MoviEQ Workshop Facilitators

May 2006 Number 1
Darfur: Humanitarian Aid under Siege
Summary......................................................................................................................................... 2
Recommendations......................................................................................................................... 4
To the Government of Sudan................................................................................................. 4
To the SLA, JEM, and other rebel factions .......................................................................... 4
To the United Nations Security Council ............................................................................... 4
To the Donors........................................................................................................................... 5
To the African Union............................................................................................................... 5
Background .................................................................................................................................... 6
Humanitarian Access in the Context of Increasing Fighting and Insecurity ..................... 11
Sudanese Government Obstruction of Humanitarian Access............................................. 15
Government Intimidation of Aid Workers......................................................................... 16
Rebel Attacks on Humanitarian Agencies and Workers ....................................................... 22
Detention of relief workers ................................................................................................... 24
Interference with air access ...................................................................................................25
AMIS and Humanitarian Access............................................................................................... 25
Lack of Funding for Humanitarian Operations ..................................................................... 26
Humanitarian Access under International Humanitarian Law ............................................ 28
Summary
The Sudanese government and rebel groups in Darfur are hindering humanitarian
agencies from reaching hundreds of thousands of civilians dependent on international
aid in many areas of Darfur. In recent weeks, the situation has become critical, with the
U.N. estimating that at least 650,000 people are partly or wholly inaccessible to
international humanitarian agencies.
Since late 2005 an upsurge of insecurity from armed clashes and criminal activity has
caused humanitarian agencies to evacuate from many locations in Darfur and along the
Chad border. Insecurity stems from clashes between the warring parties, intra-rebel
rivalry, cross-border attacks by militia groups from Darfur into Chad, continuing attacks
on the civilian population, and rampant banditry. More than 200,000 people in Darfur
have been displaced from January through March 2006 alone and many of them are
located in areas that are not regularly accessible to aid agencies due to continuing
conflict.
Even in areas where access to civilians is secure, humanitarian agencies are faced with
increasing obstruction by Sudanese government policies and practices in Darfur. The
Sudanese government has a long record of deliberately restricting the activities of
international humanitarian agencies trying to assist civilians in conflict-affected areas of
Sudan. Under international pressure, special procedures for aid work were introduced in
Darfur in 2004 that facilitated the massive expansion of the aid effort. However the
Sudanese government is now steadily rolling back the gains that were made. In February
2006 the Sudanese government passed a new law regulating non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). There is increasing harassment, arbitrary detentions, and
intimidation of aid workers by government officials, and arbitrary administrative
regulations are affecting the humanitarian activities of many agencies working in Darfur,
even in areas that are secure.
The Darfur rebel movements and other armed groups, including bandits, are responsible
for a growing number of armed attacks on humanitarian convoys and other threats
against relief workers. Numerous vehicles have been looted from humanitarian agencies
and aid workers have been beaten or threatened in an increasing number of incidents
over the past months, rendering many roads, particularly in volatile West Darfur, “no-
go” areas for the U.N. and NGOs.
2
Under international humanitarian law (the laws of war), civilians suffering undue
hardship have the right to humanitarian relief. Parties to a conflict must allow rapid and
unimpeded access of aid from humanitarian agencies to such populations. Attacks on
humanitarian workers, infrastructure and objects used in relief operations, including
food and medicine, as well as deliberate impediments to relief efforts, are serious
violations of international humanitarian law and constitute war crimes. When such
obstruction is knowingly part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian
population, it can amount to crimes against humanity.
Since mid-2004, when the Sudanese government was pressured by the international
community into lifting its near total embargo on humanitarian activity in Darfur, there
has been a massively expanded relief effort in the region. As of April 2006, 14,000
emergency relief workers are engaged in efforts to save the lives of 3.5 million
Darfurians in need of humanitarian assistance. The recent, escalating trends of attacking
and obstructing humanitarian agencies threaten to undermine the survival of more than
three million people who are dependent on international aid.
Human Rights Watch urges the international community to take immediate steps to
protect civilians and ensure humanitarian access to all areas of Darfur. The United
Nations Security Council and the African Union (A.U.) must put intense pressure on the
government of Sudan to immediately remove all obstacles to humanitarian operations,
cease attacks on civilians, and facilitate both the current African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) and any future U.N. mission in Darfur. All individuals responsible for attacks on
civilians, including on humanitarian convoys, should also be placed under U.N.
sanctions.
Donor governments must meet their financial commitments to international

humanitarian organizations so that they can serve the needs of vulnerable groups,
particularly displaced persons in especially hazardous areas such as Jebel Marra and other
parts of West Darfur. Donors must also provide AMIS with the financial and logistical
assistance, including military helicopters, needed to protect civilians and secure roads for
humanitarian convoys. They must insist on an AMIS transition to a larger, more robust
U.N. force at the earliest feasible time, to reverse the tragic decline and save lives in
Darfur.
3
Recommendations
To the Government of Sudan

• Facilitate the full, safe, and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel and the
urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need in Darfur,
expedite entry visas and travel authorization for all humanitarian aid
organizations and workers, and fully cooperate with such organizations;
• Permit U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland and other diplomatic and aid officials full access
to Khartoum and Darfur;
• Maintain and fully implement the 2004 government moratorium on restrictions
on humanitarian work in Darfur and extend it to all of Sudan;
• Remove all regulations on the operations of national and international
nongovernmental organizations, including the 2006 NGO law, that place
unnecessary obstacles and constraints on humanitarian assistance, and desist
from bureaucratic and other obstruction of such operations;
• Remove all obstacles to, and cooperate fully with, the operations of AMIS, and
support the urgent transition of AMIS to a U.N. force;
• Cease to provide arms and logistical, financial, and other support to all militia
groups in Darfur and disarm them; and
• Take all necessary steps, including by issuing clear public orders to government
forces and police, including the Border Intelligence Patrol guards and
government-sponsored and supplied paramilitary and militia forces, to
immediately cease attacks on civilians, civilian property and humanitarian
operations.
To the SLA, JEM, and other rebel factions

• Stop all attacks on humanitarian convoys and humanitarian personnel and cease
interfering with the impartial distribution of humanitarian assistance; and
• Remove all obstacles to and cooperate fully with the operations of AMIS.
To the United Nations Security Council

• Demand that the government of Sudan facilitate the full, safe, and unimpeded
access of humanitarian personnel and the urgent delivery of humanitarian
assistance to all populations in need in Darfur, whether under government or
rebel control;
4
• Take all necessary measures to ensure the deployment of a U.N. force in Darfur
immediately upon, if not before, the September 30, 2006 expiry of the AMIS
mandate;
• In the interim period prior to a transition to a U.N. force, support the African
Union’s efforts in Darfur to reach full operational capacity and to robustly
interpret its mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, and urge
member states to provide AMIS with increased support for personnel,
equipment, and funding and other resources from national and multinational
forces to enable it to effectively protect civilians and humanitarian operations
pending transition;
• Extend targeted sanctions to Sudanese government officials, rebels and others
identified by the Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee of the Security
Council; and
• Extend the arms embargo from Darfur to cover all of Sudan.
To the Donors
• Insist that the government of Sudan facilitate the full, safe, and unimpeded
access of humanitarian personnel and the urgent delivery of humanitarian
assistance to all populations in need in Darfur, whether under government or
rebel control;
• Exert maximum political pressure on the government of Sudan to remove all
obstacles to, and cooperate fully with, the operations of AMIS and support the
urgent transition of AMIS to a U.N. force;
• Provide increased financial and technical resources to AMIS to ensure that it is
fully funded and able to robustly protect civilians and humanitarian operations,
and monitor an enhanced ceasefire agreement; and
• Ensure that humanitarian agencies operating in Darfur are adequately funded.
To the African Union

• Proactively and aggressively interpret AMIS’s mandate to protect civilians and
humanitarian operations;
• Work with donors and national and multinational forces urgently to secure
logistical and financial resources to support an increased force posture; and
• Deploy in each sector fully equipped quick reaction forces to respond
immediately to imminent threats to civilians and humanitarian operations,
including along the Chad-Sudan border.
5
Background
Since the armed conflict in Darfur began in early 2003 more than 200,000 civilians have
been killed and almost 2 million people have been displaced; the assets of this
population have been looted and the economy destroyed.1 An untold number of men,
women and children have been victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
“ethnic cleansing.”2
Sudan’s government blocked almost all international relief work in Darfur while its
counter-insurgency campaign of ethnic cleansing was in progress in 2003 and 2004. It
finally relented somewhat under heightened international pressure in mid-2004. At the
time, 1 million people were already internally displaced in Darfur. By mid-2005 the
number of displaced persons had almost doubled.
The 1.7 million displaced persons now in Darfur have been robbed and driven from
their homes and farms, and threatened with death by Janjaweed militias if they try to
return; an additional 208,000 are refugees in Chad.3 Also counting those in Darfur who,
although not displaced, have been impoverished by the collapse of the rural economy
caused by the continuing violence in the countryside, a total of 3.5 million Darfurians—
more than half of the region’s population—were in need of humanitarian assistance as
of early 2006.4
1
There are currently more than 1.7 million internally displaced persons in Darfur. UNHCR, “Protection and
Assistance to Refugees and IDPs in Darfur: 2006 Supplementary Appeal,” March 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/unhcr-sdn-09mar.pdf.
2
See Human Rights Watch, “Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan,” A Human Rights Watch Report,
vol. 16, no. 5(A), April 2004, [online] http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404; “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic
Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 16, no.
6(A), May 2004, [online] http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504; “Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy
of Militia Support,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, July 19, 2004, [online]
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/19/darfur9096.htm; “Empty Promises? Continuing Abuses in Darfur,
Sudan,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, August 11, 2004, [online]
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudan/2004; “If We Return We Will Be Killed,” A Human Rights Watch
Briefing Paper, November 15, 2004, [online] http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur1104; “Targeting the Fur:
Mass Killings in Darfur,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, January 24, 2005; “Sexual Violence and its
Consequences Among Displaced Persons in Darfur and Chad,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, April
12, 2005, [online] http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0505; “Entrenching Impunity: Government
Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 17, no. 17(A), December
2005, [online] http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205; “Sudan : Imperatives for Immediate Change,” A Human
Rights Watch Report, January 2006, vol. 18, no. 1(A), [online] http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106; and
“Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, no. 2, February
2006, [online] http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/chad0206/.
3
In December 2005 there were 1.8 million internally displaced. The number fluctuated slightly to 1.7 million in
early 2006, which relief officials believe may have represented a temporary return by some displaced to
villages. The total numbers used were 3.6 million in December 2005 and 3.5 million in 2006. The number of
residential (non-displaced) persons in need remained about 1.8 million.
4
U.N. OCHA, Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 22, Situation as of January 1, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/unmis-sdn-01jan.pdf.
6
Displaced persons (as well as many among the non-displaced in need), have missed the
2004 and 2005 planting seasons, and will miss a third which begins in May 2006. A mere
4 percent of households in Darfur are now able to feed themselves from their own food
production.5 Nomads and their herds have deliberately trampled, eaten, and destroyed
crops throughout Darfur, unconstrained by any opposition from the expelled farmers or
law enforcement. They have moved herds into particularly desirable and fertile localities
in central Darfur. The nomads are suffering as well. Rebel forces mistrustful of these
herders, from whom the government has recruited its Janjaweed militias, have blocked
livestock migration routes.
The traditional “hunger gap” before the harvest—when stored food is exhausted—starts
soon, and the heavy rains that fill the wadis (dry river beds) with flash floods should
begin in June-July 2006 with the rainy season lasting from July to September. Darfur’s
roads will become impassible in many locations, at the height of the lean season.
Humanitarian aid workers seek to preposition supplies for at-risk populations in advance
of the rains, but insecurity and a shortage of donor funding will hinder this life-saving
measure this year.
Deteriorating security is the result of several factors. Periodically during the African
Union-sponsored Darfur peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, that started in 2004, both the
government and rebels have tried to improve their bargaining positions through military
advances on the ground. Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed militias have
responded to rebel attacks on government targets with further attacks on and reprisals
against civilians. Clashes between rival factions of the Sudan Liberation
Army/Movement (SLA/M) have arisen from time to time and rebels have become a
regular source of harassment and robbery of relief convoys. These attacks on convoys
traveling Darfur’s roads have left many areas “no-go” for humanitarian agencies, adding
to the climate of insecurity.
Clashes between the warring parties and attacks on villages and towns have occasionally
forced relief organizations to withdraw their staff. For instance, in January 2006,
insecurity as well as local government regulations limited relief operations outside Fashir,
the capital of North Darfur.6 Insecurity has also had a negative impact on South Darfur,
5
World Food Programme, “Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Sudan,”
February 15, 2006, [online] http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/YAOI-6M35CE?OpenDocument.
6
U.N. Joint Logistics Centre Sudan, Bulletin 72, January 2006, [online]
http://www.unjlc.org/14717/18256/bulletin72.
7
where, according to U.N. statistics, less than two-thirds of the conflict-affected
population is accessible to relief agencies.7
Nowhere is Sudan’s humanitarian crisis as acute as in West Darfur, where the U.N.
estimates that 716,000 people have been uprooted and taken refuge in internally
displaced persons camps over the past two-and-a-half years.8 Since late 2005, there have
been serious armed clashes in all three Darfur states, but some of the most intense
fighting has taken place in West Darfur, where the security situation is complicated by
the sheer multiplicity of armed groups. Some 60,000 new forced displacements took
place in West Darfur in March alone due to sustained violence.9
The security situation in West Darfur has been steadily deteriorating for some time. The
U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) was forced to resort to costly and inefficient
airdrops to remote parts of Jebel Marra as long ago as July 2005.10 As a result of
persistent government, bandit, and rebel attacks endangering humanitarian operations,
on January 3, 2006, the U.N. imposed a Phase IV Security Level in many areas of West
Darfur, north and south of the state capital Geneina: Phase IV is the U.N.’s most
stringent security restriction short of total evacuation.11 All U.N. workers not responsible
for urgent, life-saving needs, evacuated; some NGO staff also left. (For successive
restrictions on U.N. movements around Geneina in the preceding months, see below.)
The security situation in West Darfur deteriorated to the point that even the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) temporarily suspended some of its
activities outside Geneina in February 2006 for lack of sufficient security guarantees for
7
United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” October 14, 2005,
[online] http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/543/85/PDF/N0554385.pdf? OpenElement. The air
travel option is limited by the prohibitive costs and decreased cargo capacity. Carlos Veloso, the WFP
emergency coordinator for Darfur, said in March 2006 that if food aid could not reach isolated communities by
road, it would be dropped by parachute. But one airdrop costs as much as five truckloads of food and it can only
deliver grain rations for 200 people per trip. Dan Morrison, “Darfur’s turn for the worse,” Christian Science
Monitor, March 10, 2006, [online] http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0310/p01s04-woaf.html. Half of Oxfam’s
Darfur programs must be accessed by air because of security problems. Oxfam press release, Jeremy Hobbs,
“In Darfur, time is running out,” op ed, March 10, 2006, [online]
http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/oped060310_AMIS.
8
OCHA, “Sudan Humanitarian Overview,” Volume 1, Issue 2, September 15 – October 15, 2005, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6K297K?OpenDocument.
9
Human Rights Watch telephone interview from New York with international humanitarian aid official, March 29,
2006.
10
United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” August 11, 2005,
[online] http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/459/53/PDF/N0545953.pdf?OpenElement.
11
United Nations Joint Logistics Center, “Bulletin 72 - January 2006,” [online]
http://www.unjlc.org/14717/18256/bulletin72.
8
its field teams (see also below).12 The ICRC operates pursuant to security agreements it
negotiates directly with the parties, and is often able to go where other agencies cannot.
Statistics compiled by U.N. OCHA reflect the precipitous drop in U.N. humanitarian
access to the population in need in West Darfur: from 100 percent access in April 2005
to less than 90 percent in August 2005 to less than 50 percent in December 2005.13 By
January 2006, fewer than 40 percent of the people in need in West Darfur were within
reach of humanitarian aid according to U.N. security standards.14
Humanitarian access is extremely difficult in Jebel Marra,15 the mountainous area in the
center of Darfur that was the region’s breadbasket before Darfur was turned into a
killing field. Jebel Marra is considered an SLA stronghold.16 It was the historical bastion
of the Fur people, with rugged terrain that is easy to defend and hard to capture.17
Rebels groups that only operate in West Darfur, particularly the rebel National
Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD),18 have contributed to conflict and
insecurity in West Darfur, notably by harassing AMIS forces. The NMRD, led by Col.
Djibril Abdul Kareem Badri, is thought to be responsible for several attacks on AMIS
forces in the NMRD-held area of Jebel Moon, West Darfur, some of them deadly.19 The
Special Representative of the Chairman of the A.U. Commission in Sudan, Ambassador
Baba Gana Kingibe, said that a breakaway faction of the JEM working with the NMRD
abducted members of the Senegalese contingent of AMIS on October 9, 2005, in Tine,
West Darfur. No fatalities were suffered, but AMIS vehicles and equipment were stolen
by the attackers. The NMRD claimed responsibility for an attack on an AMIS patrol on
12
ICRC News, “Bulletin No.06/39 – Sudan,” February 15, 2006, [online]
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/Sudan-bulletin-150206?OpenDocument&style=custo_print.
13
U.N. OCHA, “Sudan Humanitarian Overview,” Vol. 2, Issue 2, February 1 – March 1, 2006; U.N. OCHA,
“Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 22, Situation as of January 1, 2006,” [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/unmis-sdn-01jan.pdf.
14
U.N. OCHA, “Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 22,” Khartoum, Sudan, January 1, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6MNA4G?OpenDocument.
15
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with international humanitarian aid official, March 23, 2006.
16
Disputes over land in Jebel Marra that predate the present conflict engendered local Fur self-defense groups
that later formed part of the SLA. Currently, the dominant Sudanese rebel group in eastern Jebel Marra is the
Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nour faction of the SLA; Abdel Wahid is Fur.
17
The Jebel Marra region was split among the three states of Darfur when these were created in 1996.
According to many Fur leaders, this was done in order to divide the Fur population between three different
administrative entities and thus weaken the dominance of this numerically strong ethnic group. The Fur ruled
the DarFur sultanate for hundreds of years before the British annexed Darfur to its Anglo-Egyptian
Condominium in 1916 to secure its flanks during World War I.
18
The NMRD entered into a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the Sudanese government, but announced that
since it was not a party to the Abuja peace talks, it would not respect the April 2004 ceasefire agreement.
19
On November 29, 2005, an AMIS patrol was attacked in the Kulbus area of West Darfur and five soldiers
were injured; Colonel. Djibril claimed responsibility. On January 6, 2006, ten AMIS soldiers were wounded and
one killed in another attack in West Darfur. An AMIS investigation placed responsibility for that attack on
Colonel Djibril and the NMRD.
9
November 29 in the Kulbus area of West Darfur, in which five AMIS soldiers were
injured.20
The NMRD, which is itself a splinter from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), is
suspected of receiving support from the Chadian government.21 The Chadian
government and the Sudanese government have accused each other of sponsoring anti-
government rebel groups. On April 25, the Security Council, with China, Russia and
Qatar abstaining, voted to impose targeted sanctions on Colonel Djibril and three others
(an SLA commander, a Janjaweed leader and a former Sudanese government military
commander) implicated in violating international law and Security Council resolutions
banning arms traffic to Darfur, among other things.22
Chadian rebels, also absent from North and South Darfur, are located in many remote
bases scattered throughout West Darfur.23 The Chadian rebel presence has generated
fighting in West Darfur, further impeding humanitarian access there, and there was a
direct violation of existing humanitarian access arrangements when, prior to a November
18, 2005, offensive in West Darfur purportedly against Chadian army deserters,24 the
Sudanese government sealed off the Jebel Moon area on the Chadian border.25
Events moved swiftly in the lead-up to an African Union-imposed deadline of April 30

for the conclusion of peace talks in Abuja. On April 13, Chadian rebels attacked the
Chadian capital N’Djamena, trying to oust President Idriss Déby before the May 3
elections. On April 14, 2006, President Déby accused the Sudanese government of
20
United Nations, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” January 30, 2006, [online]
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/225/76/PDF/N0622576.pdf?OpenElement.
21
U.N. Security Council, “Report of Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1591
(2005) concerning the Sudan,” January 30, 2006, S/2006/65, [online] at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/632/74/PDF/N0563274.pdf?OpenElement
22
“Security Council Imposes Travel, Financial Sanctions on 4 Sudanese,” SC/8700, April 25, 2006.
23
Chad, one of the world’s poorest countries, stands to receive billions of dollars in oil money, with the bulk of
the income earmarked for social programs pursuant to a World Bank revenue management program. Chad’s
President Idriss Déby diverted oil revenue intended for the social programs in November, leading the World
Bank to freeze certain revenue payments. In November 2005, a rash of high-level defections from Chad’s army
occurred at the same time that Zaghawa relatives of Déby took up arms as SCUD to demand a share of the oil
bonan za. See Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Bleeds.”
24
This action purportedly against Chadian army deserters occurred only a matter of weeks before Chad
declared a “state of belligerence” with Sudan on December 23, 2005. The history of successive breaches and
mends in relations between Chad and Sudan over support for rebels against each other’s governments is noted
in Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Bleeds.” For comment on the mid-April 2006 Sudanese-backed Chadian rebel
attempt to seize power in Chad, see “Chad: Rebel Offensive Poses Risk of Ethnic Reprisal,” Human Rights
Watch press release, April 13, 2006, [online] http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/04/13/chad13172.htm.
25
United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” January 30, 2006,
10
supporting the Chadian rebels and broke off relations with Sudan.26 The African Union
is investigating these charges.
On April 23, Osama bin Laden echoed the call by Sudanese President Omar El Bashir
for Islamists to go to Darfur to fight against any possible U.N. peacekeeping force,
which they termed “foreign invaders” engaged in an anti-Muslim campaign.27 The
Sudanese government rejected bin Laden’s support but did not withdraw its call for
Islamists to oppose any U.N. military operations in Darfur—which are still under
consideration by the U.N. Security Council for deployment, possibly when the African
Union forces’ mandate lapses on September 30, 2006.
Clashes increased on the ground in Darfur in late April. On April 24, the Sudanese
government attacked a rebel-controlled area of South Darfur, utilizing Antonovs, attack
helicopters and local militias, all in violation of its own commitments to refrain from
using offensive military power.28 Observers feared the attack might be a prelude to
further attacks, including on Greida, an SLA-held town where almost 100,000 displaced
civilians from the region had gathered.29 As of May 4, the deadline for negotiations in
Abuja had been extended twice as mediators struggled to reconcile the demands of the
warring parties.
Humanitarian Access in the Context of Increasing Fighting and

Insecurity
The massive relief operation underway in Darfur—amidst ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity—far surpasses the humanitarian effort launched during the 1980s
drought30 and is the largest operation for several of the leading international
humanitarian agencies.31 There are now thirteen United Nations agencies and eighty-four
26
“Chad breaks off diplomatic ties with Sudan,” Associated Press, April 14, 2006 at
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15053.
27
Alastair Lyon, “Analysis: Bin Laden call for Darfur jihad clouds UN mission,” Reuters, April 24, 2006, at
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L2424302.htm. See also Sudan Tribune, "Darfur will be foreign
troops’ graveyard - Bashir," February 26, 2006, [online]
28
“Government Offensive Threatens Darfur Civilians,” Human Rights Watch press release, April 27, 2006,
[online] http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/04/26/sudan13276.htm.
29
“Government offensive raises fears of attack on Gereida,” IRIN, May 2, 2006 at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/RURI-6PEL2S?OpenDocument&rc=1&emid=ACOS-635PJQ.
30
Alex de Waal, “Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan,” (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005).
31
Sudan is ICRC’s largest program, with Darfur accounting for a considerable proportion of the organization’s
budget and human resources. See “Overview of the ICRC’s operations in 2006,” ICRC, December 9, 2005, at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/appeals-overview-
091205/$File/icrc_overview_appeal_2006.pdf Sudan was also the largest country operation for Médecins sans
Frontières in 2005. See the MSF activity report [online]
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/i2005/factsandfigures2005.pdf.
11
nongovernmental organizations in Darfur, in total deploying 14,000 relief workers, most
of them Sudanese nationals. The humanitarian operation succeeded in preventing
massive deaths in 2005, and in bringing about a dramatic improvement in acute
malnutrition rates among children in Darfur.32
Village by village, district by district, however, civilians in Darfur have been isolated by
the persistent increase in fighting and criminal violence since late 2005. A significant
portion of Darfur’s population lives in scattered no-man’s lands, run by the rule of the
gun.
The case of Golo/Rokero described below is one of many areas in dire need as
humanitarian agencies have been unable to obtain sustained access because of security
concerns. There are many others: another example is in Aro Sharow, where Arab militias
attacked a displaced persons camp and the villages of Gosmino and Ardja in the Kulbus
area of West Darfur (northwest of Jebel Marra) on September 28, 2005, reportedly
leaving thirty-four civilians dead and ten wounded, and forcing more than 4,000 villagers
to flee.33 At this writing, approximately eight months on, the displaced in that area have
received no food distribution since the attack, and water supplies are limited. The
government made only a feeble gesture at investigating the attack—one visit in eight
months.34
North-eastern Jebel Marra, particularly the rural council districts of Golo and Rokero in
West Darfur, witnessed heavy fighting in December 2005 and January 2006, and then
throughout March. Security conditions are now so poor that no humanitarian
organization has been able to establish a regular presence in those two areas since mid-
January.35 According to a humanitarian worker, food aid has not reached approximately
63,000 displaced persons in the Golo area since the January fighting.36
Since December 2005 there have been serious clashes in eastern Jebel Marra between the
government forces at the Rokero base in this district together with their Janjaweed allies,
and the SLA rebels who claim to control the area. The fighting has ranged over an
extended area and many villages have been burned; thousands have been freshly
displaced. On December 24, 2006, an SLA ambush of a government convoy near
32
World Food Programme, “Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Sudan,”
February 15, 2006, [online] http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/YAOI-6M35CE?OpenDocument.
33
See “Sudan: U.N. expresses concern over attack on Darfur IDP camp, IRIN, September 30, 2005, [online]
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49302.
34
Confidential communication, Human Rights Watch, March 24, 2006.
35
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with international humanitarian aid official, March 23, 2006.
36
Ibid.
12
Rokero left at least fifteen people dead, including eight government soldiers and some
civilians. In retaliation, government-backed militia apparently attacked several villages in
the area over the next few days and burned the market in Rokero, displacing thousands
of civilians.37 On January 23, 2006, a force of 160 SLA rebels attacked government
positions in Golo, killing twenty police officers and wounding sixteen others.38 The
Sudanese government responded to the attack by sending in reinforcements, including
Janjaweed militia from Kebkabiya and Guildo. The fighting continued for several days.
A U.N. helicopter evacuating sixteen humanitarian staff from three organizations

working in Golo under the protection of AMIS came under fire on January 25.39 The
helicopter crashed in the nearby town of Daya, possibly due to mechanical failure, killing
one passenger, a Sudanese national working as a nutritionist.40
The violence escalated again in March and has spread to dozens of villages in eastern
Jebel Marra, displacing tens of thousands of people, many of them already previously
displaced. According to an eyewitness, hundreds of government soldiers and allied Arab
militias raided and attacked a total of seventy villages in eastern Jebel Marra in mid-
March 2006, hitting Tibon and nearby Daya in the heart of SLA territory on March 16.41
As a result of the continuing attacks, no humanitarian organization has been able to

maintain a regular presence in Jebel Marra.42 While at least three organizations have
visited either Golo town or rural areas in eastern Jebel Marra since January, the visits
were only to conduct assessments, and little or no aid was dispensed to civilians.
According to one account, both Golo and Rokero are effectively surrounded by SLA
positions and checkpoints, and roadblocks have effectively closed off vehicle access to
the area; the same report confirmed the presence of large numbers of displaced persons
in need of assistance.43
37
Confidential communications to Human Rights Watch, January 6 and January 30,2006.
38
The same day SLA fighters also ambushed a convoy of eighty commercial trucks escorted by police from
Fashir to Kebkabiya, North Darfur, located northwest of Golo. United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report
of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” March 9, 2006, [online]
39
For one relief agency, it was the third time it had been evacuated in eighteen months of working in Golo.
Human Rights Watch telephone interview, March 23, 2006.
40
United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” March 9, 2006, [online]
41
Confidential communication, Human Rights Watch, March 20, 2006.
42
UNHCR, “Sudan Operations: Sudan/Chad Situation Update 52,” March 23, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LTIO-6NAMZR?OpenDocument.
43
UNHCR, “Sudan Operations: Sudan/Chad Situation Update 50,” March 9, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6MVMR7?OpenDocument.
13
In April, the ICRC managed to assess parts of the Jebel Marra region, but noted that
most of the north and central region remained inaccessible and that people living in the
southwest had not received any assistance for months.44 The onset of the rains will likely
make it even more difficult for aid agencies to locate and assist communities who have
fled even further into the mountains.
Insecurity on major roads has been a chronic problem in Darfur, but since September
2005 banditry on the roads has made humanitarian work exponentially more difficult,
with armed hijackings of commercial and humanitarian trucks rendering the movement
of supplies increasingly erratic and sometimes impossible.45 Standard procedure for
vehicle travel in conflict zones involves arranging security guarantees with armed groups
in contested areas—these, in theory, ensure safe passage for non-combatants—but in
the words of one relief worker in West Darfur, “You can get a green light from the
parties, but there are no interlocutors with the bandits.”46
Banditry and hijackings along the main roads leading from Geneina to the rest of West
Darfur reached such dire levels in September47 that all roads leading south, west and east
of the town were declared off-limits to U.N. staff.48 The next month, all roads leading
out of Geneina were declared open to U.N. staff, but only with an armed escort.49 The
consequent limited freedom of movement for this staff affected the delivery of
assistance, and U.N. helicopters were brought to Geneina to transport personnel and
deliver humanitarian assistance.
Although the ICRC is usually able to arrange security guarantees from all relevant
parties, one of its field teams was attacked and robbed of cash and valuables by bandits
south of Geneina in October.50 On November 1, an ICRC field-assessment team in two
44
“Clashes displace tens of thousands in Darfur’s Jebel Marra,” IRIN, April 19, 2006, [online]
45
Human Rights Watch telephone interview from New York with international humanitarian aid official, March
29, 2006.
46
23, 2006.
47
On September 1, 2005, seven international humanitarian vehicles traveling in a convoy from Beida to
Geneina via Kango Haraza and Masteri in West Darfur were attacked by some twenty men in uniform who were
described as “bandits” and “suspected of being affiliated with unidentified warring parties.” The attackers looted
the vehicles, ordered the humanitarian staff to lie down on the ground, beat them with sticks and rifle butts and
threatened that they would be killed if they were to travel that road again. Seventeen people were injured in the
incident. Refugees International, “No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” November
9, 2005, [online] http://www.refugeesinternational.org/section/publications/au_darfur/.
47
49
OCHA, “UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs update,” October 12, 2005.
50
ICRC News, “Sudan Bulletin No. 35,” October 27, 2005, [online]
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/sudan-news-271005.
14
vehicles on its way to provide (among other things) post-operative care to war-wounded
civilians was ambushed while traveling to the north of Seleah in West Darfur. Its
vehicles were stolen and its staffers were robbed and left stranded on the roadside.51
The ICRC temporarily suspended its activities in Seleah and continues to limit its
movements in certain areas.
Sudanese Government Obstruction of Humanitarian Access
At the heart of the Sudanese government’s counterinsurgency strategy against rebels in

Darfur has been a policy of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing against
Darfur’s civilian population whom Khartoum considers “the enemy” because they are of
the same ethnicity as the rebels. This strategy has included “scorched earth” tactics and
a multitude of official restrictions, harassment and intimidation against international
relief agencies and their staffers seeking to bring humanitarian aid to those put at risk.
By doing so, the Sudanese government has both instigated the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur and prevented its resolution.
Khartoum has long been hostile to the presence of international relief agencies in Sudan.
Its crackdowns and bureaucratic campaign of attrition are a continuing problem for the
independent humanitarian aid agencies operating in Sudan, both international and
Sudanese.52
Aid workers trying to provide assistance in southern Sudan are familiar with a wide range
of Sudanese government strategies to delay, limit, and deny access by humanitarian
agencies to civilians in need of assistance during the civil war in the south. Flight bans,
denials or massive delays in the processing of travel permits, limitations on the numbers
of staff and unnecessarily bureaucratic or arbitrary procedures for importing and
transporting relief materials have all been “classic” Sudanese government tactics to
restrict aid to civilian populations. Over the past sixteen years, these policies have
contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of people from famine and diseases.53
Under heavy international pressure and media attention, in mid-2004 the Sudanese
government established a new administrative system for Darfur, a system designed to
51
ICRC News, “Sudan Bulletin No. 36,” November 16, 2005, [online]
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/sudan-news-161105.
52
Since the 1989 coup, the Sudanese government has imposed massive bureaucratic obstacles on
independent organizations while supporting programs of Islamic organizations.
53
Human Rights Watch, Famine in Sudan, 1998: The Human Rights Causes, (New York: Human Rights
Watch: February 1999).
15
expedite the visa and travel permit process through a moratorium on the usual
administrative procedures.54 This system included a pledge to permit “freedom of
movement for aid workers throughout Darfur.”55 To a large extent, this new process
heavily contributed to the massive increase in humanitarian personnel and programs in
Darfur in 2004 and 2005.
Since early 2005, however, the improvements were balanced by a new policy of
increased harassment and intimidation of aid workers in Darfur. In addition, since early
2006, the Sudanese government has reverted to many of its usual practices of
administrative delay and harassment, despite its own pledge to extend the moratorium,
not just in Darfur but throughout Sudan.
Government Intimidation of Aid Workers

Since the massive relief effort began in Darfur in 2004, the government has tried to
intimidate aid workers and organizations with threats and arrests of national and
international staff. In a practice that has euphemistically been referred to as
“administrative harassment,” international and Sudanese staff working for NGOs have
been detained by Sudanese security officials, often on specious grounds.
Many of the incidents appear to be targeted at organizations that provide services to, or
publicly advocate on behalf of, civilians displaced by the conflict and by the ethnic
cleansing that has taken place. It is difficult to ascertain the precise number of incidents;
many organizations fear that if they speak publicly about the incidents they will
jeopardize their operational access to the populations in need. Several dozen aid workers
at a minimum have been directly affected by the government’s harassment, but the
practice has had a broader impact on all of those involved in relief operations in Darfur.
54
The moratorium was included in the Joint Communiqué between the Sudanese government and the United
Nations, signed on July 3, 2004.
55
The text of the Joint Communiqué states that the Sudanese government commits to:
Implement a ‘moratorium on restrictions' for all humanitarian work in Darfur, and remove any other obstacles to
humanitarian work, including:
• Suspension of visa restrictions for all humanitarian workers and permitting freedom of movement for
aid workers throughout Darfur;
• Permitting immediate temporary NGO registration through a simple notification process that OCHA
will offer to manage on behalf of NGOs; permanent registration shall be processed within 90 days;
and
• Suspension of all restrictions for the importation and use of all humanitarian assistance materials,
transport vehicles, aircraft and communication equipment.
16
Between December 2004 and April 2005 alone, at least twenty aid workers were arrested
or detained, mainly in South Darfur.56 In May 2005, local Sudanese government
authorities arrested and charged two aid workers from Médecins sans Frontières with
publishing false information after the humanitarian medical organization published a
report on conflict-related rape in Darfur.57 On October 23, 2005, government police and
national security officials arrested at gunpoint two national staff members at an
international organization’s compound in Kalma internally displaced persons camp,
South Darfur.58 In North Darfur in February 2006, a United Nations staff member was
detained and questioned by security personnel after returning from a security meeting
with the SLA,59 a routine procedure to coordinate and protect relief work in rebel-held
areas.
Militias sometimes block relief going to civilians in rebel-controlled areas. For instance,
in Jebel Marra, relief workers reported that government-backed Janjaweed militias
interdicted relief organizations trying to re-establish services to the displaced in early
2006, because the militias consider the displaced in eastern Jebel Marra to be “rebels”
and are resentful of seeing relief going to them.60
Arbitrary Government Restrictions on Freedom of Movement

As noted above, in July 2004, the government of Sudan committed to a moratorium on
restrictions for humanitarian work in Darfur in the context of its Joint Communiqué
with the U.N. and it recently pledged to renew the moratorium until January 30, 2007.61
The moratorium was intended to remove obstacles to humanitarian work, including:
suspension of visa restrictions for all humanitarian workers and permitting freedom of
movement for aid workers throughout Darfur.62
56
“Darfur: Aid Workers Under Threat,” Human Rights Watch Press Release, April 5, 2005, [online]
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/05/darfur10417.htm.
57
“Second Sudan Aid Worker Arrested,” BBC News, May 31, 2005, [online]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4595911.stm; “Darfur: Arrest War Criminals, Not Aid Worker,” Human Rights
Watch Press Release, May 31, 2005, [online] http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/05/31/sudan11043_txt.htm.
After considerable international pressure, the charges were eventually dropped.
58
59
60
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with international relief organization, March 23, 2006; confidential
communication, Human Rights Watch, March 24, 2006. Attacks on civilians by these pro-government militias
have continued in West Darfur and elsewhere throughout the ceasefire period.
61
U.N. OCHA, “Fact Sheet on Access Restrictions in Darfur and Other Areas of Sudan,” April 20, 2006.
62
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/262/59/PDF/N0626259.pdf?OpenElement. Among other
unimplemented provisions, the Moratorium also was supposed to permit immediate temporary NGO registration
through a simple notification process that OCHA would manage on behalf of NGOs; and permanent registration
to be processed within ninety days.
17
Yet despite giving this and other guarantees of “free access” to Darfur for humanitarian
workers, Khartoum and state-level governments frequently place arbitrary constraints on
aid workers in Darfur by dubious administrative delays and red tape related to visa
extensions, identity documents, and travel permits.63 In a March 2006 statement,
Gemmo Lodesani, the OCHA Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, faulted
Sudanese authorities for “inconsistency in granting access, delays in visa deliveries, [and]
unreasonable reporting requests followed by suspension of access or programmes for
lack of compliance.”64
In January 2006 a number of international humanitarian agencies were denied access in

Darfur and had their travel permits revoked following an ad hoc request by the Sudanese
government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC, the national relief coordination
agency that is the liaison with international NGOs), that agencies submit questionnaires
providing detailed financial information pertaining to their operations.65 In some
locations, the request was extended to U.N. agencies.66 While it is legitimate for the
Sudanese government to request basic financial and operational information from aid
agencies running programs in Sudan, such requests have often been the way for the
Sudanese government to target and restrict specific agencies or relief activities in
particular areas.
In another example of harassment, the HAC official in Garsila (Wadi Salih locality)
insisted on charging fees for the issuance of identification cards to international NGO
staff. This was despite an official letter from HAC in Zalingei, dated March 13,
requesting that HAC officials in Wadi Salih, Mukjar and Jebel Marra localities not charge
any fees.67 While this may appear to be an isolated bureaucratic incident, it is part of a
much larger pattern of constant problems over visas, travel permits to Darfur, travel
permits within Darfur, limitations on items and quantities that can be shipped to Darfur,
and a host of other regulations whose purpose seems to be to deny rather than facilitate
access, such as the HAC’s March 11 announcement that international nongovernmental
63
International humanitarian law provides for the freedom of movement of humanitarian relief workers and aid—
see the final section of this report. But because the parties to the conflict have yet to agree upon Darfur-wide
rules for the travel of humanitarian staff, relief workers must depend on ad hoc decisions of local and state
officials, as well as by local rebel commanders. This patchwork of rules that are always subject to change adds
to the risk faced by relief workers.
64
OCHA, “Sudan Humanitarian Overview,” Vol. 2, Issue 1, January 1 – February 1, 2006, [online]
http://unjobs.org/news/1139923318.49.
65
66
The HAC, part of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, is mandated to partner with international organizations
in relief efforts, and works as liaison between international organizations and internally displaced persons
camps in Sudan.
67
United Nations, “United Nations Situation Report,” March 20, 2006, [online]
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/darfur/uploads/situation/unsitreps/2006/march/Sit%20Rep%20for%2020%20M
ar%2006.doc.
18
organizations could only transport three barrels of fuel per trip “to reduce losses in case
fuel is looted by the SLA.”68 Relief workers frequently comment that Sudan is the
hardest “emergency” situation in which to help those in need.
Government officials at the local, state and national levels frequently threaten to prevent
agencies from having access to civilians in need in Darfur—and those threats have been
carried out, sometimes in a very high-profile fashion. On April 2 the Sudanese
government barred the plane of U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland from
landing in Khartoum or Darfur for a previously agreed upon visit, for patently specious
reasons,69 and also prohibited the plane from flying over Sudanese airspace to reach the
refugee camps for Darfurians in Chad.
The next day, April 3, the Sudanese government expelled the Norwegian Refugee
Council (NRC), a key operating agency in Darfur. The NRC managed and coordinated
the largest internally displaced camp in Darfur, Kalma camp (outside Nyala, South
Darfur), housing 100,000 people. At a meeting in South Darfur, the authorities told the
NRC to end all humanitarian operations in Darfur and leave. The government gave no
reason for refusing to renew the mandate, and at this writing, has not provided the
requested written confirmation.70
The Sudanese government appeared to back down on Egeland’s visit, and claimed, after
protests from the U.N. Secretary-General and others, that the visit was only
“postponed.”71 Egeland responded, “I cannot go now. This is not a game. This is
serious humanitarian work. . . . I had agreed on a time with them and I cannot just come
and go when they please.”72 The U.N. Security Council, in a presidential statement, later
expressed its regret for the decision of the Sudanese government not to renew the
68
United Nations, “United Nations Sudan Situation Report,” March 12, 2006.
69
The reasons given by a changing cast of spokesmen have varied from a statement presented by Sudan’s
state minister for foreign affairs, Al-Samani Al-Wasleea, citing “internal reasons” that required a ten-day
postponement (“Sudan says will Allow UN official to visit Darfur,” Sudan Tribune (Khartoum)/Associated Press,
April 5, 2006, [online] http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14893), to Foreign Ministry
spokesman Jamal Ibrahim saying: “Because of the special circumstances of the birthday of the Prophet
Mohammad, the local authorities said it was not advisable to welcome him at this time” (Anna Willard, “After
visit blocked, UN’s Egeland mulls Sudan return,” Reuters, April 5, 2006, [online]
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L05400922.htm). Other pretexts given for the postponement of
Egeland’s Darfur visit include his Norwegian nationality (following the controversy over cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammad printed by a Danish newspaper and reprinted in Norway) and the closure of airports in Darfur for
maintenance. See Willard, “After visit blocked, UN’s Egeland mulls Sudan return.”
70
“Norwegian NRC must leave Darfur displaced camp,” Sudan Tribune, citing Norwegian Refugee Council
Press Release, April 3, 2006, [online] http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14855; Norwegian
Refugee Council, “NRC forced out of Darfur,” April 5, 2006, [online] http://www.nrc.no/forcedoutdarfur.htm.
71
United Nations, “Statement of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the Planned Visit of USG Jan
Egeland to Darfur,” April 4, 2006, [online] http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1975.
72
Anna Willard, “After visit blocked, UN’s Egeland mulls Sudan return,” Reuters, April 5, 2006, [online]
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L05400922.htm.
19
NRC’s contract and to deny Egeland’s entry to Darfur; it called on the government to
explain its reasons for doing so.73 As of the writing of this report, Egeland was scheduled
to visit Sudan, including Darfur, on May 6.
Egeland is far from being the only official or representative of a foreign government to
whom the Sudanese authorities has denied access for transparently false reasons. One of
many such events was in late March when the foreign minister of Sweden was barred
from traveling to Darfur to assess the deteriorating humanitarian situation—although
she had been previously cleared for travel there. Notwithstanding the same excuses
being offered by the Sudanese government as for refusing Egeland, she said she believed
the decision was really linked to Sweden’s actions in the U.N. to send U.N. peacekeepers
to Darfur.74
The prospect of the transfer of civilian protection duties from AMIS forces to a U.N.
protection force may be one reason for Khartoum’s mounting hostility to international
representatives since early 2006.75
At the heart of this hostility is the U.N. Security Council’s March 2005 referral of the
international crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for
investigation. Underlying Khartoum’s opposition to a U.N. protection force in Darfur
appears to be apprehension that the U.N. force would enforce ICC arrest warrants. The
U.N. Security Council’s Commission of Inquiry (January 2005) and the Panel of Experts
of the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee on Darfur (December 2005) have
implicated many Sudanese government officials in crimes against humanity and war
crimes. While ICC warrants have not been issued against Sudanese government officials,
the government has adamantly refused to cooperate with an ICC investigation—and is
no doubt equally adamant about blocking potential process servers—even if that means
hindering humanitarian assistance to Darfur’s millions in need.
Following the report of the U.N. Independent Commission of Inquiry in January 2005,
high-ranking Sudanese government officials made statements threatening the safety of
international staff in Darfur in the event of ICC prosecutions of Sudanese officials who
73
U.N. Security Council, “Presidential Statement,” SC/8688, April 11, 2006, [online]
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8688.doc.htm.
74
The excuses, after her arrival in Khartoum, used to revoke her permission for Darfur travel were the Prophet
Mohammad’s birthday and the Danish cartoons. “Swedish foreign minister barred from Darfur,” Mail & Guardian
Online, Johannesburg, South Africa, March 29, 2006, [online]
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=268019&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__africa/.
75
Officially, the Sudanese government says it would welcome a U.N. peacekeeping force, but only after a
peace agreement. As the government is a party to the peace talks, it is in a position to prevent and delay an
agreement indefinitely.
20
might be accused of war crimes.76 Although the humanitarian organizations are not
affiliated, directly or indirectly, with the ICC, to Sudanese officials they seem to
represent the “international community.” These government threats have placed
frontline international relief workers in jeopardy of the most immediate retaliation for
any action towards international prosecution of Sudanese government suspects for
alleged international crimes in Darfur.
Government’s Restrictive New NGO Law

The Sudanese government erected another considerable structural obstacle to
humanitarian and development activities in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan when on
February 21, the legislature passed the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary
Work Act, 2006, informally known as the “NGO Law.” It requires, among other things,
that nongovernmental organizations register with the government’s Humanitarian Aid
Commission. This gives HAC a gatekeeper’s role over which organizations are allowed
to work in Sudan and which are not.
In itself, registration is not objectionable—every country has some administrative

regulations on organizations working there. But the HAC has played an obstructive role
in administering and coordinating international relief in Sudan since its inception. It and
its predecessor agency constricted relief deliveries during the north-south war and in
Khartoum, where many southerners fled during that war. Many HAC personnel have a
security, not a relief, background.77 Examples of its obstructive approach in Darfur are
noted above.
The NGO Law effectively blocks all avenues of appeal against denials of applications for
registration by HAC. Because of the lack of an appeal mechanism before an impartial
body and hence the potential for unchecked arbitrary action, the law violates the right to
freedom of association.78
Just before the NGO Law went into effect the Sudan Social Development Organisation
(SUDO), a Sudanese nongovernmental organization operating in Darfur, was being
harassed by HAC pursuant to a slightly less stringent 1999 law. SUDO’s regional
director was summoned by Sudanese security officials in Geneina, West Darfur, on
February 20, 2006, for questioning about his background, the alleged political activities
76
Human Rights Watch telephone interviews, Khartoum, May and June, 2005.
77
Human Rights Watch confidential source, March 30, 2006.
78
The law has been criticized by many NGOs in Sudan. See United Nations, “United Nations Sudan Situation
Report,” February 23, 2006.
21
of SUDO and its protection activities and sources of funding.79 On March 8, shortly
after the NGO Law was passed, HAC informed SUDO’s director that SUDO did not
have a mandate for “protection” activities. HAC claimed that the executive director of
SUDO, Dr. Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, had a criminal record.80 On March 9, HAC
informed SUDO in writing that all SUDO activities in West Darfur would be shut
down.81 On March 11, HAC ordered the SUDO office in Zalengei, West Darfur, to
freeze its activities from March 13 and surrender to HAC its vehicle and two
motorbikes, office equipment, and hand over the keys to its clinic and nutrition centers,
among other things. After international pressure, on March 28 HAC officials apparently
authorized in writing the reopening of the SUDO office in Geneina. Even then, SUDO
was informed it must reapply within ninety days under the new NGO Law.82
On April 6, ten donor governments, including the U.K., France, the U.S., Canada and
the Netherlands, sent a joint letter to the Sudanese foreign minister, Dr. Lam Akol,
reiterating their concern over certain provisions in the NGO law that would
“substantially hinder the ability of donors, international and national NGOs to continue
providing effective humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in the
Sudan.”83
Rebel Attacks on Humanitarian Agencies and Workers
Rebel groups have conducted attacks on humanitarian convoys and aid workers that
have diverted food assistance and hindered access to the population in need. This
interference appears to be increasing. On April 28, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, threatened to suspend U.N. aid to 450,000 people in
northern Darfur “unless rebel attacks against United Nations and other relief
operations…stop immediately.”84
79
United Nations Country Team in Sudan, “United Nations Sudan Situation Report,” February 23, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6MBMGP?OpenDocument.
80
Dr. Mudawi Ibrahim Adam was jailed several times and accused of capital offenses in connection with his
activities in Darfur. See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Rights Defenders in Darfur Detained,” press release,
March 9, 2004, [online] http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/08/sudan8080.htm. Dr. Mudawi was never tried on
these allegations.
81
United Nations Country Team in Sudan, “United Nations Sudan Situation Report,” March 12, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-6MWKCS?OpenDocument.
82
Confidential communication, Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2006. See also Amnesty International, “Sudan:
Continuing blockade of humanitarian aid,” AI Index: AFR 54/010/2006, April 4, 2006, [online]
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=ENGAFR540102006.
83
Letter from the embassies of Canada, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Delegation of the European Commission to His
Excellency Dr. Lam Akol, Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2006.
84 “The Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sudan Jan Pronk appeals to SLM/A to stop attacks
on humanitarian workers in north Darfur,” UNMIS Press Release, April 28, 2006, at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-6PDBAD?OpenDocument&rc=1&emid=ACOS-635PJQ
22
U.N. OCHA concluded that SLA members were predominantly responsible for targeted
attacks against humanitarian convoys throughout the month of March 2006. OCHA
reported that the SLA forcibly hijacked three nongovernmental organization vehicles in
March, one at an SLA checkpoint and two inside displaced persons camps.85
According to several humanitarian sources, the rebels have regularly looted humanitarian
convoys, particularly vehicles. Human Rights Watch has received numerous reports of
incidents in North and South Darfur in which vehicles, particularly rental cars and trucks
used by humanitarian organizations, were stolen by SLA forces.86
Rebel movements have also abducted Arab Sudanese working for local NGOs (as well
as some international staff), although in most cases these individuals appear to have been
released unharmed. According to one humanitarian source, rebel movements have also
tried to extort WFP and others to provide vastly inflated amounts of aid. They seek so
much aid that it is suspected that the motive is to have enough surplus to sell.87
U.N. and other agencies have spent considerable time negotiating the release of
humanitarian property that has been seized by rebels. After negotiations, rebels have
sometimes returned items. In January 2006, an NGO rental vehicle taken by the SLA in
North Darfur was returned to the organization, but without its radio equipment.88 In
another incident in January, SLA forces near Nyala, South Darfur, abducted three NGO
vehicles and their drivers; the men and vehicles were returned unharmed three days
later.89 On March 22, 2006, a driver of a U.N. fuel tanker and his truck that went missing
on March 4 in Shangil Tobayi area of North Darfur were handed over to U.N.
Department of Safety and Security (DSS) staff by an SLA commander. On March 22, a
U.N.-hired commercial truck that was hijacked on March 16 while traveling from Tawilla
to Fashir was also handed over to U.N. DSS by an SLA commander in Dar al Salaam,
North Darfur.90
On March 23, a Ministry of Health vehicle traveling from Sirba to Abu Suroug in West
Darfur was carjacked by armed men whom the United Nations believed to be NMRD
insurgents. The vehicle was seized, along with a refrigerator full of medicine; there were
85
U.N. OCHA, "Sudan Humanitarian Overview," Vol. 2, Issue 3, March 1 - April 1, 2006, [online]
http://www.unsudanig.org/publications/overview/data/Sudan_Humanitarian_Overview_Vol2%20Is3.pdf.
86
Confidential e-mail communication to Human Rights Watch, January 26, 2006.
87
Human Rights Watch, confidential source, April 6, 2006.
88
Confidential e-mail communication, January 26, 2006.
89
Ibid.
90
United Nations Country Team in Sudan, "United Nations Sudan Situation Report," March 23, 2006. [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6NALCM?OpenDocument.
23
no reported injuries.91 NMRD has also been responsible for other thefts of vehicles in
West Darfur.92
Rebel attacks against humanitarian convoys have been a persistent problem for well over
a year. A May 2005 U.N. Security Council report on Darfur stated that the frequency
with which SLA and JEM fighters hijacked commercial, private and NGO vehicles
suggested that the attacks had the approval of rebel leaders. Citing reports that it judged
to be reliable, the U.N. concluded that humanitarian vehicles were being taken with the
aim of converting them into battlefield platforms.93 It noted that the SLA ambushed
several convoys belonging to or engaged by humanitarian organizations along the
Kebkabiya-Fashir road in North Darfur in May 2005.94
Detention of relief workers

In connection with robbery and for alleged security considerations, rebels have also
detained relief workers. In July 2005, the SLA briefly detained ten humanitarian workers
in West Darfur.95 Also in July, rebels abducted teams from the Sudanese government
Ministry of Health who were carrying out polio vaccinations in North and South Darfur.
As a result, the vaccination campaign was prevented from reaching people living in some
SLA-held areas in those states.96
On September 29 three SUDO staff were abducted from Zam Zam camp, North
Darfur. SUDO reportedly suspected that an SLA faction carried out the abduction,97 in
breach of a promise the SLA had made to United Nations officials in a meeting on
August 8, 2005, that humanitarian actors would be free to operate in the camp.98 SUDO
reported the release of its staff on October 6.99
91
United Nations Country Team in Sudan, “United Nations Sudan Situation Report,” March 26, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6NCMYN?OpenDocument.
92
Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch, January 2006.
93
United Nations Security Council, "Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur," May 10, 2005, [online]
94
United Nations Security Council, "Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur," June 9, 2005. [online]
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4844458.html.
95
Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch.
96
United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” August 11, 2005,
97
USAID, "Sudan: Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY2006), October 14, 2005, [online]
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/sudan/fy2006/sudan_ce
_sr01_10-14-2005.pdf.
98
E-mail communication to Human Rights Watch, September 2005.
99
USAID, "Sudan: Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY2006), October 14, 2005, [online]
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/sudan/fy2006/sudan_ce
_sr01_10-14-2005.pdf.
24
Interference with air access
The NMRD allegedly threatened to shoot down U.N. helicopters on humanitarian
missions in areas of West Darfur, including Seleah and Jebel Moon, in November
2005.100 Seleah, near the border with Chad, was already off-limits by road for security
reasons. As a result, humanitarian workers did not visit the town for several months.
The U.N. Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) also had to suspend flights to other areas
north of Geneina, West Darfur (including Sirba and Kulbus) following other credible
threats.101
As funding for Darfur emergency relief dwindled, the flights were decreased on financial
grounds.
AMIS and Humanitarian Access
As of March 10, 2006, a total of 7,031 personnel had been deployed to Darfur as part of
AMIS (4,915 protection force members, 726 unarmed military observers and 1,390
unarmed civilian police officers)102 to monitor an April 2004 humanitarian ceasefire
agreement, and protect civilians and humanitarian operations.
AMIS has been tasked with opening humanitarian corridors, and claims that it covers 50
percent of Darfur’s area,103 but it is limited in how effectively it covers that area by its
lack of mobility, communications, and other equipment—as well as its interpretation of
its mandate for civilian protection and its rules of engagement. 104
Although AMIS was charged with protecting civilians and humanitarian workers, AMIS
found that they were not the only ones in danger: AMIS itself was attacked, sometimes
while guarding humanitarian convoys. AMIS’s casualties began to mount in the second
100
Colonel Djibril was mentioned in the confidential annex to the Panel of Experts report on violations of
Security Council resolutions. U.N. Security Council, “Report of Panel of Experts established pursuant to
paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan,” January 30, 2006, S/2006/65, [online]
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/632/74/PDF/N0563274.pdf?OpenElement
101
United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” December 23, 2005,
[online] http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/648/57/PDF/N0564857.pdf?OpenElement; UNHCR,
“Sudan/Chad Situation Update 50,” March 9, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-6MVJHU?OpenDocument.
102
African Union, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the PSC
Communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM (XLV) of 12 January 2006 on the Situation in Darfur,” Addis Ababa, March 10,
2006, [online] http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/2006/46rpt.pdf.
103
Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic official, Addis Ababa, February 21, 2006.
104
The revised AMIS mandate of October 2004 included “[p]rotecting civilians whom it encounters under
imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability.” The mandate and the February
2005 rules of engagement are discussed in detail in Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate
Change.”
25
half of 2005 as various armed parties, who were often unidentified, carried out attacks
on AMIS forces. For instance, on August 25, 2005, an AMIS soldier was shot and
wounded in South Darfur by unknown assailants.105
The amended November 2005 AMIS rules of engagement make it clear that AMIS
soldiers are to use deadly force if necessary in self-defense and to avoid detention.
Commanders on the ground have the possibility, under certain circumstances, to use
deadly force to protect AMIS troops, international personnel, A.U. facilities, civilians,
humanitarian workers, and others.106
Not all international NGOs seek direct AMIS protection of their convoys. Some on
principle refuse armed protection.107 Others say that an AMIS escort is more of a risk
than a deterrent in Darfur.108 Even when agencies seek AMIS escort, however, there are
practical obstacles because of AMIS’s limited capacity. One logistics officer with a relief
organization in West Darfur had to wait three days for AMIS to reshuffle personnel just
to free up enough vehicles to accompany the officer on a short stretch of road.109
While a stronger and larger protection force could attempt to secure the main roads for
humanitarian and civilian traffic, the Sudanese government has vehemently opposed the
transfer of AMIS military operations in Darfur to what would be a better-financed,
equipped, and larger force under the United Nations.
Lack of Funding for Humanitarian Operations
U.N. OCHA asked for U.S.$1.5 billion in funding for Sudan for 2006, but as of the end
of the first quarter it has received only 8 percent of that amount.110 In 2005, OCHA
received 63 percent of its funding requirements for Darfur.111
105
United Nations Security Council, “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” September 19, 2005,
106
“Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the Military Component of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),”
African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, November 2005, A.U. Restricted. These rules of engagement are
superior to those of February 2005, which were analyzed in Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for
Immediate Change.”
107
The use of armed escorts is considered to be contradictory to the fundamental principles of humanitarian
action. These principles are humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. For further discussion of this
issue see www. icrc.org
108
Refugees International, “No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” November 9, 2005,
[online] http://www.refugeesinternational.org/section/publications/au_outreach/.
109
Human Rights Watch confidential interview, March 23, 2006.
110
27, 2006.
111
Ibid.
26
In March 2006, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
announced that it was forced to slash assistance for Darfur by 44 percent. The reason
given was that the steady erosion of security in the past months severely limited its
operations and access in Darfur (UNHCR is mainly operational in West Darfur). Its
revised budget for 2006 was U.S.$18.5 million, down from the previously planned
U.S.$33 million. 112
On March 16, 2006, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) announced that it
had received only U.S.$2.6 million in donor money for Darfur, against a target of
U.S.$91.7 million (i.e. less than 3 percent of the needed amount). UNICEF warned that
because of lack of funding it was already in the process of planning to hand over life-
sustaining and life-saving programs to the Sudanese government.113 That would be
devastating for the internally displaced and other needy people in Darfur, however,
because of the government’s limited capacity and its consistent claim that the needs are
greatly exaggerated by the “international media.”114
The World Food Programme announced in March 2006 that cash shortages had forced
it to cut food rations to more than 6 million people in Sudan.115 On April 28, WFP made
a further statement that it was forced to cut food rations in Darfur in half because it had
only received 32 percent of the $746 million it requires for Sudan. The head of WFP,
James Morris, said “We have been pushed into this last resort of ration cuts in Sudan so
we can provide the needy with at least some food during the lean season.”116
“Donor fatigue” appears to have set in, at a time when increased resources are needed to
reach those whose lives are at greater risk because of Sudanese government and rebel
policies and practices that have sharply curtailed humanitarian access.
112
“UNHCR issues new appeals for Sudan operations; insecurity forces cut in Darfur budget,” UNHCR press
release, Geneva, March 9, 2006, [online] http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/HMYT-
6MQNL9?OpenDocument&rc=1&emid=ACOS-635PJQ.
113
UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action: Darfur, Sudan Donor Update,” March 16, 2006, [online]
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-6MXNFF?OpenDocument.
114
Government of Sudan, press statements, 2005.
115
“Sudan’s Food Aid Cut by U.N. Due to Cash Shortages and Violence,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2006, [online]
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aRPRNR3uf5ug.
116
“Adding insult to injury? Sharp ration cuts leave Darfur on a diet,” WFP press release, Khartoum-Geneva,
April 28, 2006, [online] at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACIO-
6PADML?OpenDocument&rc=1&emid=ACOS-635PJQ.
27
Humanitarian Access under International Humanitarian Law
The conflict in Darfur between the government and rebel forces is considered a non-
international (internal) armed conflict under international humanitarian law (the laws of
war). Serious violations of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes.117
It is widely recognized that a civilian population suffering undue hardship is entitled to

receive humanitarian relief essential to its survival.118 In a report on emergency
assistance to southern Sudan in 1996, the U.N. Secretary-General stated:
Any attempt to diminish the capacity of the international community to

respond to conditions of suffering and hardship among the civilian
population in Sudan can only give rise to the most adamant expressions
of concern as a violation of recognized humanitarian principles, most
importantly, the right of civilian populations to receive humanitarian assistance in
times of war.119
All parties to an internal armed conflict, government forces, government-backed militias

and rebel groups alike, must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of
impartial humanitarian assistance for civilians in need.120 During numerous armed
conflicts the U.N. Security Council has called on the parties to provide safe and
unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance. The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which is investigating serious international crimes in Darfur, lists the
“deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of
part of a population” as a crime against humanity when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.121
Humanitarian relief agencies cannot in practice function without the express or implied
consent of the warring factions. International humanitarian law provides that consent
117
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2005), see rule 156 and accompanying text.
118
Customary International Humanitarian Law, p. 197, citing Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, art. 30;
Protocol I, article 70(1); and Protocol II, article 18(2). Article 18(2) of Protocol II, applicable in non-international
armed conflicts, states: “If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies
essential for its survival, such as food-stuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which
are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse
distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.” Although
Sudan is not a party to Protocol II, many of its provisions are considered reflective of customary international
law.
119
U.N. Secretary-General, Report on emergency assistance to Sudan (1996) (emphasis added).
120
ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 55, discussed at pp. 194-96.
121
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), art. 7. During an international armed conflict,
“willfully impeding relief supplies” as part of an effort to starve civilians, is also a war crime. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
28
cannot be refused on arbitrary grounds.122 According to the Commentary of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, if a civilian population is at risk of starvation,
a party is obliged to give consent to an impartial humanitarian relief organization.123 And
while international humanitarian law permits parties to a conflict to take certain
measures to control the content and delivery of humanitarian assistance, they cannot
deliberately or willfully impede its delivery.124
Parties to an armed conflict must ensure that humanitarian workers have the freedom of
movement to conduct humanitarian operations. Only in the case of “imperative military
necessity” may their movements be restricted; these restrictions must be limited and
temporary, such as when relief operations interfere with military operations and could
endanger humanitarian workers.125 The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution in
2000 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts in which it called upon
governments and opposition armed groups to “ensure the safety, security and freedom
of movement” of humanitarian relief workers.126
International humanitarian law provides special protection for humanitarian relief

workers, which considers their safety and security an indispensable condition for the
delivery of humanitarian aid.127 On numerous occasions the U.N. Security Council has
urged parties to internal armed conflicts to respect and protect humanitarian workers.128
Of course, all humanitarian aid workers are entitled to the same protections from direct
or indiscriminate attack as are ordinary civilians and from any mistreatment at any time
by a party to the conflict.129 Prohibited are efforts to harass, intimidate, or arbitrarily
detain them.130 Likewise, objects used in humanitarian relief operations, such as food
and medicines, buildings, materials, and vehicles, are civilian objects and must be
respected and protected.131 Destruction, theft and looting of such objects is prohibited.132
122
ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, p. 197, citing Protocol I, article 70(1); Protocol II, article
18(2). Refusal to allow relief could be equivalent to using starvation as a method of combat in violation of article
14 of Protocol II (Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population).
123
ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Nijhoff,
Geneva: 1987), p. 1479.
124
ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, p. 198, citing Protocol I, article 70(3).
125
Ibid., rule 56, p. 200 citing Protocol I, article 71(3).
126
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000).
127
Ibid., rule 31, p. 105, citing Protocol I, article 71(2).
128
Ibid., rule 31, p. 107, citing U.N. Security Council resolutions.
129
See, e.g. common article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Sudan is a party to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
130
ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 31, p. 108, citing various UN Security Council
resolutions and state practice.
131
Ibid., rule 32, p. 109, citing ICC Statute, article 8(2)(e)(iii) (prohibiting “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance mission …, as long as
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed
conflict).
29
132
Ibid., rule 32, p. 111, citing U.N. Security Council resolutions and state practice.
30

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May 2006 Number 1

Darfur: Humanitarian Aid under Siege

Donor governments must meet their financial commitments to international

To the Government of Sudan

To the SLA, JEM, and other rebel factions

To the United Nations Security Council

To the African Union

Events moved swiftly in the lead-up to an African Union-imposed deadline of April 30

Humanitarian Access in the Context of Increasing Fighting and

A U.N. helicopter evacuating sixteen humanitarian staff from three organizations

As a result of the continuing attacks, no humanitarian organization has been able to

Sudanese Government Obstruction of Humanitarian Access

At the heart of the Sudanese government’s counterinsurgency strategy against rebels in

Government Intimidation of Aid Workers

Arbitrary Government Restrictions on Freedom of Movement

In January 2006 a number of international humanitarian agencies were denied access in

Government’s Restrictive New NGO Law

In itself, registration is not objectionable—every country has some administrative

Rebel Attacks on Humanitarian Agencies and Workers

Detention of relief workers

AMIS and Humanitarian Access

Lack of Funding for Humanitarian Operations

It is widely recognized that a civilian population suffering undue hardship is entitled to

Any attempt to diminish the capacity of the international community to

All parties to an internal armed conflict, government forces, government-backed militias

International humanitarian law provides special protection for humanitarian relief

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