research-article

“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties

Author:

J. H. NachbarAuthors Info & Claims

Volume 19, Issue 1

Pages 59 - 89

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753708

Published: 01 March 1990 Publication History

Abstract

This paper discusses convergence properties and limiting behavior in a class of dynamical systems of which the replicator dynamics of (biological) evolutionary game theory are a special case. It is known that such dynamics need not be well-behaved for arbitrary games. However, it is easy to show that dominance solvable games are convergent for any dynamics in the class and, what is somewhat more difficult to establish, weak dominance solvable games are as well, provided they are “small” in a sense to be made precise in the text. The paper goes on to compare dynamical solutions with standard solution concepts from noncooperative game theory.

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“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties

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Published In

cover image International Journal of Game Theory

International Journal of Game Theory Volume 19, Issue 1

Mar 1990

105 pages

ISSN:0020-7276

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 1990 Physica-Verlag.

Publisher

Physica-Verlag GmbH

Germany

Publication History

Published: 01 March 1990

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Cited By

Li HHuang WDuan ZMguni DShao KWang JDeng X(2024)A survey on algorithms for Nash equilibria in finite normal-form gamesComputer Science Review10.1016/j.cosrev.2023.10061351:COnline publication date: 25-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.cosrev.2023.100613
Loginov G(2022)Ordinal imitative dynamicsInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-021-00797-751:2(391-412)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00182-021-00797-7
Chen WTseng CSunny Yang S(2020)Improving Hand Hygiene Process Compliance Through Process Monitoring in HealthcareManufacturing & Service Operations Management10.1287/msom.2018.076822:4(669-682)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/msom.2018.0768
Smyrnakis MQu HBauso DVeres S(2020)On the Combination of Game-Theoretic Learning and Multi Model Adaptive FiltersAgents and Artificial Intelligence10.1007/978-3-030-71158-0_4(73-105)Online publication date: 22-Feb-2020
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Papatheodorou SSmyrnakis MHamidou TTzes A(2018)Game theoretic optimal position computation of collaborating agents for visual area coverageProceedings of the 10th Hellenic Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.1145/3200947.3201015(1-7)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
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Zino LComo GFagnani F(2017)On imitation dynamics in potential population games2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)10.1109/CDC.2017.8263751(757-762)Online publication date: 12-Dec-2017
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Mertikopoulos PSandholm W(2016)Learning in Games via Reinforcement and RegularizationMathematics of Operations Research10.5555/3219383.321938941:4(1297-1324)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2016
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Mertikopoulos PSandholm W(2016)Learning in Games via Reinforcement and RegularizationMathematics of Operations Research10.5555/3219381.321938241:4(1297-1324)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2016
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Mertikopoulos PViossat Y(2016)Imitation dynamics with payoff shocksInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-015-0505-745:1-2(291-320)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2016
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