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Tacit Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in the Canadian Manufacturing Industry: An Empirical Study. (2011). Zeidan, Rodrigo ; Resende, Marcelo.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3623.

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  1. Abreu D., Pearce D. and Stachetti, E. (1986) Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 39, 251-69.

  2. Bauerlein, V. (2009) Bottled-Water Price War Heats Up as Demand Falls, August 31, Wall Street Journal, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB125167502443470973.html Berry, S. and Briggs, H. (1988). A Non-Parametric Test of a First-Order Markov Process for Regimes in a Non-Cooperatively Collusive Industry, Economic Letters, 27, 73-77.

  3. Borenstein,S. and Shepard, A. (1996) Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets. Rand Journal of Economics, 27, 429-451.

  4. Briggs, H. (1996) Optimal Cartel Strategies and the Number of Firms, Review of Industrial Organization, 11, 551-61 Busse, M. (2002) Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars, RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 298-318 Ellison, G. (1994) Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 37â57.

  5. Friedman, J. (1971) A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, Review of Economic Studies, 38, 1-12 Green, E. and Porter, R. H. (1984) Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica, 52, 87â100.

  6. Ivaldi, M., Rey, P., Seabright, P., Tirole, J. (2003) The Economics of Tacit Collusion. IDEI Working Paper n. 186, Report for DG Competition, European Commission.

  7. Jacquemin, A., Slade, M. (1992) Strategic Behavior and Collusion, In M. La Manna & G. Norman (eds.), The New Industrial Economics: Recent Developments in Industrial Organization and Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 47-65 Knittel, C.R. and Stango, V. (2003) Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards, American Economic Review, 93, 1703â 1729.
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  8. Knittel, C.R. and Lepore, J. (2010) Tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28, 131-44.

  9. Lee, L.F. and Porter, R.H. (1984) Switching Regression Models with Imperfect Sample Separation, Econometrica, 52, 391-418.

  10. Lu, Y. and Wright, J. (2010) Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28, 298-306.

  11. Morrison, S. and Winston, C. (1990) The Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, American Economic Review, 80, 389-93.

  12. Porter, R. H. (1983) A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee 1880â1886, Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 301â314.

  13. Rees, R. (1993). Tacit Collusion, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 9, 27â40.

  14. Ross, L. (1997) When will an airline stand its ground? An analysis of fare wars. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 4, 109â127.

  15. Rotemberg, J. J. and Saloner, G. (1986) A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms, American Economic Review, 76, 390â407.

  16. Slade, M.E. (1990) Strategic pricing models and interpretation of price wars data. European Economic Review, 34, 539-550.
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  17. Staiger, R.W. and Wolak, F.A. (1992) Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraint in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty. Rand Journal of Economics, 23, 203-220 Tirole, J. (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge-MA: MIT Press Zeidan, R. and Resende, M. (2010) ColusÃo Ãtima com monitoramento imperfeito: teste do modelo de Abreu-Pearce-Stachetti para os mercados brasileiros regionais de cimento, Economia Aplicada, 14, 41-50 Zhang, Y. and Round, D.K. (2011) Price wars and price collusion in China's airline markets, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 29, 361-372.

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