Rwanda in Retrospect

Author(s): Alan J. Kuperman

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp. 94-118
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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Rwanda in
Retrospect
Alan
J. Kuperman
A HARD LOOK AT INTERVENTION
Several
years
after
mass
killings
in
Bosnia, Somalia,
and
Rwanda,
the United States is still
searching
for
a
comprehensive policy
to
address
deadly
communal conflicts.
Among Washington policymakers
and
pundits, only
two
basic
principles
have achieved
some consensus.
First,
U.S.
ground troops generally
should not be used in humanitarian
interventions
during ongoing
civil
wars.
Second,
an
exception
should
be made for
cases
of
genocide, especially
where intervention
can
succeed
at
low cost.
Support
for intervention to
stop genocide
is voiced
across
most of the
political
spectrum.
Despite
this
amorphous
consensus
that the United States
can
and should do
more
when the next
genocide
occurs,
there has been
little hard
thinking
about
just
what that would entail or
accomplish.
A close examination of what
a
realistic U.S.
military
intervention
could have achieved in the last clear
case
of
genocide
this
decade,
Rwanda,
finds
insupportable
the
oft-repeated
claim that
5,000
troops deployed
at the outset of the
killing
in
April
1994
could have
prevented
the
genocide.
This claim
was
originally
made
by
the
U.N.'s
commanding general
in Rwanda
during
the
genocide
and
has since been endorsed
by
members of
Congress,
human
rights
groups,
and
a
distinguished panel
of the
Carnegie
Commission
on
Preventing Deadly
Conflict.
Although
some
lives could have been
saved
by
intervention of
any
size at
any
point during
the
genocide,
the hard truth is that
even a
large
force
deployed immediately
upon
Alan
J.
Kuperman is MacArthur Transnational
Security
Fellow at
mit's Center for International Studies and Fellow of the Institute for
the
Study
of World Politics.
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Rwanda in
Retrospect
reports
of
attempted genocide
would
not have been able to save
even
half the ultimate victims.
PRELUDE TO GENOCIDE
Rwandan politics were
traditionally
dominated
by
the
Tutsi,
a
group
that
once
made
up 17 percent
of the
population. Virtually
all
the rest of the
population
was
Hutu,
and less than
one
percent
were
aboriginal
Twa. All three
groups
lived
intermingled throughout
the
country. During
the transition to
independence starting
in
1959,
however,
the Hutu seized control in a
violent
struggle
that
spurred
the exodus of about half the Tutsi
population
to
neighboring
states.
The Hutu themselves
were
divided into two
regional
groups.
The
majority
lived in the central and southern
part
of the
country
and
supported
the
parmehutu
(Parti
du mouvement et de
l'?mancipation
des
Bahutu),
which assumed
power upon
independence,
while
a
minority
lived in the
northwest,
historically
a
separate region. During
the first decade of
independence,
Tutsi
refugees
invaded Rwanda
repeatedly, seeking
a return to
power.
The
ruling
Hutu
responded by
massacring
domestic Tutsi. In
1973,
a
northwestern Hutu
officer,
Juvenal
Habyarimana,
led
a
coup
that shifted
political
power
to his
region.
Northwestern Hutu
came to
dominate Rwanda's
political,
military,
and economic
life,
engendering
resentment from other Hutu
as
well
as
from the Tutsi. But
large-scale
violence
against
domestic Tutsi
largely disappeared
for
15 years
in the absence of
any
further
attempted
invasions
by refugees.
Stability began
to unravel in October
1990,
when
an
expatriate
rebel
force
composed mainly
of
Uganda-based
Tutsi
refugees,
the Rwandan
Patriotic
Army
(rpa),
invaded northern Rwanda. The
rpa
and its
political
arm,
the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(rpf),
were
led
by
battle
tested soldiers who had
fought
with the
Ugandan guerrilla
Yoweri
Museveni to overthrow
Uganda's government
in
1986
before
turning
their efforts toward home.
By early
1993,
the rebels had made substantial
inroads
against
the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed Forces
(or
far,
in
the French
acronym).
This
military
advance,
combined with
diplomatic
pressure
from the international
community, compelled Habyarimana
to
agree
to
share
power
in the Arusha accords of
August
1993.
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AlanJ.
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The
peacekeepers
of the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(unamir)
then
arrived,
but for
eight
months the Rwandan leader
obstructed and tried to
modify
the
power-sharing provisions.
The
extremist
wing
of his northwestern Hutu
clique
viewed the accords
as
abject
surrender
to
the
Tutsi,
who
they
feared would seize the
spoils
of rule and seek retribution.
Habyarimana attempted
to retain
power
by co-opting
the
opposition
Hutu
through bribery
and
appeals
to
The most
remarkable
aspect
of the
genocide
was
its
speed.
solidarity against
the
Tutsi,
and he succeeded
in
splitting
off radical factions from the main
opposition parties.
But he and the extremists
also
developed
a
forceful
option?training
militias,
broadcasting
anti-Tutsi hate
radio,
and
plotting
to kill moderate Hutu leaders
and Tutsi civilians. On
April 6,
1994,
as
Habyarimana appeared
to
be
acquiescing
to international
pressure
to
implement
the
accords,
his
plane
was
mysteriously
shot down. The
genocide plan
was
put
in motion.
In most areas of
Rwanda,
violence
began
on
the
following day.
The
government
radio station and the extremists'
counterpart?
Radio-T?l?vision Libre des Mille
Collines?urged
the Hutu to
take
vengeance against
the Tutsi for their
alleged
murder of the
president.
Led
by
militias,
Hutu
began
to
attack the homes of
neighboring
Tutsi,
attempting
to
rob, rape,
and murder
them,
and
often
setting
fire to their homes. This initial
step
did not elimi
nate a
high proportion
of
Tutsi, however,
because their attackers
were
generally poorly
armed. The vast
majority
of Tutsi fled their
homes and
sought refuge
in central
gathering places?churches,
schools,
hospitals,
athletic
fields, stadiums,
and other accessible
spaces.
Tutsi often
passed through
more
than
one
such site to
gather
in
larger
concentrations,
either
voluntarily
or at
govern
ment direction. Within
a
few
days,
most of Rwanda's Tutsi had
congregated
at such centralized sites
throughout
the
country,
in
groups ranging
from
a
few hundred to tens of thousands.
At
first,
the assembled Tutsi
gained
a
defensive
advantage.
The
surrounding
crowds of militia-led Hutu
were
generally
armed
only
with
swords, spears,
and machetes?or with the traditional masu,
a
large
club studded with nails.
By using
walls and
buildings
for
defense,
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Tutsi
groups
could often fend off
attacks
merely by throwing
rocks.
By
contrast,
individual Tutsi who
attempted
to flee
were
often killed
immediately by
the
surrounding
Hutu
masses or
caught
and killed
at roadblocks. For several
days,
this
produced
a
standoff. Tutsi
living
conditions
were
deteriorating
and
supplies
were
dwindling,
but most Hutu
were
unwilling
to risk casualties
by attacking.
This situation
changed
in most of Rwanda within
a
week,
by
about
April
13,
when better-armed Hutu
reinforcements?composed
of
members of the
regular
army,
the
reserves,
the Presidential Guard
(pg),
or the national
police?began arriving
at the Tutsi
gathering
sites.
Although
these forces
were
few in number at each
site,
they
were
armed with
rifles,
grenades,
or
machine
guns,
which tilted the
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AlanJ.
Kuperman
balance of force.
They
would
typically
toss a
few
grenades
on
the
Tutsi and follow with
light-arms
fire. Survivors who
attempted
to flee
were
usually
mowed down
by gunfire
or
caught
and killed
by
the
surrounding
mob. Militia-led Hutu would then enter the
site,
hacking
to death those still alive. Some Tutsi
escaped
in the initial
mayhem
or
avoided death
by hiding
beneath their dead
compatriots,
but
many
were
later
caught
at
roadblocks and killed
on
the
spot
or
taken to
other central sites to face
a
similar ordeal. A few
lucky
Tutsi survived
by hiding
in
places
such
as
pit
latrines
or
the homes of
sympathetic
Hutu,
living
to
tell their
harrowing
tales.
Perhaps
the most remarkable
aspect
of the
genocide
was
its
speed.
According
to survivor testimonies
gathered by
African
Rights
and
Human
Rights
Watch,
the
majority
of Tutsi
gathering
sites
were
attacked and
destroyed
before
April
21,
only
14
days
into the
genocide.
Given that half
or more
of the ultimate Tutsi victims died at
these
sites,
the unavoidable conclusion is that
a
large portion
of Rwanda's
Tutsi had been killed
by April 21?perhaps
250,000
in
just
over two
weeks. That would be the fastest
genocide
rate in recorded
history.
Despite
this
generally rapid
pace,
two
factors constrained the
speed
and extent of the
killing
in Rwanda.
First,
Hutu extremists
generally
avoided
large-scale
massacres
when international observers
were
present?as part
of
a
comprehensive strategy
to hide the
genocide
from
both the outside world and Rwanda's
remaining
Tutsi until it could be
completed.
Wherever Tutsi
were
congregated
under the watch of
outside
observers,
the extremists favored
an
alternate
strategy
of
slow,
stealthy
annihilation: Hutu leaders would arrive each
day
at such sites
with
a
list of
up
to several dozen
names,
usually starting
with the Tutsi
political
elite. These Tutsi would be removed under
a
false
pretense
such
as
interrogation
before
being
taken
to a remote location and executed.
This occurred
at
several
places
across
Rwanda:
Kamarampaka
Stadium
and the
Nyarushishi
camp
in
Cyangugu prefecture,
where Red Cross aid
workers
were
present;
the
Kabgayi Archbishopric
in
Gitarama,
under
the watchful
eyes
of the
pope's
subordinates;
Amahoro stadium in
Kigali,
where U.N.
troops
stood
guard;
and smaller sites in
Kigali
such
as
the St. Famille and St. Paul's churches. At such
sites,
the slower
pace
of
killing
meant that the vast
majority
of Tutsi there
were
still alive at
the end of
April,
and
a
good
number survived the entire ordeal.
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Rwanda in
Retrospect
Second,
the
killing
varied
among
Rwanda's ten
original prefec
tures.
Byumba prefecture
in the north
was
the base of the Tutsi-led
rebels,
who
generally prevented large-scale
massacres
of Tutsi there.
The two
prefectures
most dominated
by
Hutu
extremists,
Gisenyi
and
Ruhengeri
in the
northwest,
also suffered
relatively
little
killing
because much of their Tutsi
populations
had fled
prior
to the
genocide
in
response
to earlier threats and harassment.
Two
prefectures
with
high
Tutsi
populations
and
strong
Hutu
opposition
movements also
initially managed
to avoid the
genocide.
Butare
prefecture
in the south
was
governed by
a
Tutsi
prefect
who
managed
to
keep
matters
relatively
calm until he was
removed from
office
on
April
18.
Widespread killing
then
began
with
a
vengeance,
and
tens of thousands of Tutsi
perished
in the next few
days. Similarly,
Gitarama
prefecture,
the heart of central Rwandan Hutu
opposition
to the northwestern Hutu
regime, generally
resisted
implementing
the
genocide
until
government
forces arrived
to
spur
them
on.
Large
scale
killing
commenced there about
April
21.
Finally,
the nature of
killing
in the
capital, Kigali,
also differed
significantly
from that in
the rest of the
country. During
the first two
days,
a
highly organized
and
thorough
assassination
campaign
was
carried out there
against
opposition politicians
and
prominent
liberals such
as
human
rights
advocates. Unlike
elsewhere, many
of
Kigali's
initial victims of Hutu
extremism
were
fellow Hutu.
Civil
war
also
erupted
in
Kigali
almost
immediately.
On
April
7,
an rpa
battalion that had been stationed in the
capital
since De
cember
1993
under the Arusha accords demanded
a
halt
to atrocities
against
civilians?and then clashed with
government
forces when
its demand
was
ignored.
With the
president
and the moderate
opposition
dead,
war
breaking
out in
Kigali,
and radio broadcasts
urging
Hutu to kill their
neighbors,
the
capital
descended into
chaos.
Corpses began
to
pile
up,
totaling
as
many
as
20,000
during
the first week. Unlike in the
countryside,
however,
Tutsi had
a
decent
chance of
gaining
some
refuge by reaching
a
central
gathering
site
where
foreigners
stood
guard. Although
the extremists could not
hide the chaos and violence in the
capital, they generally
avoided
wholesale
massacres
before such witnesses in
hopes
of
averting
foreign military
intervention.
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By
late
April, only
three weeks after the
president
s
plane
crash,
almost all the
large
massacres were
finished. The rebels themselves
acknowledged
on
April
29
that "the
genocide
is almost
completed."
Human
Rights
Watch
concurs
that "in
general,
the worst massacres
had finished
by
the end of
April." By
that
time,
it
notes,
"perhaps
half of the Tutsi
population
of Rwanda"?some two-thirds of the
ultimate Tutsi
victims?already
had been exterminated.
Killing
of
the
remaining
Tutsi continued at a
slower
pace
for another two and
a
half months until halted
by
the rebels'
military victory
and
a
belated
French-led intervention.
Precise Tutsi death totals
are
difficult to determine because of
several
factors,
including
the
inability
to
distinguish
Tutsi from Hutu
corpses.
But estimates
can
be made
by subtracting
the number of
Tutsi survivors from the number
living
in Rwanda
immediately
prior
to the
genocide.
Estimated
1994
population figures,
which
are
extrapolated
from the
1991
census
and
account for annual
popula
tion
growth
of three
percent,
indicate that Rwanda's
pre-genocide
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Rwanda in
Retrospect
population
included
approximately
650,000
Tutsi. There is
no
evidence
for
other,
higher
claims.1 After the
genocide
and civil
war,
some
150,000
Tutsi survivors
were
identified
by
aid
organizations.
Thus
an
estimated
500,000
Rwandan Tutsi
were
killed,
more
than three
quarters
of their
population.
The number of Hutu killed
during
the
genocide
and civil
war is
even
less
certain,
with estimates
ranging
from
10,000
to well
over
100,000.
the knowledge gap
Although U. S.
intelligence reports
from the
period
of the
genocide
remain
classified,
they probably
mirrored those of the international
news
media,
human
rights organizations,
and the U.N.?because
U.S.
intelligence agencies
committed
virtually
no
in-country
resources
to what
was
considered
a
tiny
state in a
region
of little
strategic
value.
During
the
genocide's early phases,
the U.S.
government actually
received
most of its information from
nongovernmental organizations.
A
comprehensive
review of such international
reporting?by
American,
British, French,
Belgian,
and Rwandan
media,
leading
human
rights
groups,
and U.N.
officials?strongly suggests
that President Clinton
could not have known that
a
nationwide
genocide
was
under
way
in
Rwanda until about
April
20.
This conclusion is based
on
five
aspects
of the
reporting during
the
first two weeks.
First,
violence
was
initially depicted
in the context of
a
two-sided civil war?one that the Tutsi
were
winning?rather
than
a
one-sided
genocide against
the Tutsi. On
April
13,
the Western
press
accurately reported
that Rwanda's Hutu interim
government
had fled the
capital
for
refuge
in Gitarama and that "the fall of
Kigali
seems
imminent"
(Paris
Radio France
International).
When Western
troops
arrived to evacuate
foreign
nationals,
the Tutsi rebels did not
1
Some accounts claim that
one million Tutsi lived in Rwanda before the
genocide,
making up
12
percent
of the
population,
which would
correspond
with the estimate of
850,000
killed. But historical
demographic
data
suggest
otherwise. In
1956,
a
Belgian
census counted almost
17 percent
of the
population
as
Tutsi,
but half of those fled or died
in the violence that
accompanied independence.
The
remaining
9
percent subsequently
had
a lower
fertility
rate than the
Hutu,
reducing
the Tutsi
population
to the 8
percent
reported
in the
1991
census.
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seek assistance but rather demanded that the
troops
depart immediately
so as not to interfere with their imminent
victory.
The Canadian
commander of the U.N.
peacekeepers
in
Rwanda,
General Romeo
Dallaire,
also identified the
problem
as
mutual
violence,
stating
on
April
15
that "if
we see
another three weeks of
being cooped
up
and
seeing
them
pound
each other"
(The Guardian),
the U.N.
presence
would be reassessed. In
addition,
until
April
18 both the
government
and the rebels stated
publicly
that the
far was not
participating
in
massacres.
(The
government
was
engaged
in a
cover-up,
and the
rebels
initially
avoided
implicating
the
far
in the vain
hope
of
winning
its
allegiance against
the extremist
Hutu.)
Second,
the violence
was
reported
to be
waning
when it
actually
was
accelerating.
Just
four
days
in,
on
April
11,
The New York Times
reported
that
fighting
had "diminished in
intensity"
and Le Monde
wrote three
days
later that "a
strange
calm
reigns
in downtown"
Kigali.
The commander of
Belgian peacekeepers
stated that "the
fighting
has
died down
somewhat,
one
could
say
that it has all but
stopped"
(Paris
Radio France
International).
On
April
17,
Dallaire told the
bbc
that
except
for
an
isolated
pocket
in the
north,
"the rest of the line is
essentially quite quiet." Only
on
April
18 did
a
Belgian
radio station
question
this
consensus,
explaining
that the decline in
reports
of
violence was because "most
foreigners
have
left,
including journalists."
Third,
most
early
death counts were
gross
underestimates and
never
suggested genocidal proportions.
Three
days
into the
killing,
on
April
10,
The New York Times
quoted varying
estimates of
8,000
or
"tens of thousands" dead. But
during
the second
week,
media
estimates did not rise at all. On
April
18,
the Times still
reported only
20,000
deaths,
underestimating
the actual
carnage
at that
point by
about tenfold. The true
scope
of the
killing emerged only
on
April
20,
when Human
Rights
Watch estimated that "as
many
as
100,000
people
may
have died to
date,"
followed the next
day by
a
Red Cross
estimate of
perhaps
"hundreds of thousands."
Fourth,
the initial focus of international
reporting
was almost exclu
sively
on
Kigali,
a
relatively
small
city,
and thus failed to indicate the
broader
scope
of violence?a
consequence
both of Hutu concealment
efforts and of the Western evacuation of
expatriates
and
reporters
from the
countryside. Although
a
few
early reports
of rural violence
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did trickle out to the
West,
these indicated
military
combat,
mutual
ethnic
violence,
or
criminal
looting
rather than
an
extermination
campaign.
An
rpf
official told the
bbc on
April
12
only
that "we want
to
stop
the senseless
killing
that is
going
on
in
Kigali."
The first inter
national
report
of
a
large-scale
massacre
outside the
capital
did not
emerge
until
April
16. As late
as
April
20,
U.N.
Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali still described the
killings
as
"mainly
in
Kigali."
This initial obsession with the
capital,
which contained
only
four
percent
of Rwanda's
population,
obscured the national
scope
of violence
and thus its
genocidal
intent.
The rebels'
own
radio station did
not
report
the nationwide
scope
of the violence until
April
19.
American
newspapers
failed
to
give
any
such indication until
April
22,
when
they belatedly reported
that
fighting
bands had reduced "much of the
country
to chaos"
(The
New
York
Times).
Many foreign
observers still could
not conceive that
a
genocide
was
under
way.
On
April
23,
The
Washington
Post
pondered
why only
20,000
refugees
had crossed the border?even
though
half
a million Tutsi had fled their homes?and
reported
that aid workers
had concluded that "most of the borders have been sealed
by
the
Rwandan
Army." Only
on
April
25
did The New York Times solve the
riddle,
reporting
that violence had "widened into what
appears
to
be
a
methodical
killing
of Tutsi
across the
countryside."
The
missing
refugees
"either have been killed
or are
trying
to hide."
Fifth,
no
credible and
knowledgeable
observers,
including
human
rights
groups,
raised the
prospect
that
genocide
was occur
ring
until the end of the second week. In
opinion
articles
published
on
April
14
and
17,
Human
Rights
Watch
gave
no
hint of
an
attempted
nationwide
genocide.
The rebels did not use
the term until
April
17.
Human
Rights
Watch
finally
raised the
prospect
in an
April
19
letter to the U.N.
Security
Council. Other international observers
remained
considerably
more
cautious. The
pope
first used the word
"genocide"
on
April
27.
The U.S. Committee for
Refugees
waited
until
May
2 to
urge
the Clinton administration to
make such
a
deter
mination.
Only
on
May
4
did Boutros-Ghali
finally
declare
a
"real
genocide."
Thus the earliest President Clinton
credibly
could have
made
a
determination of
attempted genocide
was
about
April
20,
1994?two
weeks into the violence.
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THE MILITARY SCENE
At the time
of
Habyarimana's
death,
Rwanda hosted three
military
forces?those of the
government,
the
rebels,
and the United Nations.
Government forces totaled about
40,000,
including
the
army,
the
national
police,
and
1,500
pg
troops.
But
except
for the
pg
and
a
few
other elite
battalions,
this force
was
largely
hollow,
having expanded
sixfold in three
years
responding
to the rebel threat. Another
15,000
to
30,000
Hutu
were
scattered around the
country
in
militias,
but
many
apparently
did not
possess
firearms
or
ammunition. Rebel
arms
were more
primitive
than the far's and included few motorized
vehicles and
no
aircraft.
Unamir had about
2,500
peacekeepers,
most either in
Kigali
or
in the north
near
the demilitarized
zone.
Their
presence
was
subject
to the consent of the Rwandan
government.
Rules of
engagement
were
somewhat
ambiguous
but
were
generally interpreted
to bar the
use
offeree
except
in self-defense
or
in
joint operations
with Rwandan
national
police.
On the first
day
of
violence,
the
pg
executed ten
Belgian
peace
keepers
who
were
attempting
to
protect
Rwanda's
opposition prime
minister. These deaths and the
emerging
chaos in
Kigali prompted
Western
governments
to evacuate their nationals.
European troops
began arriving
on
April
9
and evacuated several thousand Westerners
before
departing
on
April
13.
On
April
10,
Dallaire also
requested
5,000
more
U.N.
troops
to
halt what he
perceived
to be mutual
killing
confined to the
capital.
Instead,
Belgium
announced
on
April
14
that
it would be
withdrawing
its un amir
battalion,
which
triggered
unease
among
the other
troop-contributors
and led the U.N.
Security
Council
a
week later to cut authorized
troop
levels to a
skeleton
crew
of
270.
Rebel
forces,
estimated at
20,000,
had been constrained
by
the
Arusha accords
to a
small
area of northern
Rwanda;
the
exception
was one
authorized
Kigali
battalion,
which the
rpf
had reinforced
clandestinely
to about
1,000
troops.
When the civil
war was
renewed
on
April
7,
the northern-based rebels set out to
help
the stranded
battalion in the
capital
and
engage
far
troops
elsewhere,
making
quick
progress
down Rwanda's entire eastern flank
by
late
April.
Thereafter,
the
war
had
two
stationary
fronts,
in
Kigali
and
Ruhengeri,
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Rwanda in
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until the end of
June,
as
well
as a
broad mobile front
moving
westward
through
southern Rwanda. In
just
three
months,
the rebels
captured
most of the
country?Gitarama
on
June 9,
Kigali
on
July
4,
Butare
on
July
5,
Ruhengeri
on
July
14,
and
Gisenyi
on
July 17?before finally
declaring
a
cease-fire
on
July
18.
As
reports
of
genocide
reached the outside world
starting
in late
April, public outcry spurred
the United Nations to reauthorize
a
beefed-up
"unamir ii"
on
May
17.
During
the
following
month,
however,
the U.N.
was
unable
to obtain
any
substantial contributions
of
troops
and
equipment.
As
a
result,
on
June
22
the
Security
Council
authorized France to lead its
own
intervention,
Operation Turquoise,
by
which time most
Tutsi
were
already long
dead.
POTENTIAL U.S. INTERVENTIONS
In
retrospect,
three levels of
potential
U.S.
military
intervention
warrant
analysis:
maximum, moderate,
and minimal. None would
have entailed full-blown nationwide
policing
or
long-term
nation
building by
American
troops.
Based
on
historical
experience,
full-blown
policing
would have
required
some
80,000
to
160,000
personnel?
that
is,
ten to
twenty troops per
thousand of
population?an
amount
far
more
than
logistically
or
politically
feasible.
Nation-building
would have been left to a
follow-on multinational
force,
presumably
under U.N. authorization.
Maximum intervention would have used all feasible force to halt
large-scale killing
and
military
conflict
throughout
Rwanda. Moderate
intervention would have
sought
to halt
some
large-scale killing
without
deploying troops
to areas
of
ongoing
civil
war,
in order to reduce U.S.
casualties. Minimal intervention would have relied
on
air
power
alone.
A maximum intervention would have
required deployment
of
a
force
roughly
the size of
one
U.S. division?three
brigades
and
supporting
units,
comprising
about
15,000
troops
and their
equipment?
with rules of
engagement
permitting
the
use
of
deadly
force to
protect
endangered
Rwandans. After
establishing
a
base of
operations
at
Kigali airport,
the force would have focused
on
three
primary goals:
halting
armed combat and
interposing
itself between
far
and
rpf
forces
on
the two
stationary
fronts of the civil
war;
establishing
order
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THREE POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS
Force
Airlifl
Tutsi
Percentage
size in
days
saved
of
death toll
Maximum Division
40 125,000 25
13,500 troops; 27,000
tons
Moderate Reinforced
Brigade
21
100,000
20
6,000
troops;
10,000
tons
Minimum Air Assault
Brigade
14
75,000 15
2,500 troops (outside Rwanda);
4,500
tons
in the
capital;
and
finally fanning
out to halt
large-scale genocidal
killing
in the
countryside.
None of these tasks would have been
especially
difficult
or
dangerous
for
properly configured
and
supported
American
troops
once
they
were in Rwanda. But
transporting
such
a
force
10,000
miles
to a
landlocked
country
with limited airfields would have been
considerably
slower than
some
retrospective appraisals
have
suggested.
The first
brigade
to arrive would have been
responsible
for
Kigali:
coercing
the
far
and
rpf to halt
hostilities,
interposing
itself between
them,
and
policing
the
capital.
The second
brigade
would have
deployed
one
battalion in the north to halt the civil
war in
Ruhengeri
and
another
as a
rapid-reaction
force in
case
American
troops
drew fire.
The third
brigade, supplemented by
a
battalion of the second
brigade,
would have been devoted
to
halting
the
killing
in the
countryside.
Such
an
effort would have
required roughly
2,000
troops
to halt the
war in
Kigali,
3,000
to
police Kigali,
1,000
to
stop
the
fighting
in the
north,
1,500
for
a
rapid-reaction
force,
and
6,000
to
stop
the
genocide
outside
Kigali?a
total of about
13,500
troops,
in addition
to
support personnel.
The time
required
to
deploy
such
a
force would have
depended
mainly
on
its
weight.
A division-size task force built around
one
brigade
each from the 101st Air
Assault,
82nd
Airborne,
and
a
light
army
division
can
be
approximated
as
the
average
of those divisions?
26,550
tons,
including
200
helicopters
and
13,500
personnel.
(The
Marines could also have substituted for the
one
of the
brigades.)
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Because Rwanda is
a
landlocked
country
in Central
Africa,
and because
speed
is critical in
stopping
a
genocide,
the entire force would have
been airlifted. The rate of airlift would have been constrained
by
factors such
as
the
delay
in
loading planes
at U.S.
bases,
excessive
demand for air
refueling,
fuel
shortages
in Central
Africa,
and the
limited airfield
capacity
in
Kigali
and
at
the
potential staging
base at
Entebbe in
neighboring Uganda.
At
an
optimistic
rate of 800 tons
daily,
the task force would have
required
33
days
to airlift.
Personnel,
which
are
much
quicker
to
transport
than
their
cargo,
could have been sent first?but
it would have been
imprudent
to
deploy
them into the field without sufficient
equip
ment and
logistics.
Several additional
days
would also have been
required
for the
delay
between the
deployment
order and start of
airlift,
for the
gradual
increase in the
capacity
of theater airfields unaccustomed
to such
Hutu
ringleaders spread
false
reports
of an
impending
Western
intervention
to
help
speed
the
killings.
traffic,
and for travel
to and
unloading
at
the theater. In
addition,
the
rate of force
deployment might
have been slowed
by
the need
to use
limited airlift
capacity
for
food, medicine,
and
spare parts
to sustain
the first
troops
to arrive. Thus the entire force could not have closed
in the theater until about
40
days
after the
president
s
order.
Advance
units, however,
could have
begun operations
much
sooner.
Approximately
four
days
after the
order,
a
battalion
or two
of
Army Rangers
could have
parachuted
in and seized
Kigali airport
at
night.
Follow-on
troops
could have
expanded
outward from the
airfield to establish
a secure
operating
base. Within about two
weeks,
sufficient
troops
and
equipment
could have arrived to halt the
fighting,
form
a
buffer between the
far
and the
rpf in
Kigali
and northwest
Rwanda,
and
fully police
the
capital. Only
later, however,
could the
intervention force have turned in earnest to
stopping
the
genocide
in
the
countryside
as
helicopters,
vehicles,
and
troops
arrived.
Some observers have
suggested
that the
genocide
would have ceased
spontaneously throughout
Rwanda
upon
the arrival of Western
enforcement
troops
in
Kigali?or possibly
even
earlier,
upon
the
mere announcement of
a
deployment. They
claim that the extremists
would have halted
killing
in
hopes
of
avoiding punishment.
But these
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Kuperman
Hutu
were
already guilty
of
genocide
and could not
have
imagined
that
stopping midway
would
gain
them absolution. More
likely,
the
announcement of Western intervention would have accelerated the
killing
as
extremists tried to finish the
job
and eliminate witnesses
while
they
had
a
chance. Such
was
the trend ahead of the
rpa
advance,
as
Hutu militias
attempted
to
wipe
out
remaining
Tutsi before the
A
major
intervention
would have saved
275,000
Tutsi,
compared
to the
150,000
who
actually
survived.
rebels arrived.
During
the
genocide,
the
ringleaders
even
trumpeted
false
reports
of
an
impending
Western intervention to
help
motivate Hutu to
complete
the
killings.
Although
the Hutu
generally
held back from
mass
killing
at sites
guarded by foreigners
to
avoid
provoking
Western
intervention,
they
would have lost this incentive for restraint
had such
an
intervention been announced.
The
6,000
U.S.
troops deployed
to the
countryside
would have been insufficient
to
establish
a
full
police
presence,
but
they
could have found and
pro
tected
significant
concentrations of threatened Rwandans.
Ideally,
helicopter
reconnaissance could have identified vulnerable
or
hostile
groups
from the air and then directed
rapid
response
forces
to
disperse
hostile factions and
secure the sites.
Alternately, ground
troops
could
have radiated
out from
Kigali
in a
methodical
occupation
of the
countryside. Displaced
Rwandans could have been
gathered gradually
into
perhaps
20
large
camps
for their
protection.
Depending
on the search
method,
large-scale genocide
could have
been
stopped during
the fourth
or
fifth week after the
deployment
order,
by May
15
to
May
25.
Interestingly enough,
this would have
been before the task force
s
airlift had been
completed.
Based
on
the
genocide
s
progression,
such
an
intervention would have saved about
275,000
Tutsi,
instead of the
150,000
who
actually
survived. Maximum
credible intervention thus could
not have
prevented
the
genocide,
as
is sometimes
claimed,
but it could have
spared
about
125,000
Tutsi
from
death,
some
25
percent
of the ultimate toll.
A
more modest intervention would have refrained from
deploying
U.S.
troops
to
any
area in Rwanda in which
far and
rpa
troops
were
actively fighting.
In late
April,
this would have limited U.S.
troops
to
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a zone
consisting
of six
prefectures
in the south and west of Rwanda.
A
single
reinforced
brigade
would have sufficed
given
the reduced
territory, population,
and threat of
potential
adversaries.
Ideally,
the
ready
brigade
of the 101st Air Assault Division would have been
designated
and
supplemented by
two additional
light-infantry
battalions,
supporting
units for
peace operations,
and additional
helicopters
and motorized
vehicles:
a
force of
6,000
personnel, weighing
about
10,000
tons.
For such
an
action,
three main
objectives
would have been set:
first,
to
deter and
prevent entry
of
organized military
forces into the
above-mentioned
zone;
second,
to halt
large-scale genocide
there;
and
third,
to
prepare
for
a
handoff to a
U.N. force.
Strategic
airlift
would not have relied
on
Kigali airport,
which
was
still
a
battleground
in the civil
war,
but rather
on
neighboring Bujumbura
in Burundi and
Entebbe in
Uganda?which
would have further constrained the
deploy
ment rates.
Still,
facing
little
military
threat in the
zone,
these
troops
probably
could have
stopped large-scale genocide
there within three
weeks after the
deployment
order,
by May
11,1994.
About
200,000
Tutsi from the
zone
could have
survived,
as
opposed
to about
100,000
from this
part
of Rwanda who
actually
did. Elsewhere in
Rwanda,
genocide
would have continued until
stopped by
the
rpa,
as
occurred,
leaving only
50,000
survivors outside the
zone
of intervention.
Moderate intervention thus could have
spared
about
100,000
Tutsi
from
death,
or 20
percent
of the ultimate toll.
Surprisingly,
moderate
intervention in this
case
would have saved almost
as
many
lives
as
the
maximum
alternative,
because
by avoiding
combat
areas
the interveners
could have turned
sooner to counter
genocide
in the
zone
where
most
Tutsi lived.
The third
alternative,
a
minimal
intervention,
would have
attempted
to
mitigate
the
genocide
without
introducing
U.S.
ground troops
into
Rwanda,
relying
on
airpower
alone from bases in
neighboring
countries.
For
example,
the United States could have threatened
to
bomb the
extremist
ringleaders
and the
fars
military
assets
unless the
killing
was
halted?and then followed
through
if
necessary.
But if the threat
alone failed to
coerce,
U.S.
pilots
would have had
difficulty locating
the
ringleaders
or
hitting
far
positions
without
killing
rebels
as
well.
Even if air coercion had succeeded in
Rwanda,
a
follow-on
ground
force would have been needed to
keep
the
peace.
Alternatively,
the
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Kuperman
United States could have
pursued
airborne
policing,
which would have
attempted
to
interdict
physically
and intimidate
psychologically
the
perpetrators
of the
genocide throughout
Rwanda.
Significant
numbers
of U.S. attack
helicopters
and
fixed-wing
aircraft could have
patrolled
Rwanda
daily
from bases in
neighboring
countries. If armed factions
threatening large
groups
of civilians
were
spotted, air-to-ground
fire
could have
dispersed
the
assailants,
at least
temporarily.
Such air
patrols
would have continued until
deployment
of non-American
ground
troops
or
until the
rpf won
the civil
war.
But airborne
policing
could
not
have
prevented
smaller acts of violence in the meantime.
Another minimal
approach
would have been to
help
the Rwandan
Tutsi
escape
to
refugee
camps
in
bordering
states?Burundi, Tanzania,
Uganda,
or
Zaire?by using helicopter patrols
to ensure
safe
passage.
Rwanda has
only
about 600 miles of
paved
roads.
Assuming
a team of
20
helicopters
with standard maintenance
needs,
five
helicopters
could
have been
kept
aloft at a
time,
with each
responsible
for
120
miles of
roadway.
If these
helicopters
flew at a
ground speed
of 120 miles
per
hour,
each section of
roadway
could have been
patrolled approxi
mately
every
hour. Airborne broadcasts and leaflets would have
directed the Tutsi to the exit routes.
Air-to-ground
fire would
have broken
up
roadblocks and
dispersed
armed
gangs
to ensure
the free flow of
refugees.
But this
strategy
could not have saved
those Tutsi unable
to
reach
major
roads and would have caused
a
major refugee
crisis.
Each of the
airpower options
would have had
drawbacks,
including
the risk of
losing
airborne
personnel
to anti-aircraft
fire,
but each also
had the
potential
to save tens of thousands of Tutsi. Coercion
might
have
stopped
the
genocide quickly, potentially facilitating
a
cease-fire
in the civil
war.
Airborne
policing
could have allowed
more
Tutsi
to be saved
by
France
s
Operation Turquoise
or a
similar
follow-up
deployment.
Free
passage
also would have
kept
more
Tutsi
alive,
albeit
as
refugees,
and
they might
have returned home
quickly
after
the rpf's
victory.
About
300,000
Tutsi still
were
alive in late
April
1994,
of whom about
150,000
subsequently perished.
If minimum
intervention had been able
to avert half these later
killings,
it could
have
spared
about
75,000
Tutsi from
death,
or
15
percent
of the
genocide's
ultimate toll.
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A WESTERN FAILURE OF WILL?
Many
observers have claimed that
timely
intervention would have
prevented
the
genocide.
Some
even
asserted
at first that
unamir itself
could have done
so,
although
most now
acknowledge
that the
peace
keepers
lacked sufficient
arms,
equipment,
and
supplies.
Conventional
wisdom still holds that
5,000
well-armed reinforcements could have
prevented
the
genocide
had
they
been
deployed promptly
when the
killing began?and
that the West
s
failure to
stop
the
slaughter
resulted
exclusively
from
a
lack of will.
Rigorous scrutiny
of six
prominent
variations of this
assertion, however,
finds all but
one
dubious.
Human
Rights
Watch makes the boldest claim:
Diplomatic
inter
vention could have averted the
genocide
without additional
military
deployment.
These advocates contend that
a
threat from the interna
tional
community
to halt aid
to
any
Rwandan
government
that
committed
genocide
would have emboldened Hutu moderates
to face
down the extremists and
extinguish
violence. As
proof, they
note that
moderate
far
officers
appealed
for
support
from Western embassies
during
the first
days
of
violence,
and that the
intensity
of
massacres
waned after the West intensified its condemnations in late
April.
However,
this
argument ignores
the fact that
virtually
all of
Rwanda's elite
military
units
were
controlled
by
extremist
Hutu,
led
by
Colonel Theoneste
Bagosora.
These forces demonstrated their
power
and ruthlessness
by killing
Rwanda's
top
political
moderates
during
the first two
days
of violence.
By
contrast,
moderate Hutu
officers had
virtually
no
troops
at their
disposal.
The moderates
avoided
challenging
the extremists not because of
a
lack of Western
rhetorical
support
but because of mortal fear for themselves and their
families. This fear
was
justified given
that the extremists
stamped
out
any
nascent
opposition throughout
the
genocide?coercing
and
bribing
moderate
politicians, removing
them from office
or
killing
them if
they
did not
yield, shipping
moderate soldiers to
the
battlefront,
and
executing
civilian
opponents
of
genocide
as
"accomplices"
of the
rebels. The decline in massacres in late
April
is
explained simply by
the
dwindling
number of Tutsi still alive. International condemnation
did little
except compel
extremists to
try
harder
to
hide the
killing
and
disguise
their rhetoric. Even these
superficial gestures
were
directed
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mainly
at
persuading
France to renew
its
military support
for the
anti-Tutsi
war?hardly
an
indication of moderation.
The
only
way
that the
army's
Hutu moderates could have reduced
the
killing
of Tutsi civilians would have been to
join
forces with the
Tutsi rebels to defeat the Hutu extremists. This
was
militarily
feasible,
given
that the Tutsi rebels alone defeated both the
far
and the Hutu
militias in
just
three months?but it
was
politically implausible. By
April,
Rwanda had
already
been
severely polarized along
ethnic lines
by
four
years
of civil
war,
the calculated efforts of
propagandists,
and
the October
1993
massacre
of Hutu
by
Tutsi in
neighboring
Burundi.
Even moderate Hutu
politicians
once
allied with the rebels had
come
to fear Tutsi
hegemony. Although
the moderate Hutu officers
sincerely
favored
a
cease-fire and
a
halt to the
genocide, they
could not realisti
U.N.
peacekeepers
were
vulnerable to
violent retaliation.
.
cally
have defected to the Tutsi rebels?at
least until the far's defeat became imminent.
The second claim is that
5,000
U.N.
troops deployed immediately
upon
the out
break of violence could have
prevented
the
genocide.
But this assertion is
problematic
on
three
grounds.
It
assumes
such
troops
could have been
deployed virtually overnight.
In
reality,
even a
U.S.
light-infantry ready brigade
would have
required
about
a
week after
receiving
orders to
begin significant operations
in the theater and
sev
eral
more
days
for all its
equipment
to arrive. Further
delays
would have
resulted from
reinforcing
the
brigade
with
heavy
armor or
helicopters,
or
from
assembling
a
multinational force. Even if ordered
on
April
10,
as
requested
at the time
by
Dallaire,
reinforcements
probably
could not
have
begun major operations
to
stop genocide
much before
April
20.
Moreover,
it is unrealistic to
argue
that
urgent
intervention should have
been launched
on
April 10?given
that the international
community
did
not realize
genocide
was
under
way
until at least
ten
days
later.
Intervention
advocates,
such
as
the
Carnegie
Commission,
also
erroneously
characterize the
progression
of the
genocide.
The
com
mission claims that there
was a
"window of
opportunity
...
from
about
April
7
to
April
21" when intervention "could have stemmed the
violence in and around the
capital
[and]
prevented
its
spread
to the
countryside."
In
reality, killing
started almost
immediately
in most of
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Rwanda,
and
by April
21,
the last
day
of this
purported
"window,"
half
the ultimate Tutsi victims
already
were
dead. Even if reinforcements
had arrived
overnight
in
Kigali,
Dallaire
was unaware
of
genocide
outside the
capital
and thus would
not have
deployed troops
to the
countryside
in time to
prevent
the
massacres.
Furthermore, 5,000
troops
would have been insufficient
to
stop
genocide
without
running
risks of failure
or
high
casualties.
Only
1,000
troops
would have been available for
policing Kigali?some
three
troops
per
thousand
residents,
which is
grossly inadequate
for
a
city
in the
throes of
genocide.
In the
countryside,
U.S. commanders would have
faced
a
stark choice: either
concentrate forces for effective
action,
leav
ing
most of the
country engulfed
in
killing;
or
spread
forces
thin,
leaving troops
vulnerable
to attack. To avoid such
painful
choices in the
past,
U.S.
military planners
have insisted
on
deploying
more
than
20,000
troops
for interventions in the Dominican
Republic,
Panama,
and Haiti?all countries with
populations
smaller than Rwanda's.
A third claim is that U.N.
headquarters
had three months' advance
notice of
genocide
and could have averted the
killing simply by
au
thorizing
raids
on
weapons
caches. Critics cite the so-called
genocide
fax?a
January
11,1994,
cable from Dallaire to
U.N.
headquarters
in
New York that
conveyed
a
Hutu informant's
warning
that extremists
were
planning
to
provoke
civil
war,
kill
Belgian peacekeepers
to
spur
their
withdrawal,
and
slaughter
the Tutsi with
an
Interahamwe militia
of
1,700 troops
that the informant
was
training.
The cable also
reported
an arms
cache
containing
at least
135
weapons,
which Dallaire wanted
to seize within
36
hours.
Dallaire, however,
raised doubts about the informant's
credibility
in this
cable,
stating
that he had "certain reservations
on
the suddenness
of the
change
of heart of the informant....
Possibility
of
a
trap
not
fully
excluded,
as
this
may
be
a
set-up." Raising
further
doubt,
the
cable
was the first and last from Dallaire
containing
such
accusations,
according
to
U.N. officials. Erroneous
warnings
of
coups
and
assas
sinations are not uncommon
during
civil
wars.
U.N. officials
were
prudent
to direct Dallaire to confirm the
allegations
with
Habyarimana
himself,
based
on
the informant's belief that "the
president
does not
have full control
over
all elements of his old
party/faction."
Dallaire
never
reported
any
confirmation of the
plot.
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Even if the U.N. had
acquiesced
to
Dallaire in
January
1994,
it is
unlikely
the
weapons
cache could have been seized
or
that
doing
so
would have
prevented
the
genocide.
The U.N.
actually
did
reverse
itself
barely
three weeks
later,
on
February
4,1994,
granting
Dallaire
authorization to raid
weapons
depots.
But his forces failed in
every
attempt,
even
after
an
informant identified three
new
caches
on
February
7.
By
mid-March,
six weeks after
receiving
authorization,
the
peacekeepers
had
captured only
a
paltry
total of 16
weapons
and
100
grenades;
their rules
required cooperating
with Rwandan
police,
who
tipped
off the extremists. If the U.N. had
permitted
Dallaire to
act without
consulting
local
authorities,
Kigali
could have
responded
under
Chapter
VI of the U.N. Charter
(which governs
consensual
peacekeeping operations) by simply expelling
the force. The
peace
keepers
also
were
vulnerable
to
violent
retaliation,
as
they
were
dispersed
and still lacked armored
personnel
carriers at the time. In
addition,
Dallaire's cable identified
a
cache of
only
135
weapons?a
tiny
fraction
of the
20,000
rifles and
500,000
machetes
imported by
the
government
over
the
preceding
two
years.
Even had Dallaire
managed
to seize this
cache without
prompting expulsion
or
retaliation,
he could not have
derailed the wider
genocide plot
without
significant
reinforcements.
A fourth claim holds that
quickly jamming
or
destroying
Hutu radio
transmitters when the violence broke out could have
prevented
the
genocide.
A
Belgian peacekeeper
who monitored broadcasts
testified,
"I
am
convinced
that,
if
we
had
managed
to
liquidate
[Radio
Mille
Collines],
we
could
perhaps
have
avoided,
or
in
any
case
limited,
the
genocide."
A human
rights
advocate characterized the
jamming
as
"the
one
action
that,
in
retrospect, might
have done the
most to save
Rwan
dan lives." But radio broadcasts
were not essential to
perpetuating
or
directing
the
killing. By April,
Rwandans had been
sharply polarized
along
ethnic lines
by
civil
war,
propaganda,
and recent massacres in
Burundi.
Habyarimana's
assassination
was a
sufficient
trigger
for
many
extremist Hutu to
begin killing.
Moderate Hutu were
usually
swayed
not
by
radio broadcasts but
by
threats and
physical
intimidation
from extremist authorities.
Furthermore,
orchestration of the
genocide
relied not
merely
on
radio broadcasts but
on
the
government's separate
military
communications network.
Silencing
the radio
might
have had
most
impact prior
to the
genocide,
when broadcasts
were
fostering
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polarization,
but such action would have been
rejected
at the time
as a
violation of
sovereignty.
Even if hate radio had been
preventively
extin
guished,
the extremists
possessed
and used other
means to foster hatred.
The fifth variant of the intervention
argument
is that the Western
forces
sent to evacuate
foreign
nationals
during
the first week could
have restored order in
Kigali?and thereby prevented
the
genocide
had
they merely
been
given
the orders to do
so.
Just
four
days
after
Habyarimana's
assassination,
some
1,000
lightly
armed Western
evac
uation
troops, mainly
French and
Belgian
soldiers,
had arrived in
Kigali,
where
Belgium's 400-troop
unamir
contingent
was
already
stationed. Another
1,100
reserves were
less than two
hours
away
by
air.
But it is doubtful that this small
force,
lack
ing
the
right equipment
or
logistical support,
could have
quickly quashed
violence in the
capital?or
that
doing
so
would have
stopped
the
genocide
elsewhere. The Western
evacua
tors had to commit half their force to
guarding
the
airport
at the town's outskirts and
a
few
key assembly points, leaving
few available for
combat. In
addition,
coordinated action
would have been inhibited
by
the
widespread
More U.N. forces
deployed prior
to the
genocide
with
a
robust
mandate could have
deterred the
killing.
perception
that France and
Belgium sympathized
with
opposite
sides
in
the civil
war.
Moreover,
Kigali
was
defended
by
2,000
elite Rwandan
army troops
and several thousand
regulars equipped
with
heavy
weapons,
another
2,000
armed
fighters
of the Hutu
militia,
and
1,000
national
police.
Also located there
were more
than
1,000
Tutsi rebels
who had
access to surface-to-air missiles and had
explicitly
threatened
to attack the evacuators if
they
extended their mission. Even if the small
Western force had somehow halted the violence in
Kigali,
it lacked the
equipment
and
logistics
to
deploy
troops
quickly
to the
countryside.
Rural
killing probably
would have continued unless the
ringleaders
were
captured
and coerced to call off the
slaughter.
Such
a
search would not
have been
a
quick
or
simple
matter for
any force,
as
demonstrated
by
the
failed search for the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid
by
U.S.
troops
in
1993.
Ill-equipped
evacuation
troops
could have wasted weeks
looking
for the
ringleaders
while
genocide
continued at a
torrid
pace
in
the
countryside,
where
95
percent
of Rwandans lived.
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The sixth claim is most realistic: Had
un amir
been reinforced
several months
prior
to the outbreak of
violence,
as
Belgium urged
at
the
time,
genocide might
have been averted. More
troops
with the
proper
equipment,
a
broad
mandate,
and robust rules of
engagement
could have deterred the outbreak of
killing
or at least snuffed it out
early.
Such reinforcement would have
required
about
3,500
additional
high-quality troops
in
Kigali,
armored
personnel
carriers,
helicopters,
adequate logistics,
and the authorization to use
force to seize
weapons
and
ensure
security
without
consulting
Rwandan
police.
This would
have been the
5,000-troop
force that Dallaire envisioned?but
one
deployed prior
to the
genocide.
Under the U.N.'s
peacekeeping
rules,
Rwanda's
government
would have had to consent to such
a
change?and probably
would
have. Prior to
the
genocide,
its cabinet still
was
dominated
by
the
Hutu
opposition
moderates who had
negotiated
the Arusha
accords,
which called for
a
neutral international force
to
"guarantee
[the]
overall
security
of the
country."
The U.N.
Security
Council had
watered down
implementation
of this
provision, authorizing
un amir
only
to "contribute to the
security
of the
city
of
Kigali."
As tensions
mounted in
early
1994,
the Rwandan
government again
asked the
U.N. to dismantle armed
groups,
but the
peacekeepers
were too
weak.
Belgium pleaded
for reinforcements and
a new
mandate
from the
Security
Council in
January
and
February
1994
on
the
grounds
that
un amir
could
not maintain order. But the United
States and Britain blocked this initiative before it could
even
reach
a
vote,
citing
the costs of
more
troops
and the
danger
that
expanding
the mission could
endanger peacekeepers?as
had occurred in
Somalia the
previous
October.
The Rwandan
government,
however,
almost
certainly
would
have welcomed
a
reinforcement of
unamir
prior
to the
genocide.
Five thousand
troops
in the
capital
would have meant 16
troops
for
every
thousand
Rwandans,
a
ratio
historically
sufficient to
quell
severe
civil disorders. Such
a
force
might
well have deterred the
genocide
plot. Failing
that,
well-equipped peacekeepers
could have
pro
tected moderate Hutu leaders and Tutsi in the
capital
and
captured
some
of the extremists
during
the first
days
of
violence,
thereby
diminishing
the chance of
large-scale
massacres in the
countryside.
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Indeed,
such
early
reinforcement of
unamir
is the
only proposed
action that would have had
a
good
chance of
averting
the
genocide.
LESSONS
Th
emostobvious lesson of Rwanda's
tragedy
is that intervention
is
no
substitute for
prevention. Although
the
1994
genocide represents
a
particularly tough
case
for intervention in some
respects?such
as
its
rapid killing
and inaccessible location?it would have been
a
relatively
easy
mission in other
respects, including
the limited
strength
of
potential
opponents.
Yet even an
ideal intervention in Rwanda would have left
hundreds of thousands of Tutsi dead. To avert such violence
over
the
long
term,
there is
no
alternative to the
time-consuming
business of
diplomacy
and
negotiation. Tragically,
international
diplomatic
efforts in Rwanda
prior
to the
genocide
were ill conceived and
counterproductive.
Whether
pursuing prevention
or
intervention,
policymakers
must
use
their
imagination
to better
anticipate
the behavior of
foreign
actors.
In
Rwanda,
Western officials failed to
foresee the
genocide, despite
numerous
warning signs,
in
part
because the
act was so
immoral that it
was
difficult to
picture.
Increased
awareness
of such risks demands that
any
peacekeeping
force
deployed preventively
to a
fragile
area
be
adequately
sized and
equipped
to
stop incipient
violence?rather than
be sent as a
lighdy
armed
tripwire
that
serves
mainly
to foster
a
false
sense
of
security.
If the West is
unwilling
to
deploy
such robust forces in
advance,
it must refrain from coercive
diplomacy
aimed at
compelling
rulers to surrender
power
overnight.
Otherwise,
such rulers
may
feel
so
threatened
by
the
prospect
of
losing
power
that
they opt
for
genocide
or
ethnic
cleansing
instead. Western
diplomacy
that relies
mainly
on
the
threat of economic sanctions
or
bombing
has
provoked
a
tragic
backlash
not
just
in
Rwanda,
but also in Kosovo and East Timor
over
the last few
years
as
local rulers
opted
to inflict massive violence rather than hand
over
power
or
territory
to
lifelong
enemies. In each
case,
Western mili
tary
intervention arrived too late to
prevent
the
widespread
atrocities.
Obviously,
time is of the
essence once
large-scale
attacks
against
civil
ians
begin.
Most such violence
can
be
perpetrated
in
a matter of
weeks,
as was
demonstrated in
Rwanda, Kosovo,
and East Timor.
Despite
this
reality,
domestic
politics
often
prevents
an
American
president
from
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Kuperman
quickly launching
a
major
intervention. Thus U.S. defense
planners
should be
more
creative in
developing
limited alternatives. The
case
of
Rwanda underscores that
lighter
intervention
options
that avoid
com
bat
areas
and focus
mainly
on
stopping
violence
against
civilians could
save
almost
as
many
lives if
pursued seriously
and
expeditiously. Rapid
responses
would be facilitated
by
the
development
of
pre-prepared plans
for known trouble
spots
and
by
better
coordinating intelligence
from
available
sources,
including nongovernmental organizations.
That
said,
tradeoffs
are
inevitable if the United States
hopes
to increase
its effectiveness in humanitarian
military
intervention. To
deploy troops
faster,
additional
"ultra-light"
units
(like
the Tenth Mountain
Division)
would have to
be
created,
either
by converting existing
heavier units
intended for
major contingencies
or
by increasing
defense
spending.
The
Pentagons
recent
proposal
to trim
some
heavy
mechanized forces down
to
medium-weight
units would not solve the
problem,
because
they
would
still be too
heavy
for
a
quick
airlift.
Lighter
units
probably
could
save more
lives abroad but would also be
subject
to more
casualties and
potential
failure. Such tradeoffs should be made
only
after
rigorous
debate,
which
to date has been
virtually
absent in the United States.
Finally,
no
policy
of humanitarian
military
intervention should be
implemented
without
a
sober consideration of its unintended
conse
quences.
Recent
interventions,
whether in
Bosnia, Kosovo,
or
East
Timor,
have been motivated
by
the
impulse
to
provide
humanitarian
aid to a
party visibly suffering
in an
internal conflict. But intervention
in those
cases also resulted in the weaker sides
being
bolstered
militarily.
This
pattern
creates
perverse
incentives for weaker
parties
in such
conflicts to
reject compromise
and escalate
fighting
because
they expect
foreign
intervention
or
hope
to attract it. The result is often
tragedy,
as
intervention arrives too little
or too late to
protect
civilians. Thus
a
policy
of
intervening
to relieve humanitarian
emergencies
that stem
from internal conflicts
may
actually
increase the number and extent of
such
emergencies?a
classic instance of moral hazard.
Inevitably,
decisions
on
whether and how to intervene in
specific
cases
will be
caught
up
in
politics.
But this
challenge
should not deter
hard
thinking
on
when and how such intervention
can
be most
beneficial?or detrimental. If Rwanda demonstrates
nothing
else,
it
is that thousands of lives
are at stake in such decisions.?
[ll8]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS-
Volume79No.
1
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