Organizational Dynamics

Shingo Ishiguro

No 07-14, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a dynamic general equilibrium framework to investigate how organizations change the modes to govern transactions over time. We show that the agency problem becomes less serious when the economy is developed well so that large market size favors decentralized organizations having more specialization. We then show that different organizational modes endogenously emerge even in the same economy and cause endogenous process of economic development.

Keywords: Economic Development; Incentive Contracts; Moral Hazard; Specialization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G30 L22 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0714

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