Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/chb/bcchwp/993.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The origins of monetary policy disagreement: the role of supply and demand shocks

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Madeira
  • João Madeira
  • Paulo Santos Monteiro
Abstract
We investigate how dissent in the FOMC is affected by structural macroeconomic shocks obtained using a medium-scale DSGE model. We find that dissent is less (more) frequent when demand (supply) shocks are the predominant source of inflation fluctuations. In addition, supply shocks are found to raise private sector forecasting uncertainty about the path of interest rates. Since supply shocks impose a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization while demand shocks do not, our findings are consistent with heterogeneous preferences over the dual mandate among FOMC members as a driver of policy disagreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Madeira & João Madeira & Paulo Santos Monteiro, 2023. "The origins of monetary policy disagreement: the role of supply and demand shocks," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 993, Central Bank of Chile.
  • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:993
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/133326/DTBC_993.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Timothy Besley & Neil Meads & Paolo Surico, 2008. "Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 218-223, May.
    2. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012. "Why Are Target Interest Rate Changes So Persistent?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 126-162, October.
    3. Uhlig, Harald, 2005. "What are the effects of monetary policy on output? Results from an agnostic identification procedure," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 381-419, March.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7684 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Pesaran, M. Hashem & Smith, Ron, 1995. "The role of theory in econometrics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 61-79, May.
    6. Carlos Madeira & João Madeira, 2019. "The Effect of FOMC Votes on Financial Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 101(5), pages 921-932, December.
    7. Sungbae An & Frank Schorfheide, 2007. "Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models—Rejoinder," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2-4), pages 211-219.
    8. Bordo, Michael & Istrefi, Klodiana, 2023. "Perceived FOMC: The making of hawks, doves and swingers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 125-143.
    9. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2008. "The FOMC versus the Staff: Where Can Monetary Policymakers Add Value?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 230-235, May.
    10. Madeira, João, 2015. "Firm-specific capital, inflation persistence and the sources of business cycles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 229-243.
    11. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2014. "Dissent in monetary policy decisions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-154.
    12. Frank Smets & Rafael Wouters, 2007. "Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 586-606, June.
    13. Coibion, Olivier & Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Kumar, Saten & Pedemonte, Mathieu, 2020. "Inflation expectations as a policy tool?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    14. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    15. Malmendier, Ulrike & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2021. "The making of hawks and doves," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 19-42.
    16. Renée Fry & Adrian Pagan, 2011. "Sign Restrictions in Structural Vector Autoregressions: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 938-960, December.
    17. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    18. John W. Keating, 2013. "Interpreting Permanent Shocks to Output When Aggregate Demand May Not Be Neutral in the Long Run," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 747-756, June.
    19. Croushore, Dean & Stark, Tom, 2001. "A real-time data set for macroeconomists," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 111-130, November.
    20. Gert Peersman, 2005. "What caused the early millennium slowdown? Evidence based on vector autoregressions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 185-207.
    21. Canova, Fabio & Paustian, Matthias, 2011. "Business cycle measurement with some theory," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 345-361.
    22. Scott R. Baker & Nicholas Bloom & Steven J. Davis, 2016. "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(4), pages 1593-1636.
    23. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 213-233, March.
    24. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-441, November.
    25. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
    26. Nicholas Bloom, 2009. "The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 623-685, May.
    27. Husted, Lucas & Rogers, John & Sun, Bo, 2020. "Monetary policy uncertainty," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 20-36.
    28. Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 964-985, September.
    29. Stefan Eichler & Tom Lähner, 2014. "Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 429-453, September.
    30. João Madeira, 2013. "Simulation and estimation of macroeconomic models in Dynare," Chapters, in: Nigar Hashimzade & Michael A. Thornton (ed.), Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Macroeconomics, chapter 25, pages 593-608, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    31. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, April.
    32. Laura Coroneo & Valentina Corradi & Paulo Santos Monteiro, 2018. "Testing for optimal monetary policy via moment inequalities," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(6), pages 780-796, September.
    33. Carvalho, Carlos & Nechio, Fernanda, 2014. "Do people understand monetary policy?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 108-123.
    34. João Madeira, 2014. "Overtime Labor, Employment Frictions, and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 96(4), pages 767-778, October.
    35. João Madeira, 2018. "Assessing the Empirical Relevance of Labour Frictions to Business Cycle Fluctuations," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 80(3), pages 554-574, June.
    36. Fendel, Ralf & Rülke, Jan-Christoph, 2012. "Are heterogeneous FOMC forecasts consistent with the Fed’s monetary policy?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 5-7.
    37. Hack, Lukas & Istrefi, Klodiana & Meier, Matthias, 2023. "Identification of Systematic Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 17999, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    38. Krishna Rao & Argia M. Sbordone & Andrea Tambalotti & Kieran Walsh, 2010. "Policy analysis using DSGE models: an introduction," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 16(Oct), pages 23-43.
    39. Francesca Monti, 2010. "Combining Judgment and Models," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(8), pages 1641-1662, December.
    40. John W. Keating, 2013. "Interpreting Permanent Shocks to Output When Aggregate Demand May Not Be Neutral in the Long Run," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 747-756, June.
    41. Madeira, João & Palma, Nuno, 2018. "Measuring monetary policy deviations from the Taylor rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 25-27.
    42. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
    43. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1991. "The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 130-138, February.
    44. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
    45. Lukas Hack & Klodiana Istrefi & Matthias Meier, 2023. "Identification of Systematic Monetary Policy," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_408, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    46. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February.
    47. Sungbae An & Frank Schorfheide, 2007. "Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2-4), pages 113-172.
    48. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7717 is not listed on IDEAS
    49. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7683 is not listed on IDEAS
    50. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    51. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
    52. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael & Velasco Rivera, Carlos, 2014. "Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 16-32.
    53. Alessandro Riboni, 2010. "Committees As Substitutes For Commitment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 213-236, February.
    54. repec:mcb:jmoncb:v:45:y:2013:i::p:747-756 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kristin Forbes & Jongrim Ha & M. Ayhan Kose, 2024. "Rate Cycles," CAMA Working Papers 2024-54, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    4. Bordo, Michael & Istrefi, Klodiana, 2023. "Perceived FOMC: The making of hawks, doves and swingers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 125-143.
    5. Francisco Ruge‐Murcia, 2022. "How do central banks make decisions?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1643-1670, November.
    6. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco Ruge‐Murcia, 2023. "The Power Of The Federal Reserve Chair," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(2), pages 727-756, May.
    7. Hubert, Paul & Labondance, Fabien, 2021. "The signaling effects of central bank tone," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    8. Castelnuovo, Efrem, 2016. "Modest macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks during the great moderation: An alternative interpretation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB), pages 300-314.
    9. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    10. Istrefi, Klodiana & Odendahl, Florens & Sestieri, Giulia, 2023. "Fed communication on financial stability concerns and monetary policy decisions: Revelations from speeches," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    11. Guido Schultefrankenfeld, 2020. "Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 223-255, January.
    12. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
    13. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 1001-1032, August.
    14. Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Designing monetary policy committees," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 47-67.
    15. Kokoszczyński, Ryszard & Mackiewicz-Łyziak, Joanna, 2024. "Making monetary policy in Poland: Are Polish hawks and doves different?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    16. Carlos Madeira & Joao Madeira, 2015. "Dissent in FOMC Meeting and the Announcement Drift," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 749, Central Bank of Chile.
    17. Firrell, Alastair & Reinold, Kate, 2020. "Uncertainty and voting on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee," Bank of England working papers 898, Bank of England.
    18. Malmendier, Ulrike & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2021. "The making of hawks and doves," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 19-42.
    19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7716 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Francesco Furlanetto & Francesco Ravazzolo & Samad Sarferaz, 2019. "Identification of Financial Factors in Economic Fluctuations," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(617), pages 311-337.
    21. Arigoni, Filippo & Lenarčič, Črt, 2020. "The impact of trade policy uncertainty shocks on the Euro Area," MPRA Paper 100832, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:993. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alvaro Castillo (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bccgvcl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.