil
actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65." 9 As discussed
in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc.,
et al., 10 this Court explained that:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari
or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only
by a tribunal, corporation, board or o cer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized
by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials. 11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal,
board, or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of
selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the
policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the
Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of
supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate o cers
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising o cials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their
own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed. 12
Following this de nition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to
see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the
policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority
over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies
with its own rules.
Two . The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in
assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his
right was violated when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts
he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations
has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. 13 The petitioner bears the burden to show that
there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding
compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of
mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an o cer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. 14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what
the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and
recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial.
Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees
for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory quali cations for
appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be
included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the
candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC, thus:
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory
quali cations for appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or
expectation that his or her name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a recommendation,
one submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the search,
screening, and selection process, and to use its discretion in deciding whether or
not one should be included in the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal
right to be included in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses
the constitutional and statutory quali cations, then the application process
would then be reduced to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the
search, screening, and selection process would not only be unnecessary, but
also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's
inclusion in the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the
JBC over the selection of nominees for a particular judicial post . Such
candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a
privilege the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment,
that is, a promotion from a rst-level court to a second level court. There is no
law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion to second-level
courts . 15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by
the JBC.
Three . The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory
relief should be led by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder." 16 "[T]he purpose of the action is
to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not
to settle issues arising from its alleged breach." 17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy.
Rather, the petition speci cally sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the
right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's ve-year
requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right
under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial
positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial o ce is a mere privilege, and not
a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion
in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right
either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the
assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does
not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions
of law are involved. 18 The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691. 20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the
exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present
petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural in rmities, the
instant petition should still be dismissed.
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list o cially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with
public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench.
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the quali cations of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental
to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies
in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
quali cations. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum quali cations required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
exibility in order to determine who is most t among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to ll up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and e cient administration of justice. Given
this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to
ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional quali cations and
possesses the qualities expected of him and his o ce. Thus, the adoption of the ve-
year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to
screen applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the
judiciary, to determine who is best quali ed among the applicants, and not to
discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is
simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classi cation. Hence,
the Court has a rmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the classi cation stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to
some legitimate government end. 21
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classi cation of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classi cation is reasonable and not arbitrary." 22 "The mere fact that the legislative
classi cation may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classi cation of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid." 23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised
its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a
member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. 24 "To ensure the ful llment of these standards in every member of the
Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among
others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all quali ed
and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded
from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre
and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified." 25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended
appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does
not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate
applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant
basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among
other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have served
at least ve years and those who have served less than ve years, on the other hand,
was rationalized by JBC as follows:
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls
squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed
with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the
more general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level
court, which is ve years experience as judge of a rst-level court, is a direct
adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on
many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the
stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of
"proven competence ." In determining competence, the JBC considers, among
other qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of
rst-level courts for ve (5) years are better quali ed for promotion to second-
level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of
conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a
su cient span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level
court, declog the dockets, put in place improved procedures and an e cient
case management system, adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive
experience in the judicial process.
A ve-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the
integrity, probity , and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit
JBC's nomination for their promotion, they must have had a "record of, and
reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and
delity to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions must be
re ective of the soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality
and strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of
promotion to the next level court, it would be premature or di cult to assess
their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the bench. 26
(Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, ve years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that
determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President.
Persons with this quali cation are neither automatically selected nor do they
automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen based on an array of
factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that
the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classi cation created by the challenged policy satis es the rational
basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower
court judges with ve year experience and those with less than ve years of experience,
like the petitioner, and the classi cation enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable
and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy
does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classi cation intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore,
the said policy is valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process
for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law
Center O ce of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that
the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have been
published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be led
in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is con ned to issuances
of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. 27 Since the
JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, 28 it is not covered by the
publication requirements of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring ve years of service as judges of
rst-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should
have been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all
statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement
existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to
the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties. 29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
quali cation standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an
applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect
only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a
call to lawyers who meet the quali cations in the Constitution and are willing to serve in
the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence
thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the
guidelines in determining competence, independence, integrity and probity. Section 1,
Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants for the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have at least ve years of experience as an
RTC judge, thus:
RULE 9 — SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1 . Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan. — In addition to the foregoing guidelines the Council should
consider the following in evaluating the merits of applicants for a vacancy in
the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least ve years of experience as
a judge of Regional Trial Court , except when he has in his favor outstanding
credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive scholastic or educational
record and performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for
honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least very satisfactory
performance rating for three (3) years preceding the ling of his application for
nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly
published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests
that the JBC is aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules implementing
the Constitution that should be published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add
special guidelines for determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it
could and should have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not
do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to
the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be
published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the ve-year requirement
because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence
from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced
the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal
right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession
of the constitutional and statutory quali cations for appointment to the Judiciary may
not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for
a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC. 30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the
prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or promotion in the judiciary
under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty
enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy
violates the constitutional provision under social justice and human rights for equal
opportunity of employment. The OSG explained:
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment
opportunities. The constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the
Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all
professions, it is regulated by the State. The o ce of a judge is no ordinary
o ce. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the administration of
justice . . . . Applicants who meet the constitutional and legal quali cations
must vie and withstand the competition and rigorous screening and selection
process. They must submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and
discretion of respondent JBC, which has the constitutional mandate of
screening and selecting candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all
applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and
abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck down as unconstitutional. 31
(Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear
legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely
led an application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal
right to be nominated for that o ce nor to be selected and included in the list to be
submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has
the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included
in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria
imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner,
cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria.
Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not
justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening,
and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC
has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate.
Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to
be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in
order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its
discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the
JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper in uence. Limiting quali ed
applicants in this case to those judges with ve years of experience was an exercise of
discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been informed of
the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and
comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the
Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the
initiative and independence inherent in the latter.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED . The Court,
however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication
requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring ve years of experience as judges of
rst-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2)
other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., took no part.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I concur and also join the concurring opinion of Justice
Brion.
Brion, J., see concurring opinion.
Peralta, J., I join the opinion of J. Brion.
Villarama, Jr., ** J., is on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, *** J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion
Separate Opinions
BRION , J, concurring :
I concur with the majority's ruling to dismiss the petition and with the directive to
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). I am ling this Separate Concurring Opinion,
however, to re ect my own views on the con uence of the Court's exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC and its expanded jurisdiction in determining grave
abuse of discretion on the part of governmental entities and agencies.
Before us is Ferdinand Villanueva's ( Villanueva or petitioner) petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC or
respondent) action of excluding him from the list of candidates for the vacancies in the
following Regional Trial Courts: Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and
Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
In taking cognizance of Villanueva's petition, the majority applied the Court's
expanded jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and explained that
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are both available to correct grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or o cer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess or jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 1
A very recent case before this Court involving the JBC (which the ponencia cited
in its earlier draft) is Jardeleza v. Sereno, 2 where the Court, for the rst time since the
enactment of the 1987 Constitution, nulli ed an action by the JBC. In so doing, the
Court exercised both its expanded jurisdiction to review acts of government agencies
amounting to grave abuse of discretion, and its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC.
In Jardeleza, the JBC's act of selectively applying its own rules, which resulted in
the violation of the petitioner (now Justice) Francis Jardeleza's due process rights,
both amounted to a grave abuse of discretion and to a cause that triggered
the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC. The JBC's grave abuse of
discretion necessarily called for the Court's duty to supervise the JBC — under the
circumstances of that case — to make sure that it would follow its own rules.
Unlike the selective application of the JBC's own rules in Jardeleza, the JBC's
assailed actions in the present case were in accord with the policies it had long laid
down. The application of this policy, according to the Villanueva petition, violated the
Constitution as it disregarded the enumeration of quali cations of members of the
judiciary under Article VIII, Section 7; violated as well his due process and equal
protection rights; and are contrary to the socio-economic provisions in Article XIII,
Section 3.
A reading of Villanueva's allegations shows that he properly alleged that the JBC
committed grave abuse of discretion, but he ultimately failed to prove his claims. As
the majority eventually held, the JBC acted within its power to prescribe its own policies
as part, and in the course, of determining the constitutional quali cations required of
every member of the bench. I agree with the majority's approach and thus
maintain that it properly took cognizance of the Villanueva petition .
In acting as it did, the Court — while acting pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
(by testing for grave abuse of discretion and nding none) — effectively and
subsequently acted pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC. That the Court
so acted is not improper as the petition in fact also validly invoked the Court's
supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC under its allegations . Note that the
petition called for the determination of whether the JBC's policy contravened
constitutional precepts.
In other words, the present petition prima facie claimed the commission of grave
abuse of discretion by the JBC to su ciently trigger the Court's expanded jurisdiction.
No grave abuse however or any "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment," as
claimed, was found. But at the same time, the allegations likewise brought into
question the JBC's actions, which actions are within the power of the Court to direct
under its constitutional supervisory power over the JBC.
Notably, the Court, in examining whether Villanueva's right to due process had
been violated, ruled that the JBC's failure to publish its policy of requiring ve years of
service to qualify for a lower court judge position did not rise to the level of a grave
abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, the majority held that, under the circumstances,
these policies should have been published; it further directed the JBC to publish
policies or guidelines that it is or will be implementing, subject to the approval of the
Court.
I agree with the majority's conclusion and directive, and note that the publication
of the JBC's policies is in line with its thrust to "to insure transparency in its
proceedings and promote stability and uniformity in its guiding precepts and
principles," 3 as well as with the Constitutional policy to promote transparency in
government processes. 4
Lest the thrust and full import of the Court's present ruling be lost, let me stress
that the present case gives us the opportunity to address important questions left
unaddressed by the Court's recent ruling in Jardeleza:
May the Court exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC
separate from the exercise of its expanded jurisdiction over acts of
grave abuse of discretion of government agencies?
If so, what remedy is available for parties wishing to secure
redress under this legal situation and how can this remedy be availed
of?
To fully address these questions, it is crucial to rst fully understand the nature
of certiorari before and after the 1987 Constitution and how the Court has been using
this remedy.
A. Certiorari under the 19 87 Consti tution
Our use of the remedy of certiorari has evolved and expanded along with the
development of constitutional litigation under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court — in giving due course to (or dismissing) public interest petitions
brought before it — has breathed life to the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, an innovation that eventually has been labeled as its
"expanded jurisdiction ." At the same time, it continues to adhere to the practice of
judicial review embodied in the rst paragraph of Section 1 or what, for clarity, I refer to
as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction ."
The Court's exercise of its traditional jurisdiction is rooted in its power of judicial
review which gives the Court the authority to strike down acts of the legislative and/or
executive, constitutional bodies or administrative agencies that are contrary to the
Constitution. The power of judicial review is part and parcel of the Court's
judicial power and is a power inherent in all courts . 5
To be successfully mounted, the petition before the Court must be embodied in
an actual case, and the following requirements must be complied with: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity ; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. 6
Remedies used to invoke judicial review under the Court's traditional jurisdiction
include declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition. These remedies mirror the nature of
the traditional concept of judicial review — i.e., that the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a law or act of government must be within the context of an
actual case or controversy brought before the courts. Thus, the requirements for ling
an action for declaratory relief 7 echo the requisites for an actual case or controversy,
similarly with certiorari and prohibition which historically developed as petitions to
assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts and which effectively con ne these remedies to
errors of jurisdiction involving adjudicatory functions.
Note, at this point, that the enumeration of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction under Section 5, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution refers to the exercise
of its traditional jurisdiction. The enumeration of what may be reviewed by the Court all
refer to cases , with reference to the traditional jurisdiction of settling actual cases or
controversies under Section 1, Article VIII, viz.:
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or a rm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, nal judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. A l l cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(emphases supplied)
The modes by which these cases may reach the Supreme Court for review are
either through an appeal of errors involving questions of law or questions of law
and facts (via a petition for review on certiorari), or through a petition for certiorari
assailing errors of jurisdiction .
Thus, certiorari under Section 5, paragraph 2 refers to a recourse under the
traditional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as provided under the rst paragraph of
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
At the same time, the Court has recognized and acted on the basis of its
expanded jurisdiction under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, albeit not explicitly at rst. Thus, we have cases where the Court,
recognizing its duty to determine grave abuse of discretion on the part of
governmental agencies or entities, reviewed acts that are neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial in nature. Notably, the procedural media used in invoking the Court's expanded
jurisdiction have been petitions for certiorari, or prohibition. 8 This practice re ects the
wording of Section 1, paragraph 2, which does not limit the determination of grave
abuse of discretion to quasi-judicial or judicial acts, but to any act involving the
exercise of discretion on the part of the government. 9
A distinctive feature in these developments is the strong correlation between the
Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction, and its relaxation of the requirements for
actual case or controversies. 10 The Court relaxes the requirements for judicial review
when the petition raises matters of transcendental importance. That a matter is of
transcendental importance tempers the standing requirement for judicial review, which
in turn, indirectly relaxes the presence of an actual case or controversy itself.
Amidst these jurisprudential developments, the Rules of Court has
remained static ; its express terms remained con ned to the courts' exercise of
traditional jurisdiction over judicial or quasi-judicial acts. Yet the Court unhesitatingly
used the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to enforce its power and to undertake
its duty to determine grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government. Thereby,
the Court effectively relaxed the rules on certiorari, notably by allowing its use in the
review of acts of government that are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. 11
It is in this latter sense that the majority in Jardeleza and in the present case
allowed the use of certiorari to determine whether there had been grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the JBC. As I emphasized in my Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino, 12 a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion is
both su cient and necessary to trigger the Court's expanded jurisdiction, in the same
way that an actual case or controversy is necessary to invoke the Court's traditional
power of judicial review. In cases that successfully invoked the Court's expanded
jurisdiction, the transcendental importance of the public issue presented by the petition
likewise relaxed the standing requirement (such that a Filipino citizen, by virtue of his
citizenship, possesses the standing to question a governmental act). The prima facie
showing of a grave abuse of discretion, on the other hand, takes the place of
the actual case or controversy requirement in the traditional concept of
judicial review .
The present petition, as earlier mentioned, successfully alleged the commission
of grave abuse of discretion, but the allegation, on deeper consideration, was not grave
nor serious enough to trigger the Court's expanded jurisdiction. Unlike in Jardeleza
where the JBC violated its own rules thereby gravely abusing its discretion, the JBC's
action in the present petition was actually in accordance with its policy, which policy is
within its power to formulate. That this policy later turns out not to be a "grave" abuse
of discretion translates to the petitioner's failure to prove that he is entitled to redress
under the Court's expanded jurisdiction. This legal conclusion, however, does not
render the JBC fully immune to the Court scrutiny as the claimed
transgression may also open or trigger a parallel and separate
constitutionally granted Court action — the Court's supervisory jurisdiction
over the JBC .
B. Supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC
Article VIII, Section 8 (1) and (5) provide that "A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court. . . It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it."
Supervision, as a legal concept , has been de ned as the power of oversight,
or the authority to see that subordinate o cers perform their duties. 13 The
Constitution's use of the concept of "supervision" carries various signi cations that
should not be missed.
First , the JBC is a body subordinate to the Supreme Court although the Chief
Justice who is primus inter pares within the Court also heads the JBC as its ex o cio
Chair.
Second , the Court's power of supervision over the JBC gives the Court the
power to ensure that the law or the rules governing the conduct of the JBC are
followed.
And third , the Court as the supervising entity merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but it does not, by itself, lay down these rules, nor does it have the discretion
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, the Court may only order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to higher applicable rules. 14
In more succinct terms, the Court's supervisory authority over the JBC involves
ensuring that the JBC's actions are in accord with the Constitution, as well as with its
own rules. Thus, when there are allegations regarding the JBC's non-compliance with
the Constitution or its own rules, especially when it comes from an applicant who is in
the position to know of these in rmities, then the Court, through its supervisory
authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC
complies with the laws applicable to it.
B.1 The Court's supervisory
jurisdiction over the JBC is
general, and not limited to
administration
That the Court's supervisory authority extends beyond mere administrative
supervision is beyond question.
Administrative supervision involves overseeing the operations of agencies to
ensure that they are managed effectively, e ciently and economically, but without
interference with day-to-day activities. 15 In contrast, general supervision involves
ensuring that the agency supervised follows their functions, directing them to redo their
actions should these be contrary to law.
Textually, nothing in the 19 87 Constitution limits the Court to the exercise of
mere administrative powers over the JBC when called for. Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides:
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex o cio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex o cio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President
for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Of the Members rst appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for
two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex o cio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in
its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 8, Article VIII clearly grants to the Supreme Court the power and duty of
supervision over the JBC. It does not specify nor limit the Court to administrative
supervision over the JBC, but couches the grant of power to the Court in general terms,
i.e., "supervision."
When the Constitution used the general term "supervision" over the JBC, it meant
to grant the Court general supervision, for had it meant to limit the Court to
administrative supervision, or to the JBC's administration, then it could have used these
words to convey this concept. Even the Administrative Code, which provides de nitions
of administrative relationships, recognizes the need for a law to specify its intent to
limit the supervising authority's to administrative supervision, by making the function of
administration a part of supervision, viz.:
(c) Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the speci c law
governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word "supervision" shall
encompass administrative supervision as defined in this paragraph. 16
Otherwise stated, when a law grants a government agency supervision over
another agency, it automatically includes administrative supervision. Thus, if an agency
merely exercises administrative authority over another, this should be speci ed in the
law granting it.
Additionally, the Court, has, in the past, exercised its general supervision over the
JBC. In In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta (Valenzuela), 17 for instance, the Court en banc motu proprio
decided to resolve the issue of whether the election ban applies to the Judiciary in lieu
of the constitutional questions raised by the JBC's attempts to continue its
deliberations in order to transmit a list of nominees to the President despite the ban. In
a Resolution ordering the interested parties (none of whom raised a petition before the
Court) to submit a comment regarding the matter, the Court en banc instructed the JBC
to defer any action over the appointments pending the Court's resolution of the election
ban issue.
The Court's acts in Valenzuela can hardly be described as administrative
supervision. In Valenzuela, the Court en banc found that the JBC's actions could violate
the Constitution and thus instructed its members to defer its deliberations and to
desist from transmitting any list of nominees to the President until the Court en banc
had resolved the constitutional question. The Court en banc initiated the determination
of the constitutional question without any interested party ling a petition for its
resolution; from this unique perspective, the Court's action was an exercise of its power
to ensure that the JBC performed its functions in accordance with the law, i.e., its
power of general supervision over the JBC.
The Court, after considering the pleadings led by interested parties in
Valenzuela, decided to annul appointments that violated the constitutional prohibition
on the election ban. This Court action no longer involved an exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction, but had spilled over into its expanded jurisdiction to annul acts of grave
abuse of discretion, which according to Valenzuela, violated the Constitution.
Interestingly, the Court distinguished this ruling from de Castro v. JBC 18 with respect
to appointments to vacancies in the Supreme Court. The ne distinctions raised,
however, do not negate the fact that the Court exercised acts of general supervision
over the JBC in Valenzuela.
The distinction between the Court's exercises of its power of supervision over
the JBC and its expanded jurisdiction over all government agencies is important, lest
we be accused of exceeding our own jurisdiction and meddling with the exclusive
affairs of an independent constitutional body.
To reiterate, the Court, as an aspect of its supervisory power, can direct the JBC
to defer or stop its actions and to redo them, should it be necessary to comply with the
Constitution. We have, in the past, exercised our supervisory jurisdiction when we
instructed the JBC in Valenzuela to defer its proceedings pending the resolution of a
constitutional question; directed the JBC to review its rules in Jardeleza v. Sereno ; 19
and now, directed the JBC to publish its own rules.
In contrast, the Court, as an aspect of its expanded jurisdiction, has annulled acts
that violate the Constitution: the Court did this when it annulled the appointments made
by the President in violation of the election ban in Valenzuela; and when it annulled the
application of the Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC Rules to Justice Francis H. Jardeleza in
Jardeleza v. Sereno.
Note at this point, that the independent character of a constitutional body
does not remove it from the Court's jurisdiction . The Commission on Elections,
Commission on Audit, Commission on Civil Service and the O ce of the Ombudsman
are all independent constitutional bodies — and none of them can invoke their
independence as a means to avoid judicial review, more so when their assailed acts
involve grave abuse of discretion.
Additionally, the Court's general supervision over the JBC is in line with its
constitutionally-bestowed discretion to assign additional functions and duties to
the JBC .
This grant of discretion empowers the Court to direct the JBC to redo its acts
that are contrary to law. To be sure, the Court's power to assign duties to the JBC as an
aspect of general supervision over it does not grant the Court the power to substitute
its discretion over the JBC; the Court, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over the
JBC, can at most direct it to redo their actions that are contrary to the law or to the
Constitution.
Lastly, that the Court has issued A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC or A Resolution
Strengthening The Role and Capacity of the Judicial and Bar Council and Establishing
the O ces Therein, which acknowledges the Chief Justice's administrative authority of
the JBC, does not contradict the Court's power of general supervision over it. First , the
Constitution recognizes the Chief Justice as the JBC's ex o cio chair, implying her
administrative authority over the JBC. A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC merely a rms this
provision in the Constitution. Second , the Court's administrative authority over the JBC
does not rule out its power to supervise it, and may, as illustrated in the Administrative
Code, be construed as an aspect of general supervision.
B.2 The Court's supervisory
jurisdiction as applied in the present
case
The current petition questions the JBC's policies for having violated the
Constitution but not at the level where these policies have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. As the majority eventually held, these policies are in accord with
the JBC's powers to determine whether applicants possess the requirements for
members of the bench. The majority, however, noted that these policies should be
published, and issued a directive to this effect.
To arrive at this conclusion, however, the Court must necessarily wear its
supervisory hat to determine whether the JBC's actions had been in accord with the
Constitution and relevant laws.
In this regard, I ask: is the Court, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction
over the JBC, limited to the examination of acts alleged to have been
committed with grave abuse of discretion?
The Court is not and cannot be so limited under the terms of the 19 87
Consti tution.
Article VIII, Section 8 — the provision for the Court's supervision over the JBC —
is separate and more speci c than the general grave abuse of discretion provision
under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, this supervisory authority,
as a separate and more speci c grant of power, may be invoked and exercised
separately from the Court's traditional and expanded jurisdictions.
In the present case, I believe that what we ultimately undertook, based on the
conclusion we arrived at, was an exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC,
made as a parallel power in the course of acting pursuant to our expanded jurisdiction.
From the prism of a petition for certiorari, we yet again relaxed our rules when we
allowed the use of the petition for another power of the Court; we allowed the use of
certiorari to invoke the Court's supervisory jurisdiction.
In these lights, the Court should neither be hesitant nor timid in exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC, without encroaching on their prerogative to
determine whether applicants to the judiciary possess the characteristics
that the Constitution requires of each member of the bench .
I believe, too, that this active Court role is necessary in light of the recent cases
brought before us and the issues that they presented. But the Court's approach should
be made very clear, particularly when a certiorari would be the medium used, to avoid
confusing the traditional, the expanded, and the supervisory occasions in invoking the
Court's jurisdiction.
To reiterate, the Court's power of supervision over the JBC is a power granted
distinctly and separately from the Court's traditional judicial review and expanded
jurisdiction powers. Thus, the exercise of supervision does not need to be limited to
instances where there is a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion (as in
petitions invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction). Neither should it be exercised only
in conjunction with the Court's judicial power to settle actual cases or controversies.
To forestall confusion in the future, the rules in this regard should be very clear,
particularly on when and how the Court's supervisory power over the JBC may be
invoked. Because the Court's power is independently granted, recourse to the Court
based on its duty to supervise should not be con ned to highly exceptional
circumstances of grave abuse of discretion or as an adjunct of adjudication.
Note, too, that we exercised our power of supervision over the JBC when the
Court's majority in Jardeleza recommended that a review of its rules be made in light of
the due process rights violations in that case. This was a review of the JBC's quasi-
legislative power and was a distinct act of supervision separate from the exercise of
our expanded jurisdiction to nullify the grave abuse of discretion the JBC committed
when it applied the unanimity rule against Jardeleza.
As a nal point, the recent cases involving the JBC has shown us that its exercise
of discretion is not infallible, and that it can commit errors that violate the Constitution,
or even its own rules. These abuses, no matter how well-intentioned, should not be left
unchecked, and the Court, as the body tasked with supervisory authority over the JBC,
should open up and clarify the avenues by which these JBC errors may be remedied.
The power to take part in the President's power to appoint judicial o cers is too
important to be hindered by mere technicalities and should be closely safeguarded.
LEONEN , J., concurring :
I concur in the dismissal of the Petition.

The Petition should be dismissed as it is procedurally infirm and fails to establish
petitioner's right to be nominated to a judicial post.
I
A writ of mandamus, certiorari, or prohibition cannot be issued against the
Judicial and Bar Council or can it be the subject of a petition for declaratory relief
absent a clear and convincing case of grave abuse of discretion.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus
may be availed to compel the performance of a duty, or to compel the inclusion of a
person in the use and enjoyment of a right or o ce to which he or she is entitled. The
provision states:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board,
o cer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
speci cally enjoins as a duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or o ce to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may le a
veri ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be speci ed by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
In particular, the remedy of mandamus requires the performance of a ministerial
duty:
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of
o cial discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in which nothing is left to
the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, de nite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." Mandamus
is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but
not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other. 1
(Citations omitted)
Although petitioner filed, among others, a petition for mandamus, his prayer does
not seek the performance by the Judicial and Bar Council of a speci c ministerial act. In
particular, he prays that:
[p]ending resolution of this Petition, a temporary Restraining order,
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued compelling Public Respondents
to refrain from disqualifying the Petitioner and all other Judges similarly
situated with the petitioner in their present or future application for second level
courts (RTC Judges) and to include the petitioner as applicants in the above
mentioned RTCs and go through the process of selection and evaluation[.] 2
It can be inferred from his prayer that petitioner seeks to compel the Judicial and
Bar Council to include him in the list of applicants for the vacant positions in the
Regional Trial Courts. In my dissenting opinion in Jardeleza v. Judicial and Bar Council: 3
[t]he determination by the Judicial and Bar Council of the quali cations
and tness of applicants for positions in the judiciary is not a ministerial duty. It
is constitutionally part of its discretion. Mandamus cannot compel the
amendment of any list already transmitted, and it cannot be made available to
compel the Council to transmit a name not in the original list.
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council clari es a unique instance when
mandamus lies against the Council. This is with respect only to the
constitutional duty to allow the President the mandatory 90 days to make an
appointment. Thus:
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the
start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is
ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will
be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the
discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus
herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the
list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in
order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an
unjusti ed delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie
against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay
on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in
submitting the list to the President. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
A writ of certiorari or prohibition cannot also be issued against the Judicial and
Bar Council as the remedy of certiorari can only be used against a tribunal, board, or
o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions while the remedy of prohibition can
only be used against any tribunal, corporation, board, o cer, or person exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.
Rule 65, Section 1 and Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure state:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or o cer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
le a veri ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or o cer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, o cer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may le a
veri ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter speci ed therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)
The ponencia correctly stated that "[i]n the process of selecting and screening
applicants, the [Judicial and Bar Council] neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogative." 5
The functions of the Judicial and Bar Council are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial
in nature. It does not perform "adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine
the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court."
6 The exercise by the Judicial and Bar Council of its constitutional duty is also not a
ministerial act by which it may be restrained from performing.
The relief sought by petitioner cannot also be the subject of an action for
declaratory relief. Under Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
declaratory relief may be led before the Regional Trial Court by one "whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation[.]"
The ponencia correctly stated that "no person possess[es] a legal right under the
Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions." 7 The
Constitution does not grant to any person the right to be nominated when he or she
quali es. The Judicial and Bar Council is given by the Constitution the full discretion on
the selection and quali cation of the nominees for judicial o ce. There are no rights
adjudicated in the Judicial and Bar Council's selection process.
It is also settled that this court does not have original jurisdiction over petitions
for declaratory relief. In Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council , 8 this court previously
encountered a petition for declaratory relief for this court to interpret Article VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the Constitution. This court, in ruling that the Regional Trial Court has
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief, stated the following:
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction
of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be
considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the
execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of
the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC) .
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an
action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of
this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. 9 (Emphasis
supplied)
II
The only exception to the use of Rule 65 is when this court's power of judicial
review due to a constitutional violation is raised. While expansive, the exercise of this
power is subject to limitations: "(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case." 10
In Prof. David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo: 11
[a]n actual case or controversy involves a con ict of legal right, an
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "de nite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest"; a
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. 12
Petitioner has no legally vested right to a nomination in an application before the
Judicial and Bar Council. The relief he requests cannot be granted since there is nothing
in the Constitution that gives this court the power to order the Judicial and Bar Council
to nominate him. There is no actual case or controversy that merits this court's power
of review.
III
The zeal that characterizes the vigilance of petitioner to protect his constitutional
right against unequal protection of the laws is commendable but unfortunately
misplaced.
The ve-year requirement imposed by the Judicial and Bar Council for rst-level
court judges before they can be considered for another tier is reasonable. This same
requirement cannot be imposed on applicants from the public service, private practice,
or the academe simply because they are not from a judicial service. This does not
mean, however, that there is no requirement or any consideration made by the Judicial
and Bar Council that is equivalent or more stringent. We cannot assume that a
constitutional body tasked to determine the tness, competence, integrity, and
independence of those that seek to serve in our branch of government will be less
dedicated to its task when screening these applicants.
At the very least, petitioner has not shown clearly and convincingly that the
burden that he imagines he bears has no equivalent to other applicants who are not
similarly situated. Certainly, any petitioner who raises the constitutionality of an act of a
constitutional organ tasked to discharge its duties bears the burden of showing that
his claims are fully grounded.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition.
Footnotes
* No part.
** On Official Leave.
*** On Leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 3-19.
2. Id. at 70.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Section 10. As soon as PHILJA shall have been fully organized with the composition of its
Corps of Professorial Lecturers and other personnel, only participants who have
completed the programs prescribed by the Academy and have satisfactorily complied
with all the requirements incident thereto may be appointed or promoted to any
position or vacancy in the Judiciary.
5. AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY, DEFINING ITS POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
6. Rollo, p. 28.
7. Id. at 40-60.
8. Id. at 68-95.
9. Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014.
10. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
11. Id.
12. Francis H. Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, the Judicial and Bar
Council and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 213181, August 19,
2014.
13. Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and Manuel V.
Fernandez v. Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and City Council of
Puerto Princesa City, G.R. No. 181792, April 21, 2014.
14. Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013, 688 SCRA
403, 424.
15. Rollo, pp. 57-58.
16. Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al., 616 Phil. 177, 186 (2009).
17. Hon. Quisumbing, et al. v. Gov. Garcia, et al., 593 Phil. 655, 674 (2008).
18. See Bankers Association of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206794,
November 27, 2013, 710 SCRA 608, 618.
19. Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
xxx xxx xxx
20. AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980". Approved on March 25, 1994.
21. Supra note 10.
22. National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial, 630 Phil. 599, 609 (2010).
23. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 419.
24. CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 7 (3) states:

3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
25. Supra note 12.

26. Rollo, pp. 48-49.
27. Administrative Code, Book VII (Administrative Procedure) provides:
Section 1. Scope. — This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next
succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed
Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and
colleges.
28. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Judicial Department states:

Section 8. — A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court . . . .
29. Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535 (1986).
30. Supra note 12.
31. Rollo, pp. 86-87.

BRION, J, concurring:
1. Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209827, July 1, 2014.
2. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014.

3. Whereas clause of JBC-009 provides:
WHEREAS, while the Council has been applying similar criteria in its assessment of
candidates to the judicial office or the Ombudsman or deputy Ombudsman, there is a
need to put these criteria in writing to insure transparency in its proceedings
and promote stability and uniformity in its guiding precepts and principles ;
4. See, for instance, the following provisions:
Article III, Section 7

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized . — Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article VI, Section 16, par. 4
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same , excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
Article VI, Section 20
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved
and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be
audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of
amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
Article VI, Section 21

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure . The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such
inquiries shall be respected.
Article XI, Section 17
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by
law.
5. As the Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156-157 (1936) said:
. . . The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development
there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and
a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution .
The Constitution is a de nition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way . And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine con icting claims of authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.
6. Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 35; and
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 842 (2003).
7. Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may le petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule. (1a, R64)
8. See, for instance, the recent cases where the Court exercised its expanded jurisdiction:
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, et al. v. Honorable Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013; James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al. , GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014; Maria Carolina P. Araullo,
et al. v. Benigno Simeon Aquino III, et al., GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
9. See the discussion on the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of the Court in Francisco v.
House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 883, 909-910 (2003), viz.:
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by
"any branch or instrumentalities of government, the afore-quoted Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the rst time into its history, into block letter law
the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and
rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech
of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx xxx xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of
the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
o f habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed
because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme
Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Brie y stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
o ces of the government as well as those of its o cers. In other words,
the judiciary is the nal arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its o cials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature .
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question. 35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
10. See the ponencia's discussion of the transcendental importance doctrine in Arturo de
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council , G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666,
722-728.
11. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice , G.R. No. 193459, February
15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198, 230-233.
12. Supra note 1.
13. More often than not, supervision is de ned in relation with the concept of control. In
Social Justice Society v. Atienza , 568 Phil. 658, 715 we de ned "supervision" as
follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
o cers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to ful ll them, the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an o cer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate o cer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Under this de nition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned task, i.e.,
who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to recommend. It
cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under its
power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being performed because of
JBC's fault or inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note
in this regard that, constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions
and duties — a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely supervisory.
14. In Hon. Dadole v. COA , 441 Phil. 532, 543-544, citing Drilon v. Lim , 336 SCRA 201, 214-
215, we have further discussed the difference between control and supervision.
"O cers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an
act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone
or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand,
supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising o cials merely see to it that
the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed."
15. See the de nition of Administrative Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2, Chapter 7,
Book IV of the Administrative Code:
(2) Administrative Supervision. — (a) Administrative supervision which shall govern the
administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and regulatory
agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of
such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, e ciently and
economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; or require the
submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of o cial functions, including recti cation of violations, abuses and
other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of
such agencies but may not increase or add to them;
16. Section 38, paragraph 2 (c), Chapter 7, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
17. A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.
18. G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666.
19. Supra note 2.
LEONEN, J., concurring:
1. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et
al., 595 Phil. 305, 326 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
2. Petition, pp. 15-16.
3. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/213181.pdf> [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
4. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Jardeleza v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 213181,
August 19, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/213181_leonen.pdf> 21 [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc], citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., 629 Phil. 629, 706 (2010)
[Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
5. Ponencia, p. 4.
6. Santos v. Go, 510 Phil. 137, 148 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
7. Ponencia, p. 6.
8. G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
9. Id. at 592.
10. Id. at 593-594, citing Senate of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 522 Phil. 1,
27 (2006) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
11. 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Guttierez, En Banc].
12. Id. at 753, citing ISAGANI CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 259 (2002).

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 211833. April 7, 2015.]

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-

Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court

LEONEN , J., concurring :

I concur in the dismissal of the Petition.

1. Rollo, pp. 3-19.

20. AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,

24. CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 7 (3) states:

25. Supra note 12.

28. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Judicial Department states:

31. Rollo, pp. 86-87.

2. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014.

Article III, Section 7

Article VI, Section 21

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