1. RAMOS V.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108121, May 10, 1994
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. Q-49272, the spouses Hilario and Lydia Celestino filed a lawsuit
against Herminia Ramos and the heirs of Herminio Ramos. They sought to be declared
as the lawful owners of Lot No. 25, Block 86 in Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City.
They also requested that the defendants execute a deed of absolute sale over the lot
in their favor, remove any improvements they had made, vacate the lot, and pay
damages, attorney's fees, and costs. This case was related to LRC Rec. Case No. Q-
3387(86), which aimed to declare void an order issued in LRC Case No. Q-3150(85)
that canceled Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 204173 upon Herminia Ramos's
petition. The court found that an implied trust existed, with Lydia as the beneficial
owner, and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. However, Lydia was disqualified from
acquiring the lot, and the court ordered the petitioners to refund her payments with
interest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the transaction was valid, and whether or not Lydia Celestino is
entitled to recover her payments for the property with interest.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Lydia Celestino was not entitled to the property due to
her disqualification, and the transaction was deemed invalid. Consequently, she was
ordered to be refunded the payments made with interest, and the related cases were
dismissed.
 2. FERRER V. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-46963, March 14, 1994

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the dismissal of the petitioner's
complaint for Quieting of Title to Real Property by the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Branch III. The dispute revolves around a strip of land south of Lot 1980, which
the petitioner claims ownership of due to accretion, being the owner of Lot 1980.
Private respondents assert ownership based on long occupation and a Certificate of
Title issued through a Free Patent. The court initially dismissed the case, citing it as a
collateral attack on the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title of the defendants.
However, the Supreme Court found merit in the petition, affirming the petitioner's
ownership of the land due to accretion and stating that the Free Patent was null and
void as the land was already privately owned. The court ordered private respondents
to reconvey the disputed land to the petitioner, considering the prolonged legal
proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether the ownership of a strip of land south of Lot 1980 is with the petitioner
claiming ownership based on accretion or private respondents asserted ownership
through a Free Patent and Certificate of Title.

RULING:
The ruling of the Supreme Court was in favor of the petitioner. The Supreme Court
declared that the Free Patent and Certificate of Title obtained by the private
respondents were null and void because the land in question was already privately
owned at the time of issuance. The Court affirmed the petitioner's ownership of the
disputed land due to accretion and ordered the private respondents to reconvey the
land to the petitioner. This decision was based on the legal principle that the Director
of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private
ownership and that any title issued in such a case would be null and void. The Court
also noted that the prolonged legal proceedings justified its decision to order the
reconveyance of the land to the petitioner.
 3. RAMOS V. RAMOS
G.R. No. L-19872, December 3, 1974
FACTS:
Paulino, Narcisa, Mario, and Antonio are siblings and co-owners of the subject
property. By a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the co-owners in favor of
Narcisa, her daughter sold the property to the respondents. However, petitioners
assailed the validity of the sale and filed a complaint to the RTC to resolve ownership
claims. RTC ruled that the sale was valid insofar the sales of Narcisa are concerned but
not to the sales of the other co-owners because the SPA was executed in favor of
Narcisa only but not her daughter. On appeal, CA modified the ruling, deciding that the
sale was valid because the daughter is a sub-agent of Narcisa and there is no need to
execute another SPA in her favor. The decision of the CA became final and executory
and was not appealed. Petitioners filed to CA a motion to set aside the Decision. They
contended that the copy of either the Complaint or summon has not been served.
Neither of them impleads as parties to the case in the RTC. They alleged that it
adversely affected their respective shares in the property without due process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the option to set aside the decision be granted to the petitioners
because the complaint or summons has not been served.

RULING:
An action in personam lodged against a person based on personal liability. While the
action in rem is, direct against the thing itself instead of a person, and the action quasi
in rem names a person as a defendant, its object is to subject that person's interest in
a property to a corresponding lien or obligation.

Therefore, it was a real action because it affected the title to or possession of the real
property. A complaint was filed against the deceased registered co-owners Narcisa,
Mario, Paulino, and Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by their respective estates.
Petitioners were not the registered owners of the land but represented merely an
inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. The had no legal standing in court
concerning actions over the property of the estate because an executor or
administrator represented the latter. Thus, there was no need to implead them as
defendants in the case, since the estates of the deceased co-owners were assigned as
parties to the case.
 4. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1993
FACTS:
B.P. Mata & Co is a private corporation that provides goods and services to shipping
companies and acts as a manning or crewing agent, with Star Kist Foods Inc being one
of its clients. Security Pacific National Bank initially instructed PNB to pay Mata
$14,000, but later corrected the amount to $1,400. Despite this, PNB mistakenly paid
Mata $14,000, and over six years later, PNB sought a refund. PNB filed a case, citing
constructive trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, but the RTC dismissed it, ruling
it falls under Article 2154 on solutio indebiti. The appellate court upheld this decision,
stating that PNB's claim was time-barred under Article 1145, which requires actions
upon a quasi-contract to be filed within 6 years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB was correct in arguing that based on constructive trust, it can still
collect the amount from Mata even after more than 6 years have already lapsed.

RULING:
PNB was correct in stating that based on constructive trust, he may claim the $14,000
it erroneously sent to Mata. In fact, he can opt to invoke solution indebiti or
constructive trust to claim it. However, the action to enforce an implied trust is already
barred by laches.

Article 1456 of the Civil Code establishes that property acquired through mistake or
fraud creates an implied trust for the benefit of the original owner. However, the
action to enforce this implied trust is time-barred by laches. Implied trusts, categorized
as resulting and constructive trusts, differ in their origin and nature. While a resulting
trust is implied from the nature of the transaction and the parties' intentions, a
constructive trust is created by equity to ensure justice, lacking a fiduciary relationship
between the parties involved. Article 1456, despite its name, does not entail a typical
trust with fiduciary obligations, as it does not involve a promise or a trustee's intent to
hold property for a beneficiary. Therefore, PNB may have a legal basis for claiming the
funds, but the action is barred due to laches.
 5. MORALES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117228, June 19, 1997
FACTS:
The plaintiffs assert their exclusive ownership of a property, originally purchased from
Celso Avelino, which they later transferred the tax declaration for and paid taxes on.
Celso Avelino initially acquired the land in question from Alejandra Mendiola and Celita
Bartolome and consolidated its tax declarations. He developed the land and declared it
in his tax filings, even building a house there for his family. However, the defendant
constructed a beauty shop on the property without Celso Avelino's consent. The
plaintiffs purchased the property and, despite promises to vacate by the defendant, he
refused unless compensated a much higher amount than the shop's value. As a result,
the plaintiffs are seeking damages for mental anguish, monthly rental payments,
litigation expenses, and attorney's fees due to the dispute over the property's
ownership and possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property acquired is a trust property?

RULING:
No. A trust is a legal relationship in which one person holds the legal title to property
while another person has equitable ownership, entitling them to certain duties and
powers. Trusts can be express or implied, with express trusts created intentionally by
the parties, while implied trusts arise through the law or circumstances. Implied trusts
are further categorized into resulting trusts, which stem from the equitable principle
that valuable consideration determines equitable ownership, and constructive trusts,
which are created by equity to prevent unjust enrichment in cases of fraud, duress, or
abuse of confidence. Trusts are characterized by their fiduciary nature, property
involvement, and the manifestation of intention to establish the relationship.
 6. MINDANAO DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-49087, April 5, 1982
FACTS:
The case involves a dispute over a piece of land, Lot 1846-C, in Davao City. Francisco
Ang Bansing sold a portion of his land to Juan Cruz Yap Chuy in 1939, with a
stipulation that Ang Bansing would handle the titling expenses for his entire land, while
Chuy would cover the expenses for the sold portion. Subsequently, the land underwent
various transactions and subdivisions. In 1965, the government transferred ownership
of certain parcels of land, including Lot 1846-C, to the Mindanao Development
Authority. The Authority requested the title from Ang Bansing, who refused. This led to
a legal dispute, with the Court of First Instance ruling in favor of the Authority, stating
that an express trust existed. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision,
concluding that there was no express trust. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of
Appeals' decision, stating that the stipulation in the sale did not clearly establish an
express trust, and the beneficiary (Chuy) did not enforce any alleged trust for more
than 28 years, making it barred by prescription and laches.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an express trust had been established between Francisco Ang Bansing
and Juan Cruz Yap Chuy regarding Lot 1846-C in Davao City.

RULING:
The Supreme Court's ruling was that there was no express trust established in this
case. They determined that the stipulation in the sale agreement between Ang Bansing
and Chuy did not clearly create an obligation on Ang Bansing's part to hold the
property in trust for Chuy. Additionally, the conduct of Chuy, who never sought the
transfer of the title to Lot 1846-C in his name despite numerous other land
transactions, was inconsistent with the existence of a trust. The Court also noted that
even if an express trust had existed, it would have been barred by prescription and
laches due to the significant amount of time that had passed without any enforcement
of the alleged trust.

Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision that no express
trust existed, and consequently, it ruled in favor of Francisco Ang Bansing.
 7. DE BUENCAMINO V. DE MATIAS
G.R. No. L-19397, April 30, 1966
FACTS:
This is an appeal case involving three parcels of land originally registered in the name
of Hilaria Dizon Matias, later transferred to the names of Teodora Matias and Roque
Buencamino. The Court of Appeals upheld a judgment from the Court of First Instance,
which declared that Teodora held these properties in trust for her legitimate siblings
and ordered the cancellation of a mortgage in favor of Felipe Buencamino, Jr. The
deceased spouses, concerned that their son Luis might favor his illegitimate children,
secretly transferred the properties to Teodora to safeguard their legitimate children's
interests. Despite the initial mortgage, the Court found that an implied trust existed,
precluding a prescription claim. Furthermore, a fourth parcel of land donated to
Teodora was determined to grant her only beneficial use during her lifetime, leading to
a partition among the heirs. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Teodora held these properties in trust for the benefit of her legitimate
brothers and sisters or if she had full ownership of them.

RULING:
The Supreme Court's ruling affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court held that an implied trust existed in favor of Teodora's legitimate
brothers and sisters, as the evidence indicated that the deceased spouses had
intended for Teodora to hold the properties in trust for the family's benefit. The Court
also ruled that the action for reconveyance brought by the legitimate siblings was not
barred by prescription because Teodora had recognized the trust, and continuous
recognition of a resulting trust precluded any defense of laches. Additionally, the Court
confirmed that a fourth parcel of land belonging to Fulgencio Matias had been donated
to Teodora but only granted her the beneficial use during her lifetime, leading to the
partition of the naked ownership among the heirs. Therefore, the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the legitimate siblings, affirming
the existence of the implied trust and the rightful ownership of the properties.
 8. JULIO V. DALANDAN
G.R. No. L-19012, October 30, 1967
FACTS:
The plaintiff appealed to a higher court, disputing the lower court's decision to dismiss
their complaint. The plaintiff's complaint was based on a document called "SALAYSAY"
(Statement) in which one Clemente Dalandan acknowledged a debt secured by a four-
hectare piece of riceland that belonged to Victoriana Dalandan, with the plaintiff,
Victoria Julio, as the sole heir. The document implied that the land was transferred to
the plaintiff in exchange for the debt, with certain conditions regarding its use and
possession. The plaintiff sought a judgment to establish their ownership of the land, fix
a time for the defendants to deliver it, and demanded attorneys' fees and costs. The
lower court ruled that the plaintiff's claim had expired under the statute of limitations,
but the higher court disagreed, interpreting the document as establishing a trust
relationship between the parties. Therefore, the plaintiff's action was not barred by the
statute of limitations. The court also rejected other grounds for dismissal raised by the
defendants, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether SALAYSAY established a trust relationship between the parties involved.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the document indeed established a trust relationship. It
concluded that Clemente Dalandan had divested himself of ownership, with the
defendants serving as trustees for the plaintiff, Victoria Julio. The document's terms
and conditions, such as the prohibition on immediate possession and the right to enjoy
the fruits of the land, indicated a fiduciary relationship, and the plaintiff's acceptance
of these terms further confirmed this trust. Therefore, the plaintiff's action to recover
the property held in trust was not barred by the statute of limitations, and the
defendants were bound by the trust established in the document.

As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint and instructed the case to be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. The ruling upheld the plaintiff's right to seek ownership and
possession of the land described in the document based on the trust relationship
established therein.
 9. PEÑALBER v RAMOS
G.R. No. 178645, January 30, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioner, who is the mother of respondent Leticia and the mother-in-law of
respondent Quirino, filed a complaint against various respondents, including Bartex,
Inc., a corporation. She claimed ownership of a piece of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
with a house and warehouse, but discovered that the title had been transferred
fraudulently to respondent spouses Ramos. The petitioner alleged her signature was
forged in a donation deed that purportedly transferred the property to the Ramos
couple. Despite warnings, Ramos sold the property to Bartex, Inc. The petitioner also
had a dispute regarding another property with the Ramos couple, where she claimed
they acted as trustees and should reconvey the property to her. The RTC ruled in favor
of the petitioner for the second property but not the first, citing insufficient evidence of
forgery. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding insufficient proof of the
alleged trust agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of a trust agreement between her and respondent
spouses Ramos was clearly established.

RULING:
No. The court distinguishes between express trusts, created by the intention of the
parties, and implied trusts, which arise by operation of law. It's noted that when an
express trust involves immovable property, it cannot be proven by oral evidence, as
per Article 1443 of the Civil Code. The burden of proof lies with the petitioner, who
must establish her case with preponderance of evidence. While the alleged verbal trust
agreement between the petitioner and respondent spouses Ramos concerning a
property was deemed admissible due to their failure to timely object, the court finds
this evidence insufficient to prove the existence of the alleged trust agreement. The
resulting inventory difference in a hardware store does not conclusively show the use
of funds for property purchase, and thus the petition is denied.
 10. TORBELA V. SPOUSES ROSARIO
G.R. No. 140528, December 7, 2011
FACTS:
The spouses Eugenio and Marta Torbela received a parcel of land from Marta’s
sister. Upon the death of the spouses, the Land was adjudicated in equal shares
among their children. These children executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over
the land in favor of their nephew, Dr. Rosario. Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim
was executed, this time by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he only borrowed the
land and was already returning it to his aunts and uncles. The latter Deed was
notarized but was not immediately annotated on the title of the land, hence, the
title was still in the name of Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosario mortgaged the land to Banco
Filipino for a loan. Dr. Rosario failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extra-
judicially foreclosed. The children then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
and possession of the subject land against Dr. Rosario and Banco Filipino. The trial
court ruled in their favor which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether an express trust was created in this case.

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that “Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil
Code, “[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.”62 It is possible to create a trust
without using the word “trust” or “trustee.” Conversely, the mere fact that these
words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The
question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the
kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or
not he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and
whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is
called a trust.”
 11. DE LEON V. MOLO-PECKSON
G.R. No. L-17809, December 29, 1962
FACTS:
In November 1958, Resurreccion De Leon and others filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, seeking to compel Emiliana Molo-Peckson and others to convey
ten parcels of land in Pasay City, totaling 1,749 sq. m., for a nominal fee of P1.00 per
parcel. They claimed that the land had been willed or donated to the defendants in
1948 by their foster parents, with the understanding that they should sell it to the
plaintiffs. The defendants, however, argued that they revoked the donation due to a
misinterpretation of their foster parents' wishes. The court found that a trust had been
established in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to convey the land,
free it from encumbrances, account for its fruits, and pay attorney's fees and costs.
The defendants appealed, but the court affirmed the decision, holding that the trust
was valid and irrevocable without the beneficiary's consent.

ISSUE:
Whether an express trust was validly established in favor of the plaintiffs, Resurreccion
De Leon and others, with regard to ten parcels of land in Pasay City.

RULING:
The court upheld the validity of the express trust, rejected the defendants' attempt to
revoke it, and ordered the defendants to convey the land, account for its fruits, and
remove any encumbrances, in accordance with their duties as trustees.
 12. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 144516, February 11, 2004
FACTS:
In 1980, the DBP created the DBP Gratuity Plan and authorizing the setting up of a
retirement fund to cover the benefits due to DBP retiring officials and employees. A
Trust indenture was entered into by and between the DBP and the Board of Trustees
of the Gratuity Plan Fund, vesting in the latter the control and administration of the
Fund.

The trustee subsequently appointed the DBP Trust Service Dept. as the investment
manager thru an Investment Management Agreement, with the end in view of making
the income and Principal of the Fund sufficient to meet the liabilities of DBP under the
Gratuity Plan. In 1983, the Bank established a Special Loan Program availed thru the
facilities of the DBP Provident Fund and funded by placements from the Gratuity Plan
Fund.

Under the Special loan program, a prospective retiree is allowed the option to utilize in
the form of a loan a portion of the outstanding equity in the gratuity fund and to invest
it in a profitable investment or undertaking. The earnings of the investment shall then
be applied to pay the interest due on the gratuity loan which was initially set at 9%
per annum subject to the minimum investing rate resulting from the updated actuarial
study. The excess or balance of the interest earnings shall be distributed to the
investor-members.

The payments were disallowed by COA on the ground that the distribution of the
income of GFF to future retirees of DBP is irregular and constituted the use of public
funds for private purposes. The auditor reasoned that the fund is still owned by the
Bank, the Board of Trustees is a mere administrator of the Fund in the same way that
the Trust Services Department where the fund was invested was a mere investor and
neither can the employees, who have still an inchoate interest in the fund.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Fund is the subject of a trust and that the agreement transferred
legal title over the Fund to the trustees

RULING:
Yes. The DBP Board of Governors Resolution No. 794 and the agreement executed by
former DBP Chairman Rafael Sison and the trustees of the plan created an express
trust, specifically, an employees trust. An employees trust maintained by an employer
to provide retirement, pension or other benefits to its employees. it is a separate
taxable entity established for the exclusive benefit of the employees. Resolution No.
794 shows that DBP intended to establish a trust fund to cover the retirement benefits
of certain employees under RA 1616. The principal and income of the fund would be
separate and distinct from the funds of the DBP.

As far back as in Government v. Abadilla the Court held that "it is not always necessary
that the cestui que trust should be named, or even be in esse at the time the trust is
created in his favor." It is enough that the beneficiaries are sufficiently certain or
identifiable.
 13. GAYONDATO V. TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. L-24597, August 25, 1926
FACTS:
Domingo Gayondato inherited three parcels of land from his mother, and after
marrying Adela Gasataya, they had a daughter named Rosario Gayondato. Domingo
passed away in 1902, and Adela later married Domingo Cuachon. The land parcels
were involved in a cadastral case where Domingo represented Adela and Rosario.
Despite Domingo's claims that the land belonged to both Adela and Rosario, it was
erroneously registered in Adela's name alone by the Court of First Instance. Adela
subsequently mortgaged the property and sold it to Francisco Rodriguez in 1920, with
him assuming the mortgage and other debts. Rosario filed a lawsuit against Adela,
Domingo, Francisco, and the Insular Treasurer, seeking damages for the incorrect land
registration. The trial court ruled in Rosario's favor, ordering Adela and Domingo to
jointly compensate her while absolving the Insular Treasurer and Francisco.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Insular Treasurer should be held secondarily liable

RULING:
As the plaintiff-appellant was a minor at the time of the registration of the land and
consequently no negligence can be imputed to her, in the absence of special
circumstances to the contrary, the assurance fund is secondarily liable for the damages
suffered by her through the wrongful registration.
 14. ARANETA V. PEREZ
G.R. Nos. L-16185-86, May 31, 1962
FACTS:
These are two 2) incidents of the trusteeship of the minors Benigno, Angela and
Antonio, all surnamed Perez Y Tuason. The issue in G.R. No. L-16185 is whether or not
the trustee, J. Antonio Araneta - hereinafter referred to as the appellee - may be
allowed to pay a sum of money to the law firm, Araneta & Araneta, of which he is a
member, for services rendered to him, in his aforementioned capacity as such trustee,
in several judicial proceedings, whereas G.R. No. L-16186 concerns the question
whether the purchase of certain shares of stock nude by the appellee for the benefit of
the trusteeship merits judicia approval. Both questions were decided by the Court of
First Instance of Riza Quezon City Branch) in the affirmative. Hence. this appeal by
Antonio M. Perez - hereinafter referred to as the appellant - as guardian of the person
of said minors with respect to G.R. NO. L-16185, it appears that the law firm Araneta &
Araneta, through its assistant, Atty. Francisco T. Papa, had rendered services, as
counsel for the appellee. The lower court authorized the payment of P5,500.00 for the
services thus rendered by Araneta & Araneta, which appellant assails upon the ground
that, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:

“When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the
estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the pavment of services to Araneta & Araneta violates section 7 of
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
No. Said Section 7 of Rule 86 refers onlv to "executors or administrators" of the estate
of deceased persons and does not necessarily apply to trustees. Although it is true that
some functions of the former bear a close analogy with those of the latter. A trustee,
like, an executor or administrator, holds an office of trust, particularly when, as in the
case of appellee herein, the trustee acts as such under judicial authority. Hence,
Generally, the policy set forth in said Section 7 of Rule 86 basically sound and wise as
it is should be applicable to trustees. The duties of executors or administrators are,
however, fixed and or limited by law, while the trustees are usually, governed by the
intention of the trustor or of the parties, if established by contract. Besides, the duties
of trustees may cover a much wider range than those of executors or administrators of
the estate of deceased persons.

15. LORENZO V. POSADAS JR.

G.R. No. L-43082, June 18, 1937
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of a certain Thomas
Hanley, deceased, brought an action against respondent Posadas, Collector of Internal
Revenue. Petitioner alleges the respondent to have exceeded in its tax collection,
which, as assessed by the former, should only be in the amount of PhP1,434.24
instead of PhP2,052.74. Disregarding the allegation, respondent filed a motion in the
CFI of Zamboanga praying that the trustee be made to pay such tax. The motion was
granted. Petitioner paid the amount in protest, however notified the respondent that
until a refund is prompted, suit would be bought for its recovery. Respondent
overruled the protest. Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the compensation of the trustees should be part of the estate
subject to tax.?

RULING:
NO. A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services . But
from this it does not follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted
in arriving at the net value of the estate subject to tax.
 16. TAN SENGUAN & CO., INC. V. PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. L-38810, November 6, 1933
FACTS:
Plaintiff Tan Sen Guan & Co. secured a judgment for a sum of P21,426 against the
Mindoro Sugar Co. of which the Philippine Trust is the trustee. The plaintiff entered
into an agreement with the defendant Philippine Trust Co. wherein the former
assigned, transferred, and sold to the latter the full amount of said judgment against
Mindoro Sugar Co. together with all its rights thereto and the latter offered satisfactory
consideration thereto. The agreement further stipulated that upon signing of the
agreement, Phil Trust shall pay Tan Sen the sum of P5000; should the Mindoro Sugar
be sold or its ownership be transferred, an additional P10,000pesos will be paid to Tan
Sen upon perfection of the sale; in case any other creditor of Mindoro Sugar obtains in
the payment of his credit a greater proportion than the price paid to Tan Sen, the Phil
Trust shall pay to the latter whatever sum may be necessary to be proportioned the
claim of the creditor. However, if the Mindoro Sugar is sold to any person who does
not pay anything to the creditors or pay them equal or less than 70 percent of their
claim, or should the creditors obtain from other sources the payment of their claim
equal to or less than 70 percent, the Phil Trust will only pay to Tan Sen the additional
sum of P10,000 upon the sale or transfer of the Mindoro Sugar as above stated. The
properties of Mindoro Sugar were later on sold at public auction to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila and base on the agreement plaintiff Tan Sen brought suit against
defendant Phil Trust for the sum of P10,000.

Defendant's argument: Only a portion of the Mindoro Sugar's properties were sold.

CFI: Absolved the defendant on two grounds: (a) in the contract, it was only bound as
a trustee and not as an individual; (b) that it has not been proved that all the
properties of the Mindoro Sugar had been sold.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant is personally liable for the claim of the plaintiff?

RULING:
Yes, The court notes that the relative pronoun "which" is descriptive and not
restrictive, meaning that it does not limit the scope of the sale. Furthermore, the
Philippine Trust Company, despite being referred to as the trustee in the contract, was
not authorized in the original deed of trust to engage in such contracts on behalf of
Mindoro Sugar Company. Even if it were authorized, the Philippine Trust Company
would still be held responsible for the contract, as there was no explicit provision
indicating that the liability should fall on the trust estate rather than the trustee.
Therefore, the appellant's claim should be directed at the Philippine Trust Company
and not the Mindoro Sugar Company or the trust estate.

17. CAÑEZO V. ROJAS

G.R. No. 148788, November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Soledad Cañezo alleges that she purchased a piece of land from Crisogono Limpiado in
1939, although there was no written record of the transaction. She occupied and
managed the land until 1948 when she entrusted it to her father, Cripulo Rojas.
However, in 1980, she discovered that her stepmother, Concepcion Rojas, had taken
control of the land and had the tax declaration transferred to Crispulo's name.
Consequently, Cañezo initiated legal action to reclaim the land and seek damages from
Rojas. Rojas, on the other hand, contends that Crispulo had acquired the property
from Limpiado in 1948 and possessed it until his passing in 1978.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a trust, express or implied, was constituted between Cañezo and
Crispulo

RULING:
No. There was no trust, express or implied, between Cañezo and Crispulo. A trust is
defined as a legal relationship where one person holds the equitable ownership of
property while another holds the legal title, and the former has certain duties and
powers over the property. To establish a trust, specific elements must be proven,
including the trustor or settlor, trustee, trust res (defined real properties), and clear
beneficiaries. In this case, the burden of proving the trust's existence was on Cañezo,
but she failed to provide sufficient evidence. Express trusts involving real property
require written proof and clear intent. It clarifies that constructive trusts arise from
legal principles rather than intentional agreements, and they may not require
repudiation by the trustee for prescription to apply.
 18. MARTINEZ V. GRAÑO
G.R. No. L-16709, August 8, 1921

FACTS:
Juana Juan, the sole heir of her late husband, created a will that named various
beneficiaries, including Guillermo San Rafael, who was the mother of both the plaintiffs
and defendant Pilar Perez Nable. In 1948, Juana executed a donation in favor of
Emiliana Molo Peckson and Pilar, transferring a significant portion of her property,
including 10 parcels of land. After Juana's death in 1950, Emiliana and Pilar agreed
that they would transfer these 10 parcels of land to Justa De Leon and Resurreccion
De Leon for a nominal fee of P1.00 per parcel, in accordance with the verbal wishes of
the late spouses. However, in 1956, the defendants revoked this agreement, claiming
that it did not accurately represent the wishes of the late spouses. Nonetheless, the
beneficiaries, Justa De Leon and Resurreccion De Leon, demanded the land's
conveyance. The defendants argued they had misunderstood their foster parents'
wishes and revoked the donation. No testimonial evidence was presented by either
party in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the foster parents constituted a trust over the properties in question in
favor of plaintiffs as beneficiaries.

HELD:
Yes. The document in question represents a recognition of a pre-existing trust or a
declaration of an express trust, based on the provision in the donor's will to the effect
that the titles to the land should be conveyed to appellants with the duty to hold them
in trust for the appellee.

The requirement that to establish a trust the proof must be clear, satisfactory and
convincing, is sufficiently complied with by the document in question, which clearly and
unequivocally declares the existence of the trust even if the same was executed
subsequent to the death of the trustor.
Appellants had no right to revoke it without the consent of the cestui que trust. In the
absence of any reservation of the power to revoke, a voluntary trust is irrevocable
without the consent of the beneficiary.

19. SPOUSES PARINGIT V. BAJIT

G.R. No. 181844, September 29, 2010
FACTS:
The spouses Paringit leased a lot in Sampaloc, Manila, from Terocel Realty and built
their home there, raising five children. Terocel Realty offered to sell the lot to Julian,
but he lacked the funds. To facilitate the purchase, Julian assigned the leasehold right
to his son Felipe and wife Josefa, who bought the property and obtained a title in their
names. Julian later clarified that the purchase was for the benefit of all his children.

Despite the title being in Felipe and Josefa's name, they moved to another house in
1988. Marciana and other siblings continued to occupy the lot without paying rent.
When their father died in 1994, Felipe and Josefa demanded rental arrearages, leading
to a lawsuit. The court ruled in favor of Felipe and Josefa, ejecting Marciana and
others from the property.

In response, the remaining children filed a legal action against Felipe and Josefa,
seeking to annul the title and reclaim the property, believing it was their inheritance
from their parents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Felipe and his wife purchased the subject lot under an implied trust for
the benefit of all the children of Julian

RULING:
Yes, the Court ruled that the case at bar falls under the rubric of the implied trust
provided in Article 1450 of the Civil Code. Implied trust under Article 1450 presupposes
a situation where a person, using his own funds, buys property on behalf of another,
who in the meantime may not have the funds to purchase it. Title to the property is for
the time being placed in the name of the trustee, the person who pays for it, until he
is reimbursed by the beneficiary, the person for whom the trustee bought the land. It
is only after the beneficiary reimburses the trustee of the purchase price that the
former can compel conveyance of the property from the latter.
 20. SALAO V. SALAO
G.R. No. L-26699, March 16, 1976
FACTS:
The case involves a complex family estate dispute. Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio
had four children, with Manuel and one of the children, Patricio, having passed away.
There is no clear documentation of Manuel Salao's estate. Valentina's estate was
managed by Ambrosia, and when Valentina died, the estate was to be divided among
Valentin (Patricio's son), Alejandra, Juan, and Ambrosia. Valentin received more than
his share and had to compensate his coheirs. Juan and Ambrosia acquired a fishpond
and swampland, and disputes arose regarding ownership. After Ambrosia's death,
Benita, Valentin's daughter, claimed a share in the fishpond held in trust, now solely
owned by Juani (Juan's son). The case resulted in a ruling in favor of Juani, asserting
the indefeasibility of the Torrens title and the absence of co-ownership due to the
parties' deaths.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fishpond was held in trust for Valentin by Juan and Ambrosia and
whether or not their action for reconveyance had already prescribed.

RULING:
No, and if there was a trust, the action has already prescribed. Parol evidence is
insufficient to prove express trusts concerning immovable property, emphasizing the
importance of written documentation. There is no resulting or constructive trusts in
this case due to a lack of intention or fraud. Furthermore, prescription and laches in
implied trust claims were barred by the passage of time. The importance of Torrens
title as conclusive evidence of land ownership, and maintaining an action for
reconveyance requires clear and convincing proof of a fiduciary relationship. Finally,
Benita cannot represent Valentin legally due to the specific rules regarding
representation in collateral relationships.
 21. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987
FACTS:
In 1941, Lot No. 76, part of Cadastral Lot No. 140, was owned by Gonzalo Ditching,
who passed away, leaving his widow and daughter. The daughter, who later became
the grandmother, inherited the entire Lot No. 140. In 1952, she donated a portion for
a high school and converted another part into a subdivision. In 1963, it was discovered
that the municipality had been using a parcel within her property as a cemetery since
1934. The granddaughter claimed ownership and demanded payment, while the mayor
argued the municipality bought the land in 1934 but lacked documentation. In 1964,
the granddaughter filed a complaint for possession. The municipality presented a
certificate as evidence, and the court initially ruled in their favor, but the Court of
Appeals later overturned the decision. In 1972, the granddaughter passed away, and
her husband continued the legal battle on her estate's behalf, despite the land being
under her name in the TCT.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the granddaughter and husband are bound to execute a deed of
reconveyance in favour of the municipality.

RULING:
YES. The CFI decision is reinstated. Although the land in now covered by a TCT in the
name of the GRANDAUGHTER (which entitles her to protection afforded to a holder of
a Torrens Title), Article 1456 of the NCC provides that if the property is acquired
through mistake or frau, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. The beneficiary shall have the right to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the
irrevocability of the Torrens title and the trustee and his successor-in-interest are
bound to execute the deed of reconveyance.
 22. HEIRS OF CANDELARIA V. ROMERO
G.R. No. L-12149, September 30, 1960
FACTS:
Ester Candelaria, representing herself and the other alleged heirs of Emilio Candelaria,
claims that prior to 1917, Emilio and his brother Lucas Candelaria jointly purchased lots
in the Solokan Subdivision on an installment basis. Lucas initially paid the first two
installments for his lot but, due to illness, sold his interest to Emilio, who reimbursed
him for the payments made. Emilio continued making payments on the lot, even
though it was technically in Lucas's name on the transfer certificate of title issued by
the Manila register of deeds. It is alleged that Lucas held the title in trust for Emilio, a
fact acknowledged by both Lucas and the current defendants (his heirs). Lucas passed
away in 1942, and the defendants, including his spouse Luisa Romero and children,
continue to possess the lot despite requests for its return to Emilio's heirs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trust which has been created is implied?

RULING:
Yes, when someone acquires property under an agreement to hold it for another
person's benefit or convey it to them, a resulting or implied trust is established in favor
of the intended beneficiary. An implied trust occurs when someone buys property
using their own funds but takes the title in someone else's name. In such cases, the
property is considered to be held in a resulting trust for the person who provided the
money unless there is evidence of a different intent. This type of trust is not based on
a formal contract but arises from the circumstances and principles of equity. In a
specific case mentioned, it is clear that the person who provided the funds intended to
have a beneficial interest in the property, as they made payments with the
understanding that ownership documents would be transferred later. Thus, the
property was acquired under the assumption that it would be held for or conveyed to
the original grantor, establishing the presence of an implied trust.
 23. HEIRS OF TRANQUILINO LABISTE V. HEIRS OF JOSE LABISTE
G.R. No. 162033, May 8, 2009
FACTS:
A parcel of Friar Land in Cebu City, spanning 13,308 square meters, originally
purchased in 1919 by Emilio on behalf of himself and his siblings, collectively known as
the Heirs of Jose. Emilio and his Uncle Lino jointly funded the purchase, and Emilio
affirmed their co-ownership through an affidavit in 1923. The Bureau of Lands issued a
deed of conveyance in 1924, and the land was later divided into equal parts for
Emilio's group and Lino in 1928. In 1939, Lino's heirs acquired the Heirs of Jose's
share, but during World War II, they were displaced, returning to find their property
occupied by squatters. In 1993, a reconstitution of the title was initiated by one of the
Heirs of Jose, leading to a compromise agreement in 1994. However, the Heirs of Jose
did not honor the agreement, prompting Lino's heirs to file a complaint in 1995, which
the Heirs of Jose claimed had already lapsed due to laches.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Linos heirs has long prescribed or barred by latches?

RULING:
Trust can be either express or implied, with an express trust established through clear
intentions, regardless of specific wording, often through written instruments like deeds
or wills. In this case, Emilio's affidavit serves as an express trust, confirming co-
ownership of Lot 1054 with Jose and Lino, supported by a subdivision plan. For a trust
to be repudiated, there must be unequivocal acts of repudiation known to the
beneficiary, supported by clear and conclusive evidence. While Jose's heirs hold a
Torrens title in their names, obtaining such a title doesn't constitute repudiation of the
trust, except for the petition for reconstitution filed by one heir in 1993. As of the
complaint filed by Lino's heirs in January 1995, the statute of limitations has not yet
expired.
 24. MERCADO V. ESPINOCILLA
G.R. No. 184109, February 1, 2012
FACTS:
Doroteo Espinocilla's land, Lot No. 552, was initially divided equally among his five
children after his death. Dionisia later died, and Macario claimed her share through a
questionable affidavit of transfer. Subsequently, Macario and his daughters sold
portions of the land to various individuals. Petitioner Salvacion's son sought to recover
two portions and claimed entitlement to 171 sq. m., which included inheritance and a
purchase from Aspren. However, respondents argued that they possessed the land
through acquisitive prescription and denied encroachment. The trial court ruled in
favor of the petitioner, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, citing
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s action to recover the subject portion is barred by
prescription.

RULING:
Yes. The court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint based on the
grounds of prescription, which pertains to the acquisition of ownership and real rights
over immovable property through the lapse of time, conditioned on possession in the
concept of an owner, being public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. In this case,
respondents had uninterrupted adverse possession of a portion of Lot No. 552 for 55
years, confirming their ownership rights. The court also noted that Macario's
possession was public and adverse since his sisters occupied other portions of the lot.
Even though Macario's 1948 affidavit regarding his claim to the property was
considered void, extraordinary acquisitive prescription still applied. Furthermore, the
petitioner's action for reconveyance based on an implied trust was barred by extinctive
prescription, as it was filed 55 years after Macario took possession. The court
highlighted the sisters' failure to question Macario's actions as a factor in their
decision.
 25. LOPEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 157784, December 16, 2008
FACTS:
The dispute centers around the ownership of properties originally owned by Juliana,
who was married to Jose. Juliana's notarial will in 1968 established a trust fund called
Fideicomiso de Juliana Lopez Manzano, naming Jose as the initial administrator. If Jose
could not fulfill this role, her nephew, Enrique Lopez, was to take over. Jose passed
away in 1980, leaving a holographic will that transferred the disputed properties to
respondents. The RTC approved Jose's will in 1983, leading to the properties being
transferred to the respondents. Enrique Lopez initially assumed the trusteeship, but
Richard Lopez later took over and filed a lawsuit in 1984, alleging that Jose had
wrongfully registered Juliana's paraphernal properties as his own during their marriage
or while executing Juliana's estate, and that these properties should belong to the
Fideicomiso trust. The RTC dismissed the case due to the statute of limitations, a
decision upheld by the Court of Appeals, which also determined that an implied trust
existed in Jose's fiduciary role.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an implied trust was constituted over the disputed properties when
Jose, the trustee, registered them in his name.

RULING:
Yes. The disputed properties originally belonged to Juliana and should have been
included in a Fideicomiso. However, they were mistakenly registered in the name of
Jose, who actually possessed them as a trustee in an implied trust. Implied trusts,
which are not explicitly stated but inferred from the transaction's nature or imposed by
law for equity, come in two types: resulting and constructive trusts. Resulting trusts
are based on equitable principles where valuable consideration, not legal title,
determines the equitable interest, while constructive trusts are created by equity to
prevent unjust enrichment or address situations where someone holds legal rights to
property they shouldn't due to fraud, duress, or breach of confidence. In this case, the
erroneous adjudication of the properties to Jose established a constructive implied
trust in favor of the Fideicomiso beneficiaries. However, the right to seek reconveyance
based on such a trust is subject to a 10-year prescriptive period, starting from the date
of registration in Jose's name in 1969 when he effectively repudiated the trust by
indicating the properties were conjugal and not part of the Fideicomiso.

26. MIGUEL J. OSSORIO PENSION FOUNDATION, INC. V. COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. No. 162175, June 28, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioner, a non-profit corporation, was established to manage an Employees'
Trust Fund for the benefit of Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (VMC) employees. They
argue that the income from this fund is tax-exempt under the National Internal
Revenue Code. The petitioner claims a 49.59% ownership stake in a property known
as the MBP lot, which was purchased through VMC. They argue this ownership is
supported by a notarized Memorandum of Agreement and documents from board
meetings. The petitioner believes that since the Employees' Trust Fund funded the
MBP lot purchase, they are entitled to a refund of 49.59% of the income tax paid when
VMC sold the property. However, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) denied their claim,
and the Court of Appeals (CA) agreed, stating that the petitioner's evidence was
largely self-serving and failed to prove the source of funds for the MBP lot purchase.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to claim a refund for the income tax paid on the
sale of its co-owned MBP lot in its capacity as trustee of the Employees Trust Fund?

RULING:
The court's ruling emphasized that the tax-exempt status of the petitioner's Employees
Trust Fund was not a matter of dispute, as it had been long-established. The Trust
Fund's purpose was to manage and oversee this tax-exempt fund for the benefit of
VMC's employees, thereby giving the petitioner the legal standing to pursue tax
refunds related to the Trust Fund. Regarding the co-ownership of the MBP lot, the law
permitted a co-owner (1st co-owner) to have their proportional share registered under
the name of another co-owner (2nd co-owner), who would act as a legal trustee for
that share. The income generated from the Trust Fund investments was confirmed to
be exempt from income tax and, consequently, from creditable withholding tax on
property sales. Therefore, the Employees Trust Fund was established as the owner of
49.59% of the MBP lot, and as a result, the petitioner, in its capacity as the trustee,
was entitled to claim a tax refund of PHP 3,037,500.00 that had been mistakenly paid
during the sale of the MBP lot.

27. CUAYCONG V. CUAYCONG

G.R. No. L-21616, December 11, 1967
FACTS:
Eduardo Cuaycong, who was married to Clotilde de Leon and had no children, passed
away, leaving behind three brothers (Lino, Justo, Meliton) and a sister (Basilisa). After
his death, Eduardo's properties were distributed according to his will, with the
exception of two haciendas known as Hacienda Bacayan. These haciendas, consisting
of eight lots, were all titled in the name of Luis D. Cuaycong, the son of Justo
Cuaycong. Meliton and Basilisa passed away without heirs. The surviving heirs of Lino
initiated a legal action against Justo, Luis, and Benjamin Cuaycong, alleging that Luis
had obtained title certificates for Hacienda Bacayan through deception and in violation
of Eduardo's wishes. The plaintiffs claimed that Eduardo had an understanding with
Justo and Luis to hold these properties in trust for the benefit of his siblings. They
repeatedly requested their share of the property after Eduardo and Clotilde's deaths.
However, Luis Cuaycong moved to dismiss the case on various grounds, including the
statute of frauds, lack of cause of action, and statute of limitations. The Court of First
Instance (CFI) dismissed the case due to the plaintiffs' failure to include written
evidence of the alleged trust in their amended complaint, prompting the plaintiffs to
argue that the claim was based on an implied trust, as indicated in paragraph 8 of the
complaint, and that they couldn't amend it to include a written trust instrument since
none existed.

ISSUE:
WON the trust is express or implied.

RULING:
The SC held that the alleged trust is an express trust. The Civil Code distinguishes
between express trusts, which are intentionally created by the trustor or through direct
and positive actions or documentation, such as deeds, wills, or explicit statements of
intent, and implied trusts, which arise by operation of law and are inferred from the
nature of a transaction, irrespective of the parties' specific intentions. When the
intention to create a trust is evident and clear, it is classified as an express trust, while
implied trusts are inferred from surrounding circumstances or indications. In a legal
case, the plaintiffs have alleged the existence of an express trust concerning real
estate, as they claim the trustor expressly communicated their intention to establish
the trust to the defendants. This situation aligns with Article 1443 of the Civil Code.

28. ADAZA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 47354, March 21, 1989
FACTS:
The Father, before passing away, executed a Deed of Donation, initially containing a
provision that his daughter, who was unmarried at the time, should share half of the
land with one of her siblings after his death. The Deed was notarized and accepted,
but the land was still public property, cultivated by the Father. With her Brother's
assistance, the Daughter filed a homestead application and eventually got the land
registered under her name. After her marriage, the Daughter and her spouse
mortgaged the property. When the Brother, who had become a Provincial Fiscal,
returned for a family gathering, he persuaded his Sister to sign a Deed of Waiver,
claiming co-ownership and transferring her share to him. Subsequently, the Daughter
and her husband filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed, alleging fraud and
undue influence. The trial court upheld the Deed's validity, declaring them co-owners,
but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, emphasizing that the land had been
unconditionally donated to the Daughter alone. In the Brother's petition to the
Supreme Court, he argued that co-ownership itself constituted sufficient consideration,
claiming it was their Father's intention to donate the land to both him and his Sister.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property was co-owned by the brother and sister.

RULING:
YES. The execution of the Deed of Donation by the Father created an implied trust in
favor of the brother in respect of half of the property donated. Art. 1449 There is also
an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the
legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial
interest or only a part thereof.
 29. TING HO, JR. V. TENG GUI
G.R. No. 130115, July 16, 2008
FACTS:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo
against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around a
parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their
deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the
siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26,
1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and
properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente
Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen,
was then disqualified to own public lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death of
Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use
and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale was void.

RULING:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price
is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract. The sale in this case, was however valid
because the sale was in fact a donation. The law requires positive proof of the
simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding was based on a mere
assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation.
 30. JUAN V. YAP, SR.
G.R. No. 182177, March 30, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Maximo and Dulcisima Cañeda mortgaged two parcels of land in Talisay, Cebu
to Richard Juan for a loan of P1.68 million, payable in a year. In 1998, Richard Juan,
represented by Solon, attempted to foreclose the mortgage but couldn't complete the
process due to unpaid commissions. Later, a memorandum of agreement was signed,
recognizing the Cañeda spouses' debt to respondent as their "real mortgagee-
creditor," with Richard Juan being a trustee. They agreed to a redemption price of
P1.2 million for the properties and planned to initiate legal action to either annul or
reform the contract or compel Richard Juan to transfer the mortgagee's rights to the
respondent as trustor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an implied trust arose between petitioner and respondent, binding
petitioner to hold the beneficial title over the mortgaged properties in trust for
respondent?

RULING:
The court ruled that an implied trust stemming from mortgage agreements is not
explicitly listed in the Civil Code as one of the trust relationships. However, it
emphasized that under general trust principles, if the circumstances of property
acquisition render the holder morally unfit to possess it, equity will designate them as
a trustee for someone else's benefit. The court considered parol evidence, which
confirmed that the Cañeda spouses acknowledged the respondent as the lender who
provided the funds secured by the Contract, with the respondent covering foreclosure
expenses. Consequently, the court accepted this evidence and found the respondent
responsible for holding the purchased property in trust for the actual buyer, under an
implied trust. The court also asserted that formal title holders may be seen as trustees
obligated to transfer the title to the beneficiaries for whom the trusts were deemed
established, applying this principle to mortgage contracts that meet the criteria for
implied trust creation.

31. PILAPIL V. HEIRS OF BRIONES

G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007
FACTS:
A dispute between the heirs of Donata Ortiz-Briones (Petitioners) and the heirs of
Maximino Briones (Respondents). Donata and Maximino were married but had no
children. After Maximino's death in 1952, Donata initiated intestate proceedings to
settle his estate, and she was granted ownership of disputed land by a court order in
the same year. Donata passed away in 1977, and her niece, Erlinda, became the
administrator of her estate. In 1985, Maximino's nephew, Silverio (a Respondent),
sought Letters of Administration for Maximino's estate, but this was contested by
Donata's estate administrators. In 1987, the Respondents filed a complaint for the
annulment and recovery of possession of real property, alleging that Donata had
fraudulently registered properties belonging to Maximino's estate in her name. The trial
court ruled in favor of the Respondents, ordering the Petitioners to reconvey the
properties and provide an accounting. The Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), which upheld the trial court's decision, leading the Petitioners to file a petition
with the Supreme Court (SC) seeking a review of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have rightful claim to recover their share from
Maximino’s Estate based on the alleged misrepresentation of Donata that eventually
resulted to her being registered the disputed estate properties?

RULING:
No. Because Respondent’s cause of action had already been prescribed. The rule that
an action to compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the
benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, only applies to express trust. Basis:
the possession of the trustee is not adverse. It may also apply to resulting trust so
long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust. But with respect to constructive trust,
the rule is different, prescriptibility applies.

32. ESCAY V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-37504, December 18, 1974
FACTS:
Emilio and Jose Escay, both now deceased, were brothers. Emilio mortgaged certain
properties to the Philippine National Bank before his death in 1924, leaving an unpaid
obligation. In 1930, the bank filed a foreclosure suit against Emilio's estate,
represented by Atty. Eduardo Arboleda. In 1933, an original contract was established
involving the PNB, Jose Escay Sr., and Atty. Arboleda, in which Jose assumed Emilio's
mortgage debt. This arrangement was approved by Magdalena Vda. de Escay, Emilio's
widow and guardian of their children. However, it was later discovered that the original
contract didn't clarify the transfer of property ownership to Jose Escay Sr. A
supplementary contract was subsequently approved by the probate court in 1934. In
1941, Emilio's heirs filed a complaint against Jose Escay Sr. and Atty. Arboleda,
alleging fraudulent means in transferring property titles to Jose, creating an implied
trust. They argued that Jose had become a trustee for Emilio's heirs, and therefore,
should reconvey the properties to them, with no prescription on their right to recovery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners may still recover the property in question.

RULING:
No, the SC held that assuming that there was fraud in the transfer of the properties,
the lapse of time since the discovery of the alleged fraud in 1941 has extinguished any
right on the part of the petitioners to seek the reconveyance of the properties.
Further, assuming the existence of a trust relation, such trust was not an express one.
If there was a trust, it arose from law, and therefore an implied trust. And implied trust
prescribes in ten years. According to the appellants they discovered the fraud in 1941;
the action to enforce an implied trust prescribed ten years thereafter. And assuming an
express trust, the trust had been repudiated by Jose Escay, Sr. when in 1941 he
refused to transfer the property to the appellants, and appellants filed Civil Case No.
8829 in 1941 for the recovery of the properties. The prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is now a settled question in this
jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten years.

33. BRITO, SR. V. DIANALA

G.R. No. 171717, December 15, 2010
FACTS:
The subject of this petition concerns a parcel of land in Negros Occidental, initially
owned by Esteban Dichimo and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, who are now deceased. In
1976, Margarita Dichimo and others filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against Jose Maria Golez, claiming to be the heirs of Esteban and Eufemia,
asserting their rights to the land. In response, respondents filed an Answer-in-
Intervention, asserting that they are the heirs of Esteban and his previous wife
Francisca, holding possession of the land for over 30 years. A Compromise Agreement
divided the land between Golez and the heirs of Vicente. However, in 1999, Brito and
co-heirs filed a new Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against the
Dianalas, who countered with a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages. Brito
argued that the Dianalas are guilty of laches and estopped from challenging the earlier
RTC decision in Civil Case No. 12887 due to their delay in asserting their rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are barred by laches

RULING:
No, they are not barred by laches. In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for
not appealing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they are
no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to assail the said
judgment.
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the
subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a
separate action against respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to
respondents' possession of the disputed property, it follows that their complaint for
reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should
respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity,
cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.

34. ADILLE V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-44546, January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The dispute centers around a property originally owned by Felisa Alzul, who had two
sets of children from her two marriages: petitioner Rustico Adile from the first
marriage and respondents Emetria Asejo et al. from the second marriage. Felisa sold
the property with a three-year repurchase option but passed away before repurchasing
it. During the redemption period, Rustico Adile repurchased the property on his own
and later claimed sole ownership through an extra-judicial partition, asserting himself
as the only heir of Felisa. This led to a legal challenge from his half-siblings (the
respondents), who argued that Rustico should be considered a trustee under implied
trust when he redeemed the property and thus should not have exclusive ownership of
the entire property.

ISSUE:
Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on behalf of his co-heirs, in
which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Art 2144 of the
Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must
act as trustee, the respondents being the beneficiaries, pursuant to Art 1456.
 35. GONZALES V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-66479, November 21, 1991
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a legal case involving a dispute over the
ownership of a residential land in Dagupan City. The case began in 1965 when private
respondents filed a complaint for partition against Fausto Soy, claiming a share of the
land based on their familial relationship. A notice of lis pendens was placed on the
land's title. After Fausto Soy's death, his heirs continued the legal battle. In 1974, the
trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents, ordering a partition. However, this
decision was complicated by third-party claims from Juanito and Coronacion Gonzales,
who asserted ownership of a portion of the land. The case continued with various legal
motions and disputes over ownership details. In 1983, the Appellate Court ruled in
favor of the private respondents, implying that a trust relationship existed between
them and Fausto Soy. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, arguing
that the private respondents had not taken timely action to enforce their implied trust
claim, and Fausto Soy's title had become indisputable over time. Consequently, the
complaint for partition was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an implied trust relationship between the private
respondents (plaintiffs) and Fausto Soy (defendant) regarding the ownership of the
residential land in Dagupan City, and whether the private respondents had a valid
claim to a portion of the land based on this implied trust.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there was no valid implied trust relationship established
between the private respondents and Fausto Soy. It emphasized that Fausto Soy's title
to the land had become indisputable and that the private respondents had not taken
timely legal action to enforce any such implied trust claim. The Court also mentioned
that the private respondents had waited for an unreasonably long period before
asserting their rights, implying that they had acquiesced to Fausto Soy's ownership. As
a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for partition in favor of Fausto
Soy's heirs, effectively upholding his undisputed ownership of the land.

36. PEDRANO V. HEIRS OF PEDRANO

G.R. No. 159666, December 4, 2007
FACTS:
Lot No. 6416 was originally owned by Dr. Isidro Hynson, who sold it to Romana
Monteal Pedrano on March 15, 1965, for PhP 315.02. Romana, who was married to
Benedicto Pedrano, later passed away on August 19, 1967. Fourteen years later,
Romana's son, Eulogio M. Pedrano, claimed to have purchased the land for PhP 30,000
from his mother in a Deed of Sale dated December 22, 1981. However, Lot No. 6416,
along with another lot, Lot No. 6409, remained untitled and became the subject of a
cadastral case. Respondents alleged that Eulogio failed to pay the agreed
consideration by the December 31, 1982 deadline and initiated legal action seeking to
annul the December 22, 1981 Deed of Sale and recover possession and ownership of
Lot No. 6416. They claimed that Romana had canceled the sale but allowed Eulogio to
occupy the property. The Trial Court initially dismissed the case, citing prescription, but
the Court of Appeals (CA) later reversed this decision, asserting that the case involved
an implied trust and that a different article of the Civil Code should apply, specifically
Article 1456.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a prescription had set in.

RULING:
An action for the reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust, as we have already explained in this case, prescribes in 10 years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title of the property; however, where no OCT has yet been issued despite
an order from the court to title the lots, the date from whence the prescriptive period
could be reckoned is unknown and it could not be determined if indeed the period had
already lapsed or not. Thus, we agree with the CA that prescription has not yet set in.

37. MACABABBAD, JR. V. MASIRAG

G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009
FACTS:
On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag, Faustina Masirag, Corazon Masirag,
Leonor Masirag, and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy filed a complaint against Macababbad,
Chua, and Say. They alleged that the deceased spouses Pedro Masirag and Pantaleona
Tulauan were the original owners of Lot No. 4144, and the respondents, their children,
only learned of their inheritance in March 1999. They claimed that the petitioners had
falsified a document to deprive them of their shares in Lot No. 4144, which was
subsequently registered in the names of new owners. Macababbad filed a petition for a
duplicate copy of the title, and Chua sought the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408. The
RTC initially dismissed the complaint due to prescription and failure to implead
indispensable parties but was later reversed by the appellate court, which ruled that
the appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in reversing the RTC decision

RULING:
No. The case at hand provides the distinction between questions of law and questions
of fact in legal proceedings. It emphasizes that questions of law concern the
interpretation of the law itself, while questions of fact pertain to determining the truth
or falsity of alleged facts. The type of appeal chosen (ordinary appeal, petition for
review, or Supreme Court petition) depends on whether the case involves questions of
fact, law, or a mix of both. It is also essential to provide solid evidence when ruling on
issues like prescription and laches, highlighting that mere allegations in pleadings are
insufficient. Additionally, it is important include indispensable parties in an action, but
notes that the immediate dismissal of a case may not be warranted if the court hasn't
issued an order for their inclusion, based on Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.

38. O'LACO V. CO CHO CHIT

G.R. No. 58010, March 31, 1993
FACTS:
This legal case involves a property dispute between half-sisters, Emilia O'Laco and O
Lay Kia, over a parcel of land. Emilia claimed that she left the property's certificate of
title with O Lay Kia for safekeeping, while O Lay Kia asserted that she and her husband
had bought the land with their conjugal funds. The central issue was whether there
was a resulting trust in the acquisition of the property. The trial court initially ruled that
there was no trust relationship between the sisters, but the Court of Appeals
disagreed. Eventually, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision,
establishing that a resulting trust did exist between the parties due to various pieces of
evidence, and therefore, the action for breach of trust had not yet prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a resulting trust existed between half-sisters Emilia O'Laco and O Lay
Kia in the acquisition of a parcel of land.

RULING:
The ruling of the Supreme Court was that a resulting trust did indeed exist between
the parties. The Court held that the evidence, including the possession of documents
of ownership by O Lay Kia, Emilia's recognition of the trust, the circumstances
surrounding the acquisition of the property, and the sale of the property by Emilia, all
pointed to the existence of a resulting trust. As a result, the action for breach of trust
had not yet prescribed, and the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
favor of O Lay Kia and her husband.

39. KHEMANI V. HEIRS OF TRINIDAD

G.R. No. 147340, December 13, 2007
FACTS:
The petition for review on certiorari challenges a decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals, affirming an order of the Regional Trial Court in a case involving the
ownership of a disputed property. The case revolves around Lot No. 107, with various
parties claiming ownership rights to a portion of it. The dispute traces back to historical
land awards and government decisions regarding the allocation of land. The petitioner,
Cynthia Cruz Khemani, asserts ownership through purchase, while respondents, the
Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, claim ownership through long-term possession. The legal
battle involves allegations of fraud, prior court cases, and the proper legal remedies.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to proceed with the case, as it
found no substantial identity of parties or causes of action between this case and a
prior case. The decision concludes that a full trial is necessary to determine the validity
of the competing claims.

ISSUE:
whether res judicata (the legal principle that a matter already judged cannot be
relitigated) applies, considering a previous case involving one of the parties.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not apply in this case because there is
no substantial identity of parties and causes of action. The Court emphasized that the
parties in the two cases had different bases for their claims, and the evidence required
to support their respective claims was distinct. Therefore, the Court of Appeals and the
trial court were correct in allowing Civil Case No. 1122 to proceed.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that even if the one-year time limit for filing an
action to reopen or review a decree of registration had passed, the respondents might
still be entitled to relief through an action for reconveyance, provided that the property
had not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value.