Legal Separation Digest
Legal Separation Digest
Legal Separation Digest
HELD:
Ocampo vs Florenciano
Florenciano’s admission to the
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina investigating fiscal that she committed
Florenciano were married in 1938. adultery, in the existence of evidence of
adultery other than such confession, is
not the confession of judgment likewise preclude the court from acting on a
disallowed by Article 48 of the Family motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
Code. applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit
What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court or Held:
through a pleading.
No
Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendant’s The court where the action is pending
statement agreeing to the legal according to Article 103 is to remain
separation, the decree of separation passive. It must let the parties alone in
should be granted since it would not be the meanwhile. It is precluded from
based on the confession but upon the hearing the suit. There is then some
evidence presented by the plaintiff. plausibility for the view of the lower
What the law prohibits is a judgment court that an ancillary motion such as
based exclusively on defendant’s one for preliminary mandatory
confession. injunction is not to be acted on. If it
The petition should be granted based
were otherwise, there would be a
on the second adultery, which has not
failure to abide by the literal language
yet prescribed.
of such codal provision.
That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases
Lucy Somosa-Ramos vs Hon. Vamenta and for judicial power to assert itself is
Clemen Ramos discernible from what is set forth in the
following article. It reads thus: "After
Facts: the filing of the petition for legal
Petitioner filed for legal separation separation, the spouse shall be entitled
against respondent on the ground of to live separately from each other and
concubinage managevtheir respective property. The
Also sought for the issuance of writ of husband shall continue to manage the
preliminary mandatory injunction for conjugal partnership property but ifvthe
the the return of her paraphernal and court deems it proper, it may
exclusive property appoint another to manage said
Respondent opposed stating that property, in which case the
issuance of such would lessen the administrator shall have the same rights
chances of them reconciling and duties as a guardian and shall not
Respondent judge granted the motion be allowed to dispose ofthe income or
by respondent on the ground of Art 103 of the capital except in accordance with
the orders of the court."
Issue: Whether or not Article 103 of the There would appear to bethen a
Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an recognition that the question of
action for legal separation before the lapse of management of their respective
six months from the filing of the petition, would property need not be left
unresolved even during such six- of Guijulñgan, Province of Negros
month period. Oriental, in the year 1988;
An administrator may even be (3) that since their said marriage
appointed for the management of the plaintiff and defendant had lived as
property of the conjugal partnership. husband and wife and had nine
The absolute limitation from which the children, three of whom were living
court suffers under the preceding article and were already of age;
is thereby eased. The parties may in the (4) that during their marriage
meanwhile be heard. There is plaintiff and defendant had
justification then for the petitioner's acquired property, real and
insistence that her motion for personal, the value of which was
preliminary mandatory injunction about P300,000 and all of which
should not be ignored by the lower was under the administration of
court. the defendant;
There is all the more reason for this (5) that since the year 1913 and up
response from respondent Judge, to the date of the complaint, the
considering that the husband whom she defendant had been committing
accused of concubinage and an attempt acts of adultery with one Ana
against her life would inthe meanwhile Calog, sustaining illicit relations
continue in the management of what with her and having her as his
she claimed to be her paraphernal concubine, with public scandal and
property, an assertion that was not in disgrace of the plaintiff;
specifically denied by him (6) that because of said illicit
relations, the defendant ejected
the plaintiff from the conjugal
home, for which reason she was
Diego De la Vina vs Antonio VIllareal
obliged to live in the city of Iloilo,
September 17, 1917, Narcisa where she had since established
Geopano filed a complaint in the her habitual residence; and
Court of First Instance of the (7) that the plaintiff, scorned by her
Province of Iloilo against Diego de husband, the defendant, had no
la Viña, alleging: means of support and was living
(1) That she was a resident of the only at the expense of one of her
municipality of Iloilo, Province of daughters. Upon said allegations
Iloilo, and that the defendant was a she prayed for (a) a decree of
resident of the municipality of divorce, (b) the partition of the
Vallehermoso, Province of Oriental conjugal property, and (c)
Negros; alimony pendente lite in the sum of
(2) that she was the legitimate wife P400 per month and a (d)
of the defendant, having been preliminary injuction for properties
married to him in the municipality which she allege was being
alienated and encumbered by the The matrimonial domicile of the wife is
defendants usually that of the husband, but if she is
Diego the petitioner tried to justified in leaving him because his
oppose this stating that the court conduct has been such as to entitle her
has no jurisdiction to take to a divorce, and she thereupon does
cognizance of the cause nor over leave him and go into another state for
the person of the defendant the purpose of there permanently
Respective judge overruled the residing, she acquires a domicile in the
petitioner and granted the latter state.
preliminary injunction If the wife can acquire a separate
Hence petition residence when her husband consents
or acquiesces, we see no reason why
Issue: May a married woman ever acquire a
the law will not allow her to do so
residence or domicile separate from that of her
when, as alleged in the present case,
husband during the existence of the marriage?
the husband unlawfully ejects her from
Held: the conjugal home in order that he may
freely indulge in his illicit relations with
It is true, as a general of law, that the another woman.
domicile of the wife follows that of her In the case of property, it is a rule that
husband. the husband is the administrator but
But the authorities are unanimous in when that relation ceases and, in a
holding that this is not an absolute rule. proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve
"Under modern laws it is clear that the marriage and to partition the
many exceptions to the rule that the conjugal property, it is just and proper,
domicile from of the wife is determined in order to protect the interests of the
by that of her husband must obtain. wife, that the husband's power of
Accordingly, the wife may acquire administration be curtailed, during the
another and seperate domicile from pendency of the action, insofar as
that of her husband where the theorical alienating or encumbering the conjugal
unity of husband and wife is is property is concerned
dissolved, as it is by the institution of
divorce proceedings; or where the
husband has given cause for divorce; or
where there is a separation of the
parties by agreement, or a permanent
separation due to desertion of the wife
by the husband or attributable to cruel
treatment on the part of the husband; Froilan Gandionco vs Penaranda and Teresita
or where there has been a forfeiture by Gandionco
the wife of the benefit of the husband's
Facts:
domicile.
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, intended to obtain the right to live
filed a complaint against herein separately, with the legal consequences
petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal thereof including the dissolution of the
separation on the ground of conjugal partnership of gains, custody
concubinage as a civil case. of the children, support and
Teresita also filed a criminal complaint disqualifications from inheriting from
of concubinage against her husband. the innocent spouse.
She likewise filed an application for the Decree of legal separation may be
provisional remedy of support issued upon proof by preponderance of
pendente lite which was approved and evidence, where no criminal proceeding
ordered by the respondent judge. or conviction is necessary.
Petitioner moved to suspend the action Furthermore, the support pendente
for legal separation and the incidents lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an
consequent thereto such as the support action for legal separation, and granted
for pendent elite, in view of the criminal at the discretion of the judge. If in
case for concubinage filed against him. case, the petitioner finds the amount of
He contends that the civil action for support pendente lite ordered as too
legal separation is inextricably tied with onerous, he can always file a motion to
the criminal action thus, all proceedings modify or reduce the same.
related to legal separation will have to
be suspended and await the conviction Carmen Lapuz vs Eufemio Eufemio
or acquittal of the criminal case.
Facts:
Facts:
Held:
Petitioner filed a writ of prohibition
The necessity of founding the action for
alleging that complaint had been filed
support or alimony on a title, and a title
by Victorina Obin against petitioner
supported by documentary evidence, is
praying that she be declared lawful wife
a consequence of the precepts of article because petitioner is a diplomat
143 of the Civil Code cited by the assigned in different countries
respondent judge himself. In this article Petitioner retired as an ambassador in
the right to support is granted (1) to 1985 and came back to PH
spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate 4 years later he filed an action for
descendants and ascendants inter judicial authorization to sell a building
se; (3) to parents and certain and lot in San Juan stating that he is old
legitimated and acknowledged natural and sick hence the profit from the
children; (4) to other illegitimate selling will sustain his medication and
children, and (5) to brothers and sisters. hospitalization
In all these cases it is a civil status or a Wife opposed authorization and filed
juridical relation which is the basis of for counterclaim of legal separation
the action for support the civil static of alleging that said house was occupied
marriage or that of relationship. by her and their 6 children and they
it is necessary for her to prove were depending support from rentals
possession of the civil status of a spouse from another conjugal property
that is, a marriage, without which one She also alleged that when petitioner
has no right to the title of husband or came back she went home not to his
wife. family but to another woman with 3
Marriages before the effectivity of the children
code must be proven by canonical Wife asked the court to grant legal
certificates separation and to liquidate conjugal
The court below had jurisdiction to try properties
the divorce suit, but he was without RTC decreed legal separation and
jurisdiction to grant alimony when the forfeiting petitioner’s share in the
right to claim alimony had not accrued conjugal properties after discovering he
in accordance with the provisions of the had a bigamous marriage
CA approved writ of preliminary
Civil Code. This Code only grants the
injunction to enjoin petitioner from
right to alimony to a wife. This status
interfering with the administration of
not appearing by a final judgment, the
their properties and was GRANTED
court is without jurisdiction to make any
Petitioner opposed arguing that the law
order in the matter. Therefore
provides for joint administration of
mandamus is the proper remedy upon
conjugal properties also citing Art 124
the facts related.
and Art 61 of FC
Sabalones vs CA
Held:
Facts:
Yes, preliminary injunction can still be
Petitioner Samson Sabalones left to his issued
wife the administration of some Pending the appointment of an
conjugal properties for 15 years administration over the conjugal assets,
the court justified in allowing the wife Ramirez, guilty of thecharge, sentencing
to continue administration them to a term of imprisonment.
The law does indeed grant joint During the pendency of the adultery
administration over the conjugal caseagainst the respondent, wife On
properties as clearly provided in Art November 18, 1969 the respondent
124 however Art 61 states that after the filed with the lower court,a complaint
petition for legal separation the trial against the petitioner for legal
court in the absence of a written separation and/or separation of
agreement appoint either one of the properties, custodyof their children and
spouse or a 3rd party to be the support, with an urgent petition for
administrator support pendente litefor her and their
The designation was implicit when the youngest son, Gregory, who was then
court denied the petitioner any share in and until now is in her custody. The
the conjugal properties respondent's complaint for legal
Purpose of preliminary injunction is to separation is based on two grounds:
preserve status quo concubinage and attempt against
Requirements are the existence of a herlife.
right and actual or threatened violation The application for support pendente
Let it be stressed that the injunction has lite was granted.
not permanently installed the The petitioner filed his opposition to
respondent wife as the administrator of the respondent's application for
the whole mass of conjugal assets. It support pendente lite setting up as
has merely allowed her to continue defense the adultery charge he had filed
administering the properties in the against the respondent
meantime without interference from On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed
the petitioner, pending the express with respondent Court of Appeals a
designation of the administrator in petition for certiorari and prohibition
accordance with Article 61 of the Family with preliminary injunction to annul the
Code. aforementioned orders on the ground
that they were issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
Lerma vs CA The next day the respondent court gave
due course to the petition and issued a
Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz writ of preliminary injunction to stop
were married on May 19, 1951. Judge Luciano from enforcing said
On August 22,1969 the petitioner filed a orders. The respondent court, in its
complaint for adultery against the decision of October 8, 1970, set aside
respondent and a certain Teodoro the assailed orders andgranted the
Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the petitioner an opportunity to present
court of First Instance of Rizal decided evidence before the lower court in
the adultery case of the respondent and support of his defense against the
found her and her co-accused, Teodoro application for support pendente lite
The respondent moved to reconsider instance of the other spouse, cannot be
the decision on the ground that the considered as within the intendment of the law
petitioner had not asked that he be granting separate support.
allowed to present evidence in the
In fact under Article303 of the same Code the
lower court. The respondent court, in its
obligation to give support shall cease "when the
resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside
recipient, be he aforced heir or not, has
the decision of October 8 and rendered
committed some act which gives rise to
another dismissing the petition. This is
disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of
now the subject of the instant
the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when
proceeding for review.
the spouse has given cause for legal
ISSUE: separation." The loss of the substantive right to
support in such a situation is incompatible with
W/N the lower court acted with grave abused of any claim for support pendente lite
discretion in granting the
respondent’sapplication for support pendente
lite without giving the petitioner an opportunity
People vs Sensano and Marcelo Ramos
to present evidence in support of his defense
against the said application. Facts:
HELD: Respondents were sentenced for the
crime of adultery
Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura
and the orders of respondent Juvenile and
were married April 29 1919 and begot 1
Domestic Relations Court herein complained of,
child
dated December 24, 1969 and February
After birth of child, husband left wife to
15,1970, all are set aside and their enforcement
go to province for 3 years without
enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment
writing to his wife or sending anything
asmay be rendered in the pending action for
for the support of herself and son
legal separation between the parties. Wife then met accused Marcelo Ramos
The right to separate support or maintenance, who took her and the child to live with
even from the conjugal partnership him
Upon the return of the husband he filed
property,presupposes the existence of a
a case of adultery and both were found
justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such
guilty
right to live separately.
After completing sentence, wife went
This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, back to husband and begged for pardon
which states that after the filing of the petition but was denied
for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled Abandoned for the second time, she
to live separately from each other. A petition in went back to Marcelo
After some years, husband upon coming
bad faith, such as that filed by one who is
back from Hawaii again charged them of
himself or herself guilty of an act which
adultery
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the
Because of the nullity of the divorce
decree, complainant instituted two
Held:
actions, one for bigamy and one for
Apart from the fact that the husband in concubinage
Accused was convicted for bigamy
this case was assuming a mere pose
While the case was pending for
when he signed the complaint as the
concubinage, Rodolfo interposed the
"offended" spouse, we have come to
plea of double jeopardy but was denied
the conclusion that the evidence in this
both in RTC and CA and then he was
case and his conduct warrant the
convicted
inference that he consented to the
adulterous relations existing between Issue: Should accused be acquitted of
the accused and therefore he is not concubinage in view of the agreement executed
authorized by law to institute this by Rodolfo and Elena
criminal proceeding.
We cannot accept the argument of the Held:
Attorney-General that the seven years
Yes, the agreement constituted a
of acquiescence on his part in the
consent given by Elena to Rodolfo
adultery of his wife is explained by his
Concubinage is mere cohabitation by
absence from the Philippine Islands
the husband with a woman who is not
during which period it was impossible
his wife
for him to take any action against the He should have been acquitted because
accused. the document executed by petitioner
There is no merit in the argument that it
and defendant was a valid consent to
was impossible for the husband to take
the act of concubinage within the
any action against the accused during
meaning of Art 344 of RPC
the said seven years. Previous jurisprudence provided that
Judgment reversed
the court held that the consent which
bars the offended party from instituting
a criminal prosecution in cases of
People vs Schneckenberger adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abducation, rape and acts of
Facts:
lasciviousness is that which has been
May 15 1926 accused Rodolfo married given expressly or implied after the
Elena Ramirez Cartagena crime has been committed
After 7 years they agreed to live
separately and secured an agreement
June 15, 1935 w/o leaving th PH Bugayong vs Ginez
secured a divorce decree from civil
court in Mexico Facts:
May 11, 1936 he contracted another
marriage with co accused Julia Madel Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in
the US Navy was married with Leonila
Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan infidelity. He then filed a complaint for
while on furlough leave. legal separation.
Immediately after the marriage, they
lived with the sisters of Bugayong in ISSUE: Whether there was condonation
said municipality before he went back between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as
to duty. a ground for dismissal of the action.
The couple came to an agreement that
HELD:
Ginez would stay with his sisters who
later moved in Manila. Condonation is the forgiveness of a
On or about July 1951, she left the marital offense constituting a ground
dwelling of the sisters-in-law and for legal separation.
informed her husband by letter that she Yes. There was condonation because
had gone to Pangasinan to reside with the husband, Benjamin Bugayong,
her mother and later on moved to actively searched for hiswife in
Dagupan to study in a local college. Pangasinan after she left the conjugal
Petitioner then began receiving letters home. The act of Benjamin in
from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s persuading Leonizato come along with
sister-in-law) and some from him, and the fact that she went with
anonymous writers, which were not him and consented to be brought to
produced at the hearing, informing him thehouse of his cousin and together
of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. slept there as husband and wife and the
He admitted that his wife informed him
further fact that in thesecond night they
by letter that a certain Eliong kissed
slept together in their house as
her. All these communications,
husband and wife all these facts have
prompted him in October 1951 to seek
no other meaning than that a
the advice of the Navy Chaplain who
reconciliation between them was
asked him to consult with the navy legal
effected and that there was
department.
condonation of the wife by the
In August 1952, Bugayong went to
husband.
Pangasinan and looked for his wife.
A single voluntary act of marital
They met in the house of the
intercourse between the parties
defendant’s godmother. They
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
proceeded to the house of Pedro,
condonation and where the parties live
cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed
in the same house, it is presumed that
for 1 day and 1 night as husband and
they live on terms of matrimonial
wife.
cohabitation.
The next day, they slept together in
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code
their own house. He tried to verify with
states that the legal separation may be
Leonila the truth on the information he
claimed only by the innocent spouse,
received but instead of answering, she
provided there has been no
merely packed up and left which he
condonation of or consent to the
took as a confirmation of the acts of
adultery or concubinage
In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the
second sentence of Art 100 that both of
William Brown vs Justina Yambao
them are offenders hence cannot grant
Facts: legal separation
Contrary to Art 102, the petition was
July 14, 1955 Petitioner filed a suit in filed 10 years after he learned of his
CFI to obtain legal separation from his wife’s adultery
lawful wife Juanita Yambao
He alleged that while interned by the William Ong vs Lucita Ong
Japanese invaders in 1942-1945, the Facts:
wife engaged in adulterous acts with
Carlos Field whom she begot a baby girl Parties were married for over 20 years
and learned of it only in 1945 when lucita filed for a complaint for
Brown prayed for confirmation of legal separation under Art 55 Par 1 of FC
liquidation agreement and custody of Husband subjected her to physical
children issued of the marriage violence so lucita left the conjugal home
Court declared Yambao in default for Abusive behavior was corroborated by
failure to answer in due time despite her sister and her doctor
service of summons in accordance with RTC granted her petition for legal
Art 101 if collusion exists separation
In cross examination, it was found that William filed for petition for review
after liberation brown had lived He contends that he never inflicted
martially with another woman and physical harm on her and their children
begotten children by her He also alleged that the reason for filing
The court then rendered judgment of legal separation was for the wife’s
denying the legal separation asked on family to prevent him from having
the ground that while the wife’s control in the conjugal property
adultery was established brown had He also claimed that Lucita abandoned
incurred in a misconduct a similar the family home therefore she is also
nature that barred his right of action given a ground for legal separation
under Art 100 Issue: should the legal separation be granted
Issue: Should the petition for legal separation be Held:
granted?
Yes
Held: The contentions of the husband is
absurd
No. It was correctly held that the action
The reason why the wife left the
was already barred because Brown did
conjugal home because of the physical
not petition for legal separation
violence imposed by the husband
proceedings until 10 years after he
It was correctly done by the lower
learned of his wife’s adultery
courts to take cognizance of the
witnesses’ testimonies and their Since petitioner merely obtained the
credibility husband's permission to bring theminor
The abandonment referred in the children to Manila, for the purpose of
Family code is abandonment without attending the funeral of their maternal
justifiable cause for more than one year grandfather, petitionerobtained and has
the physical possession of the minors in
Rosario Matute vs Hon. Higino Macadaeg
a precarious manner. She holds it in the
Facts: name,on behalf and by authority of
husband, whose agent she, in effect, is.
Armando Medel filed a petition for legal He may, therefore, demand theirreturn
separation against Petitioner on the at any time, and she is bound to comply
ground of adultery committed with his immediately with such demand. She
brother Ernesto Medel cannot even questionhis authority to
Rosario was found guilty and the make it, although she is free to seek a
custody of their 4 children awarded to review of the order or decision
Armando awarding thecustody of minors to him,
Armando thereafter went to the US and
and to ask that they be placed under
left the children under the care of his
her charge.
sister
Upon coming home they all saw each Quiao Vs Quiao
other and joined in Cebu
Rosario asked that she be granted to FACTS:
take the children to the funeral of her
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
father and the children’s grandfather
Armando allowed this with the legal separation against petitioner
condition that she returns the children Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
RTC rendered a decision declaring the
after 2 weeks
She did not return them and then filed a legal separation thereby awarding
petition that she be granted the custody the custody of their 3 minor children in
of the children and to order the father favor of Rita and all remaining
to give support to children properties shall be divided equally
Motion was based upon the ground between the spouses subject to the
that the three children who were above respective legitimes of the children and
7 years old did not want to go back to the payment of the
their father because the father was unpaid conjugal liabilities.
living with another woman Brigido’s share, however, of the net
Rosario filed a complaint holding the profits earned by
petitioner in contempt for not returning the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
the children favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse.
The petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC
Held:
to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” default rule is that In the absence of marriage
denotes “the remainder of the properties of the settlements, or when the same are void, the
parties after deducting the separate properties system of relative community
of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” or conjugal partnership of gains as established
in this Code, shall govern the property relations
It further held that after determining between husband and wife.
the remainder of the properties, it shall
be forfeited in favor of Second, since at the time of the dissolution of
the common children because the the spouses’ marriage the operative law is
offending spouse does not have any already the Family Code, the same applies in the
right to any share of the net profits instant case and the applicable law in so far as
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) the liquidation of
and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
The petitioner claims that the court a concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
of the Family Code, instead of Article
102. He confusingly argues that Article 2. The petitioner is saying that since the
102 applies because there is no other property relations between the spouses is
provision under the Family Code which governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership
defines net profits earned subject of of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
forfeiture as a result of legal separation. acquired vested rights over half of the
properties of the Conjuga lPartnership of Gains,
ISSUES: pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: “All property of
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned
community or Art 129
in common by the husband and wife.”
on dissolutionof conjugal partnership of gains is
applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern. While one may not be deprived of his “vested
right,” he may lose the same if there is
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired
due process and such deprivation is founded in
vested rights over½of the properties in
law and jurisprudence.
the conjugal partnership– NO.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in
his right to due process. First, he was well-aware
the conjugal partnership of gains the same with
that the respondent prayed in her complaint
the computation of “net profits” earned in the
that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to
absolute community? NO.
her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
RATIO: that the trial court divide the community assets
between the petitioner and the respondent as
1. ART 129 should govern circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community
First, since the spouses were married prior to
properties of the parties. Second, when the
the promulgation of the current family code, the
decision for legal separation was promulgated,
the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as complete separation of capitals.
“net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
In the instant case, since it was already
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process. established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to
3. When a couple enters into a regime of return to any of them. The listed properties
absolute community, the husband and the wife above are considered part of
become joint owners of all the properties of the the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
marriage. Whatever property each spouse remains in the above-listed properties should
brings into the marriage, and those acquired be divided equally between the spouses and/or
during the marriage (except those excluded their respective heirs. However, since the trial
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form court found the petitioner the guilty party, his
the common mass of the couple’s properties. share from the net profits of
And when the couple’s marriage or community the conjugalpartnership is forfeited in favor of
is dissolved, that common mass the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2)
is divided between the spouses, or their of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused,
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion like in the absolute community regime, nothing
the parties have established, irrespective of the will be returned to the guilty party in
value each one may have originally owned. the conjugal partnership regime, because there
is no separate property which may be
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
applicable, since it has been established that
the spouses have no separate properties, what
will be divided equally between them is simply
Laperal vs Republic
the “net profits.” And since the legal
separation½share decision of Brigido states that Facts:
the in the net profits shall be awarded to the
children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. The petitioner, a bona fide resident of
Baguio City, was married with Mr.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.
a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under However, a decree of legal separation
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and was later on issued to the spouses.
the wife place in common fund the fruits of Aside from that, she ceased to live with
their separate property and income from their Enrique.
work or industry, and divide equally, upon During their marriage, she naturally
the dissolution of the marriage or of the uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained petition to be permitted to resume in
indiscriminately by either spouse during the using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each This was opposed by the City Attorney
of the couple has his and her own property and of Baguio on the ground that it violates
debts. The law does not intend to effect a Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was
mixture or merger of those debts or properties claiming that continuing to use her
married name would give rise to
confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets.
HELD: