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Chever, L., Saussier, S., and Yvrande-Billon, A. 2013. The Law of Small Numbers: Investigating the Benefits of Restricted Auctions for Public Procurement., Mimeo.
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- Column 1 reports the result for the Full Sample. Columns 2 through 5 report the results from 2000 and 2005. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
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- Columns 2 and 4 report the results of a model that add as additional control the contracting authority experience, defined as the number of works awarded in the past year. Observations reports the number of observations. Standard Errors are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with project value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro.
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Conley, T., and Decarolis, F. 2015. Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming.
- COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015 by authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief passages quoted in critical articles and reviews. MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION For media inquiries, please contact Barbara Piazzi at +39 06 72595652/01 or by email at ufficiostampa@ceis.uniroma2.it. Our web site, www.ceistorvergata.it, contains more information about Center’s events, publications, and staff. DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT For information about contributing to CEIS Tor Vergata, please contact Carmen Tata at +39 06 72595615/01 or by e-mail at segr.ceis@economia.uniroma2.it
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Feir, D., Lemieux, T., and Marmer, V. 2015. Weak Identification in Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Designs. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Forthcoming.
- Figure 2: Rebates, Number of Bidders and Discretion 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Number of bidders Minimum Winning Maximum % rebate from the starting value Notes: Distribution of the rebates conditional on the number of bidders participating to the auction at different levels of discretion: high (in red) or low (in blue). Circles denote the minimum rebate; triangles the winning rebate; diamonds the maximum rebate. Vertical lines denote the 95% confidence intervals. Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). Figure 3: Overall Distribution of the Auctions Reserve Price 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 Density −1 0 1 2 Dist. from the discontinuity, in 100000 euro Notes: The running variable is the difference between reservation price and the 300,000 euro threshold (red vertical line).
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- Figure 4: Discontinuity Test of Auctions Reserve Price Around the Threshold 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 −2 −1 0 1 2 Dist. from the discontinuity, in 100000 euro Notes: The running variable is the difference between the reserve price and the 300,000 euro threshold (vertical line). Circles are average observed values, the bold solid line is a kernel estimate (see McCrary, 2008), and the two thin lines are 95% confidence intervals.
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Gelman, A., and Imbens, G.W. 2014. Why high-order polynomials should not be used in regression discontinuity designs. NBER WP N. 20405.
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McCrary, J. 2008. Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 698-714 Molander, P. 2014. Public Procurement in the European Union: The Case for National Threshold Values. Journal of Public Procurement, 14(2), 181-214 Rosenbaum, P. R., and Rubin, D. B. 1983. The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55.
- Rows 1 and 2 report the Coefficient and Standard Errors of the of the Discontinuity Test according to McCrary (2008).
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- Shi, L., and Susarla, A. 2008. Relational Contracts, Reputation Capital, and Explicit Contracts: Evidence from Information Technology Outsourcing. No. UWEC-2008-16.
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- Source: Statistics for all the construction procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). Figure A.2: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths, Region-Year Fixed Effects 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 Effect 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Bandwidth Trattativa Privata −25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works with missing value in the dependent variables are not dropped.
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). Figure 7: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 Effect 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Bandwidth Trattativa Privata −30 −20 −10 0 Effect 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Bandwidth Number of Bidders −5 0 5
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). Figure A.3: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths, Local Linear Regression .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 Effect 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Bandwidth Trattativa Privata −20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 Effect 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Bandwidth Number of Bidders −4 −2 0 2 4
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). Figure A.4: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths, Local Linear Regression with Region-Year Fixed Effects 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 Effect 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Bandwidth Trattativa Privata −25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0 Effect 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Bandwidth Number of Bidders −5 0 5
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2001 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2001 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public constructon works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2003 and 2005 and by the county and municipality of Turin, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public road works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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- Source: Statistics for all the public road works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Spagnolo, G. 2012. Reputation, Competition and Entry in Procurement. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(3), 291-296.
Spulber, D.F. 1990. Auctions and Contract Enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 6(2), 325-44.
- Standard Errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
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- Table 3: McCrary Discontinuity Test All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Discontinuity-0.154-0.194 0.146-0.185-0.253-0.282-0.549* (SE) (0.131) (0.300) (0.252) (0.237) (0.237) (0.262) (0.322) Notes: The running variable is the difference between the reserve price and the 300,000 euro threshold (in 100,000 euros).
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works assigned with Trattativa Privata, one bidder and less than five invited bidder or the number of invited bidders is missing are dropped.
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works assigned with Trattativa Privata, one bidder and only less than 5 invited bidder are dropped.
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works assigned with Trattativa Privata, one bidder and only one invited bidder are dropped.
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works executed in 2000 are dropped.
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works executed in 2000 are dropped.
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works from the North and Center of Italy.
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works with missing values in the dependent variable are not dropped.
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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- Van der Klauw, W. 2002. Estimating the Effect of Financial Aid Offers on College Enrollment: a Regression-Discontinuity Approach. International Economic Review, 43(4), 12491287.
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- Yukins, C. R. 2008, Are IDIQs Inefficient? Sharing Lessons with the European Framework Contracting. Public Contracts Law Journal, 37, 545-568.
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