Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results. (2017). Martinelli, Cesar ; Palfrey, Thomas R.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:gms:wpaper:1065.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 9

Citations received by this document

Cites: 112

References cited by this document

Cocites: 31

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Balanced voting. (2021). Gersbach, Hans ; Wickramage, Kamali.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:113:y:2021:i:c:p:203-229.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Against All Odds: Tentative Steps Toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups. (2020). Vadovic, Radovan ; Schnedler, Wendelin ; Schlangenotto, Darius.
    In: EconStor Preprints.
    RePEc:zbw:esprep:222533.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Against All Odds: Tentative Steps Toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups. (2020). Vadovic, Radovan ; Schnedler, Wendelin ; Schlangenotto, Darius.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13547.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Against All Odds: Tentative Steps toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups. (2020). Vadovic, Radovan ; Schnedler, Wendelin ; Schlangenotto, Darius.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:3:p:31-:d:396119.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning. (2019). Guerra, José ; Ginzburg, Boris .
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:169:y:2019:i:c:p:52-64.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Voting as a war of attrition. (2019). Vlassopoulos, Michael ; Kwiek, Maksymilian ; Marreiros, Helia.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:167:y:2019:i:c:p:104-121.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes. (2019). Pogorelskiy, Kirill ; Shum, Matthew.
    In: CAGE Online Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cge:wacage:427.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Tools and approaches in public contracting research. (2018). Moszoro, Marian.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:101589.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Voting as a War of Attrition. (2018). Vlassopoulos, Michael ; Marreiros, Helia ; Kwiek, Maksymilian.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11595.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Agranov, M., Goeree, J., Romero, J., Yariv, L., 2017. What makes voters turn out: The effects of polls and beliefs. Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.

  2. Agranov, M., Tergiman, C., 2014. Communication in multilateral bargaining. Journal of Public Economics 118, 75–85.

  3. Agranov, M., Tergiman, C., 2016. Communication and voting rules in bargaining games. Working Paper. California Institute of Technology.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  4. Ali, N., Goeree, J., Kartik, N., Palfrey, T., 2008. Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 98 (2), 181–186.

  5. Andreoni, J., Rao, J., 2011. The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism. Journal of Public Economics 95 (7), 513–520.

  6. Austen-Smith, D., Banks, J., 1996. Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem. American Political Science Review 90 (1), 34–45.

  7. Baranski, A., Kagel, J., 2015. Communication in legislative bargaining. Journal of the Economic Science Association 1 (1), 59–71.

  8. Baron, D., Bowen, T. R., Nunnari, S., 2017. Durable coalitions and communication: Public versus private negotiations. Journal of Public Economics 156, 1-13.

  9. Baron, D., Ferejohn, J., 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181–1206.

  10. Barro, R., 1973. The control of politicians: An economic model. Public Choice 14, 19–42.

  11. Battaglini, M., Morton, R., Palfrey, T., 2007. Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms. American Political Science Review 101 (3), 409–424.

  12. Battaglini, M., Morton, R., Palfrey, T., 2008. Information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 98 (2), 194–200.

  13. Battaglini, M., Palfrey, T., 2012. The dynamics of distributive politics. Economic Theory 49(3), 739-777.

  14. Bhattacharya, S., Duffy, J., Kim, S., 2017. Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 102, 316–338.

  15. Black. D, 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  16. Bochet, I. Page, T. Putterman, L., 2006. Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60, 11-26.

  17. Bolton, G. E., Chatterjee, K., McGinn, K., 2003. How communication links influence coalition bargaining: a laboratory investigation. Management Science 49 (5), 583–598.

  18. Bornstein, G., 1992. The free-rider problem in intergroup conflicts over step-level and continuous public goods. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62 (4), 597–606.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  19. Bornstein, G., Rapoport, A., 1988. Intergroup competition for the provision of step-level public goods: Effects of preplay communication. European Journal of Social Psychology 25, 125-142.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  20. Bornstein, G., Rapoport, A., Kerpel, L., Katz, T. 1989. Within and between group communication in intergroup competition for public goods. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 25, 422-436.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  21. Bouton, L., Castanheira, M., Llorente-Saguer, A., 2017. Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory. Games and Economic Behavior 101, 132–150.

  22. Buchanan, J. and G. Tullock, 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  23. Callander, S., 2008. Majority rule when voters like to win. Games and Economic Behavior 64, 393–420.

  24. Cason, T. and Khan, F. 1991. A laboratory study of voluntary public goods provision with imperfect monitoring and communication. Journal of Development Economics 58, 533– 552.

  25. Christiansen, N., Georganas, S. and Kagel, J., 2013. Coalition formation in a legislative voting game. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, 182-204.

  26. Dasgupta, S., Williams, K., 1995. Search behavior of asymmetrically informed voters: an experimental study. Economics & Politics 7 (1), 21–41.

  27. Dasgupta, S., Williams, K., 2002. A principal-agent model of elections with novice incumbents: Some experimental results. Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (4), 409–438.

  28. Dawes, R., J. McTavish, and H. Shaklee, 1977. Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (1), 1-11.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  29. Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

  30. Duggan, J., Martinelli, C., 2015. Electoral accountability and responsive democracy. GMU Working Paper.

  31. Duggan, J., Martinelli, C., 2017. The political economy of dynamic elections: Accountability, commitment, and responsiveness. Journal of Economic Literature 55 (3), 916–984.

  32. Duverger, M., 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  33. Elbittar, A., Gomberg, A., Martinelli, C., Palfrey, T. R., 2016. Ignorance and bias in collective decisions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  34. Endersby, J. W., 1993. Rules of method and rules of conduct: An experimental study on two types of procedure and committee behavior. Journal of Politics 55 (1), 218–236.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  35. Esponda, I., Vespa, E., 2014. Hypothetical thinking and information extraction in the laboratory. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (4), 180–202.

  36. Fearon, J., 1999. Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: Selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance. In: Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (eds.), Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  37. Feddersen, T., Pesendorfer, W., 1996. The swing voter’s curse. American Economic Review 86 (3), 408–204.

  38. Feddersen, T., Pesendorfer, W., 1997. Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica 65 (5), 1029–1058.

  39. Feddersen, T., Pesendorfer, W., 1998. Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting. American Political Science Review 92, 23–36.

  40. Ferejohn, J., 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50 (5-25).

  41. Fey, M., 1997. Stability and coordination in Duverger’s law: a formal model of pre-election polls and strategic voting. American Political Science Review 91 (1), 135–147.

  42. Forsythe, R., Myerson, R., Rietz, T., Weber, R., 1993. An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories. Social Choice and Welfare 10 (3), 223–247.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  43. Forsythe, R., Rietz, T., Myerson, R., Weber, R., 1996. An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections. International Journal of Game Theory 25 (3), 355–383.

  44. Fudenberg, D., Levine, D. K., 1993. Self-confirming equilibrium. Econometrica 61 (3), 523– 545.

  45. Gerber, E., Morton, R., Rietz, T., 1998. Minority representation in multimember districts. American Political Science Review 92 (1), 127–144.

  46. Goeree, J. and Großer, J., 2007. Welfare reducing polls. Economic Theory 31, 51–68.

  47. Goeree, J., Yariv, L., 2011. An experimental study of collective deliberation. Econometrica 79 (3), 893–921.

  48. Goeree, J., Yariv, L., 2015. Conformity in the lab. Journal of the Economic Science Association 1 (1), 15–28.

  49. Großer, J., Schram, A., 2006. Neighborhood information exchange and voter participation: An experimental study. American Political Science Review 100 (2), 235–248.

  50. Großer, J., Schram, A., 2010. Public opinion polls, voter turnout, and welfare: An experimental study. American Journal of Political Science 54 (3), 700–717.

  51. Großer, J., Seebauer, M., 2016. The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior 97, 205–226.

  52. Guarnaschelli, S., McKelvey, R., Palfrey, T., 2000. An experimental study of jury decision rules. American Political Science Review 94 (2), 407–423.

  53. Guinier, Lani. 1994. The Tyranny of the Majority. Free Press. New York.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  54. Herrera, H. and Martinelli, C., 2006. Group formation and voter participation. Theoretical Economics 1, 461–487.

  55. Herrera, H., Morelli, M., Palfrey, T. R., 2014. Turnout and power sharing. Economic Journal 124 (February), 131–162.

  56. Houser, D., Ludwig, S., Stratmann, T., 2016. Deception and political participation: Theory and laboratory evidence. Economic Inquiry 54, 464–484.

  57. Houser, D., Morton, R., Stratmann, T., 2011. Turned on or turned out? Campaign advertising, information and voting. European Journal of Political Economy 27 (4), 708–727.

  58. Houser, D., Stratmann, T., 2008. Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign reform. Public Choice 136, 215–239.

  59. Hung, A., Plott, C., 2000. Information cascades: Replication and an extension to majority rule and conformity-rewarding institutions. American Economic Review 91 (5), 1508– 1520.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  60. Isaac, M. and Walker, J., 1988, Communication and free-riding behavior: the voluntary contributions mechanism. Economic Inquiry 264, 585-608.

  61. Isaac, M. and Walker, J., 1991, Costly communication: an experiment in a nested public goods problem. In: Palfrey, T. (Ed.), Laboratory Research in Political Economy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 269-286.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  62. Isaac, M., McCue, K., and Plott, C., 1985. Public goods provision in an experimental environment. Journal of Public Economics 26, 51–74.

  63. Jackson, M. O. and Moselle, B., 2002. Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game. Journal of Economic Theory 103, 49–87.

  64. Kalandrakis, T., 2004. A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game. Journal of Economic Theory 116(2), 294-322.

  65. Kartal, M., 2015. Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: Proportional representation versus majoritarian rule. Experimental Economics 18 (September), 366–384.

  66. Kittel, B., Luhan, W., Morton, R., 2014. Communication and voting in multi-party elections: An experimental study. The Economic Journal 124 (574).

  67. Klor, E., Winter, E., 2007. The welfare effects of public opinion polls. International Journal of Game Theory 35, 379–394.

  68. Klor, E., Winter, E., 2014. On public opinion polls and voters’ turnout, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, unpublished.

  69. Ledyard, J., 1995. Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In: Kagel, J, Roth, A. (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  70. Levine, D. K., Palfrey, T., 2007. The paradox of voter participation? A laboratory study. American Political Science Review 101 (1), 143–158. Lohmann, S. Information aggregation through costly political action. American Economic Review 84, 518–530.

  71. Lupia, A., 1994. The effect of information on voting behavior and electoral outcomes: An experimental study of direct legislation. Public Choice 78 (1), 65–86.

  72. Marewll, G. and R. Ames. 1979. Experiments on the provision of public goods I: Resources, interest, group size, and the free-rider problem. American Journal of Sociology, 84(6), 1335-60.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  73. Marewll, G. and R. Ames. 1980. Experiments on the provision of public goods II: Provision points, stakes, experience, and the free-rider problem. American Journal of Sociology, 85(4), 926–37.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  74. Martinelli, C., 2006. Would rational voters acquire costly information? Journal of Economic Theory 129 (1), 225–251.

  75. Martinelli, C., 2007. Rational ignorance and voting behavior. International Journal of Game Theory 35 (3), 315–335.

  76. McKelvey, R. D., 1991. An experimental test of a stochastic fame model of committee bargaining. In: Palfrey, T. (Ed.), Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  77. McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C., 1984a. An experimental study of the effects of procedural rules on committee behavior. Journal of Politics 46 (1), 182–205.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  78. McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C., 1984b. Rational expectations in elections: Some experimental results based on a multidimensional model. Public Choice 44 (1), 61–102.

  79. McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C., 1985a. Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. Journal of Economic Theory 36 (1), 55–85.

  80. McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C., 1985b. Sequential elections with limited information. American Journal of Political Science, 480–512.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  81. McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C., 1987. Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model. Mathematical Social Sciences 14 (1), 77–99.

  82. McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C., 1990. Information and elections: Retrospective voting and rational expectations. In: Ferejohn, J. and Kuklinski, J. (Ed.), Information and Democratic Processes. University of Illinois Press Champaign, pp. 281–312.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  83. McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T., 1995. Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1), 6–38.

  84. Morton, R., Williams, K., 1999. Information asymmetries and simultaneous versus sequential voting. American Political Science Review 93, 51–67.

  85. Myerson, R., 1998. Population uncertainty and Poisson games. International Journal of Game Theory 27 (3), 375–392.

  86. Myerson, R., Weber, R., 1993. A theory of voting equilibria. American Political Science Review 87 (1), 102–114.

  87. Orbell, J., van de Kragt, A., Dawes, R., 1988. Explaining discussion-induced cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 (5), 811-819.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  88. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., Walker, J. 1991. Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

  89. Palfrey, T., 1989. A mathematical proof of Duverger’s law. In: Ordeshook, P. (Ed.), Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 69-91.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  90. Palfrey, T., 2015. Experiments in political economy. In: Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Vol. 2.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  91. Palfrey, T., Rosenthal, H., 1985. Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. American Political Science Review 79(1), 62-78.

  92. Palfrey, T., Rosenthal, H., 1991a. Testing game-theoretic models of free riding: new evidence on probability bias and learning. In: Palfrey, T. (Ed.), Laboratory Research in Political Economy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 239-268.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  93. Palfrey, T., Rosenthal, H., 1991b. Testing for effects of cheap talk in a pubic goods game with private information. Games and Economic Behavior 3, 183-220.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  94. Palfrey, T., Rosenthal, H., Roy, N., 2017. How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games. Games and Economic Behavior 101, 234-259.

  95. Palfrey, T., Rosenthal, H.,h 1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice 41(1), 7-53.

  96. Plott, C., 1991. A comparative analysis of direct democracy, two-candidate elections, and three-candidate elections in an experimental environment. In: Palfrey, T. (Ed.), Laboratory Research in Political Economy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  97. Pogorelskiy, K. 2015. Correlated equilibria in voter turnout games. Social Science Working Paper 1395, California Institute of Technology.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  98. Pogorelskiy, K. and Palfrey, T., 2017. Communication among voters benefits the majority party. Economic Journal, forthcoming.

  99. Pogorelskiy, K. and Shum, M., 2017. News sharing and voting on social networks: An experimental study. Working Paper, California Institute of Technology.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  100. Reitz, T., Myerson, R., Weber, R., 1998. Campaign finance levels as coordinating signals in three-way, experimental elections. Economics & Politics 10(3), 185–218.

  101. Riker, W. H., 1982. The two-party system and Duverger’s law: An essay on the history of political science. American Political Science Review 76 (4), 753–766.

  102. Riker, W. H., Zavoina, W. J., 1970. Rational behavior in politics: Evidence from a three person game. American Political Science Review 64 (1), 48–60.

  103. Riker, W., Ordeshook, P., 1968. A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review 62 (1), 25–42.

  104. Roth, A. E., Erev, I., 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1), 164–212.

  105. Sally, D., 1995. Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Rationality and Society 7 (1), 58–92.

  106. Schram, A., Sonnemans, J., 1996. Why people vote: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology 17, 417–442.

  107. Smith, V., 1979a. Incentive compatible experimental process for the provision of public goods. In Smith, V. (ed.) Research in Experimental Economics, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  108. Smith, V., 1979b. An experimental comparison of three public good decision mechanisms. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81, 198–215.

  109. Smith, V., 1980. Experiments with a decentralized mechanism for public good decisions. American Economic Review 70, 584–599.

  110. Taylor, C. and Yildirim, H., 2010. Public information and electoral bias. Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 353–375.

  111. Tyszler, M., Schram, A., 2011. Information and strategic voting. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper.

  112. Tyszler, M., Schram, A., 2013. Strategic voting in heterogeneous electorates: An experimental study. Games 4 (4), 624–647.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting. (2021). Gersbach, Hans ; Tejada, Oriol ; Mamageishvili, Akaki.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:195:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000454.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Modeling undecided voters to forecast elections: From bandwagon behavior and the spiral of silence perspective. (2021). Wang, Hai ; Jiang, Yuanchun ; Sun, Jianshan ; Ye, CHANG ; Liu, Yezheng.
    In: International Journal of Forecasting.
    RePEc:eee:intfor:v:37:y:2021:i:2:p:461-483.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Elections under biased candidate endorsements — an experimental study. (2021). Sloof, Randolph ; Schram, Arthur ; Sun, Junze.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:125:y:2021:i:c:p:141-158.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Beliefs about Others: A Striking Example of Information Neglect. (2020). Wolff, Irenaeus ; Renerte, Baiba ; Fehrler, Sebastian.
    In: TWI Research Paper Series.
    RePEc:twi:respas:0118.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation. (2020). Sanz, Carlos ; Fujiwara, Thomas.
    In: Review of Economic Studies.
    RePEc:oup:restud:v:87:y:2020:i:3:p:1261-1295..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment. (2020). KALAYCI, Kenan ; Pimienta, Carlos ; Faravelli, Marco.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-019-09620-3.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods. (2020). Gee, Laura K ; Deangelo, Gregory ; de Angelo, Gregory.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:210-227.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions. (2020). Castanheira, Micael ; Drazen, Allan ; de Moura, Micael Castanheira ; Bouton, Laurent.
    In: Working Papers ECARES.
    RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/313224.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Pollsand Elections: Strategic Respondents and Turnout Implications. (2020). Luxen, Christina.
    In: ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:020.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules. (2019). Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael ; Ramos-Sosa, Maria del Pino ; Moreno, Bernardo ; del Pino, Maria.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:53:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01182-w.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party. (2019). Pogorelskiy, Kirill ; Palfrey, Thomas R.
    In: Economic Journal.
    RePEc:oup:econjl:v:129:y:2019:i:618:p:961-990..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Can Biased Polls Distort Electoral Results? Evidence From The Lab And The Field. (2019). Maniadis, Zacharias ; Li, Lunzheng ; Jennings, Will ; Boukouras, Aristotelis.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lec:leecon:19/06.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules. (2019). Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael ; Ramos-Sosa, Maria del Pino ; Moreno, Bernardo ; del Pino, Maria.
    In: ThE Papers.
    RePEc:gra:wpaper:19/04.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Can ATMs Get Out the Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Field Experiment. (2019). Vicente, Pedro ; Tavares, Jose ; Santos, Joo Pereira.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13991.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting. (2019). Tejada, Oriol ; Mamageishvili, Akaki ; Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13921.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Can Biased Polls Distort Electoral Results? Evidence from the Lab and the Field. (2019). Maniadis, Zacharias ; Li, Lunzheng ; Jennings, Will ; Boukouras, Aristotelis.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001528.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Ties. (2019). Tsai, Tsung-Sheng ; Revelli, Federico.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7786.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions. (2018). Drazen, Allan ; Castanheira, Micael ; Bouton, Laurent.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24413.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions. (2018). Castanheira, Micael ; Drazen, Allan ; Bouton, Laurent.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12789.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Assessment Voting in Large Electorates. (2018). Gersbach, Hans ; Tejada, Oriol ; Mamageishvili, Akaki.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1712.05470.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Costly Voting: A Large-scale Real Effort Experiment. (2017). KALAYCI, Kenan ; Pimienta, Carlos ; Faravelli, Marco.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:swe:wpaper:2017-16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Norms in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation in Spain. (2017). Fujiwara, Thomas ; Sanz, Carlos.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24137.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. One in a Million: Field Experiments on Perceived Closeness of the Election and Voter Turnout. (2017). Morgan, John ; Hoffman, Mitchell ; Gerber, Alan ; Raymond, Collin .
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23071.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Risk aversion and bandwagon effect in the pivotal voter model. (2017). Grillo, Alberto.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0457-5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results. (2017). Martinelli, Cesar ; Palfrey, Thomas R.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gms:wpaper:1065.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems. (2017). Greiner, Ben ; Sastro, Anne ; Ambrus, Attila.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:34-48.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Norms in bargaining: evidence from government formation in Spain. (2017). Sanz, Carlos ; Fujiwara, Thomas.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bde:wpaper:1741.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Conformity in the lab. (2015). Goeree, Jacob ; Yariv, Leeat.
    In: Journal of the Economic Science Association.
    RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:1:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-015-0001-7.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule. (2015). Kartal, Melis.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:3:p:366-384.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. A passion for voting. (2015). Panova, Elena .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:44-65.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty. (2014). Li, Ming ; Degan, Arianna.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5014.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-12-24 05:13:00 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.