The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 109, issue C, 1-11

Abstract: This paper proposes two new solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games that are Core selections, the Central Core and the Mid-central Core, with the first being set-valued and the latter point-valued. The basic idea at the root of the Central Core is to allow such Core elements that grant to each player at least the pay-off obtained from the centroid of the extreme points of the Core of the same game but with the worth of the grand coalition reduced to the minimum value such that the game remains balanced. The Mid-central Core is defined as the centroid of the extreme points of the Central Core.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; Solution concepts; Axiomatization; Optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:109:y:2021:i:c:p:1-11

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.003

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