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A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection. (2013). Duggan, John.
In: Wallis Working Papers.
RePEc:roc:wallis:wp64.

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Cited: 2

Citations received by this document

Cites: 23

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Markovian Elections. (2014). Forand, Jean Guillaume ; Duggan, John.
    In: 2014 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed014:153.

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  2. Markovian Elections. (2013). Forand, Jean Guillaume ; Duggan, John.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wat:wpaper:1305.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Aumann, R., Maschler, M., 1995. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. MIT Press.

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  9. Duggan, J., 2000. Repeated elections with asymmetric information. Economics and Politics 12, 109–136.

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  11. Dutta, P., 1995. A folk theorem for stochastic games. Journal of Economic Theory 66, 1–32.
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  12. Ferejohn, J., 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50, 5–25.

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  15. Fudenberg, D., Yamamoto, Y., 2011. The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 146, 1664–1683.

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  20. Plott, C., 1967. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic Review 57, 787–806.
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  21. Schofield, N., 1978. Instability of simple dynamic games. Review of Economic Studies 45, 575–594.

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  23. Wen, Q., 2002. A folk theorem for repeated sequential games. Review of Economic Studies 69, 493–512.

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  6. A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection. (2013). Duggan, John.
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