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Democratic Rulemaking

Author

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  • John M. de Figueiredo
  • Edward H. Stiglitz
Abstract
This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21765
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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