Bayesian Persuasion

Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow

No 15540, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results.

JEL-codes: D83 K41 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Note: IO POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as “Bayesian Persuasion” (with Emir Kamenica). American Economic Review . 101(6). October 2011.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bayesian Persuasion (2011)
Working Paper: Bayesian Persuasion (2009)
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