JOSEPH ACE LAGURIN 1

CRUZ vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission discovered that petitioner Zenaida Paitim (municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan) took the
non-professional examination for Gilda Cruz, after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. A formal
charge for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The petitioners entered a
general denial of the formal charge. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will
continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the CSC was the complainant, the prosecutor, and the
judge, all at the same time.
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in
accordance with Sec. 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate
jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the
complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as an investigator, complainant, prosecutor
and judge all at the same time.

RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative. It must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the
Civil Service examination. The examinations were under the direct control and supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The
culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after the
petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether they were indeed guilty of dishonesty, the penalty meted was
dismissal from the office.
Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provides that the CSC can rightfully take
cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected to the examinations.
Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant,
prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is
mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions
of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which states:
The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an
administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. It cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally
charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges,
given a chance to submit their answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Hence, no denial of due process.

CSC vs DBM

FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management to release the balance of its budget
for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal
autonomy. By petitioner's claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the General
Appropriations Act of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to
P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year
2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its "no report, no release" policy whereby
allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section
7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds. Petitioner contends that the
application of the "no report, no release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the
principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the “no report, no policy” is unconstitutional.
 JOSEPH ACE LAGURIN 2

RULING:
The "no report, no release" policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed.
Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of
the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.
By parity of construction, "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission
which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed.
Respecting respondent's justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same
does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there
was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of
the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of
which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in
the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on
equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established
by the Constitution. The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the
release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
Therefore, respondent's act of withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
unconstitutional.

CAYETANO vs. MONSOD

FACTS:
Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by President Corazon Aquino as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. Cayetano stated that Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary requirement of practicing law for at least 10 years.
However, despite Cayetano’s objection, the Commission on Appointments (COA) still confirmed Monsod’s appointment

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent possesses the required qualification.

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the
basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill. As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. At this
point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services.

ABAD vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Abad and Sarenas were both candidates for Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman. Petitioner emerged as the winner. Private
respondent filed an election protest with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court alleging fraud on the part of petitioner through the
registration of four unqualified voters. The MCTC Judge ruled in favor of private respondent and ordered the four votes,
 JOSEPH ACE LAGURIN 3

representing the votes of the persons whose qualifications as voters were questioned, be deducted from petitioner. As this
resulted in a tie, the Judge ordered that the winner be determined via drawing of lots or toss of a coin.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court but it dismissed his appeal. The drawing of lots proceeded and private
respondent Sarenas emerged as winner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review with the COMELEC en banc. The
COMELEC en banc, through a Resolution, dismissed the petition on the ground that no anomaly or irregularity attending the
proceeding was proven by petitioner warranting the setting aside of the result thereof. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to decide the case

RULING:
The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and ordered the COMELEC to assign the case to one of its
divisions for prompt resolution. As previously held in a long line of cases, the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the
requisite authority to hear and decide election cases in the first instance . The power pertains to the divisions of the
Commission as provided for in Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, and any decision by the Commission en banc as
regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
In the recent case of Zarate v. COMELEC, 10 this rule has been reiterated. We nullified the decision of the COMELEC en banc in
Zarate, which incidentally also concerns a 1996 SK election case appealed directly from the MTC. We remanded the case and
ordered it assigned to an appropriate division of the COMELEC. Thus, consistent with the rulings in Zarate and Sarmiento cases,
we are now constrained to declare as null and void the questioned resolution of the COMELEC en banc in this case of Abad.

LEDESMA vs. CA

FACTS:
An investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas of two foreign
nationals. Graft Investigator resolved the administrative case suspending petitioner for a year. The criminal case was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has encroached into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters.

RULING:
No. The Ombudsman has not encroached into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters. The creation
of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors
of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agency or instrumentality.
The refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or
employee is a ground for disciplinary action; that the Ombudsman’s recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but
actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

OSMENA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:
Reynaldo de la Cerna was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately expired in the evening of that same day
due to severe loss of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not for the "ineptitude, gross
negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff" of the Medical Center. The de la Cerna Spouses
accordingly instituted in the Regional Trial Court for recovery of damages. Named defendants were the City of Cebu, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City Medical Center. After the action had been pending for some time,
negotiations for an amicable settlement were commenced, which culminated in an agreement designed to put an end to the
controversy in a manner acceptable to the parties. The compromise agreement included a provision for the payment of the sum
of P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu.
About eleven months later, however, respondent Commission on Audit disallowed the financial assistance thus granted to the
spouses de la Cerna, stating that the City of Cebu the giving away of public funds to a bereaved family in the form of financial
assistance has definitely no casual relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the community. In fact, no real or
 JOSEPH ACE LAGURIN 4

substantial relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare of the community can be perceived from the act of giving
such financial assistance.
In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COA and
its Members in so disallowing the city's appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise agreement in the
civil suit against the City, embodied in due course in the Trial Court's judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether the COA acted in grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the financial assistance granted by the City of Cebu.

RULING:
The Court believes that COA's disallowance of the appropriation is indeed tainted by grave abuse of discretion. The participation
by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative
thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is
involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.
The Civil Code affirms the capacity of juridical persons to compromise, in the form and with the requisites which may be
necessary to alienate their property. The court made pronouncements in the case of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Bishop of
Jaro:

"As a juridic person, the municipality of Miagao was authorized to execute a contract of compromise in the manner and with the
requisites necessary to alienate its property (Civ. Code, art. 1812), and such requisites and formalities were fulfilled in
accordance with the provisions of Section 40, subsection (c) of the Municipal Code. The provincial governor was of that opinion
when he gave his approval to the contract of compromise, which was deemed to benefit the contracting municipality for the
reason that it thereby avoided a lawsuit and got the Church to renounce other claims and to recognize the municipality's right in
the other real properties sought to be registered."
That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise
agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its
established rules and procedure. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to
sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against
it. By making reciprocal concessions, the parties put an end to the action in a manner acceptable to all of them. The City thus
eliminated the contingency of being made to assume heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection
with its operation and management of the Cebu City Medical Center.
Therefore, the respondent Commission on Audit is ordered to approve and allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00 of
Cebu City.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to
sell through public bidding shares of the Manila Hotel. There were two entities who participated in the bidding: Petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel (MHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy the shares at ₱ 41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, which bid for the shares at ₱ 44.00 per share. Eventually, MHC matched the bid price of Renong Berhad at ₱
44.00 per share. MHC even sent a manager’s check to GSIS which the latter refused. Apprehensive about the GSIS’ refusal, MHC
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court.
MHC invokes Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (known as the “Filipino First Policy”) where it states that in grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos. In the same vein, MHC submits that Manila Hotel has become a part of the national patrimony for its importance in
the national Filipino heritage. Also, the ownership of shares by the GSIS shows that they are engaged in the hotel business,
which makes them part of the national economy. Thus, the aforementioned constitutional provision can be invoked. Further,
MHC should be considered the preferred bidder since the bidding rules provide that the shares must be awarded to qualified
bidders in case the highest bidder cannot be awarded the same, provided that the qualified bidders matched the highest bid.
On the other hand, GSIS maintains that Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution cannot be invoked because it is not self-
executing and would require an implementing legislation. Granting that the said provision is self-executing, the Manila Hotel
cannot be considered a part of the national patrimony because it only refers to lands of public domain, waters, minerals, etc.
 JOSEPH ACE LAGURIN 5

Further, granting that Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, GSIS is not selling its land or the building, but its shares of
ownership.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution may be invoked as a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel can be considered part of the national patrimony.

RULINGS:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It admits that a provision which lays down the basic principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, the Court also held that a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without aid of an enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
or extent of right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the
Constitution is mandatory, positive command, which is complete in itself and requires not further implementing laws for its
enforcement. Thus, it may be invoked by MHC in the present case.
2. The Court also ruled in the affirmative. It held that national patrimony includes the national resources of the Philippines,
which necessarily includes those which are considered cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Since, Manila Hotel itself has become a
landmark of many events in the Philippine history, with its existence impressed with public interest. Thus, the contested
constitutional provision is applicable.
Therefore, GSIS, MHC, Committee on Privatization, and the Office of Government Corporate Counsel were directed to cease and
desist the selling of shares to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching offer of Manila Prince Hotel Corp.

BOARD OF MEDICINE vs. YASUYUKI OTA

FACTS:
Ota a Japanese National, who is married to a Filipina, graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with
a degree of doctor of medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center, and passed the medical board exam in 1992. As noted by the courts, Ota merited an average of 81.83 in the medical
board exam, with scores higher than 80 in 9 out of the 12 subjects. His request for license, however, was opposed by then Board
of Medicine chairman Dr. Raul Flores and PRC chairman Hermogenes Pobre, on the ground that there is “no genuine
reciprocity" in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice there. Ota filed a petition claiming
the Board and PRC acted arbitrarily in depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession in the Philippines to his
damage and prejudice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ota should be allowed to practice here in the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes. Nowhere in the statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the condition for the practice of medicine in
said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that a Filipino has been
granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice
in the Philippines.
The SC ruled that it is not the impossibility or prohibition against Filipinos that would account for the absence of Filipino
physicians holding licenses and practicing medicine in Japan but the difficulty of passing the board examination in the Japanese
language. “Granting that there is still no Filipino who has been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not mean that
no Filipino will ever be able to be given one," the court said.

CARIÑO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a
result, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The matter was then investigated, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño
ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was brought to the
 JOSEPH ACE LAGURIN 6

Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and
prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over the case.

RULING:
No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation
involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The
CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claims of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of the controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered as such, the faculty of receiving evidence must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively. The Constitution clearly grants the
CHR the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear or determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. These matters are within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being in the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him by the Civil Service Law.

PIMENTEL VS. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD

FACTS:
Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993 which creates the
Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and
memorandums establishing law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting
a system of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and establishing and implementing the
nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power
to “prescribe the minimum standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the
petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of
institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec.
7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec.
7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by the political
departments. The historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the political
departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal education
is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This
peculiarity, however, is no reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory
powers of the political branches.
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and supervision of legal education:
First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as a necessary
consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to
the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.
 JOSEPH ACE LAGURIN 7

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a power that is not
constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and
thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.
As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the practice of law and not the study of law.
The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and actually
regulates legal education, it merely provides academic competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar.
Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate and supervise the education of
its citizens and this includes legal education.
2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the
practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal
education but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive
authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal
education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s
power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of
law is considered the practice of law.
4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the applicant’s aptness for
legal education along with such other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However,
the PhilSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail
exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhilSAT is used to
exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.