Colonialism and Imperialism

This paper examines HIV education projects in the context of the construction of a UNESCO World Heritage site in Salvador, Brazil, in order to consider what it means to live within, and contest, the ongoing effects and structures of imperial domination.

The present chapter explores what Grotius came to know about trade,
diplomacy and politics in the East Indies. The period under review covers
the beginning of his engagement on East Indian affairs around the year
1604 until his arrest and incarceration in August 1618. It focuses on
geographically present-day Southeast Asia, especially on the island world of Indonesia, but also areas of the Malay Peninsula and Thailand (Siam). The discussion is aimed at answering the following overarching questions: how and in what capacity did Grotius engage with East Indian affairs? When, from whom and under what circumstances did he acquire his working knowledge about the East Indies?

Decoloniality is, in the first place, a concept whose point of origination was the Third World. Better yet, it emerged at the very moment in which the three world division was collapsing and the celebration of the end of history and a new world order was emerging. The nature of its impact was similar to the impact produced by the introduction of the concept of “biopolitics”, whose point of origination was Europe. Like its European counterpart, “coloniality” moved to the center of international debates in the non-European world as well as in “former Eastern Europe.” While “biopolitics” moved to center stage in “former Western Europe” (cf., the European Union) and the United States, as well as among some intellectual minorities of the non-European followers of ideas that originated in Europe, but who adapt them to local circumstances, “coloniality” offers a needed sense of comfort to mainly people of color in developing countries, migrants and, in general, to a vast quantitative majority whose life experiences, long and short-term memories, languages and categories of thoughts are alienated to life experience, long and short-term memories, languages and categories of thought that brought about the concept of “biopolitics” to account for mechanisms of control and state regulations.

In the first of two essays in this Journal, I seek to unify the historical geography of early modern ‘European expansion’ (Iberia and Latin America) with the environmental history of the ‘transition to capitalism’ (northwestern Europe). The expansion of Europe's overseas empires and the transitions to capitalism within Europe were differentiated moments within the geographical expansion of commodity production and exchange – what I call the commodity frontier. This essay is developed in two movements. Beginning with a conceptual and methodological recasting of the historical geography of the rise of capitalism, I offer an analytical narrative that follows the early modern diaspora of silver. This account follows the political ecology of silver production and trade from the Andes to Spain in Braudel's ‘second’ sixteenth century (c. 1545–1648). In highlighting the Ibero-American moment of this process in the present essay, I contend that the spectacular reorganization of Andean space and the progressive dilapidation of Spain's real economy not only signified the rise and demise of a trans-Atlantic, Iberian ecological regime, but also generated the historically necessary conditions for the unprecedented concentration of accumulation and commodity production in the capitalist North Atlantic in the centuries that followed.

Focusing particularly on the Madras College of Physical Education opened in 1919, this article reconstructs the role of the United States of America-dominated Indian Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in the spread of physical-education schemes in South Asia between the beginning of the century and the outbreak of the Second World War. American YMCA secretaries stressed the scientific, liberal, and egalitarian character of their 'physical programme' aiming at the training of responsible and self-controlled citizens and therefore supposedly offering an alternative to British imperial sports. The study demonstrates that the Y indeed exercised a considerable influence by acting as adviser to provincial and 'princely' governments as well as through the graduates of the Madras College of Physical Education (MCPE), many of whom became physical directors in educational institutions in India, Burma, Ceylon and other Asian countries. At the same time, it also makes clear that North American models could not be transplanted in a simple or straightforward manner to South Asian contexts. For one, in spite of its representation as a 'school for democracy', the Y's supposedly inclusive and emancipatory discourses and practices of physical fitness remained over-determined by the powerful influences of the colonial discourse of race, and the programme of the Indian Y continued to be rife with the imperial tropes Ligtenberg as well as Modern Asian Studies' anonymous reviewers for reading earlier drafts and making valuable suggestions for the improvement of the text.

""Liberalism is widely regarded as a modern intellectual tradition that defends the rights and freedoms of autonomous individuals. Yet, in both colonial and postcolonial contexts, liberal theorists and policymakers have struggled to defend the rights and freedoms of political subjects whom they regard as “primitive,” “backward,” or in more politically-correct terms, “indigenous” (Pagden 1982; Damodaran 2006b; Viswanathan 2006; Jung 2008). Liberalism thus recurrently encounters its primitive other, a face-off that gives rise to a peculiar set of dilemmas and contradictions for political theory, policy, and practice in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Ivison 2002; Ivison et al 2000; Banerjee 2006; Ghosh 2006). In what ways can postcolonial law rid itself of its colonial baggage? How can the ideal of universal liberal citizenship overcome paternalistic notions of protection? How might “primitive” subjects become full and equal citizens in postcolonial societies?

To explore these dilemmas and contradictions, I study the intellectual trajectory of “primitivism” in India from the construction of so-called tribal areas in the 1870s to legal debates and official reports on tribal rights in contemporary India. As such, this paper has two principal aims: firstly, to read closely the legal provisions justifying colonial and postcolonial rule over tribal populations in order to highlight the ambiguities and paradoxes of primitivism as an ideology of rule in India, and secondly, to understand these legal texts in their proper intellectual and political contexts in order to develop an historically-inflected understanding of the continuing tension between the constitutional ideal of liberal citizenship and the disturbing reality of tribal subjecthood produced by colonial and postcolonial states in India. In doing so, I seek to put into conversation the small but influential literature on liberalism and modern empire with the voluminous writings on colonial anthropology and administration in British India.

My approach in this paper may be termed interpretive or hermeneutical. I read primary legal texts closely with particular attention to continuities and shifts in their languages and concepts. Furthermore, I situate these texts in their historical contexts in order to better appreciate how the hermeneutics of these texts share a two-way relationship with real-world policy and practice. For the colonial period, I focus on the Scheduled Districts Act (1874), selected administrative and missionary writings on tribal areas and peoples, and extracts from colonial constitutions and commissioned reports. For the postcolonial period, I study the debates over the Constitution of India and its provisions for scheduled tribes, key legislation and court decisions on tribal rights and livelihoods, and reports on tribal development from the 1960s onwards. Lastly, I invoke secondary sources by historians, political theorists, and anthropologists that explore the historical relationship between liberalism and modern empire as well as ideologies of rule that have used anthropological knowledge to justify their raison d’êtres.""

This book addresses core issues concerning nations, states, nation-states and statenations. The authors identify the latter as the main functional alternatives to ‘nations-states’, although both must share the necessary condition of being ‘states’ if they are to work. Stepan, Linz and Yadav are themselves aware of the awkwardness of the term ‘state-nation’, which is meant to distinguish democratic states that do not—and cannot—fit appropriately into the classic French-style Jacobin model of forged homogeneity. India is a case in point which serves the purpose of illustrating a proposal of a set of seven policy domains that the authors regard as highly supportive for the crafting of state-nations. Such policies are synthetically proposed in direct and parsimonious phrases composing a ‘nest policy grammar’ aimed at facilitating the emergence and persistence of state-nations.

Recent literature on racial capitalism has overwhelmingly focused on the Atlantic settler-slave formation, sidelining the history of European imperialism in Asia. This article addresses this blind spot by recovering the aborted project of British settler colonialism in India through the writings of its most prominent advocate, John Crawfurd. It is argued that Crawfurd's vision of a liberal empire in India rejected slavery and indigenous dispossession yet remained deeply racialized in its conception of capital, labor, and value. Crawfurd elaborated a "capital theory of race," which derived racial categories from a civilizational spectrum keyed to the capitalist organization of production. His proposals accordingly revamped the conventional terms of colonization by representing India as overstocked with labor but vacant of capital and skill that only European settlers could provide. The article concludes with the broader implications of a trans-imperial analytic framework for writing connected histories of racial capitalism and settler colonialism.

H. G. Wells was one of the most influential writers of the first half of the twentieth century. Most famous today as a founder of modern science fiction, he was once known throughout the world as a visionary social and political thinker. Questions of global order were central to his work. From the opening decade of the century until the close of the Second World War, he campaigned tirelessly for the creation of a world state, characterised by universal peace and justice. Yet scholarship on Wells has paid insufficient attention to the complex and conflicted nature of Wells’s early views about how to build a world state, and in particular the tensions between his advocacy of a New Republic, formed by the unification of the English-speaking peoples, and his support for liberal imperialism. In this essay I analyse the development of this key theme in Wells’s political thinking. I demonstrate how his views on race, empire, and Anglo-American union shifted over time, show how his political arguments connected to his underlying views about social explanation and language, and highlight how his interpretation of the United States had a profound influence on his ideas about world order.

This article is intended to rethink a symbiotic but otherwise inadequately attended relationship between postcolonial studies and Chinese academia at a time when the rise of China evokes epistemic, ontological and empirical challenges for critical reflection. Above all, I argue that China is situated in her postcolonial conditions in such a way that these conditions largely define China's multi‐faceted positioning as colonial agent, (semi‐)colonial victim, recipient of colonialist ideology, overthrower of that ideology and its accompanying world‐system, and contender for the “top place” within such a world‐system. Postcolonial theory hence becomes relevant and productive in terms of its potential to problematize various puzzles, contradictions and tensions during China's rise like widespread disregard of basic civic values, political partisanship in scholarship, aggravation of the East‐West divide and rising Chinese exceptionalism. Additionally, however, this article also pinpoints the need to transform and reshape the oftentimes Eurocentric inclination in postcolonial studies through an incorporation of the revolutionary and post‐revolutionary experiences in China and elsewhere. Doing so therefore calls for a post‐revolutionary paradigm as proposed by Wang Hui, among others. I thus advocate cross‐fertilization, rather than mutual exclusion, not only be-tween the postcolonial and post‐revolutionary paradigms but also between postcolonial studies and Chinese scholarship/academia.

This article contends that the ecologically destructive nature of capitalism was operative from the very beginning of the modern world-system, and was a major force in the geographic expansion of the system. The case of the "sugar frontier" demonstrates that early modern capitalism was both highly "industrial" and profoundly destructive of the natural environment. The ecological devastation caused by sugar cultivation and processing, in combination with booming European demand, was a major force behind the geographic expansion of the world-economy in the early modern period. The article shows the interconnections between the sugar frontier, the world-economy, and such socio-ecological issues as: deforestation, soil erosion, livestock overpopulation, delocalization of food supply, hydraulic systems, worker health and safety, monocultures, species extinction, and climate change.

During the final quarter of the twentieth century, the democratic peace thesis - the idea that democracies do not fight one another - moved to the centre of scholarly and political debate throughout the Western world. Much of this work traces its origins to the European Enlightenment, and especially on Immanuel Kant. However, this historical narrative misses much of the subsequent discourse about democracy and war. In this essay I focus on some prominent, though now largely forgotten, strands of political thinking in the United States and Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, I dissect fin de siècle debates about democracy, empire, race, and interstate conflict. Section I delineates four popular visions of peace that circulated during the nineteenth century: structural-liberal, radical-liberal, socialist, and republican. Section II introduces what I call the ‘democratic war thesis’ and the ‘democratic empire thesis.’ The former identified the linkages between democratic political structures and inter-state conflict, the latter suggested that vast empires could co-operatively govern the world and abolish war.  Section III anatomises the racial peace thesis, which was propounded by a range of prominent figures,  including Andrew Carnegie, Cecil Rhodes and H. G. Wells. They argued, from different points on the political spectrum, that the 'Anglo-Saxon race' held the key to perpetual peace.

This essay offers a critical reexamination of the works of Friedrich List by placing them in the context of nineteenth-century imperial economies. I argue that List’s theory of the national economy is characterised by a major ambivalence, as it incorporates both imperial and anti-imperial elements. On the one hand, List pitted his national principle against the British imperialism of free trade and the relations of dependency it heralded for late developers like Germany. On the other hand, his economic nationalism aimed less at dismantling imperial core-periphery relations as a whole than at reproducing these relations domestically and expanding them globally. I explain this ambivalence with reference to List’s designation of imperial Britain as the prime example of successful economic development and a model to be emulated by late industrialisers. List thereby fashioned his ideas on national development out of the historical experience of an empire whereby he internalised its economic logic and discourse of the civilising mission. Consequently, List’s national economy culminated in an early vision of the global north-south relations, in which the global industrial-financial core would expand to include France, Germany, and the Unites States, while the rest of the world would be reduced to quasi-colonial agrarian hinterlands.

This article develops a series of arguments about social fields, subfields, and social spaces that can help us understand empires and colonies.  First, we have to assume that the scale of fields is not always coextensive with the boundaries of the national state but is often much larger, or smaller. Imperial fields are among the most spatially extensive ones, though they may not be as territorially extensive as truly global fields. Second, we need to make a distinction between imperial fields and imperial social spaces (based on Bourdieu’s distinction betweem social fields and social spaces).  The third argument is that colonies in modern empires were characterized by two different kinds of fields: fields that were simply extended into the overseas territories, versus completely separate fields unique to one or more of the colonies. The colonial state is an example of a field that is specific to the colony.  By contrast, scientific fields were often simply extended from the metropole into the colonies, encompassing both.  The fourth argument concerns subfields. Transported into imperial realms, this distinction suggests that some colonial offshoots of fielded metropolitan practices do not constitute separate fields but are nonetheless differentiated from their main overarching field. These four points are illustrated with examples from British, French, and German imperial policy, colonial statecraft, and colonial sociology.

As critics have recently demonstrated, developmentalist thinking sustains modern Euro-pean imperialism by portraying non-Europeans as further back on a fixed scale of civilizations. The problem persists in the developmental logics underlying contemporary Marxist and liberal political theory, suggesting that developmentalism is implicitly bound to domination and imperialism. This article complicates this connection by drawing out anti-imperial developmentalist arguments articulated from the other side of the colonial divide. I elaborate three distinctive developmental logics in anti-imperialisms advanced by Surendranath Banerjea, Aurobindo Ghose, and Shyamji Krishnavarma, leading figures in India's independence movement, to show the particularity of the form of developmentalism so intimately bound to domination. This exposition aims to provincialize it by uncovering alternative developmentalist schemas offering distinctive conceptual resources for understanding progress in relation to anti-imperialism. By reaching beyond the Western lens framing the problem of developmentalism, I show its instabilities and consider its utility in resisting imperialism .

This article is concerned with the creation, by the Russian colonial administration, Russian researchers and photographers/artists, of a corpus of ‘historical monuments’ of Samarkand in the first decades after the conquest of the city. It uses travelogues, administrative reports, memoirs, the periodical press and artistic productions to determine the mechanism of selection of representative monuments, defined as the ‘cultural heritage’ of Russian Turkestan and, indirectly, of the Russian Empire. The internal logic of ‘patrimonialisation’, initiated from above and ideologically engaged, becomes more obvious when it is juxtaposed against native understandings of the significance of monuments, European practices, and the political projects of the Russian Empire.
 

This article aims at contributing to current debates on the ‘new imperialism’ by presenting the main results of a reading of Marx’s Capital in light of his writings on colonialism, which were unknown in the early Marxist debate on imperialism. It aims to prove that, in his main work, Marx does not analyse a national economy or – correspondingly – an abstract model of capitalist society, but a world-polarising and ever-expanding system. This abstraction allows the identification of the laws of development of capitalism and its antagonisms, and reflects the tendency of the capital of the dominant states, by making permanent recourse also to methods of so-called ‘primitive accumulation’, to expand and increase the exploitation of workers worldwide, and, at the same time, the cooperation between them. What, for Marx, was later defined as imperialism is the concrete form of the process of ‘globalisation’ of the capital of the dominant states. With the development of his analysis, Marx became increasingly aware of the economic and political consequences of imperialism. In his activity within the First International, with regard to the question of Irish independence, he affirmed the fundamental importance of building a real solidarity between class struggles in imperialist countries and anti-colonial resistance in colonised and dependent countries. His examination of imperialism and internationalist perspective were downplayed, denied, if not completely reversed in the interpretation and systematisation of his thought by reformist leaders within the Second International. In their attempt to react against this tendency and develop an analysis and a political strategy adequate to the new phase of generalised imperialist expansion, increased inter-imperialist rivalries and rising anti-colonial resistance, Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin reaffirmed the centrality of the critique of imperialism at the economic and at the political levels. Even if they were partially unaware of this, they thus developed and expanded on some aspects already present in Marx’s work.

What is a " settler‐colonial city " and how does it differ from other forms of imperial urban spatial organization? This article seeks to answer these questions by attempting to urbanize recent insights in settler‐colonial theory. It begins by considering well‐established theorizations of the "colonial city " —particularly those developed by geographers and urbanists in the 1970s and 1980s—in order to assess their suitability for analyses of contemporary settler‐colonial milieu. Building on this discussion, the paper asks if and how the insights of settler‐colonial theory offer new opportunities to renovate earlier theorizations in ways that are more explicitly relevant to making sense of the urban process in North America and other societies where colonists have " come to stay " and no formal process of decolonization has unfolded.

This article throws light on how the issue of conservation stood in tension with imperial hunting and exploitation in colonial India. The indiscriminate slaughter of wildlife and the declining numbers of game species in nineteenth-century India gave rise to a need for conservation, but with a caveat. Wildlife conservation, consequently, was aimed at the expansion of colonial economy and infrastructural development. Thus, in colonial India, wild predators that posed a threat to such interests were ruthlessly decimated and those animals that were useful for the smooth functioning of the British colonial rule were overlooked. This, in part, was also necessitated by the British seeking to establish their credentials as rulers, which explains the reason the colonial government's conservation programme was fundamentally selective and guided by expediency. The comparative perspective on elephants and tigers elucidates how the former were protected by the law because of the critical role they played in the colonial economy and administration, whilst the latter were ruthlessly exterminated for the threat they posed to the same. This article especially argues that the reasons for conserving elephants and decimating tigers in colonial India were more practical and economic than a mere reflection of cultural sensitivity on the part of the colonizers.

The collective memory inscribed in Korean history books recalls when the Japanese colonial state requi23sitioned brassware from Korean households during World War II. This study explores the complex mechanism behind these campaigns. Copper was a scarce commodity in the Japanese empire. The colonial brassware industry expanded but struggled due to fluctuating copper prices before the war. To overcome the reluctance of Koreans to part with their brassware, the colonial state had to coordinate various actors across multiple organisations, provide
ceramic replacements, and establish a system of financial payments. The Japanese also ultimately created a ‘brass bureaucracy’ capable of carrying out the sensitive task of removing copper from Korean households. The Korean case reminds us that institutional frameworks are necessary for wartime salvage. Finally, brassware collections also resulted in fundamental changes in Korean society and everyday material culture that require careful analysis.

This article examines the history of a similarity measure—the Mahalanobis Distance Function—and its movement from colonial India into contemporary artificial intelligence technologies, including facial recognition, and its reapplication into postcolonial India. The article identifies how the creation of the Distance Function was connected to the colonial “problem” of caste and ethnic classification for British bureaucracy in 1920-1930s India. This article demonstrates that the Distance Function is a statistical method, originating to make anthropometric caste distinctions in India, that became both a technical standard and a mobile racialized technique, utilized in machine learning applications. The creation of the Distance Function as a measure of “similitude” at a particular period of colonial state-making helped to model wider categories of classification which have proliferated in facial recognition technology. Overall, we highlight how a measurement function that operates in recognition technologies today can be traced across time and space to other racialized contexts.

La identidad canaria está fundada en un trauma. Por esta razón, quienes han reflexionado acerca del Archipiélago han recurrido con harta frecuencia a la fantasía para representar su ubicación y su historia, así como la raza, el género, la clase y los conocimientos atribuidos a su población. A través de una antología de discursos sobre la identidad insular, en este artículo se intenta demostrar que existen vínculos entre la canariedad y la colonialidad. Desde el punto de vista del pensamiento descolonial, se incide en la obra de quienes han ocultado ese trauma mediante el recurso a una identidad que no sólo ha mistificado ciertas formas de desigualdad, sino que también puede impulsar la demanda de mayores cotas de justicia cognitiva y social.

This article examines the contemporary mining industry in Nunavut, Canada to determine whether land claims and other negotiated agreements have enabled Inuit to capture wealth produced by extraction. It examines the geographic distribution of wealth produced by Nunavut’s extractive economy and considers several structural limits to economic development through private-sector extraction in Northern Canada. Although the 1993 Nunavut Agreement has allowed Inuit to increase their share of extraction based wealth, most wealth still accrues to other jurisdictions. The extractive economy therefore remains a colonial economy, because it continues to benefit external interests disproportionately.

It was 2pm. The intense sun that afternoon made the fifteen-minute wait at the city centre of Likasi in Haut-Katanga province of Congo all the more tedious for Papa Kabongo, my research assistant, and me. We were waiting for some informants for an interview and they had not appeared. Half an hour passed and we spotted two brand-new Bajaj motorbikes whiz past us and turn around rather abruptly. The riders were both without helmets but they wore some fancy sunglasses. The blue bike came right up to me. The rider slowly lifted his glasses and with a cheeky grin said, 'Timoté, ni je?' ('Timoté, how is it?'). It was Francis, my informant. I was perplexed, unsure of whether I should comment on his looks, that suspicious grin, or the flippant greeting. Francis knew and could see that I looked visibly surprised because, only the day before, Papa Kabongo and I had stumbled into him in an artisanal mine near the city of Likasi where I was conducting my fieldwork. Then, he wore shorts soiled with mud and a tired T-shirt browned by dust and spoke to us about the Sunday meeting while standing knee-deep in brown murky water while overseeing his copper ore being washed. At one moment, he would be speaking calmly to us and at the next he would be flailing his arms and hollering at some teenage boys at the nearby stream to hurry up with the rinsing of his malachite rocks. Francis was a creuseur. That Sunday afternoon when I met him one might have mistaken him for a sapeur. 1 He had donned a Yankees baseball cap, aviator sunglasses, blue jeans, a Chelsea Football Club jersey, moccasins, and, just for effect, two replica Seiko watches – one on each wrist. Time obviously mattered to this guy, I mused. So, why was he late? The momentary shock of seeing Francis sapé wore off. Jules, Francis's friend and business partner, approached me. He laughed as he came off his bike in his black three-piece suit and greeted us in the respectful Katangese manner of bringing our heads to touch each other from side to side. I realized that their laughter and smiles were a response to what they must have perceived to be my exaggerated sense of surprise. I am sure they were wondering why it was so strange to me that they were à la mode, akin to the male dancers of the Congolese pop-music sensation Werrason. 2 Of course, they did not say that but they knew they had surprised me, and, from their smiles, I gathered that this pleased them. With their arrival

The British colonial state was transformed during the Second World War, and adopted a new commitment to economic and social development funded by the United
Kingdom. Designed to pre-empt international and colonial criticism of colonial rule, this policy was affected by wartime debates within Britain on post-war social and economic reconstruction. Wartime collectivist ideas were selectively adopted into Colonial Office thinking and justified as a means of promoting faster development and appeasing colonial critics of expatriate business. The implementation of these ideas exposed the post-war colonial state to charges of exploitation, damaging the reputation
of public enterprise and reaffirming the importance of private enterprise in the colonial context.

The evolving internationalisation of imperial and colonial affairs fostered the emergence of specific, and interrelated, arguments, institutional arrangements and repertoires of political action regarding colonial societies. The actors and the institutions aiming to shape colonial dynamics in a number of fields of intervention, with different agendas and expertise, multiplied, and the topics under debated expanded. Expressions of imperial internationalism – that is, discourses and projects promoted by groups and institutions aiming at developing forms of internationalism dealing with imperial and colonial affairs, namely through international organisations – proliferated. This article deals with two: The Union Catholique d’Études Internationales (UCEI), an example of (conservative) religious internationalism, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), a case of (progressive) ‘international feminism’. Alongside other important transnational, non-governmental organisations, which competed for protagonism in the historical unfolding of the intersections between internationalism and imperialism and colonialism, the UCEI and the WILPF were active voices in the most important debates carried out by the League of Nations and its specialised agencies (from slavery and ‘native labour’ to opium trade), influencing their content and direction.

Disproportional morbidity and mortality experienced by ethnic minorities in the United Kingdom have been highlighted by the Covid-19 pandemic. The 'Black Lives Matter' movement has exposed structural racism's contribution to these health inequities. 'Cultural Safety', an anti-racist, decolonising, and educational innovation originating in New Zealand, has been adopted in Australia. Cultural Safety aims to dismantle barriers faced by colonised Indigenous Peoples in mainstream healthcare, by addressing systemic racism. This paper explores what it means to be 'Culturally Safe'. The ways in which New Zealand and Australia are incorporating Cultural Safety into educating healthcare professionals and in day-today practice in medicine are highlighted. We consider the 'nuts and bolts' of translating Cultural Safety into the UK to reduce racism within healthcare. Listening to the voices of Black, Asian and minority ethnic NHS consumers, education in reflexivity, both personal and organisational within the NHS, are key. By listening to Indigenous colonised peoples, the ex-Empire may find solutions to health inequity. A decolonising feedback loop is required; however, we should take care not to culturally appropriate this valuable reverse innovation.

Populism and nationalism have been described as major threats to democracy. But ambiguities linger over their conceptual boundaries and overlaps. This article develops a typology of nationalist narratives to historically situate the recent global rise of populist nationalism. Specifically, we identify three common types of historical experience with empire that have shaped contemporary expressions of nationalism by populist leaders: imperial power, where a nation's forerunner was the leading polity in a regional or global empire; imperial subject, where a nation was ruled and dominated by an imperial power, and imperial holdout, where a nation battled off imperial encroachments with relative success. Collective memories of these divergent imperial experiences are associated with three distinct types of nationalist narratives today: restorative nationalism in former imperial powers, redemptive nationalism in former imperial subjects, and retentive nationalism in former imperial holdouts. We illustrate this typology in three major cases of twenty-first-century populism: Turkey under Erdogan, the Philippines under Duterte, and Thailand under Thaksin. We tentatively contend that restorative nationalism is an especially likely conduit for greater political disruptions at home and abroad.

What causes imperialism? Classic explanations of imperialism theorized causes within the imperial metropole, such as nationalist culture or the imperatives of capital accumu- lation. More recent theories emphasize global pressures. To assess these longstanding but rarely adjudicated theories, this paper employs original time-series data and quali- tative evidence on British imperialism from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century. The analysis shows that British imperialism was not only a domestically produced pro- cess but also a global one. British imperialism was a strategy for meeting the state’s imperatives of geopolitical security (containment) and economic growth (capital) in the face of external threats. Those threats were most likely to be perceived when the global system was at its most economically competitive. These findings affirm a “structural competition” approach that builds upon existing global-oriented theories but specifies the structural conditions and causal processes driving imperialism.

Only the copy of the first page. Full article can be accessed here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01916599.2020.1746084

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This article examines early twentieth-century British Commonwealth ideologies as historical precursors of empire-related Euroscepticism, with a particular focus on the thought of Reginald Coupland (1884–1952) and Alfred Zimmern (1879–1957). It shows that the liberal internationalists committed to advocating the Commonwealth, Coupland and Zimmern sought to promote an idealized view of the empire by portraying it as a harmonious and multiagency polity grounded in a supposed benign form of nationalism and internationalism. The essay also highlights a relatively disregarded ideological source of the British Commonwealth projects at the time: Edmund Burke. Coupland and Zimmern built on aspects of Burke’s thought – respectively, his account of trust and manners – to characterize their schemes for the empire. Moreover, such Burkean elements helped them to distinguish between the systems of their envisaged Commonwealth and Continental states, among others, Germany. The essay presents Coupland’s and Zimmern’s imperial projects as two significant cases of the incorporation of Burke’s thought into the early century British Commonwealth accounts.

Exploring the history of Koreans in the Russian Far East from the perspective of New Imperial History, the article demonstrates that political activism of Koreans and policies of the Russian (Soviet), Korean, and Japanese governments resulted in consolidation of two visions of their future. The first vision implied unity between the Koreans living in the Russian Far East with those who stayed in Korea, moved to Japan, or emigrated elsewhere and corresponded to the agenda of building a Korean nation. The second vision implied that the bilingual or Russified Koreans aspired to stay in the Russian Far East permanently, ensuring their own livelihood in the new regional frontier. The two currents interlaced in the project of Korean autonomy in a post-imperial state, first the Far Eastern Republic and later the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The project involved inclusion of Koreans into the global spread of revolution through the Communist International and left open the issue of the duration of Korean presence in the Russian Far East. Its ultimate failure in 1926 left the Koreans partly excluded from the Soviet system without the institutional benefits of national autonomy.

""In the closing decades of the nineteenth century the idea of Greater Britain, of the unity of the 'Anglo-Saxon' colonies and the ‘mother country’, became a topic of considerable interest and controversy amongst the metropolitan intellectual and political elite. This article examines the roles played by the monarchy in the debates. Queen Victoria, as both idea and institution, assumed two central functions. First, it was argued that the institution of the monarchy, stretching back over centuries, could supply an anchor of permanence and constitutional fidelity in a redesigned global polity. This would reassure critics of such schemes that their fears about fundamental transformation were unfounded; that a thread of historical continuity ran through the proposals. Secondly, Victoria – or at least an idealised representation of her – acted as the linchpin for a sense of global national identity. The prestige and admiration that she (and the institution of the monarchy itself) generated, it was contended, bound the distant peoples of her realm iin close communion. Moreover, the way in which she was sometimes represented in imperial debate harked back to (while modifying) an older civic humanist language of ‘patriot kingship’.""

This paper explores the different ways in which the English School of International Relations (ES) can contribute to the broader Global IR research agenda. After identifying some of the shared concerns between the ES and Global IR, such as the emphasis placed on history and culture, the paper proceeds with discussing what the authors believe to be the areas in which the ES can align itself more closely with the ideas and values underpinning Global IR: a more thorough engagement with the origins of global international society rooted in dispossession, violence, and colonialism; a more localised and diverse understanding of 'society'; a sharper and more grounded conceptualisation of 'the state' as a basic ontology; an embracement of the interpretivist principle of charity; and a problematisation of assumptions of 'globality' of international society. The paper concludes with a tentative research agenda, emphasising the value of fieldwork, local practices and languages, archives, and a theorisation of international society that is grounded in the very social contexts being investigated.

This paper is based on a close reading of Greek and Rodesli (Rhodian Jewish) narratives focusing on the time when Rhodes was under Italian (1912–1943) and then German (1943–1945) rule, the last period when religiously diverse communities coexisted in the island. While Greek historiography seeks to vindicate the island’s final integration into the Greek national space, Rodesli memory is meant to preserve the heritage of a community destroyed by the Nazis. Notably, these corpuses make no references to one another. This phenomenon of soliloquy, the article argues, is illustrative of a competitive memory characteristic of recollections of the past in the eastern Mediterranean and challenges nostalgic invocations of a pre-national, “cosmopolitan” Mediterranean. Broadening the discussion to other post-Ottoman settings, the article draws attention to property redistribution in the aftermath of ethnic cleansing as a major factor in the separation of memory along communal lines. Noting the omnipresence of the figure of the “ghost” in the literature on the region, the paper finally explores the heuristic potential of hauntology to conceive histories of the region that would be inclusive and yet attentive to the differences in the nature, purpose and reciprocal indifference of the sources and of the asymmetrical relations of power in which they were produced.