Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure. (1994). Myerson, Roger.
In: Discussion Papers.
RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1095.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 3

Citations received by this document

Cites: 30

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study. (2003). Soberg, Martin.
    In: Memorandum.
    RePEc:hhs:osloec:2002_017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study. (2002). Soberg, Morten.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:ssb:dispap:328.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. The political economy of targeting. (1998). Hindriks, Jean ; De Donder, Philippe.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:95:y:1998:i:1:p:177-200.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks, Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes, American Political Science Review (1988), 82:405-422.

  2. Balinski, Michael, and H. P. Young, Fair Representation, New Haven: Yale University Press (1982).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  3. Baron, David, and John Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review (1989), 83:1181-1206.

  4. Carey, John, and Matthew Shugart, Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas, University of California at San Diego working paper (1994).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  5. Cilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, American Journal of Political Science (1990), 34:531-564.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  6. Cox, Gary, and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, Berkeley: University of California Press (1993).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  7. Cox, Gary, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science (1990), 34:903-935.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  8. Cox, Gary, The Efficient Secret, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (l987a) Cox, Gary, Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions. American Journal of Political Science (1987b), 31:82-108.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  9. Crofman, Bernard, and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press (1986).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  10. Diermeier, Daniel, and Roger Myerson, Bargaining, Veto Power, and Legislative Committees, Northwestern University working paper (1994).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  11. Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row (1957).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  12. Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, London: Methuen (1954).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  13. Enelow, James, and Melvin Hinich, eds., Advances in the Spatial Theory 18 of Voting, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  14. Feddersen, Timothy, A Voting Model implying Duvergers Law and Positive Turnout, American Journal of Political Science (1992) 36:938-962.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  15. Hotelling, Harold, Stability in competition, Economic Journal (1929), 39:41-57.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  16. Katz, Richard S., A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1980).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  17. Layer, Michael, and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition Formation in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1990).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  18. Lijphart, Arend, Democracies: Patterns of Maioritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press (1984).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  19. Lijphart, Arend, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1992).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  20. Mayhew, David R., Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press (1974).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  21. McKelvey, Richard and Raymond Riezman, Seniority in legislatures, American Political Science Review (1992), 86:951-965.

  22. Myerson, Roger, Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption, Games and Economic Behavior (l993a), 5:118-132. Myerson, Roger, Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems, American Political Science Review (l993b), 87:856-869. Myerson, Roger, and Robert Weber, A Theory of Voting Equilibria, American Political Science Review (1993), 87:102-114.

  23. Palfrey, Thomas, A Mathematical Proof of Duvergers law, in Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, ed. by P. C. Ordeshook, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1989), pages 69-91.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  24. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Part I, Risk sharing and Moral Hazard; Part II, Risk Sharing and Redistribution, CEPR working paper (1993).

  25. Rae, Douglas, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven: Yale University Press (1971).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  26. Riker, William, The Two-Party System and Duvergers Law, American Political Science Review (l982a), 76:753-766. Riker, William, Liberalism against Populism, San Francisco: Freeman (l982b) Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1960).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  27. Shepsle, Kenneth, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science (1979), 23: 27-59.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  28. Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes, New Haven: Yale University Press (1989).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  29. Van Damme, Eric, Reinhard Selten, and Eyal Winter, Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit, Games and Economic Behavior (1990), 2:188-201.

  30. Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress Journal of Political Econorny (1988), 96:132-163.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Strategic vote trading under complete information. (2017). Xefteris, Dimitrios ; Ziros, Nicholas.
    In: University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:ucy:cypeua:03-2017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. A model of constitutional design and corruption. (2017). Pelagidis, Theodore ; Mitsopoulos, Michael.
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:44:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-015-9486-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Strategic vote trading in power-sharing systems. (2016). Xefteris, Dimitrios ; Ziros, Nicholas.
    In: University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:ucy:cypeua:01-2016.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. A bargaining model of endogenous procedures. (2016). Vlaicu, Razvan ; Prato, Carlo ; Diermeier, Daniel.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-016-1002-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Coalition Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies. (2016). Schneider, Maik ; Gersbach, Hans ; Tejada, Oriol.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11492.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. The impact of group identity on coalition formation. (2015). Hugh-Jones, David ; Leininger, Arndt ; Laroze, Denise .
    In: University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2015_03.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results. (2015). Martinelli, Cesar ; Duggan, John.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gms:wpaper:1056.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information. (2014). Eraslan, Hülya ; Chen, Ying.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:821.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Proportional Representation with Uncertainty. (2014). Manzoni, Elena ; iannantuoni, giovanna ; Pimienta, Carlos ; De Sinopoli, Francesco.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mib:wpaper:288.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation. (2014). Cho, Seok-Ju .
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:3:p:407-426.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods. (2014). Rubí-Barceló, Antoni ; Cardona, Daniel ; Rubi-Barcelo, Antoni.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:3:p:345-366.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results. (2014). Martinelli, Cesar ; Duggan, John.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cie:wpaper:1403.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Extreme parties and political rents. (2013). Aytimur, R. Emre.
    In: Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cegedp:161.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Pandering and Electoral Competition.. (2013). Gratton, Gabriele.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-22b.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Coalition Formation: The Role of Procedure and Policy Flexibility. (2013). Rusinowska, Agnieszka ; Saiz, Elena M ; Ridder, Annelies .
    In: Group Decision and Negotiation.
    RePEc:spr:grdene:v:22:y:2013:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-011-9276-0.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy. (2012). Fong, Pohan ; Baron, David ; Diermeier, Daniel.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:703-738.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections. (2012). Mattozzi, Andrea ; Iaryczower, Matias.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:591-619.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems. (2012). Leblanc, William ; Ansolabehere, Stephen ; Snyder, James.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:521-547.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Corporate governance under proportional electoral systems. (2012). Suh, Jaekwon .
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:150:y:2012:i:3:p:671-690.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. A survival analysis of the circulation of the political elites governing Italy from 1861 to 1994. (2011). Forte, Francesco ; Fedeli, Silvia.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp141.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. The political economy of power-sharing. (2011). Tridimas, George.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:2:p:328-342.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?. (2011). Piolatto, Amedeo.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:2:p:311-327.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Strategic delegation and voting rules. (2010). Harstad, Bard ; Harstad, Bård, .
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:1-2:p:102-113.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. How do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from State and Local Governments, 1890 to 2005. (2010). Gathmann, Christina ; Funk, Patricia.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2958.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining. (2009). Sjostrom, Tomas ; Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha ; Chatterjee, Kalyan.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:rut:rutres:200908.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?. (2009). Piolatto, Amedeo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/12/doc2009-27.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents. (2009). Gallego, Maria ; Cressman, Ross.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:1:p:64-83.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining. (2009). Sjostrom, Tomas ; Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha ; Chatterjee, Kalyan.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bir:birmec:09-10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition Formation Model. (2008). Rusinowska, Agnieszka ; Swart, Harrie .
    In: Group Decision and Negotiation.
    RePEc:spr:grdene:v:17:y:2008:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-008-9103-4.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Endogenous Presidentialism. (2008). Torvik, Ragnar ; Robinson, James.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14603.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation. (2008). Herrmann, Michael .
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:mnh:spaper:2317.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy. (2008). Oak, Mandar ; Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:3:p:554-561.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems. (2008). Mattozzi, Andrea ; Iaryczower, Matias.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002387.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Corruption and Power in Democracies. (2008). Seidmann, Daniel ; Giovannoni, Francesco ; DanielJ. Seidmann, .
    In: The Centre for Market and Public Organisation.
    RePEc:bri:cmpowp:08/192.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Strategic voting under proportional representation and coalition governments : a simulation and laboratory experiment. (2007). Meffert, Michael F ; Gschwend, Thomas .
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:mnh:spaper:2513.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Bargaining In Legislature: Number Of Parties And Ideological Polarization. (2007). Nupia, Oskar.
    In: DOCUMENTOS CEDE.
    RePEc:col:000089:004282.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Pork Barrel Cycles. (2006). Eslava, Marcela ; Drazen, Allan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12190.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Optimal Electoral Timing: Exercise Wisely and You May Live Longer. (2006). Smith, Lones ; Davydov, Dmitry ; Keppo, Jussi.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1565.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. The Art of Compromise. (2005). Scoones, David ; Gallego, Maria.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0042.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues. (2005). Merlo, Antonio.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:05-033.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. A Model of Government Formation with a Two Dimensional Policy Space. (2005). aragones, enriqueta.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:238.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation. (2004). Rapoport, Amnon ; Parco, James ; Garratt, Rodney ; QIN, Cheng-Zhong .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.82.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview. (2000). Berganza, Juan Carlos.
    In: Investigaciones Economicas.
    RePEc:iec:inveco:v:24:y:2000:i:3:p:501-543.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electral Incentives. (1999). Persico, Nicola ; Lizzeri, Alessandro.
    In: Princeton Economic Theory Papers.
    RePEc:wop:prinet:99f4.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures. (1999). Merlo, Antonio ; Diermeier, Daniel.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1267.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems. (1999). Myerson, Roger.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:4-6:p:671-697.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Voting for a coalition government: A game-theoretic view. (1997). Vannucci, Stefano.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:3:p:537-555.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure. (1994). Myerson, Roger.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1095.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A SPATIAL MODEL OF n-PARTY COMPETITION. (1993). Schofield, Norman ; Parks, Robert.
    In: Public Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9308002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Proportional Representation. (1991). Myerson, Roger.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:928.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-12-20 18:54:49 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.