Corinthian War

The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. VI. IN RUSSIAN.

Четвертый век до нашей эры: в 2 полутомах / Под ред. Д.-М.Льюиса и др.; перевод с англ., подготов. текста, предисловие, примечания А.В.Зайкова. – М.: Ладомир, 2017. – Первый полутом. – 624 с. (Кембриджская история древнего мира. Т. VI, первый полутом [1–624 с.]). ISBN 978-5-86218-544-7  ISBN 978-5-86218-545-4 (п/т. 1). 45 у.п.л.

Здесь представлен первый полутом VI тома "Кембриджской истории древнего мира" (перевод английского 2-го издания The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. VI). В этой книге рассказывается о истории греческого мира от конца Пелопоннеской войны до крушения фиванской гегемонии, о Сицилии этого же времени, о перипетиях персидской истории до столкновения Ахеменидов с Македонией;  представлены также региональные обзоры (в основном по IV в. до н. э., но не только): персидские сатрапии, Карфаген, кельты, иллирийцы, фракийцы и скифы, Боспорское царство. "Закрывает" этот полутом обстоятельное рассмотрение системы коммуникаций в Средиземноморье.
Книга снабжена большим количеством рисунков (академического свойства) и картами.

The paper reflects on the relationship between the respective oligarchies of Corinth and Argos and proposes a theory to explain the events that connected the two cities between 392 and 386 BC. The analysis, including the lead up to and consequences of the coups of Argos (418 BC) and Corinth (392 BC), starts with the Battle of Sepeia in (494 BC) to end with the cessation of oligarchical rule in both cities in 370 BC. With the context in place, the paper reviews the political rationale behind the isopoliteia between the Argives and Corinthians from a pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, standpoint.

In this article we defend that, during the Corinthian War, this polis did not undergo any constitutional change that ended two centuries of moderate oligarchy, nor existed an agreement of isopoliteia with Argos, nor stopped existing like independent state after a presumed Argive annexation. It was an episode more of factional turmoil, framed in an atmosphere of permanent stasis caused by the serious consequences of a fight dissolved in its own territory, in which the oligarchical and minority Argophile group, needed the Argive troops to squash to its opponents –as well oligarchs, though laconophiles-, to conserve the power inside and the symmachia with Argos, Boeotia and Athens outside. There was not any political experiment at all.

Este trabajo analiza un capítulo relevante aunque escasamente considerado de la guerra de Corinto: la práctica sistemática de la piratería (leisteía) contra intereses atenienses por parte de sus vecinos y enemigos eginetas. Esta actividad pirática eginética, legitimada e incluso institucionalizada por sus aliados y hegemónes, los espartanos, no tuvo en apariencia resultados geopolíticos o estratégicos, pero causó sin duda un enorme daño económico sobre las costas áticas y el Pireo, además de llevar el miedo y la inseguridad al dêmos ateniense.

The military successes of the Athenian Iphicrates to the command of a highly professional and qualified body of mercenary peltasts during the Corinthian War constitutes one of the factors that opened the way to a new understanding of the warfare and the society in the fourth century Greece, in which the crisis of the old identification between hoplite, citizen and landowner goes along with that of the polis itself and her ideological base.

The anaylisis of the public and personal economic factors, joined to that prosopographical of the political leaders at the time and that of the citizenship rights, undertaken before, betray a complex but coherent scene of the Athenian society at the end of fifth century and early fourth century B.C., where all of these elements interact and explain each other. The adverses economic conditions contribute to increase the tensions and the risk of losing rights.

The control of the Athenian demos over military commanders:
the case of Thrasybulus’ strategia (390–389 BC.)

Thrasybulus was an important Athenian military commander between the late 5th and the beginning of the 4th century BC. The paper deals with his last campaign in the Aegean, during the Corinthian War (395–387/6 BC). The much debated question of campaign chronology is raised and the author argues for dating the whole expedition to the years 390–389. After the overall description of military actions, the article focuses on the problem of Thrasybulus relations with the native authorities, and the degree of his freedom to make decisions in the field. The testimony of a pair of Lysias’ speeches (Against Ergocles and Against Philocrates) is analysed in such a context and compared with the information transmitted by Xenophon and Diodorus. It is very probable that the accusations formulated in the court speeches were true to a significant degree. Thus, Thrasybulus’ movements were quite wilful and even contrary to the commands of the Athenian demos (like sailing north instead of Rhodes, where he was sent), who had serious problems with executing control over the commander. The question of relations between military commanders is also raised. We hear from the speeches that other officers (besides Thrasybulus) participated in the campaign. They could have been a potential organ of the polis’ control. In such a situation, filling the military with one’s own supporters was very useful in decreasing the controlling power of the Athenian demos. This had probably been done by Thrasybulus.

Après les grandes batailles hoplitiques de Némée et de Coronée dans l´été 394 av. J.-C., victoires non décisives des Lacédémoniens, la guerre de Corinthe entre dans une phase de relatif enlisement, mais aussi d'usure et de pillage, qui détruit lentement hommes et ressources des póleis concernées. Sur cette guerre, Xénophon est notre principale source – quand il n'est pas la seule. Il s'agit de campagnes « oubliées », à peine héroïques et dignes d'être considérées dans la perspective de l'éthos militaire hellénique ; mais ces opérations militaires sont assez destructrices dans le domaine économique et déstabilisatrices dans le domaine social pour provoquer, ou rendre plus aiguë, la stásis de l´État qui les subit ; de la sorte, ces campagnes peuvent sinon faire basculer une fidélité, du moins émousser une pugnacité.

The island of Rhodes was a naval base of a huge strategic interest for the Greek states fighting for the hegemony, specially Athens and Sparta in the classical period. This hegemonic conflict influence on the Rhodian civic community, where there was several episodes of stasis o civil war between democrats and oligarchs, supported respectively by Athenians and Spartans. In the present article we focuses on one of these episodes, in the frame of the so-called Corinthian War (395-386 B.C.), of which development and implications our two main sources disagree (Xenophon and Diodorus of Sicily).