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Can Private Money Buy Public Science? Disease Group Lobbying and Federal Funding for Biomedical Research

Author

Listed:
  • Deepak Hegde

    (Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10012)

  • Bhaven Sampat

    (Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, New York 10032)

Abstract
Private interest groups lobby politicians to influence public policy. However, little is known about how lobbying influences the policy decisions made by federal agencies. We study this through examining lobbying by advocacy groups associated with rare diseases for funding by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the world’s largest funder of biomedical research. Disease group lobbying for NIH funding has been controversial, with critics alleging that it distorts public funding toward research on diseases backed by powerful groups. Our data reveal that lobbying is associated with higher political support, in the form of congressional “soft earmarks” for the diseases. Lobbying increases with disease burden and is more likely to be associated with changes in NIH funding for diseases with higher scientific opportunity, suggesting that it may have a useful informational role. Only special grant mechanisms that steer funding toward particular diseases, which comprise less than a third of the NIH’s grants, are related to earmarks. Thus, our results suggest that lobbying by private groups influences federal funding for biomedical research. However, the channels of political influence are subtle, affect a small portion of funding, and may not necessarily have a distortive effect on public science. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy .

Suggested Citation

  • Deepak Hegde & Bhaven Sampat, 2015. "Can Private Money Buy Public Science? Disease Group Lobbying and Federal Funding for Biomedical Research," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(10), pages 2281-2298, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:61:y:2015:i:10:p:2281-2298
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Kok, Holmer & Faems, Dries & de Faria, Pedro, 2022. "Pork Barrel or Barrel of Gold? Examining the performance implications of earmarking in public R&D grants," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(7).
    4. Graddy-Reed, Alexandra, 2020. "Getting ahead in the race for a cure: How nonprofits are financing biomedical R&D," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(8).
    5. Coburn, Josie & Yaqub, Ohid & Ràfols, Ismael & Chataway, Joanna, 2024. "Cross-disease spillover from research funding: Evidence from four diseases," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 349(C).
    6. Madsen, Emil Bargmann & Aagaard, Kaare, 2020. "Concentration of Danish research funding on individual researchers and research topics: Patterns and potential drivers," SocArXiv j874c, Center for Open Science.
    7. Amitabh Chandra & Craig Garthwaite & Ariel Dora Stern, 2018. "Characterizing the Drug Development Pipeline for Precision Medicines," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Dimensions of Personalized and Precision Medicine, pages 115-157, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Wei-Fong Pan, 2023. "Does a firm’s lobbying activity respond to its peers’ lobbying activity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 297-324, March.
    9. Arzi Adbi & Chirantan Chatterjee & Anant Mishra, 2022. "How Do MNEs and Domestic Firms Respond Locally to a Global Demand Shock? Evidence from a Pandemic," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9003-9025, December.
    10. Peter T. Leeson & Henry A. Thompson, 2023. "Public choice and public health," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 5-41, April.
    11. Ming Jia & Zhe Zhang, 2018. "The Role of Corporate Donations in Chinese Political Markets," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 153(2), pages 519-545, December.
    12. Mancuso, Raffaele & Rossi-Lamastra, Cristina & Franzoni, Chiara, 2023. "Topic choice, gendered language, and the under-funding of female scholars in mission-oriented research," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(6).
    13. Aslan, Yasemin & Yaqub, Ohid & Rotolo, Daniele & Sampat, Bhaven N., 2023. "Cross-category spillovers in medical research," SocArXiv hpmxd, Center for Open Science.
    14. Kyle Myers, 2020. "The Elasticity of Science," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 103-134, October.
    15. Kyle, Margaret K., 2022. "Incentives for pharmaceutical innovation: What’s working, what’s lacking," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    16. Mikko Packalen & Jay Bhattacharya, 2018. "Does the NIH Fund Edge Science?," NBER Working Papers 24860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Ohid Yaqub & Javier A Luna & Duncan Aq Moore & Alfredo Yegros-Yegros, 2022. "Responding to a disease with resources from other diseases: Evidence from Zika vaccine research dynamics [Protective Efficacy of Multiple Vaccine Platforms against Zika Virus Challenge in Rhesus Mo," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(6), pages 942-950.

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