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Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence. (2011). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
In: Games and Economic Behavior.
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:186-199.

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  1. Revenue sharing agreements and hold-up problems in joint projects: Theory and experiments. (2024). Bayer, Ralph-Christopher ; Zhang, Sookie Xue.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:228:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124003883.

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  2. Reference points in sequential bargaining: theory and experiment. (2024). Brekke, Kjell Arne ; Helland, Leif ; Heggedal, Tomreiel ; Ciccone, Alice.
    In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:scandj:v:126:y:2024:i:2:p:254-288.

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  3. Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work. (2023). Kunimoto, Takashi ; Holden, Richard ; Chen, Yi-Chun ; Wilkening, Tom ; Sun, Yifei.
    In: Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/721153.

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  4. Hold-up induced by demand for fairness: theory and experimental evidence. (2023). Mak, Vincent ; Lauga, Dominique Olie ; Kc, Raghabendra Pratap.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:94:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-022-09905-9.

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  5. Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage. (2023). Shachat, Jason ; Katok, Elena ; Walker, Matthew J.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:6:p:3492-3515.

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  6. The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?. (2021). Sannajust, Aurelie ; Meier, Olivier.
    In: Small Business Economics.
    RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:57:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11187-020-00339-7.

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  7. Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment. (2021). Chambolle, Claire ; Allain, Marie-Laure ; Teyssier, Sabrina ; Rey, Patrick.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03341440.

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  8. Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment. (2021). Allain, Marie-Laure ; Teyssier, Sabrina ; Rey, Patrick ; Chambolle, Claire.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03283879.

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  9. Contracting for technology improvement: The effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty. (2021). Masini, Andrea ; Aflaki, Sam ; Shantia, Ali.
    In: European Journal of Operational Research.
    RePEc:eee:ejores:v:293:y:2021:i:2:p:481-494.

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  10. Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment. (2021). Teyssier, Sabrina ; Rey, Patrick ; Chambolle, Claire ; Allain, Marie-Laure.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:137:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121001367.

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  11. A SURVEY OF THE HOLD?UP PROBLEM IN THE EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS LITERATURE. (2021). Yang, Yadi.
    In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
    RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:35:y:2021:i:1:p:227-249.

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  12. Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms. (2021). Wilkening, Tom ; Powell, Michael ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:4:p:1055-91.

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  13. Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In. (2020). Stremitzer, Alexander ; Stone, Rebecca .
    In: The Journal of Legal Studies.
    RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/707562.

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  14. Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up: an Experiment. (2020). Allain, Marie-Laure ; Teyssier, Sabrina ; Rey, Patrick ; Chambolle, Claire.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:123940.

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  15. Reciprocity and Veto Power in Relation-Specific Investments: An Experimental Study. (2020). Wang, Xiaoyuan ; Zheng, Kaiming ; Yang, Yang ; Ni, Debing.
    In: Sustainability.
    RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:12:y:2020:i:10:p:4027-:d:358340.

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  16. Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation. (2020). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David J.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:177:y:2020:i:c:p:514-532.

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  17. Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up: an Experiment. (2020). Allain, Marie-Laure ; Teyssier, Sabrina ; Rey, Patrick ; Chambolle, Claire.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:crs:wpaper:2020-09.

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  18. Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage. (2020). Shachat, Jason ; Katok, Elena ; Walker, Matthew J.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:20-34.

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  19. Relationship-specific investment and hold-up problems in supply chains: theory and experiments. (2019). Sethi, Suresh ; Katok, Elena ; Haruvy, Ernan ; Ma, Zhongwen.
    In: Business Research.
    RePEc:spr:busres:v:12:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s40685-018-0068-0.

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  20. Endogenous claims and collective production: an experimental study on the timing of profit-sharing negotiations and production. (2019). Baranski, Andrzej.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:22:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-018-9591-2.

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  21. Investment in Outside Options as Opportunistic Behavior: An Experimental Investigation. (2018). Servátka, Maroš ; Morita, Hodaka.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
    RePEc:wly:soecon:v:85:y:2018:i:2:p:457-484.

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  22. Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory. (2018). Schmitz, Patrick W ; Hoppe, Eva I.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:95618.

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  23. Investment in Outside Options as Opportunistic Behavior: An Experimental Investigation. (2018). Servátka, Maroš ; Morita, Hodaka.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:85322.

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  24. The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation. (2018). Holden, Richard ; Wilkening, Tom ; Fehr, Ernst ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: Journal of the European Economic Association.
    RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:16:y:2018:i:1:p:232-274..

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  25. Contracts and Capacity Investment in Supply Chains. (2018). Leider, Stephen ; Davis, Andrew M.
    In: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.
    RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:20:y:2018:i:3:p:403-421.

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  26. Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion. (2018). Herweg, Fabian ; Muller, Daniel ; Karle, Heiko.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:145:y:2018:i:c:p:176-201.

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  27. Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory. (2018). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva I.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:544-564.

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  28. Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence. (2018). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David J.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13204.

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  29. Courts Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts. (2018). De Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: CEU Working Papers.
    RePEc:ceu:econwp:2018_5.

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  30. Stretch It but Dont Break It: The Hidden Cost of Contract Framing. (2017). , Richard ; Tontrup, Stephan ; Stremitzer, Alexander.
    In: The Journal of Legal Studies.
    RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/694234.

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  31. The management of innovation: Experimental evidence. (2017). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:706-725.

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  32. The Boundary of the Farm: Homegrown versus Purchased Feed on Ontario Swine Farms. (2017). Shang, Max ; McEwan, Ken.
    In: Annual Meeting, 2017, June 18-21, Montreal, Canada.
    RePEc:ags:caes17:264191.

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  33. Markets, contracts, and uncertainty in a groundwater economy. (2016). Jacoby, Hanan ; Gine, Xavier.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7694.

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  34. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics. (2016). Zingales, Luigi ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: OUP Catalogue.
    RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199826216.

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  35. Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence. (2016). Landeo, Claudia ; Spier, Kathryn E.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201606)172:2_235:sdaarm_2.0.tx_2-6.

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  36. The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence. (2016). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11215.

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  37. Human Capital Investment and Work Incentives. (2016). Kräkel, Matthias ; Krakel, Matthias.
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:25:y:2016:i:3:p:627-651.

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  38. Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem. (2015). Erlei, Mathias ; Ross, Wiebke .
    In: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth).
    RePEc:zbw:vswi15:140886.

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  39. Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence. (2015). Landeo, Claudia ; Spier, Kathryn.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ris:albaec:2015_010.

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  40. The Handbook of Behavioral Operations Management: Social and Psychological Dynamics in Production and Service Settings. (2015). .
    In: OUP Catalogue.
    RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199357222.

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  41. Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation. (2015). Herweg, Fabian ; KlausM. Schmidt, .
    In: Review of Economic Studies.
    RePEc:oup:restud:v:82:y:2015:i:1:p:297-332.

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  42. Energy Efficiency Contracting in Supply Chains Under Asymmetric Bargaining Power. (2015). Masini, Andrea ; Aflaki, Sam ; Shantia, Ali.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02002717.

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  43. Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: an experiment. (2015). Rey, Patrick ; Allain, Marie-Laure ; Teyssier, Sabrina ; Chambolle, Claire.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02104547.

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  44. Energy Efficiency Contracting in Supply Chains Under Asymmetric Bargaining Power. (2015). Masini, Andrea ; Aflaki, Sam ; Shantia, Ali.
    In: HEC Research Papers Series.
    RePEc:ebg:heccah:1106.

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  45. REFERENCE POINTS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS. (2015). Bartling, Bjorn ; Schmidt, Klaus M. ; KlausM. Schmidt, .
    In: Journal of the European Economic Association.
    RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:13:y:2015:i:1:p:98-129.

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  46. HOW DO INFORMAL AGREEMENTS AND REVISION SHAPE CONTRACTUAL REFERENCE POINTS?. (2015). Zehnder, Christian ; Fehr, Ernst ; Hart, Oliver.
    In: Journal of the European Economic Association.
    RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:13:y:2015:i:1:p:1-28.

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  47. Ex Post (In) Efficient Negotiation and Breakdown of Trade. (2015). Schoar, Antoinette ; Iyer, Rajkamal.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:5:p:291-94.

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  48. Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation. (2014). Wilkening, Tom ; Powell, Michael ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
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  49. Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation. (2014). Herweg, Fabian ; Schmidt, Klaus.
    In: Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100485.

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  50. Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion. (2014). Karle, Heiko ; Herweg, Fabian ; Muller, Daniel.
    In: Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100473.

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  51. Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion. (2014). Karle, Heiko ; Herweg, Fabian ; Muller, Daniel.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:454.

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  52. Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation. (2014). Wilkening, Tom ; Powell, Michael ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8404.

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  53. Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion. (2014). Karle, Heiko ; Herweg, Fabian ; Muller, Daniel.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9874.

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  54. Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation. (2014). Wilkening, Tom ; Powell, Michael ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4948.

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  55. Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion. (2014). Karle, Heiko ; Herweg, Fabian ; Muller, Daniel.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  56. Endogenous Property Rights in a Hold-up Experiment. (2014). Erlei, Mathias ; Siemer, Philipp J..
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    RePEc:bla:metroe:v:65:y:2014:i:2:p:237-270.

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  57. Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations. (2013). Schmidt, Klaus ; Bartling, Björn.
    In: Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79809.

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  58. Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem. (2013). Erlei, Mathias ; Ro, Wiebke .
    In: TUC Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:tuc:tucewp:0009.

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  59. Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement. (2013). Iimi, Atsushi.
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  60. Group identity and relation-specific investment: An experimental investigation. (2013). Servátka, Maroš ; Morita, Hodaka.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:58:y:2013:i:c:p:95-109.

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  61. THE ‘REFERENCE POINT’ APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: AN INTRODUCTION. (2013). Walker, Paul .
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  62. The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability. (2012). Schmitz, Patrick.
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  63. Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition. (2012). Bartling, Bjorn ; Schmidt, Klaus M. ; KlausM. Schmidt, .
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  64. Self-Regulation, Negotiated Agreements and Social Welfare. (2012). Lyon, Thomas ; Maxwell, John W..
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  65. The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability. (2012). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:841-843.

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  66. The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability. (2012). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9050.

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  67. Group Identity and Relation-Specific Investment: An Experimental Investigation. (2012). Servátka, Maroš ; Morita, Hodaka.
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cbt:econwp:12/16.

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  68. Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation. (2012). Werden, Gregory ; Ganglmair, Bernhard ; Froeb, Luke.
    In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
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  69. Global Sourcing if Contracts are Reference Points. (2012). Kukharskyy, Bohdan.
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    RePEc:bav:wpaper:129_kukharskyy.

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  70. How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?. (2011). Zehnder, Christian ; Hart, Oliver ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:043.

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  71. How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?. (2011). Zehnder, Christian ; Hart, Oliver ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17545.

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  72. How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?. (2011). Zehnder, Christian ; Hart, Oliver ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6095.

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  73. Investments as Signals of Outside Options. (2011). Schmitz, Patrick ; Goldlücke, Susanne ; Goldlucke, Susanne.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8366.

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  74. The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?. (). Sannajust, Aurelie ; Meier, Olivier.
    In: Small Business Economics.
    RePEc:kap:sbusec:v::y::i::d:10.1007_s11187-020-00339-7.

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  58. Williamson, O.E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. 1985 Free Press: New York
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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics. (2016). Zingales, Luigi ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: OUP Catalogue.
    RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199826216.

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  2. Exit options and the allocation of authority. (2013). Bester, Helmut ; Krahmer, Daniel.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20135.

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  3. On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship. (2013). Fairise, Xavier ; de Sousa, Jose.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00870060.

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  4. Algunos Alcances en torno a la Institucionalidad y Renegociación de Concesiones en la Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público en Perú. (2012). Saavedra, Eduardo ; Montesinos, Jorge .
    In: ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers.
    RePEc:ila:ilades:inv277.

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  5. Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence. (2011). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:186-199.

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  6. Holdup, search, and inefficiency. (2010). Ishiguro, Shingo.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:44:y:2010:i:2:p:307-338.

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  7. Incomplete Contracts: Foundations and Applications. (2010). Pei, Di.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:23650.

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  8. The Dynamics of Climate Agreements. (2010). Harstad, Bard ; Bård Harstad, .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2962.

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  9. Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent. (2009). Korn, Evelyn ; Meisenzahl, Stephan .
    In: MAGKS Papers on Economics.
    RePEc:mar:magkse:200909.

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  10. Independent Directors and Board Control in Venture Finance. (2008). Broughman, Brian .
    In: Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt9w966114.

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  11. Preisbindung als Kooperationsinstrument in Wertschöpfungsnetzwerken. (2007). Wipprich, Mark .
    In: Arbeitspapiere.
    RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:60.

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  12. Die Ausgestaltung von Versorgungsverträgen: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse / A Contract Theory Approach to Health Care Contracting. (2007). Muehlbacher, Axel .
    In: Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik).
    RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:227:y:2007:i:5-6:p:765-786.

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  13. Optimal CEO Compensation: Some Equivalence Results. (2006). Choe, Chongwoo.
    In: Journal of Labor Economics.
    RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:24:y:2006:i:1:p:171-201.

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  14. Credible implementation. (2006). Wilkie, Simon ; Corchon, Luis ; Chakravorty, Bhaskar.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:57:y:2006:i:1:p:18-36.

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  15. The Hold-up Problem. (2006). Sákovics, József ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: ESE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:edn:esedps:142.

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  16. The dynamics of venture capital contracts. (2005). Bienz, Carsten ; Hirsch, Julia.
    In: CFS Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200611.

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  17. A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post Marital Residence Rules. (2005). Jacobsen, Joyce ; Baker, Matthew.
    In: Wesleyan Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:wes:weswpa:2005-006.

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  18. The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:66.

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  19. Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention. (2005). Shavell, Steven.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11284.

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  20. Contracting on Time. (2005). Kvasov, Dmitriy ; Guriev, Sergei.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:1369-1385.

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  21. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2005). Antras, Pol.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:1054-1073.

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  22. Asset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction. (2004). Roider, Andreas.
    In: RAND Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:4:p:787-802.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem. (2004). Rasmusen, Eric ; Lyon, Thomas.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2004-10.

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  24. Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle. (2004). Sonnemans, Joep ; Sloof, Randolph ; Oosterbeek, Hessel.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:6:p:1399-1410.

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  25. Household bargaining and microfinance. (2004). Van Tassel, Eric.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:74:y:2004:i:2:p:449-468.

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  26. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2004). Antras, Pol.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:nasm04:62.

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  27. Holdup with Subsidized Investment. (2004). Hanazono, Makoto.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:feam04:640.

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  28. A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post-Marital Residence Rules. (2003). Jacobsen, Joyce ; Baker, Matthew.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:usn:usnawp:2.

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  29. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2003). Antras, Pol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9945.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure. (2003). Antras, Pol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9740.

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  31. On partial contracting. (2002). Rey, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:4-5:p:745-753.

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  32. Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem. (2002). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:169-188.

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  33. Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships. (2002). Rajan, Madhav V. ; Baiman, Stanley.
    In: Accounting, Organizations and Society.
    RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:27:y:2002:i:3:p:213-238.

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  34. Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness. (2001). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst ; Klein, Alexander.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:18.

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  35. Insider trading and managerial incentives. (2001). Noe, Thomas ; Hu, Jie.
    In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:25:y:2001:i:4:p:681-716.

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  36. To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts. (2001). Bac, Mehmet.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:3-4:p:567-588.

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  37. Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance. (2001). Walz, Uwe ; Bascha, Andreas .
    In: Journal of Corporate Finance.
    RePEc:eee:corfin:v:7:y:2001:i:3:p:285-306.

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  38. Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness. (2001). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst ; Klein, Alexander.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2790.

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  39. Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium. (2001). Helpman, Elhanan ; Grossman, Gene.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_460.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999). (2000). Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:195-205.

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  41. Threatening inefficient performance. (2000). Ayres, Ian ; Madison, Kristin.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:4-6:p:818-828.

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  42. Competing for Ownership. (2000). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2573.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications. (2000). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_403.

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  44. Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting. (2000). Watson, Joel ; Schwartz, Alan.
    In: University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt4jr3g3h7.

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  45. Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization. (1999). Helpman, Elhanan ; Grossman, Gene.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7303.

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  46. After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment. (1999). De Fraja, Gianni.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:1:p:22-39.

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  47. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting. (1999). Che, Yeon-Koo ; Hausch, Donald B..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:125-147.

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  48. Section 365 : mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuation. (1998). schwartz, alan ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:att:wimass:199812.

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  49. Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring. (1997). Maug, Ernst.
    In: Journal of Corporate Finance.
    RePEc:eee:corfin:v:3:y:1997:i:2:p:113-139.

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  50. Incomplete contracts and privatization. (1996). Schmidt, Klaus.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:3-5:p:569-579.

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