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Connected Lending of Last Resort

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  • Mitchener, Kris
  • Monnet, Eric
Abstract
Because of secrecy, little is known about the political economy of central bank lending. Utilizing a novel, hand-collected historical daily dataset on loans to commercial banks, we analyze how personal connections matter for lending of last resort, highlighting the importance of governance for this core function of central banks. We show that, when faced with a banking panic in November 1930, the Banque de France (BdF) lent selectively rather than broadly, providing substantially more liquidity to connected banks – those whose board members were BdF shareholders. The BdF’s selective lending policy failed to internalize a negative externality – that lending would be insufficient to arrest the panic and that distress via contagion would spillover to connected banks. Connected lending of last resort fueled the worst banking crisis in French history, caused an unprecedented government bailout of the central bank, and resulted in loss of shareholder control over the central bank.

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  • Mitchener, Kris & Monnet, Eric, 2023. "Connected Lending of Last Resort," CEPR Discussion Papers 17831, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17831
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lender of last resort;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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