Social Stratification and Inequality

Objective: To determine whether coding a developmental disability as the underlying cause of death obscures mortality trends of adults with developmental disability.

Design: National Vital Statistics System 2012–2016 US Multiple Cause-of-Death Mortality files.

Setting: USA.

Participants: Adults with a developmental disability indicated on their death certificate aged 18 through 103 at the time of death. The study population included 33 154 adults who died between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2016.

Primary outcome and measures: Decedents with a developmental disability coded as the underlying cause of death on the death certificate were identified using the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision code for intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome or other developmental disability. Death certificates that coded a developmental disability as the underlying cause of death were revised using a sequential underlying cause of death revision process.

Results: There were 33 154 decedents with developmental disability: 7901 with intellectual disability, 11 895 with cerebral palsy, 9114 with Down syndrome, 2479 with other developmental disabilities and 1765 with multiple developmental disabilities. Among all decedents, 48.5% had a developmental disability coded as the underlying cause of death, obscuring higher rates of choking deaths among all decedents and dementia and Alzheimer’s disease among decedents with Down syndrome.
Conclusion: Death certificates that recorded the developmental disability in Part I of the death certificate were more likely to code disability as the underlying cause of death. While revising these death certificates provides a short-term corrective to mortality trends for
this population, the severity and extent of this problem warrants a long-term change involving more precise instructions to record developmental disabilities only in Part II of the death certificate.

This paper attempts a general assessment of the contributions included in this volume. We examine three main kinds of problems related to the research on social inequality in Iberian Late Prehistory. These are theoretical, empirical and interpretative. Among the first, we comment upon the very definition of social inequality, the taxonomical categories employed in social evolution, as well as the main factors causing inequality, with special attention to labour force mobilisation. Among the second, we highlight some weaknesses of the Iberian archaeological record for the investigation of the subject matter, such as the limitations of the absolute chronology or the settlement record. Finally, we discuss the propositions that have been put forward to understand the forms that social inequality took among Neolithic, Copper and Bronze Age communities, concluding that Iberian archaeologists would much benefit from a comparative perspective.

In this research paper, two social anthropology undergraduates question the ongoing impact of social inequality and criminality on school attendance and drop-out rates of Salvadoran students. The many educational reforms and policies passed in the past two decades have made a slow but growing progress in the country’s literacy and school completion rate. Nevertheless, the drop-out rate of secondary school students, remains a major national challenge. We believe that the recounting of El Salvador’s history of inequalities, is crucial in order to get a better understanding of the current problems. We therefor address social and ethnical discrimination that have prevailed since the colonial era, the ongoing violence, and growing criminality that emerged at the end of the last century, in relation to El Salvador’s educational reform history.
The most recent education policy was proposed by late president Sanchéz Cerén in the quinquennial development plan (PQD) issued in the beginning of his term. The plan highlights inclusive education, social equity and citizen security as its main priorities. While this last presidential term has ended on June 1. 2019, we argue that no substantial changes have occurred to tackle criminality and strengthen social inclusiveness around public schools. This statement guides us through the analysis of the above- mentioned education policy. With the methodology of Bardach’s eight-fold path to public policy analysis (Bardach, 2012), we identified the problem of the PDQ, searched for alternatives, and analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of two existing alternatives. The first one, Plan El Salvador Educado (PESE) aiming at inclusive and quality education goals, has been ratified by the government and the educational ministry in 2016. Since then, no practical strategy nor any financial plan, have been officially announced. Our second alternative is a Brain-Education Project of IBREA foundation: this organization focuses on work with youth, suffering from stress or other mental weaknesses due to a violent and criminal background. Its qualitative approach has allowed its participants to make significant progress, and has expanded its program over the years. As a result of our education policy analysis, we have concluded that the government should collaborate more firmly with IBREA, and further develop its motivational program, in the country’s neighborhoods which are the worst affected by school drop-out rates.

Nel presente contributo, si intende dimostrare quanto la dimensione lavorativa - essere o meno entrati nel mercato del lavoro, ricoprire una posizione professionale più o meno qualificata, poter contare su un determinato livello di reddito - continui a rivestire un peso cruciale nella transizione alla vita adulta delle giovani generazioni, influenzando le opportunità e i vincoli di social attainment, in relazione alle disuguaglianze di partenza. A questo scopo, per cinque paesi europei, tra cui l’Italia, si valuta se e quanto le diseguaglianze nelle origini sociali, mediate dai titoli di studio ottenuti e dalle occupazioni raggiunte, incidono sul completamento della transizione, ovvero sulla convivenza neolocale e sulla genitorialità considerate congiuntamente. Il lavoro si basa sui dati internazionali OECD-PIAAC, per la popolazione di età tra i 30-39 anni (considerando questa fascia come ‘young-adults’), operando una comparazione tra Italia, Francia, Germania, Polonia e Spagna.

In the 1960s Mancur Olson and Samuel Huntington suggested that the positive correlation
between per capita income and the level of sociopolitical destabilization that they detected
for low and middle income countries might be partly accounted for by the growth of the inequality
associated with the economic and technological development in these countries. The
empirical tests we perform generally support this hypothesis, but they also identify certain
limits for such an explanation. Our tests reveal for low and middle income countries a statistically
significant correlation between GDP per capita and the economic inequality levels, but
this correlation is not particularly strong. Earlier we found for the same countries significantly
stronger positive correlations between GDP per capita and some important components of
sociopolitical destabilization, such as the intensity of political assassinations, general strikes
and anti-government demonstrations. It is quite clear that the strong association between
the increase in the intensity of these components of sociopolitical destabilization and GDP
per capita growth, can be explained by a much weaker tendency toward the growth of economic
inequality only partly. In addition, our empirical tests suggest the presence of a certain
threshold level of about 40 points on the Gini scale, after crossing which one can expect a
radical increase in levels of sociopolitical destabilization in general, and the intensity of terrorist
acts / guerrilla warfare and anti-government demonstrations in particular. According
to the World Bank, the value of the Gini coefficient for Russia is now just in this zone, which
suggests that the further growth of inequality in Russia could lead to an abrupt increase in
political destabilization.

Based on in-depth oral interviews carried out in Mogadishu, Somalia, and countries neighboring Somalia in 2009 and 2013, our purpose in this study is to map the nature of prejudice and hate discourse used by Somalis against the Bantu Jareer and the Yibir, Gabooye, and Tumaal communities in Somalia. The hate discourse used against the Yibir, Gabooye, and Tumal outcast communities is premised on assumptions of their supposed unholy origin and their engagement in occupations and social activities that are despised by the so-called Somali noble groups. The prejudice and hate discourse against the Bantu Jareer Somalis is derived from their African origin and alleged African-like physical characteristics in comparison with the features of other Somalis.