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PVL 2601 Revision Paper and Solutions

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SECTION A : MULTIPLE-CHOICE QUESTIONS

Circle the correct answer.

1 In Guggenheim v Rosenbaum the court awarded the innocent party upon breach of promise the
following:

[1] Compensation for all her prospective loss.


[2] Compensation for all her expenditure incurred.
[3] Compensation for all her prospective loss and all her expenditure incurred.
[4] Compensation for part of her prospective loss and part of her expenditure incurred.
(2)

2 X and Y are married. They have a son, M. Y also has a daughter, Q, from a previous
marriage. M and Q are related to each other as follows:

[1] They are blood relatives in the direct line.


[2] They are collateral blood relatives.
[3] They are relatives by affinity in the direct line.
[4] They are relatives by affinity in the collateral line.
(2)

3 In Ex parte Dow the court decided that a marriage that had been solemnised in the garden
of a private dwelling is ...

[1]void.
[2]voidable.
[3]valid.
[4]putative.
(2)
4 Susan, a 17-year-old student, wants to conclude a civil marriage with John, a 25-year-old
teacher. Susan’s mother, who has sole guardianship of Susan, refuses to consent to the
marriage. Which one of the following persons/authorities should Susan consult for
consent in order to proceed with the marriage?

[1] The High Court


[2] The Minister of Home Affairs
[3] The presiding officer of the Children’s Court
[4] Susan’s father
(2) 5 If Cindy is pregnant with John’s child when she marries Peter, and Peter
is blissfully unaware of this, the marriage is ...

[1] valid and unchallengeable.


[2] valid but voidable.
[3] void ab initio.
[4] void but putative.
(2)

6 In which one of the following instances would a married woman lose her right to claim
maintenance from her husband?

[1] The wife and her husband agree to live apart.


[2] The wife moves out of the matrimonial home because her husband beats her.
[3] The wife moves out of the matrimonial home because she is having an affair with her
boss.
[4] The husband moves out of the matrimonial home because he is having an affair with
his boss.
(2)

7 In which one of the following cases did the Constitutional Court hold that contempt
proceedings in the High Court to secure the enforcement of a maintenance debt are
appropriate constitutional relief for the enforcement of a claim for the maintenance of
children?

[1] Reyneke v Reyneke


[2] Purnell v Purnell
[3] Mngadi v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates Provident Fund
[4] Bannatyne v Bannatyne
(2)

8 Sarah and Luke are married in community of property. They live on a lovely farm in
Mpumalanga. The farm is subject to a usufruct. Which one of the following assets falls
into their joint estate?

[1] The crops on the farm which is subject to a usufruct.


[2] The farm which is subject to a usufruct.
[3] The engagement ring that Luke bought Sarah.
[4] The disability payments that Sarah receives from Old Mutual after being injured.

(2) 9 Before their marriage, Jack and Gill agreed that they would marry out of community of
property. They signed an antenuptial contract, but this contract was never properly executed
and registered. What must Jack and Gill now do to ensure that they are formally married out of
community of property?

[1] They must bring a court application in terms of section 21(1) of the Matrimonial
Property Act 88 of 1984 for leave to change their matrimonial property system.
[2] They must enter into a postnuptial written agreement and have it notarially executed.
[3] They must bring a court application in terms of section 88 of the Deeds Registries Act
47 of 1937 for permission to have the contract executed and registered after the
marriage.
[4] They do not have to do anything.
(2)
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10 In which one of the following cases was it decided that all three factors listed in section 9
of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 must be present before a forfeiture order can be granted
and, particularly, that substantial misconduct is a prerequisite for the making of a forfeiture
order?

[1] Klerck v Klerck


[2] Matyila v Matyila
[3] Binda v Binda
[4] Wijker v Wijker
(2)

11 As far as redistribution orders are concerned, which one of the following awards with
regard to the division of the spouses' assets was made by the Supreme Court of Appeal
in Bezuidenhout v Bezuidenhout?

[1] A ⅓:⅔ division


[2] A 20:80 division
[3] An equal division
[4] A 40:60 division
(2)

12 Paul and Mary are involved in divorce litigation. They have a son, aged 6 and a daughter,
aged 1. In which one of the following scenarios does the family advocate NOT need to
apply for an order authorising an enquiry in terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorce
Matters Act 24 of 1987?

[1] Paul and Mary agree that Mary will be the care-giving parent of the children after the
divorce.
[2] Paul and Mary agree that Paul will be the care-giving parent of the children after the
divorce.
[3] Paul and Mary agree that Paul will be the care-giving parent of their son and Mary
will be the care-giving parent of their daughter after the divorce.
[4] Paul and Mary agree that care of the children should be awarded to Paul’s parents
after the divorce.

(2) 13 On which one of the following ground(s) can a divorce be obtained in terms of
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998?

[1] Irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship.


[2] Irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and desertion of the wife by the husband.
[3] Irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship and the inability of the husband
to pay the outstanding lobolo.
[4] Inability of the husband to pay the outstanding lobolo.
(2)

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14 In which one of the following cases did the court grant a Muslim wife’s application for
maintenance pendente lite in terms of rule 43 of the Uniform Rules of Court even though
the spouses had never entered into a civil marriage?

[1] Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund


[2] Hassam v Jacobs
[3] AM v RM
[4] Khan v Khan
(2)

15 In Volks v Robinson it was held that ...

[1] the common-law action for loss of support can be extended to a claim by the
surviving same-sex life partner.
[2] the law may distinguish between married and unmarried people and accord benefits
to married people which it denies to unmarried people.
[3] section 5 of the Children’s Act discriminates unfairly against same-sex life partners
on the ground of sexual orientation.
[4] the exclusion of same-sex life partners from intestate inheritance from each other’s
deceased estate is unconstitutional.
(2)
TOTAL SECTION A [30]

SECTION B

Question 1

The names of five court cases (which deal with some of the invariable consequences of marriage
and with marriage in community of property) are given below. Write the name of the court case
that offers authority for the statement in the first column on the dotted line in the second column.

Du Plessis v Pienaar
Nedbank v Van Zyl
Reloomel v Ramsay
De Wet v Jurgens
Peter v Minister of Law and Order

Statement Case

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In determining whether a particular item is a
household necessary the court used the
subjective approach in terms of which the
matter is viewed from the perspective of the …………………………......……………………
dealer, ie the court looked at the facts of which
the dealer was aware or should reasonably
have been aware.
The court said that the concept of “consortium
omnis vitae” is used “as an umbrella word for
all the legal rights of one spouse to the …………………………......……………………
company, affection, services and support of
the other”.
The court held that exclusion of an asset from
the joint estate does not protect the asset in the
case of insolvency, for all property of both
spouses married in community of property fall …………………………......……………………
into the insolvent estate if the spouses are
sequestrated.
The court held that spouses who are married
in community of property are joint debtors in
respect of joint debts. It also held that the
spouses, however, remain separate debtors …………………………......……………………
even though the debt has to be paid out of the
joint estate.
The court held that a spouse who is married in
community of property cannot stand surety for
the other spouse’s debt because those debts …………………………......……………………
are joint debts and in our law a person cannot
stand surety for his or her own debt.
[10]

Question 2

Ivy and Irvin concluded a marriage out of community of property with application of the accrual
system in 2001. Recently, Ivy discovered that Irvin had fathered a child outside their marriage.
She approaches the court for dissolution of the marriage. Their antenuptial contract reflects that
Irvin had R20 000 in his ABSA cheque account while Ivy had no assets at the time of the
conclusion of the marriage.

At the time of approaching the court for dissolution of marriage, Ivy’s net estate is worth R200
000, while Irvin’s net estate amounts to R400 000 consisting of the following, respectively:

Spouse Assets in 2011


Ivy A flat, worth R100 000, which she inherited from her father

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" A Rolex watch, worth R40 000, given to her by Irvin as a wedding
anniversary gift
" R60 000 which she received as compensation for loss of income
when she was unable to work due to illness
Irvin An immovable property worth R 300 000
" R100 000 he won from betting on horses

Assume that according to the weighted average of the consumer price index, money was worth
twice as much at the commencement of the marriage as at its dissolution. Indicate by doing the
necessary calculations, the accrual claims of the spouses, if any. Discuss your answer by
substantiating your calculations. (10)

Question 3

Briefly explain whether a surviving spouse may claim lump-sum maintenance in terms of the
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. Refer to case law as authority. (3)

Question 4

Dr and Mrs Khumalo entered into a civil marriage subject to the accrual system in 1992. Dr
Khumalo has been working for a large medical aid scheme since obtaining his medical degree
fifteen years ago. Mrs Khumalo worked as a receptionist at the same medical aid scheme until
eight years after the spouses married. She resigned because she was diagnosed with cancer
and had to receive extensive and lengthy treatment for the disease. After the treatment the
cancer was in remission, but it returned two years later. She again received treatment. She is
currently free from cancer. She started working as a receptionist at the same medical aid scheme
again four years ago. The marriage relationship between the spouses has broken down
irretrievably and Mrs Khumalo has instituted a divorce action against Dr Khumalo. Both spouses
are now 45 years of age. Dr Khumalo currently earns a monthly salary of R55 000 after tax,
while Mrs Khumalo earns R8 500 after tax. Mrs Khumalo has an accrual claim against Dr
Khumalo in the amount of R450 000. No children were born of the marriage.

Answer the following questions:

(a) Are Dr and Mrs Khumalo’s pension interests part of their assets which are taken into
account for purposes of calculating the accrual in their respective estates upon divorce?
Refer to legislation as authority for your answer. (2)

(b) Can Mrs Khumalo claim redistribution of assets from Dr Khumalo upon divorce if the
spouses are unable to reach an agreement about division of their assets? Refer to
legislation as authority for your answer. (3)

(c) In the divorce action, Mrs Khumalo claims permanent maintenance or, alternatively,
rehabilitative maintenance from Dr Khumalo. Explain whether the court will make a
permanent maintenance award or an order for rehabilitative maintenance in her favour.
Refer to authority in your answer. (15)

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Question 5

John and Mary want to marry. They heard that a civil union is an alternative to a civil marriage.
They approach you to advise them on the following:

(a) How is a civil union defined in terms of section 1 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006? (5)

(b) What will their union under the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 be called? (2)
Question 6

Nosipho ran away from home when she was 16 because her father was busy negotiating a
marriage for her with an older man in the community. She met another man, Bongani, the
same year and they entered into a customary marriage in terms of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 without the consent of Nosipho’s parents. Bongani was
18 when they married. Nosipho is turning 18 this year. She realises that she has made a
mistake and wants to return to her parents. She approaches you to advise her on the validity
of her marriage with Bongani. (6)

Question 7

Mr and Mrs Carrim were married in terms of Muslim rites. Their marriage was de facto
monogamous. Their marriage was not concluded by a marriage officer in terms of either the
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 or the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. In their marriage contract Mr Carrim
undertook to pay Mrs Carrim a specified amount of money upon their divorce or his death (so
called deferred mahr). Mr Carrim divorced Mrs Carrim in terms of Islamic law. Will Mrs Carrim
be able to enforce the provisions of their marriage contract against Mr Carrim? Discuss with
reference to the relevant case law. (7)

Question 8

List five ways in which an unmarried father can acquire parental responsibilities and rights in
respect of his child. (5)

Question 9

Fill in the two missing words in the following statement:

The duty of a parent to support his or her child is terminated by the death of the
___________________________________, but not by the death of
the
___________________________________. (2)

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TOTAL SECTION B: 70 TOTAL PAPER: 100

2.2 MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXAMINATION PAPER

SECTION A

1 [4](2)
(Not part of the prescribed work.)

2 [2](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 29 and the study guide pp 6-8.)

3 [3](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 33 and the study guide p 9.)
4 [1](2)
(See the prescribed textbook pp 18 & 20.)

5 [2](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 37 and the study guide pp 13-14.)

6 [3](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 48.)

7 [4](2)
(See the prescribed casebook pp 88-95.)

8 [1](2)
(See the prescribed textbook pp 68-69.)

9 [3](2)
(See the prescribed textbook pp 86-87 & 104 and the study guide pp 43-44.)

10 [2](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 130 and the prescribed casebook p 195.)

11 [4](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 146 and the study guide pp 85-87.)

12 [1](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 166 and the prescribed casebook pp 281-283.)

13 [1](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 218 and the study guide p 116.)
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14 [3](2)
(See the prescribed textbook p 235.)

15 [2](2)
(See the prescribed textbook pp 248-249 and the prescribed case book pp 351-357.)

SECTION B

Question 1

Statement Case
In determining whether a particular item is a
household necessary the court used the
subjective approach in terms of which the Reloomel v Ramsay(2)
matter is viewed from the perspective of the
dealer, ie the court looked at the facts of which (See the prescribed casebook p 81.)
the dealer was aware or should reasonably
have been aware.
The court said that the concept of “consortium
omnis vitae” is used “as an umbrella word for Peter v Minister of Law and Order(2)
all the legal rights of one spouse to the
company, affection, services and support of the (See the prescribed textbook p 44.)
other”.
The court held that exclusion of an asset from
the joint estate does not protect the asset in the Du Plessis v Pienaar(2)
case of insolvency, for all property of both
spouses married in community of property fall (See the prescribed textbook p 70.)
into the insolvent estate if the spouses are
sequestrated.
The court held that spouses who are married in
community of property are joint debtors in De Wet v Jurgens(2)
respect of joint debts. It also held that the
spouses, however, remain separate debtors (See the prescribed casebook p 106.)
even though the debt has to be paid out of the
joint estate.

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The court held that a spouse who is married in
community of property cannot stand surety for Nedbank v Van Zyl(2)
the other spouse’s debt because those debts
are joint debts and in our law a person cannot (See the prescribed textbook p 71 and the
stand surety for his or her own debt. prescribed casebook pp 107-111.)

Question 2

The accrual in Ivy’s estate is calculated as follows:

Net value on dissolution/ net end value(1) R200 000(½)

Minus net commencement value(1) -R 0(1)

Minus assets excluded from the accrual:


(i) Inheritance – flat - R100 000(½)
(In terms of section 5(1) of the Matrimonial
Property Act an inheritance which accrues to a
spouse during the subsistence of her marriage
does not form part of the accrual of her estate.)(1)

(ii) Gift by spouse – Rolex watch - R 40 000(½)


(Section 5(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act -
Donations inter vivos between the spouses do
not form part of the accrual of her estate.)(1)

(Compensation for loss of income in the amount of R60 000


NOT EXCLUDED, because it constitutes
damages for patrimonial loss.)(1)
_________
Accrual R 60 000(1)

The accrual in Irvin’s estate is calculated as follows:

Net value on dissolution R400 000(½)

Minus net commencement value as adapted in terms of


the consumer price index(1) (R20 000 x 2 = R40 000) - R 40 000(1)

(Winnings are not excluded from the accrual – Therefore


R100 000 won from betting on horseracing forms part of
his estate)(1)
_________
Accrual R360 000(1)

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Ivy’s estate has the smaller accrual and she can claim half the difference between the bigger
and smaller accruals.(1)

Ivy’s accrual claim = ½(1) (R360 000 – R60 000)(1)


= ½ (R300 000)
= R150 000(1)

Ivy is therefore entitled to R150 000.

There are 16 possible marks for this 10 mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook pp 95-99 and the study guide pp 47-52)

Question 3

In Oshry (and Oshry) v Feldman(1) the supreme court of appeal held that lump-sum maintenance
can be awarded to a surviving spouse(1) as nothing in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses
Act 27 of 1990 precludes a lump-sum award.(1) The court held that the difficulties with estimating
an appropriate lump sum are not an insurmountable obstacle to a lump-sum award.(1) Courts do
the best they can when using assumptions to assess a claim for maintenance(1) and take various
factors into account to decide on an appropriate lump-sum award.(1)

There are 6 possible marks for this 3 mark question.

(See the study guide p 62-63.)

Question 4

(a) Yes, the Khumalos’ pension interests are part of their assets upon divorce for purposes
of calculating the accrual in their respective estates.(1) In terms of section 7(7)(a) of the
Divorce Act,(1) spouses’ pension interests are deemed to be part of their assets upon
divorce, unless they married subject to complete separation of property after 1
November 1984.(1)

There are 3 possible marks for this 2 mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook pp 126, 129-130.)

(b) No, she cannot.(1) Because the spouses married with the accrual system, redistribution
of assets is not available/Because the spouses married after 2 December 1988 (or after
the coming into operation of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment
Act), redistribution of assets is not available.(1 mark for either of these statements) In terms of section
7(3) of the Divorce Act,(1) the prerequisites for the making of a redistribution order include
that the spouses must have married prior to the commencement of the Matrimonial

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Property Act/1 November 1984, with an antenuptial contract which excludes community
of property, community of profit and loss, and accrual sharing in any form (ie, subject to
complete separation of property);(1) or prior to the commencement of the Marriage and
Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act/2 December 1988, in terms of section 22(6)
of the Black Administration Act which also provided for complete separation of
property).(1)

There are 5 possible marks for this 3 mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook p 133.)

(c) In terms of section 7(2) of the Divorce Act,(1) the court may make any maintenance award
it finds just.(1) It must take the following factors into account:

(1) The spouses’ existing or prospective means.


(2) The spouses’ respective earning capacities.
(3) The spouses’ financial needs and obligations.
(4) Each spouse’s age.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The spouses’ standard of living during the marriage.
(7) Each spouse’s conduct in so far as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the
marriage.
(8) Any redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act.
(9) Any other factor which, in the court’s opinion, should be taken into account.
(2 marks for any 4 of the factors)

No single factor predominates.(1) The court considers each case on its own merits in the
light of all the facts and circumstances to decide what is just.(1)

Although the court must make a just maintenance order, it need not establish financial
equality between the parties.(1)

In Buttner v Buttner(1) the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a just maintenance order is
one that effects justice between the parties.(1)

In Botha v Botha(1) it was held that a just maintenance order contains “a moral component
of what is thought to be ‘right’ and ‘fair’”. The order must be “‘appropriate’ as between the
parties” in the sense of being deserved and fair when measured against the factors listed
in section 7(2). Furthermore, the interests of both spouses and the impact the order will
have on each spouse must be considered. Merely establishing that the poorer spouse’s
income is insufficient to enable her to sustain the standard of living the spouses enjoyed
during the subsistence of the marriage and that the other spouse can afford to pay
maintenance does not comply with section 7(2) and does not achieve justice as between
the parties.(1 mark for any of these statements regarding Botha)

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Dr and Mrs Khumalo probably maintained a high standard of living during the marriage
due to Dr Khumalo’s good income. The courts no longer favour the view that was adopted
in Grasso(1) and Pommerel,(1) namely that if one of the parties is wealthy there is no
reason why the other party should have to drop his or her standard of living after divorce.(1)

Furthermore, the courts no longer use the starting point that a husband has to maintain
his former wife until her death or remarriage.(1) Women who are in paid employment are
increasingly denied maintenance, because they are assumed to be able to meet their
own maintenance needs even if they have a much lower earning capacity than their
husband.(1) The courts also increasingly expect of women who are engaged in only limited
paid employment to increase their participation in such employment after divorce, and
grant them only rehabilitative maintenance.(1) Rehabilitative maintenance is awarded only
for a limited period, during which women with an earning capacity must be trained or
retrained to take up paid employment or increase their participation in such
employment.(1) In Kroon v Kroon(1) it was held that the facts of each case will determine
whether or not rehabilitative maintenance should be awarded.(1) In Botha v Botha(1) the
court expressly required a causal connection between the marriage and the spouse’s
inability to be self-supporting before an order for rehabilitative maintenance would be
made.(1)

In Kooverjee v Kooverjee(1) the court held that a proper analysis of the rationale behind
the awarding of rehabilitative maintenance dictates that an arbitrary period for the
payment of rehabilitative maintenance will not address the ultimate object of the
achievement of self-sufficiency. In Kooverjee the court made a tapered award for
rehabilitative maintenance, which took account of the wife’s decreasing need to devote
time to child-care as her children grew older. The court also stressed that the de facto
roles of women in society must not be ignored and that the court must take into account
“that the division of roles in families, influence[s] not only the past earning capacity of the
parties, but also their future earning capacities”.(1 mark for any of these statements regarding Kooverjee)

Dr and Mrs Khumalo need not have the same financial means after the divorce.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Dr Khumalo earns a good income and is able to support
Mrs Khumalo does not mean that she is entitled to maintenance that will enable her to
maintain her previous standard of living. The court must make the maintenance order it
considers just. Because Mrs Khumalo has a job, will receive R450 000 from Dr Khumalo
as her accrual claim, and no children were born of the marriage, it is unlikely that she will
get a permanent maintenance award. The court will probably only award rehabilitative
maintenance to her. However, the fact that Mrs Khumalo is already 45 years of age, was
unemployed for part of the marriage, has a modest job which cannot easily be upgraded
to enable Mrs Khumalo to earn more money, and has a history of cancer, that the
marriage lasted for a long time, and that Dr Khumalo has the means to pay permanent
maintenance to her might convince the court to award permanent maintenance to her.
(2 marks for application to Dr and Mrs Khumalo; irrelevant whether student concludes that permanent or rehabilitative maintenance will be
awarded)

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There are 26 possible marks for this 15 mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook pp 126, 129-130, the study guide pp 91-95 and the
prescribed casebook pp 245-251, 254-259.)

Question 5

(a) In terms of section 1 of the Civil Union Act, a civil union is the monogamous,(1) voluntary
union(1) of two persons(1) who are at least 18 years of age,(1) which is solemnised(1/2) and
registered(1/2) in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Act. (1)

There are 6 possible marks for this five mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook p 193.)

(b) The parties can choose whether they want to call their relationship a marriage(1) or a civil
partnership.(1) The consequences will however be the same.

(See the prescribed textbook p 193 and the study guide p 107.)

Question 6

As the age of majority is 18 years, Nosipho was a minor when she concluded the customary
marriage with Bongani.(1) If a party to a customary marriage is a minor, the minor’s parent(s) or
legal guardian(s) must consent to the marriage.(1) If a minor girl enters into a customary marriage
without her parents’ consent section 24A of the Marriage Act applies.(1) This section provides
that the marriage is voidable(1) at the instance of the minor(1) or her parent or legal guardian.(1)
Nosipho can therefore apply to have her marriage with Bongani set aside.(1) The application to
have the marriage set aside must be made by Nosipho before she turns 18 (attains majority) (1)
or within three months thereafter.(1)

There are 9 possible marks for this 6 mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook p 207.)

Question 7

In Ryland v Edros(1) the court held that the contractual obligations flowing from a de facto
monogamous Muslim marriage(1) can be recognised and enforced between the parties despite
the fact that the marriage is potentially polygynous.(1) The court rejected the decision in Ismail v
Ismail(1) in which the Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) had held that a
potentially polygynous, but de facto monogamous, Muslim marriage and the contractual
obligations flowing from it could not be recognised because polygamy violates the public
policy.(1) The decision in Ismail was rejected as the court considered the views of only one group
of our pluralistic society.(1) In view of our constitutional dispensation this is unacceptable – an act
will be branded as offensive to public policy only if it “is offensive to those values which are
shared by the community at large, by all right-thinking people in the community and not only by

14
one section”./The court held that Ismail no longer precluded a court from enforcing a claim
emanating from the marriage contract between Muslim spouses.(1) The court however stressed
that this might not be the case with a de facto polygynous marriage.(1) As Mrs Carrim was married
in a de facto monogamous marriage, she will be able to enforce the provisions of their marriage
agreement against Mr Carrim.(1)

There are 9 possible marks for this 6 mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook pp 233-234.)

Question 8

(i) Entering into a marriage or civil union with the child’s mother after the child’s birth(1)
(ii) Being in a permanent life partnership with the child’s mother at the time of the child’s
birth(1)
(iii) Acknowledging paternity and contributing to the child’s upbringing and maintenance(1)
(iv) Entering into a parental responsibilities and rights agreement with the child’s mother or
somebody else who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child(1)
(v) Obtaining parental responsibilities and rights by an order of court(1)
(vi) Receiving parental responsibilities and rights after the mother’s death as a result of an
appointment in the mother’s will(1)
(vii) Adopting the child(1)

There are 7 possible marks for this 5 mark question.

(See the prescribed textbook pp 287-29 and the study guide pp 135-137.)

Question 9

Fill in the two missing words in the following statement: The duty of a parent to support his or
her child is terminated by the death of the CHILD, (1) but not by the death of the PARENT .(1)

(See the prescribed textbook p 326 and the study guide p 142.)

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