Abstract
In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games. We introduce three new concepts for equilibrium threat strategies called strategic stability, strategic monotonicity with respect to changes in the number of agents and strategic constancy. Our primary objective in this paper is to show that familiar assumptions satisfied by bargaining games with a variable population yield equilibrium threat strategies which satisfies in a very natural way the concepts we have introduced.
References
[1]
Kalai E (1977) Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, Econometrica 45, 1623–1630
[2]
Kalai E, Smorodinsky M (1975) Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 43, 513–518
[3]
Lahiri S (1988a) Bargaining with a Variable Population for Games With a Reference Point, IIM-A, Working Paper No. 773
[4]
Lahiri S (1988b) A General Saddle Point Property For Two Person Variable Threat Games. IIM-A, Working Paper No. 732
[5]
Lahiri S (1988c) The Max-Min Solution For Variable Threat Games, IIM-A, Working Paper No. 756 (Economics Letters, Vol. 29, 1989)
[6]
Lensberg T (1987) Stability and Collective rationality, Econometrica 55, 935–961
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Lensberg T (1988) Stability and the Nash Solution, Journal of Economic Theory 45, 330–331
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Nash J (1950) The Bargaining Problem: Econometrica 18, 155–162
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Owen G (1982) Game Theory, Academic Press Inc.
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Thomson W (1982) Monotonicity, Stability and Egalitarianism, Harvard University, Discussion Paper No. 895
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Thomson W (1983a) The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population, Mathematics of Operations Research 8: 319–26
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Index Terms
- Threat bargaining games with a variable population
Index terms have been assigned to the content through auto-classification.
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Copyright © 1990 Physica-Verlag.
Publisher
Physica-Verlag GmbH
Germany
Publication History
Published: 01 March 1990
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