Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences

Muriel Niederle () and Leeat Yariv

No 14840, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.

JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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