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Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003. (2004). Serrano, Roberto.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-20.

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  1. The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model. (2022). Rogna, Marco.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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  2. The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games. (2021). Rogna, Marco.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:109:y:2021:i:c:p:1-11.

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  3. Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an Evergreen Clause. (2021). Dutta, Prajit K.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:193:y:2021:i:c:s0022053120301630.

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  4. Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game. (2021). Levando, Dmitry.
    In: Papers.
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  5. Office-based and home-care for older adults in primary care: A comparative analysis using the Nash bargaining solution. (2020). Mendoza-Alonzo, Jennifer ; Charkhgard, Hadi ; Zayas-Castro, Jose.
    In: Socio-Economic Planning Sciences.
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  6. The problem of fair division of surplus development rights in redevelopment of urban areas: Can the Shapley value help?. (2020). Cubukcu, Mert K.
    In: Land Use Policy.
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  7. The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model. (2020). Rogna, Marco.
    In: BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series.
    RePEc:bzn:wpaper:bemps69.

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  8. The story of conflict and cooperation. (2018). Ismail, Mehmet S.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1808.06750.

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  9. Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game. (2017). Levando, Dmitry .
    In: Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    RePEc:mse:cesdoc:17015r.

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  10. Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game. (2017). Levando, Dmitry .
    In: Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    RePEc:mse:cesdoc:17015.

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  11. Formation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game. (2017). Levando, Dmitry .
    In: HSE Working papers.
    RePEc:hig:wpaper:157/ec/2017.

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  12. Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game. (2017). Levando, Dmitry.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01491935.

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  13. Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game. (2017). Levando, Dmitry .
    In: Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
    RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01491935.

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  14. Non-cooperative equilibrium with multiple deviators. (2016). Levando, Dmitry .
    In: Working Papers.
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  15. On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinsteins game. (2016). Duman, Papatya ; Trockel, Walter.
    In: jMID articles.
    RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v1i1a3.

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  16. On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash Solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein’s game. (2016). Trockel, Walter ; Duman, Papatya.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
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  17. Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers. (2006). Gomez, Juan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:57:y:2006:i:2:p:254-263.

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  29. A generalized assignment game. (2006). Camiña, Ester ; Camina, Ester.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:52:y:2006:i:2:p:152-161.

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  30. Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy. (2006). Triossi, Matteo ; Romero Medina, Antonio.
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
    RePEc:cca:wpaper:22.

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  31. A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets. (2005). Oviedo, Jorge ; Echenique, Federico.
    In: 2005 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed005:233.

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  32. Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem. (2005). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:86:y:2005:i:2:p:153-158.

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  33. A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets. (2004). Oviedo, Jorge ; Echenique, Federico.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0401002.

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  34. Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (2004). Sotomayor, Marilda.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:199-212.

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  35. Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003. (2004). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-20.

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  36. Decentralized Job Matching. (2003). Wooders, Myrna ; Haeinger, Guillaume.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:688.

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  37. A Selling Mechanism. (2003). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
    In: Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE.
    RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:57:y:2003:i:4:a:864.

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  38. A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets. (2003). Oviedo, Jorge ; Echenique, Federico.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000374.

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  39. The Principal-Agent Matching Market. (2003). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Dam, Kaniska.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_945.

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  40. Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market. (2003). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Dam, Kaniska .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:99.

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  41. Decentralized job matching. (2003). Wooders, Myrna ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:40.

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  42. Decentralized Job matching. (2003). Wooders, Myrna ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Economic Research Papers.
    RePEc:ags:uwarer:269572.

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  43. A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure. (2002). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:2:p:461-474.

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  44. A Generalized Assignment Game. (2002). Camiña, Ester.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:514.02.

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  45. The Principal-Agent Matching Market. (2001). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Dam, Kaniska.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:503.01.

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  46. Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems. (2000). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:294-302.

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  47. A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure. (2000). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0704.

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  48. - SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM. (1999). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1999-16.

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  49. Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem. (1999). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:6126.

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  50. Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems. (1999). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:6124.

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