Consistent belief reasoning in the presence of inconsistency
Author: 
Jinxin LinAuthors Info & Claims
Pages 80 - 94
Abstract
Since everything is a consequence of an inconsistency, classical logics are not useful in modeling the reasoning of an agent who has inconsistent beliefs. In this paper, we differentiate consistent beliefs from inconsistent beliefs. We propose two belief operators <b>B<sup>c</sup></b> and <b>B</b>, standing for <i>consistent belief</i> and <i>belief</i>, respectively. <b>B<sup>c</sup></b> has the modus ponens property, by which the agent is able to reason with consistent beliefs as normal and draw consistent conclusions. <b>B</b> tolerates inconsistency, and by <b>B</b> the agent can reason about his inconsistent beliefs as well. The concept of consistent belief and our logical formalism for it are new, in that reasoning <i>consistently</i> about the information in an inconsistent knowledge base is possible. We also present a complete axiomatization for the logic and discuss the application of <b>B<sup>c</sup></b> and <b>B</b> in reasoning about implicit knowledge in a group of agents and eliminating inconsistency from a knowledge base.
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- Consistent belief reasoning in the presence of inconsistency
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Published: 13 March 1994
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