A passion for voting
Elena Panova
Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 90, issue C, 44-65
Abstract:
We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies.
Keywords: Expressive voting; Self-signaling; Ignorant voting; Habitual voting; Bandwagon and underdog effects; Information aggregation in elections; Status quo bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D71 D72 D82 D83 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:44-65
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.003
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