Strategic vote trading under complete information

Dimitrios Xefteris and Nicholas Ziros

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: We study two-party elections considering that: a) prior to the voting stage voters are free to trade votes for money according to the rules of the Shapley-Shubik strategic market games; and b) voters' preferences -both ordinal rankings and cardinal intensities- are public information. While under plurality rule no trade occurs, under a power-sharing system (voters' utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party) full trade is always an equilibrium (two voters -the strongest supporter of each party- buy the votes of all others). Notably, this equilibrium implements proportional justice with respect to the two buyers: the ratio of the parties' vote shares is equal to the ratio of the preference intensities of the two most opposing voters.

Keywords: Vote trading; Complete information; Strategic market games; Power sharing; Proportional justice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Strategic vote trading under complete information (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:03-2017

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