Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
The Art of Compromise. (2005). Scoones, David ; Gallego, Maria.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0042.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 1

Citations received by this document

Cites: 43

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents. (2009). Gallego, Maria ; Cressman, Ross.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:1:p:64-83.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Alesina, A., Rosenthal H., 1995, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Econoi~y, Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  2. Alesina, A., Rosenthal H., 1996, A Theory of Divided Government, Econometrica 64:1311-1341.

  3. Austen-Smith, D., 2000, Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation, Journal of PoliticalEcono~y, 108 (6): 1235-69.

  4. Austen-Smith, D., Banks, J., 1988, Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes, The American Political Science Review 82(2): 40 5-422.

  5. Banks, J. S., Duggan, J. 2000, A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice, The American Political Science Review 94(1): 73-8 8.

  6. Baron, D. P., 1998, Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments, The American Political Science Review 92(3): 593-609.

  7. Baron, D. P., Diermeier D., 2001, Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems, The Quarter~ Journal of Economics, 116(3): 933 -- 967.

  8. Baron, D.P., Ferejohn J. A., 1989, Bargaining in Legislatures, The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181-1206.

  9. Binmore, K. G., Rubinstein A., Wolinsky A., 1986, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, Rand Journal of Economics, 17: 176-188.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  10. Bloch, F., Rottier, 5., 2002, Agenda Control in Coalition Formation, Social Choice and Welfare, 19: 769-788.

  11. Breton, A., 1996, Competitive Governments: An Economic Theo~y of Politics and Public Finance, Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  12. Buchanan, J. M., Tullock G., 1962, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  13. Crémer, J., Palfrey, T., 2000, Federal Mandates by Popular Demand, The Journal of PoliticalEconoi~y, 108(5): 905-927.

  14. Crémer, J., Palfrey, T., 2002, Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters, Review of Economic Design, 7(3): 279 - 296.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  15. Crémer, J., Palfrey, T., 2003, A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities, unpublished 21 manuscript, Department déconomie, Université des sciences sociales de Toulouse.

  16. Cressman, R., Gallego, M., 2005, On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents, unpublished manuscript, Wilfrid Laurier University.

  17. Denzau, A. T., Mackay, R. J., 1983, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, The American Journal of Political Science, 27(4): 740-761.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  18. Diermeier and Myerson [19991 Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures, American Economic Review, 89(5): 1182-96.

  19. Diermeier, D., Feddersen T. J., 1998, Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure, The American Political Science Review, 92(3): 611-21.

  20. Diermeier, D., Merlo A., 2000, Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies, Journal of Economic Theo~y. 94: 46-79.

  21. Diermeier, D., Merlo, A., 2004 An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures, Journal of Public Economics, 88(3-4): 783-797.

  22. Dixit, A., Londregan, J., 1998. Fiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politics, Journal of Public Economics, 68: 153-180.

  23. Greenberg, J., Weber S., Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation, The American Political Science Review, 79(3): 693-703. Inman, R;P., Rubinfeld, D. L., 1997, Rethinking Federalism, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4): 43-64.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  24. Kalai,E., and M. Smorodinsky, 1975, Other Solutions to Nashs Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 43(3): 513-518.

  25. Kannai, Y., 1977, Concavifiability and construction of Concave utility functions, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 4: 1-56.

  26. Kilstrom, R; E., Roth, A., and Schmeilder D., 1981, Rish Aversion and Nashs Solution to the Bargaining Problem, Game Theo~y and Mathematical Economics, ed. by 0. Moesclilin and D. Pallaschke, Amsterdam: North Holland.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  27. Layer, M., Shepsle K. A., 1996, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamenta~y Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  28. Levmore, 5., 1992, Bicameralism: When are two decisions better then one?, International Review of Law and Economics. 12: 145-62.

  29. Mo, J., 1995, Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in TwoLevel Games, The American Political Science Review, 89(4): 914-924.

  30. Moravcsik, A., 1991, Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community, International Organization, 45(I):19-56.

  31. Morelli, M., 1999, Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining, The American Political Science Review 93(4): 809-820.

  32. Nash,J. F. Jr., 1950, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2: 155-162.

  33. Persson T., Tabellini G., 1996, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution, Journal of Political Econoi~y, 104(5) :979-1009.

  34. Peters, H., 1992. A Criterion for Comparing Strength of Preferences with an Application to Bargaining, Operations Research 40(5), 1018-1022.

  35. Riker, W, I 992a, The Justification of Bicameralism, International Political Science Review 13:101-16. Riker, W, 1992b, The Merits of Bicameralism, Int. Review of Law and Economics 12:166-68.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  36. Robins, K., 1998, Britain and Europe: Devolution and Foreign Policy, International Affairs, 74(I):105-I 17.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  37. Romer, T., Rosenthal H., 1978, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agenda, and the Status Quo, Public Choice, 33: 27-44.

  38. Roth, A., 1979, Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, Berlin and New York: Springer.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  39. Rubinstein, A., 1982, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica, 50(1): 97-110.

  40. Simeon, R. (1972) Federal Provincial D~ploma~y: The Making of Recent poli~y in Canada, University of Toronto Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  41. Snyder, J. M., Ting M. M., 2002. An Informational Rationale for Political Parties, American Journal of Political Science, 46(1): 90-110.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  42. Thomson, W., 1994. Cooperative Models of Bargaining. Handbook of Game Theo~y, Auman, R. J., Hart, S. (Eds.), Elsevier Science Amsterdam/New York, pp. 1237-1284.

  43. Tsebelis, G., Money J., 1997, Bicameralism, Political Econo~y of Institutions and Decision, Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. The Race to the Base. (2020). Hidir, Sinem ; Bernhardt, Dan ; Buisseret, Peter.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:3:p:922-42.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies. (2016). Bernecker, Andreas.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:142:y:2016:i:c:p:24-38.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Partisan Politics: The Empirical Evidence from OECD Panel Studies. (2016). Potrafke, Niklas.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6024.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Moderating Government. (2015). De Sinopoli, Francesco ; Iannantuoni, Giovanna ; Ferraris, Leo.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:2:p:415-440.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for The Midterm Gap. (2014). Knight, Brian.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20311.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results. (2014). Martinelli, Cesar ; Duggan, John.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cie:wpaper:1403.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies. (2014). Bernecker, Andreas.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4564.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. The Impact of Voter Uncertainty and Alienation on Turnout and Candidate Policy Choice. (2014). Brown Natalya R., .
    In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:14:y:2014:i:1:p:20:n:7.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel. (2013). Veiga, Linda.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:3:p:335-353.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions. (2013). Ade, Florian ; Freier, Ronny .
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:64:y:2013:i:c:p:1-20.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Zum Einfluss von Parteiideologie auf die Staatstätigkeit in den US-Bundesstaaten. (2013). Potrafke, Niklas ; Simon, Christian ; Schneider, Margret .
    In: ifo Schnelldienst.
    RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:66:y:2013:i:11:p:24-29.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable. (2012). Schelker, Mark.
    In: Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:30.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Is German domestic social policy politically controversial?. (2012). Potrafke, Niklas.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:3:p:393-418.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power. (2012). Kim, Chansog ; Park, Jung Chul ; Pantzalis, Christos.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:106:y:2012:i:1:p:196-228.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Moderating Government. (2011). iannantuoni, giovanna ; Ferraris, Leo ; De Sinopoli, Francesco.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ver:wpaper:09/2011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals. (2011). Scoones, David ; Gallego, Maria.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:3:p:591-610.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Judiciaries in corrupt societies. (2011). Priks, Mikael.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:75-88.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Independence, Investment and Political Interference: Evidence from the European Union. (2011). Rondi, Laura ; Cambini, Carlo.
    In: RSCAS Working Papers.
    RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2011/42.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. A political agency model of coattail voting. (2011). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:11:p:1652-1660.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods. (2011). Moreno-Ternero, Juan.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:29-36.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Sincere Lobby Formation. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/151545.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28800.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Sincere Lobby Formation. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28249.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we1011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. (2008). Umeno, Luis Gustavo ; Bugarin, Mauricio Soares .
    In: Brazilian Review of Econometrics.
    RePEc:sbe:breart:v:28:y:2008:i:1:a:1516.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Communication for Public Goods. (2008). Kawamura, Kohei .
    In: ESE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:edn:esedps:182.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence on Institutional Restraints on the Fiscal Commons Problem for Swiss Cantons. (2008). Schaltegger, Christoph ; Feld, Lars.
    In: CREMA Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections. (2007). Merlo, Antonio ; Degan, Arianna.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:07-011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. The electoral college: diversification and the election process. (2007). .
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
    RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:1:p:21-34.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Political Cycles : Issue Ownership and the Opposition Advantage. (2006). Soubeyran, Raphael ; Gautier, P..
    In: Working Papers MOISA.
    RePEc:umr:wpaper:200613.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Investigating the Effects of Moral Disengagement and Participation on Unethical Work Behavior. (2006). Barsky, Adam J. ; Zyphur, Michael J. & Johnson, Emily, ; Islam, Gazi.
    In: Insper Working Papers.
    RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_62.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. The Art of Compromise. (2005). Scoones, David ; Gallego, Maria.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0042.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues. (2005). Merlo, Antonio.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:05-033.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates. (2005). Glazer, Amihai ; Gradstein, Mark.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:122:y:2005:i:3:p:467-482.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention. (2004). Llavador, Humberto.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:571.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections. (2004). Merlo, Antonio ; Degan, Arianna.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:04-014.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule. (2004). Trannoy, Alain ; Renault, Régis.
    In: IDEP Working Papers.
    RePEc:iep:wpidep:0403.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria. (2003). iannantuoni, giovanna ; De Sinopoli, Francesco.
    In: CEIS Research Paper.
    RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:31.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Divided government and dominance solvability. (2003). iannantuoni, giovanna.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:4:p:715-733.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention. (2003). Llavador, Humberto.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:34.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Electoral Balancing in Federal and Sub-national Elections: The Case of Canada. (2001). .
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
    RePEc:kap:copoec:v:12:y:2001:i:4:p:313-331.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Bad politicians. (2000). Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco.
    In: Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:fip:fedmem:134.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. On the Optimal Number of Representatives. (2000). Gary-Bobo, Robert ; Auriol, Emmanuelle.
    In: THEMA Working Papers.
    RePEc:ema:worpap:2000-01.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Bad Politicians. (2000). Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2402.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia. (2000). Kugler, Maurice ; Rosental, Howard.
    In: WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO.
    RePEc:col:000123:002117.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty. (1998). Bugarin, Mauricio .
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. - IDEOLOGICAL VERSUS DOWNSIAN POLITICAL COMPETITION. (1998). Ortin, Ignacio Ortuo .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1998-22.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Appointing the median voter of a policy board. (1998). Waller, Christopher.
    In: Working Papers (Old Series).
    RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9802.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock. (1998). Swank, Otto ; Dur, Robert.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:3:p:561-572.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Comparative Politics and Public Finance. (). Tabellini, Guido ; Roland, Gérard ; Persson, Torsten.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:114.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-12-30 01:09:19 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.