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- • Buyers and Exporters: Information on buyers includes whether they own a mill and history of operation. This information is compiled through a combination of ICAFE records, internet searches and interviews. For the subset of buyers that are exporters we match the information with transaction level customs records from season 2006-2007 onward (information on foreign buyers is available for seasons 2008-2009 to 2012-2013 only). We match this information with data on coffee imports by the countries that source from Costa Rica obtained from the Commodity Trade Statistics Database. • Daily prices: We collect daily world coffee prices for coffee from public sources.
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- • Mills: From the 2006-2007 seasons onward we are able to match the transaction data with information on mills operation from the ICAFE. This includes information on the operating costs, the prices paid to farmers, the rate of coffee conversion from cherries to beans. Information on sourcing of coffee is also available in two forms: i) bi-weekly reports of all coffee sourced by mills (by two broad categories) and ii) aggregate volumes and number of farmers supplying each mill by season and location. We complement this information by reconstructing, through a mix of ICAFE records, interviews and internet searches, the history of mill’s operation and ownership type during the sample period. To do so we extensively rely on information on the location of the mills, which we then complement with detailed geographic data, including both geographic characteristics, historical weather data and infrastructures.
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- • Transactions: The data on contracts includes information on 44282 contracts between mills and buyers spanning 12 harvest seasons (from 2001-2002 to 20122013) . Approximately a quarter of all contracts are for the national market while the remaining are for export. Information on contracts cancellations is available from season 2006-2007 onward, and includes the reason for the contract cancellation.
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- Contract controls include a third-degree polynomial in Kilos of coffee on the contract and a dummy indicating whether the contract is for the national or export markets. Buyers fixed effects are dummies for buyer. Region fixed effects refer to the region where the mill is located, and are interacted with the season (harvest campaign from 2001/02 to 2011/12) and the month in which the contract is signed. Contract dates fixed effects are dummies for the date in which the contract is signed, and Delivery dates fixed effects are dummies for the date in which the coffee in the contract is delivered. Product FE is a set of (111) dummies for product types (preparation, quality and bean grading). Mill controls include the size of the mill (coffee traded in the season).
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- Controls interacted with price surprise include mill size, age, suitability and variability (defined in Table 3). The sample period covers the harvest campaigns from 2004/05 to 2012/13 for which data on contract cancellations are available. The sample excludes trade involving forward integrated mills.
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- Figure A3: Use of Organizational Forms .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 Share of harvest 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Harvest season Market Relationships Integrated The Figure reports the share of coffee sold by relationships under each organizational form (baseline definition) for seasons 2004/5 to 2011/12. A mill-buyer pair are defined to be in a relationship if they have traded more than four consecutive years during the sample period. By definition then, observations for the first (last) three seasons over the sample period are left (right) censored (see Table A2 for details). The first three seasons over the sample period are omitted. The decline in the share of relationships for the last three seasons over the sample period is due to right censoring. Figure A4: Within Date Variation in Prices Figure A1: Geographical Location of Mills !!!!!!!!!!!! ! !
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