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Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships. (2002). Rajan, Madhav V. ; Baiman, Stanley.
In: Accounting, Organizations and Society.
RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:27:y:2002:i:3:p:213-238.

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  2. How multi-sourcing can influence management control: Case study evidence from the electronic products supply chain. (2022). Romero, Jorge ; Schloetzer, Jason D ; O'Connor, Neale G ; Wu, Anne.
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  4. Uncertainty and Compensation Design in Strategic Interfirm Contracts†. (2020). Krishnan, Ranjani ; Mani, Deepa .
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  5. Supply chain integration and operational performance of Kenya’s public health sector. (2019). Juliana, Namada ; Anne, Mbugua.
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  6. Friends along supply chain and relationship-specific investments. (2019). Yu, Jianqiao ; Luo, Ting.
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  7. Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting. (2019). Shields, Michael D ; Marinich, Eric J ; Krishnan, Ranjani ; Gallani, Susanna.
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  9. Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting. (2018). Gallani, Susanna ; Shields, Michael D ; Marinich, Eric J ; Krishnan, Ranjani.
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  23. Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem. (2004). Rasmusen, Eric ; Lyon, Thomas.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2004-10.

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  24. Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle. (2004). Sonnemans, Joep ; Sloof, Randolph ; Oosterbeek, Hessel.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:6:p:1399-1410.

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  25. Household bargaining and microfinance. (2004). Van Tassel, Eric.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:74:y:2004:i:2:p:449-468.

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  26. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2004). Antras, Pol.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:nasm04:62.

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  27. Holdup with Subsidized Investment. (2004). Hanazono, Makoto.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:feam04:640.

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  28. A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post-Marital Residence Rules. (2003). Jacobsen, Joyce ; Baker, Matthew.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:usn:usnawp:2.

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  29. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2003). Antras, Pol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9945.

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  30. Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure. (2003). Antras, Pol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9740.

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  31. On partial contracting. (2002). Rey, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:4-5:p:745-753.

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  32. Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem. (2002). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:169-188.

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  33. Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships. (2002). Rajan, Madhav V. ; Baiman, Stanley.
    In: Accounting, Organizations and Society.
    RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:27:y:2002:i:3:p:213-238.

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  34. Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness. (2001). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst ; Klein, Alexander.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:18.

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  35. Insider trading and managerial incentives. (2001). Noe, Thomas ; Hu, Jie.
    In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:25:y:2001:i:4:p:681-716.

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  36. To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts. (2001). Bac, Mehmet.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:3-4:p:567-588.

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  37. Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance. (2001). Walz, Uwe ; Bascha, Andreas .
    In: Journal of Corporate Finance.
    RePEc:eee:corfin:v:7:y:2001:i:3:p:285-306.

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  38. Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness. (2001). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst ; Klein, Alexander.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2790.

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  39. Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium. (2001). Helpman, Elhanan ; Grossman, Gene.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_460.

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  40. Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999). (2000). Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:195-205.

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  41. Threatening inefficient performance. (2000). Ayres, Ian ; Madison, Kristin.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:4-6:p:818-828.

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  42. Competing for Ownership. (2000). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2573.

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  43. Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications. (2000). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_403.

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  44. Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting. (2000). Watson, Joel ; Schwartz, Alan.
    In: University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt4jr3g3h7.

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  45. Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization. (1999). Helpman, Elhanan ; Grossman, Gene.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7303.

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  46. After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment. (1999). De Fraja, Gianni.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:1:p:22-39.

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  47. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting. (1999). Che, Yeon-Koo ; Hausch, Donald B..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:125-147.

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  48. Section 365 : mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuation. (1998). schwartz, alan ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:att:wimass:199812.

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  49. Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring. (1997). Maug, Ernst.
    In: Journal of Corporate Finance.
    RePEc:eee:corfin:v:3:y:1997:i:2:p:113-139.

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  50. Incomplete contracts and privatization. (1996). Schmidt, Klaus.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:3-5:p:569-579.

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