JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004

ALFREDO CHING vs CA

FACTS: In 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company obtained a loan of ₱9M from Allied Bank.
PBMCI, through Exec Vice-Pres Ching, executed a promissory note for the amount promising to pay in
1978 at interest of 14% per annum. As added security for loan, Ching, together with Tañedo and Hua,
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38M. Loan was renewed on
various dates, the last renewal having been made in 1980. December 1979, the ABC extended another
loan to PBMCI for ₱13M payable in eighteen months at 16% interest. PBMCI, through Ching,
executed a promissory note to evidence the loan. This was renewed once for a period of one month.
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect ₱12.6M exclusive of interests,
penalties and bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants were Ching, et al as sureties of the PBMCI in
RTC Manila. ABC averred they falsely represented themselves to be in a financial position to pay their
obligation upon maturity thereof. RTC denied ABC’s application for writ of preliminary attachment.
The trial court decreed that the grounds alleged in the application and that of its supporting affidavit
"are all conclusions of fact and of law", however, RTC reconsidered its previous order and granted the
ABC’s application for a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of ₱12,700,000. PBMCI and Ching
jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with SEC seeking PBMCI’s rehabilitation. SEC
issued an Order placing the PBMCI’s business, including its assets and liabilities, under rehabilitation
receivership, and ordered that "all actions for claims pending before any court or tribunal are suspended
in whatever stage the same may be until further orders from the Commission." PBMCI and Alfredo
Ching jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss/ motion to suspend Civil Case, PBMCI’s pending application
for suspension of payments which the SEC had assumed jurisdiction. Trial court partially granted the
motion by suspending the proceedings with respect to the PBMCI. It denied Ching’s motion to dismiss
the complaint/or suspend the proceedings and pointed out that P.D. No. 1758 concerns the activities of
corporations, partnerships and associations and was never intended to regulate and/or control activities
of individuals. Thus, it directed the individual defendants to file their answers.22
ISSUE/S: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on
attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; (b) whether or not
the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed orders.
HELD: Yes. petitioner-wife had the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil
Case. Upon application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of
determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the
execution of the writ of attachment, if he has indeed levied on attachment and taken hold of property
not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order the sheriff to release the property from the
erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the motion of the third party, the
court does not and cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of
finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted
correctly or not. If the claimant’s proof does not persuade the court of the validity of the title, or right of
possession thereto, the claim will be denied by the court. The aggrieved third party may also avail
himself of the remedy of "terceria" by executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the
property levied on attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy and the adverse party.
Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful levy
and seizure, which should be a totally separate and distinct action from the former case.
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000
shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal
in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.
CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of the RTC. The private respondent, The tribunal acts
without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal purpose to determine the case; there is excess of
jurisdiction where the tribunal, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its
authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment and is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
RTC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed orders.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in
the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of
the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done
during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus,
presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used
for his own business or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one
within the term "obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Thus:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money
and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the
term "… obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and
rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

G.R. No. 143736 August 11, 2004

OFELIA HERRERA-FELIX, vs CA

FACTS: In 1993, respondent St. Joseph Resource Dev't filed a complaint for sum of money against
Spouses Felix with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment. It was alleged that, during the period
from November 1992 to December 1992, the Felix Spouses purchased from the respondent tubs of
assorted fish. Spouses still had an outstanding obligation amounting to P1M after deducting their total
payment of P438,615.50 from their aggregate purchases.
The trial court granted respondent's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond
of P1.1M which was posted in 1993. The Sheriff levied and took custody of some of the personal
properties of the Spouses. A copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, summons and complaint were
served on them at their residence, through the sister of Herrera-Felix, Ma. Luisa Herrera. According to
the Sheriff's Return, Ofelia Herrera-Felix was out of the country, as per the information relayed to him
by Ma. Luisa Herrera. Feliz spouses through counsel filed a motion praying for an extension of time to
file their answer to the complaint. The trial court issued an Order granting the motion. However, the
Felix Spouses failed to file their answer to the complaint. The respondent then filed a Motion to declare
the said spouses in default, granted by the court in its Resolution. A copy of the said resolution was sent
to and received by the counsel of the Felix Spouses through registered mail.
The petitioner, through her sister, Jovita Herrera-Seña, now comes to this Court via a petition for review
on certioraripraying for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. She alleges that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over her person through the service of the complaint and summons on her
sister, Ma. Luisa Herrera. She maintains that the latter was a mere visitor in her house, not a resident
therein; hence, the decision of the trial court is null and void. She further alleges that even assuming the
validity of the trial court's decision, such decision never became final and executory since she was not
served a copy of the same. As such, the writ of execution issued by the trial court, the sale of her personal
properties at public auction, as well as the issuance of the Certificate of Sale, are null and void. She asserts
that the actuations of both the trial court and the Sheriff deprived her of her right to due process.
The contentions of the petitioner have no merit.
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of the complaint and summons
on him, either by personal service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereof or by his
voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel. In this case, the petitioner appeared
before the court, through counsel, and filed a motion for extension of time to file her answer to the
complaint which the trial court granted. She even admitted in the said motion that she was served with a
copy of the complaint as well as the summons. The admissions made in a motion are judicial admissions
which are binding on the party who made them. Such party is precluded from denying the same unless
there is proof of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

SECONDARY EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 191696 April 10, 2013

ROGELIO DANTIS vs MAGHINANG
FACTS: This is a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages filed by petitioner
Dantis against respondent Maghinang before RTC. Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a
parcel of land covered by TCT, with an area of 5,657 sqm, located in Bulacan; that he acquired ownership
of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father in 1993; that he
had been paying the realty taxes on the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a
portion of his property without any right at all; that demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that he vacate the
premises but the same fell on deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his
title and right of possession of his property. He, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring him to be
the true and real owner of the parcel of land ordering Julio, Jr. to deliver the possession of that portion of
the land he was occupying; and directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from October 2000 and attorney’s fees.
Maghinang claimed that he was the actual owner of the 352 square meters (subject lot) of the land where
he was living; that he had been in open and continuous possession of the property for almost thirty (30)
years; the subject lot was once tenanted by his ancestral relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s father,
Emilio, to his father, Julio Maghinang; that later, he succeeded to the ownership of the subject lot after his
father died in 1968; and that he was entitled to a separate registration of the subject lot on the basis of the
documentary evidence of sale and his open and uninterrupted possession of the property.
RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the true owner of the entire 5,657-square meter lot
located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over the same. The RTC did not lend
any probative value on the documentary evidence of sale adduced by Julio, Jr. consisting of: 1) an affidavit
allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among
others, to the sale of the subject lot made by his son, Emilio, to Julio; and 2) an undated handwritten receipt
of initial downpayment in the amount of ₱100.00 supposedly issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection
with the sale of the subject lot. 8 The RTC ruled that even if these documents were adjudged as competent
evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been
completely paid, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to
be a mere possessor by tolerance. CA found appeal to be impressed with merit. It held that Exhibit "4" was
an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also ruled that
the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale
and brought it outside the operation of the statute of frauds. Finally, the court a quo declared that Julio, Jr.
and his predecessors-in-interest had an equitable claim over the subject lot which imposed on Rogelio and
his predecessors-in-interest a personal duty to convey what had been sold after full payment of the selling
price.
ISSUE: WON there is a perfected contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr.
HELD: CA and the RTC reached different conclusions on the question of whether or not there was an oral
contract of sale. The RTC ruled that Rogelio Dantis was the sole and rightful owner of the parcel of land
and that no oral contract of sale was entered into between Emilio Dantis and Julio Maghinang, Sr. The CA
was of the opposite view.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored
on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of
oath.20
Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this
case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best
evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary
evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself to the
exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that:
when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss
and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not
due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence. 23 In MCC Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, 24 it was held that where the missing document is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.

Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a receipt when it should be the receipt that should further
corroborate the existence of the sale. At best, his testimony only alleges but does not prove the existence
of the verbal agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to establish by preponderance of evidence that there
was a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the subject matter and the purchase price.
The chief evidence of Julio, Jr. to substantiate the existence of the oral contract of sale is Exhibit "4." For a
better understanding and resolution of the issue at hand, Exhibit "4" is being reproduced here:
Alamin ng sino mang
Makababasa
Akong si Emilio Dantis may sapat na Gulang may asawa naninirahan sa Sta Rita San Miguel Bul. ay
kusang nagsasasay ng sumosunod.
Na ako Tumanggap Kay Julio Maghinang ng ₱100.00 peso cuartang Pilipino, bilang paunang bayad sa
Lupa niyang nilote sa akin 400 apat na raan mahigit na metro cudrado.
Testigo Tumangap,
Emilio a Dantis
A perusal of the above document would readily show that it does not specify a determinate subject matter.
Nowhere does it provide a description of the property subject of the sale, including its metes and bounds,
as well as its total area. The Court notes that while Julio, Jr. testified that the land subject of the sale
consisted of 352 square meters, Exhibit "4," however, states that it’s more than 400 square meters.
Moreover, Exhibit "4" does not categorically declare the price certain in money. Neither does it state the
mode of payment of the purchase price and the period for its payment.
In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court ruled that the manner of payment of the purchase
price was an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale could exist. Albeit the Civil Code
does not explicitly provide that the minds of the contracting parties must also meet on the terms or manner
of payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise, there is no sale. 38 An agreement anent the
manner of payment goes into the price so much so that a disagreement on the manner of payment is
tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. 39 Further, in Velasco v. Court of Appeals,40 where the parties
already agreed on the object of sale and on the purchase price, but not on how and when the
downpayment and the installment payments were to be paid, this Court ruled:
Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the
parties had been perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a
definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation
of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the
respondent the sum of ₱10,000.00 as part of the down-payment that they had to pay cannot be considered
as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between the parties herein under
Art. 1482 of the new Civil Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter - the terms
of payment - still had to be mutually covenanted. 41
The CA held that partial performance of the contract of sale- giving of a downpayment coupled with the
delivery of the res - took the oral contract out of the scope of the Statute of Frauds. This conclusion arose
from its erroneous finding that there was a perfected contract of sale. The above disquisition, however,
shows that there was none. There is, therefore, no basis for the application of the Statute of Frauds. The
application of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a perfected contract. 42 As to the delivery
of the res, it does not appear to be a voluntary one pursuant to the purported sale. If Julio, Jr. happened to
be there, it was because his ancestors tenanted the land. It must be noted that when Julio, Jr. built his
house, Rogelio protested.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 25, 2010 Decision and the March 23, 2010
Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March
2, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 280-M-2002,
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108453 July 11, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONALD DISMUKE Y PAMARITO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an information1 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 994-V-92, accused Donald Dismuke y Pamarito was charged with the violation of
Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, committed in this wise:
That on or about the 8th day of February 1992 in Valenzuela, MM. and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, sell and give away to one PO2
Nelson Labrador two tea bags of marijuana flowering tops for one Twenty peso bill with SN
QB65721, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug under the provision of the above-cited
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 24 February 1992.
After trial on the merits, the lower court promulgated on 28 August 1992 its decision 2 finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of
P20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
In the main, the prosecution's case drew its support from the uncorroborated testimony of PO3 Nelson
Labrador of the Northern Police District Anti-Narcotics Unit (NPD-ANU). He had joined the National Police
Service on 5 November 1991. 3 According to him, at about 3:00 p.m. of 8 February 1992 (barely three
months after he had joined the service), he was at the office of the NPD-ANU at Sangandaan, Caloocan
City, when an informer arrived and told him that a certain "Donald" was selling marijuana. 4 He then decided
to conduct a buy-bust operation, with himself acting as the buyer, and with PO3 Eliseo Gargaritano and
PO3 Wilfredo Lumba as the other team members. Together with the informer, they proceeded to Consuelo
Street, Doña Ata Subdivision, Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. They arrived at their destination at about
5:00 p.m. and while cruising around, their informer pointed to a man near a sari-sari store as Donald, the
accused in this case. Labrador, who was in plainclothes, approached Donald and told the latter of his
"intention to buy P20.00 worth of marijuana." Since Donald "trusted" him, he (Labrador) "gave him the
buy/bust money" and Donald in turn gave the former "two teabags of marijuana." 5 Then, pursuant to the
team's pre-arranged signal, Labrador held Donald's right hand. Responding thereto, the other members of
the team came out from their strategic locations, identified themselves, and assisted Labrador in arresting
Donald. The team then brought Donald to the NPD-ANU office in Sangandaan, Caloocan City, where he
was turned over to the unit's investigator, a certain Reynaldo Lichido, for proper disposition and
investigation. The latter prepared a referral-letter to the PC Laboratory for examination of the tea bags.
Labrador, however, could only produce in court a photocopy of the alleged marked money (Exhibit "E")
because the bill itself was allegedly in the custody of PO3 Gargaritano. The bill had supposedly been
marked by Gargaritano on the "Saligang Batas" portion thereof.6 The latter, despite subpoenas sent to him,
failed to appear, thereby causing the postponement of the hearing and prompting the trial court to issue
orders requiring him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 7 Although he
subsequently appeared, the prosecution did not present him as a witness in the case.
Through Ms. Tita V. Advincula, a forensic chemist of the PNP Central Laboratory Section, Central Police
District, Manila, the prosecution also proved that the contents of the two heat-sealed transparent plastic
bags (Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"), which were transmitted to her office by PNP Inspector Asuncion S. Santos
of the District Dangerous Drug Enforcement Division of the Northern Police District Command, were found
positive "for marijuana, a prohibited drug."8
On the other hand, through the testimonies of the accused and Dennis Pinpin, the defense presented a
different version of the incident. According to the accused, in the afternoon of 8 February 1992, he and his
friends, namely, Dennis Pinpin, Ricky Pinpin, and Erwin Soriano were at Consuelo Street, Marulas,
Valenzuela, helping their friend, Allan Olequino, transfer residence. 9 Suddenly, a tricycle stopped, and PO3
Nelson Labrador and his two companions, Erning and Vicente, alighted from the tricycle. Labrador asked
who among them had quarreled with his brother. Labrador's companions pointed to the accused and so
Nelson told him to board the tricycle and picked up a piece of wood of which he brandished at him. The
three forced him to board the tricycle. The accused protested that he had not done anything, but he was
told to do his explaining at the police headquarters. He was not, however, brought to the headquarters but
to a place near the barangay hall at F. Bautista Street in Marulas where he was questioned about the
identities of the pushers in the area. When he failed to name or pinpoint any pusher, he was taken to the
Sangandaan police headquarters where PO3 Labrador took out two plastic teabags of marijuana which
Labrador threatened to use against him if he would still refuse to name the pushers. Nonetheless, he
insisted that he did not know any pusher. He was detained at the said headquarters for about two days.
Thereafter, he was brought before a fiscal in Caloocan City after being warned not to say anything against
them.10
The accused further testified that during his school days at the Valenzuela Municipal High School in 1990,
he intervened in a fight between his neighbor and Noel Labrador, a brother of PO3 Labrador. When he
failed to pacify them, he boxed Noel, hitting him on the chin. This incident came to the knowledge of the
school principal who then called them to a conference, which PO3 Labrador attended. He had personally
known PO3 Labrador for a long time because the latter's residence is at F. Bautista Street, Marulas,
Valenzuela, which is merely within "walking distance" from where he, the accused, lived. 11
Dennis Pinpin, a neighbor, friend, and former schoolmate of Donald, corroborated the latter's testimony on
the incident of 8 February 1992, 12 He also testified that he was the one who had a misunderstanding with
Noel Labrador in 1990. He reported the matter to Donald who tried to settle their differences but Donald
ended up fighting with Noel. He, Donald, and Noel were called to the principal's office and were
reprimanded by the principal. At the said conference, Noel's parents and PO3 Labrador were present.
Thereafter, Noel threatened them by saying that the fight was not yet over. 13
The lower court found the testimony of PO3 Labrador to be credible and positive and dismissed the
accused's claim that he was framed and that the charge was ill-motivated. It said:
The alleged quarrel happened in 1990 almost two years ago and was allegedly patched up
and settled by the school principal in the presence of PO2 Nelson Labrador. If it is true that
there was a fight/quarrel, the Labradors will not wait that long a time to take the alleged
vindictive
move.14
In his Appellant's Brief, the accused asserts that the trial court erred:
I
. . . IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE IMPROBABLE AND INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION LONE EYEWITNESS.
II
. . . IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO TEA BAGS OF MARIJUANA WHICH WAS
PLANTED BY POLICE OFFICER NELSON LABRADOR IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE
ACCUSED ['S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
III
. . . IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.15
At the heart of these assigned errors is the issue of credibility of witnesses. It is well-settled that this Court
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of the witnesses, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked
or the significance of which has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. 16 The reason for this is that the
trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.17
A careful review of the records of this case and a meticulous evaluation of the evidence of the parties
reveal vital facts and circumstances which the trial court overlooked or misapprehended and which if taken
into account would alter the result of this case.
For one thing, the accused personally knew PO3 Labrador; they had met in 1990 in the principal's office of
the Valenzuela Municipal High School during a confrontation between PO3 Labrador's brother, Nelson, on
the one hand, and Dennis Pinpin and the accused on the other, after the accused had intervened in the
fight between Nelson and Dennis and boxed Nelson on his chin. It is, therefore, most unlikely that the
accused would sell a prohibited drug to a brother of a former foe who, after the confrontation, had warned
that the fight was not yet over. 18 This incident could have provided PO3 Labrador with a motive against the
accused. The trial court is of the view that it could not have, because the incident happened two years
earlier, the dispute was settled by the principal, and if Labrador desired revenge, he would not have waited
for two years. We do not agree. While time may heal wounds of conflict, it does not necessarily extinguish
the desire for vengeance, which may just hibernate until the circumstances become favorable.
In the instant case, the favorable circumstances could have arisen when PO3 Labrador joined the PNP in
November of 1991. Within three months thereafter, he conducted the alleged buy-bust operation against
the accused solely on the basis of an alleged tip from an informer given two hours before he conducted the
operation. It may be noted that PO3 Labrador did not testify that he had obtained other derogatory
information against the accused or that he had known the accused to be a drug dealer, pusher, or user. His
conduct in this case tainted the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty.
For another, we have serious doubts on the existence of the alleged marked money. There is no evidence
as to who provided it and as to when and where it was allegedly marked by PO3 Gargaritano. What
Labrador produced was a mere photocopy of the alleged marked money (Exhibit "E"). He claimed that the
marked money itself was in the possession of Gargaritano. If it was in Gargaritano's possession, we cannot
understand why he was not called anymore to the witness stand to testify for the prosecution when he
finally appeared in court in compliance with its orders.
While the presentation in evidence of the marked money in drugs cases resulting from buy-bust operations
may not be indispensable,19 the peculiar circumstances of this case, heightened by the attempt of the
alleged poseur-buyer to present a photocopy of what he claims to be the buy-bust money and the
unexplained failure of the prosecution to call to the witness stand the claimed custodian of the marked
money although the latter had already appeared in court, only taint further the veracity of PO3 Labrador's
story.
Exhibit "E" is not admissible in evidence under the best evidence rule. 20 To be admissible as secondary
evidence, the prosecution should have shown that the original marked money has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court or that it is in the custody of the adverse party. 21 The prosecution did not.
Then too, the prosecution failed to prove that the specimens examined by the forensic chemist were the
ones purportedly sold by the accused to PO3 Labrador. According to the latter, when they arrived at their
headquarters after the buy-bust operation, he turned over the accused to their investigator, a certain
Reynaldo Lichido, for proper disposition and investigation. Lichido also "immediately prepared the referral
to the PC Laboratory for examination in order to be sure if the specimen is positive." 22 What the forensic
chemist examined were the contents of "two transparent plastic bag [sic] containing flowering tops with
rolling papers suspected to be marijuana" transmitted by PNP Inspector Asuncion Santos, Officer-in-
Charge of the District Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Division of the Northern Police District
Command. 23 Both Lichido and Santos were not presented by the prosecution to testify in this case. Thus,
there is no evidence to prove that what were allegedly sold by the accused to PO3 Labrador were actually
the ones turned over to Lichido, that what the latter received were turned over to Santos, and that what
Santos transmitted to the forensic chemist were those allegedly sold by the accused. The failure to
establish the evidence's chain of custody is damaging to the prosecution's case.
On the whole then, the scanty evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of the
accused. It does not pass the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to rebut the presumption of
innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees the accused. It is apropos to repeat the doctrine that an
accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow
the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 24
In the light of the above disquisition, it is apparent that the law enforcement agency charged with the
enforcement of the Dangerous Drugs Act is partly to be blamed for the result of this case, assuming that it
does have a case against the accused. In People vs. Tantiado, 25 we exhorted "the law enforcement
agencies, especially those assigned to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act, to carefully prepare their plans
for buy-bust operations and to efficiently and effectively carry them out, ever mindful of the possibility that
their blunders may not only frustrate the efforts to eradicate the drug menace but worse, embolden drug
lords, pushers or users into defying the authorities." Equally at fault is the prosecuting arm of the
Government, whose ineptitude in prosecuting the case warrants that its attention be likewise directed, as in
the Tantiado case and the recent case of People vs. Camba,26 to what was said in People vs. Esquivel:27
In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys
the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with
methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and
loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts,
that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is
the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state.
Again, just like in People vs. Camba,28 we cannot help but notice that the trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua which was not the penalty provided for by law at the time the offense charged was
allegedly committed. Although the penalty imposable is now immaterial, we call the trial court's attention to
the fact that the penalty then imposable was life imprisonment, if only to underscore the need to impose
only the penalty which the law prescribes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 994-V-92 is REVERSED and, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant DONALD DISMUKE y PAMARITO is hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release from detention
is hereby ordered, unless further detention for any lawful cause is warranted.
Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE
DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO, respondents.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose W. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons.
Arturo E. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso.

TEEHANKEE, J.: 1äwphï1.ñët

The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders declaring that
petitioner has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the
deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of (his)
adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent
judge correctly ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her
adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her pre-
deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the opposition of private
respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the status of an adopted child of the without his
first producing competent and documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said
spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.
On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife,
Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent
Bernardo de Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding
before the Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and
Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz,
intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child.
Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will
executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to
respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late
sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.
Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust Company,
Roxas Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after
Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de
Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers
and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother.
Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it
was held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock
certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the bank
personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death
and so, she removed everything from the box.
On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis, before
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of respondent Court, Days after having learned that respondent Nora L.
de Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the
probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and
demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora
L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will
therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara, the safety deposit box
was opened on November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty, because prior thereto
respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened for the
first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326- P),
as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the estate
proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box,
Whereupon, on January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the
properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases
(Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of
respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora L. de Leon and
Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety deposit box and to
deliver the same to the custody of the court within one week. Within the period ordered, respondent Nora L.
de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit
box which could only be opened upon order of the court.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the
estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed
by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate
son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to
state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. de Leon guilty of contempt of court for
not complying with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29, 1975, requiring her to produce and deliver
to the court an the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box. Her former counsel was also
found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a fine of P00.00 and suspended from appearing in the two
cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on her
testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon, acted upon his advice.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita de
Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his, favor.
Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the
deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was known
as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses
refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the
residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy
Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to
the present. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso
where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and
petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the admission of petitioner's
evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his
alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to file
memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence because: têñ.£îhqwâ£

All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara through their counsel do not
prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the
adoption of the parties above named were taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence
tend to establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption of
the above named persons was held. The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a
recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon
seek to intervene in this proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into consideration the
evidence heretofore presented by the petitioners, any further introduction of similar
evidence, documentary or oral, would not prove or tend to prove the fact of their adoption
but rather of a recognized natural child.
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the fact of
adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders of respondent court to
deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As authority therefor,
petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, since according to him, the
order of the court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered as an order for
production and inspection of documents under Rule 27.
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court denied petitioner's
motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent court the items she had
removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by respondent court, with notice to the
parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution on his previous n
declare as established the fact of adoption, issued the f order: têñ.£îhqwâ£

As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to establish his status as an adopted
child, The Court has ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The any motion for
reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof.
Hence, the petition at bar.
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence.
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. 6 The fact
of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The
destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does
not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to
be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption
of its non-existence. 7 Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order,
the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. 8
2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. We can
not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor.
Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another a specific court of competent
jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his
adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or
attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially
adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. By what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom
was the petition heard, petitioner does not even manifest, much less show. There are no witnesses cited to
that adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. Apparently on the assumption that the adoption was
commenced in Manila, petitioner's counsel secured a certification from the Court of first Instance of Manila
which, however, negatively reported "(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this Office, there
has not been found, after a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias
Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin and Margarita de Asis Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila "(T)hat our
pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were either destroyed or burned during
the Liberation of the City of Manila," does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor
of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an
adoption petition was filed in the Court of first Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after
hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was really such adoption,
petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the newpaper publication of the adoption as required
under Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of the
publishing house to that effect. Petitioner's failure on this point is anotherer strong indication of the non-
existence of the one who gave the written consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also
observed to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court), whether the parents or orphanage, does not
appear on this point is not so difficult and such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence
of the adoption. And of course, if the war, the clear right and duty of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the
records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be
substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a
child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that
he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided
with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to
establish the fact of adoption.10 Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated,
recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, recognized and referred to one like
petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child. 11 Withal, the attempts of
petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his
status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child
was — the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as
above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the
principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is
admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from
the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 13 But, in proving an adoption, there is a better proof
available and it should be produced. The whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction
in which they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely
produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an order. 14 Besides, since the point in favor of receiving
hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a
condition upon which such evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the family. Pursuant to
this view, before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the
relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must
ordinarily be established by competent evidence. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or declaration
of a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such actor
declaration ..."
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually
lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish
the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss;
contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 16 The sufficiency
of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion
of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. 17 As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed
to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary
proof may only be introduced if it has first beer. established that such adoption paper really existed and was
lost. This is indispensable. 18 Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to
be testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the
deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the records thereof should
have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of
loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced. 19
Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify the
conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute
admissible proof of adoption.
We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to consider as
established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce the
document of adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of petitioner's adoption had not been
established; second, there is no proof that such document of adoption is in the possession of respondent
Nora L. de Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to produce the items retrieved
from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of
documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited in the safety deposit box have already been
surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976 and no document of adoption in favor of
petitioner was listed as found in the safety deposit box.
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly
intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as an adopted child
because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has
an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor. 20 A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption unless
the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired
by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The
burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove
compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A
fortiori if no hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof,
whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary
complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate
natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 24
In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which show that petitioner
sought to intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged adoptive father Dr.
Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child, 25 while his
intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate of Margarita de Asis, widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp.
Proc. No. 2341-P) was as her adopted child on the basis of the affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr.
Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975 (which affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on
May 31, 1975, which failed to estate by "oversight" petitioner, but stated that affiant knew petitioner to be
"an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally adopted (him) as a son before the Court of First
Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928 and 1921") and prescinding from the question of
whether a natural or spurious child may be legally adopted by the putative father, we hold that no grave
abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of
March 4, 1976, March 26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established in
this proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof." The Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding by
petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact of your petitioner's adoption as a
son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the
applicable law on succession as to his inheritance."
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a temporary restraining order; which as
amended on July 21, 1976, restrained respondent judge "from proceeding with the hearing scheduled on
June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of evidence to establish heirship in Special
Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate Estate of the Late Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings
No. 2341-P, entitled 'Testate Estate of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,' and from proceeding with
the probate of the alleged holographic will of the deceased Doñ;a Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin
scheduled on June 29, 1976, August 10 and 12, 1976 and on any other dates." With the Court's
determination of the issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any need for restraining the proceedings
below and the said restraining order shall be immediately lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to conditionally allow respondent judge
"to take the deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies pursuant to Rule 134,
Section 7 of the Rules of Court, subject to the Court's ruling in due course on the admissibility of such
testimonies." The Court thereby permitted in effect the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses,
principally among them Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L. Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr. Mariano
L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's motion of January 11, 1977: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Substantially, the testimony of the above-named witnesses will be on the fact that they had
been informed by the deceased spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner
was their [Mariano's and Margarita's] judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them
the fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being their judicially adopted son in the
Lazatin family.
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses was but in application of
the Court's long standing admonition to trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan vs. De la Cruz, 26, "to be liberal
in accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to accept the evidence, the affected party
will nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The
Court therein once again stressed the established rule that "it is beyond question that rulings of the trial
court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court
on the merits of the case," 27 and that a party's recourse when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial
court is to make a offer stating on the record what a party or witness would have testified to were his
testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the record any rejected exhibits.
At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of the alleged
holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, pet who has failed to establish his status as
an alleged ;m child of Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he can show some
documentary proof),and whose intervention in the estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an
admitted illegitimate child, win have to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such
admitted illegitimate child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his course of action and whether
or not he may be duly snowed to intervene in the proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate
child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his
excluded evidence, oral and documentary, and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying petitioner's petition below "to
declare as established in this proceeding the fact of [his] adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary
restraining order issued on June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted, effective
immediately. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët

De Castro, J., took no part.