1 - People vs. Abiong, 82 Phil 174
1 - People vs. Abiong, 82 Phil 174
1 - People vs. Abiong, 82 Phil 174
We are not without well-considered American We have reached the conclusion by a course
authority to back up our conclusion. As to L, the of argument unnecessarily prolix except from
supreme court of Louisiana has held that it is not a desire to fully consider the earnest and able
essential that the violence inflicted by the defendant argument of the defendant, that the test is —
should have been the sole cause of death; but if it or at least one test — whether, when the
hastened the termination of life, or really contributed, death occurred, the wound inflicted by the
mediately or immediately, to the death in a degree defendant, did contribute to the event. If it did,
sufficient to be a clear contributing cause, that is although other independent causes also
sufficient. (State vs. Matthews [1886], 38 La. Ann., contributed, the causal relation between the
795.) Fenner, J., in the course of his opinion in this unlawful acts of the defendant and the death
case, includes third philosophical reflection — has been made out. Here, when the throat
was cut, Farrell was not merely languishing
In a certain sense, every man is born and from the mortal wound. He was actually dying
lives mortally wounded; that is, subject to laws — and after the throat was cut he continued to
which inevitably doom him to death. No languish from both wounds. Drop by drop the
murder does more than to hasten the life current went out from both wounds, and at
termination of life. the very instant of death the gunshot wounds
was contributing to the event. If the throat
cutting had been by a third person,
As to V, in People vs. Lewis ([1899] 124 Cal., 551),
unconnected with the defendant, he might be
the facts were as follows:
guilty; for, although a man cannot be killed
twice, two persons, acting independently, may
Defendant and deceased were brothers-in- contribute to his death and each be guilty of a
law, and not all together friendly, although homicide. A person dying is still in life, and
they were on speaking and visiting terms. On may be killed, but if he is dying from a wound
the morning of the homicide the deceased given by another both may properly be said to
visited the residence of the defendant, was have contributed to his death. ([1899] 124
received in a friendly manner, but after a while Cal., 551.)
an altercation arose, as a result of which
defendant shot deceased in the abdomen,
The lower court gave the defendants the benefits of
inflicting a wound that was necessarily mortal.
the mitigating circumstances of ignorance and of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as The authorities bearing on the problem here
naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. presented seem to us to be harmonious, considering
The first can be admitted. As to the latter, the rule is the differing facts upon which the courts have been
that passion and obfuscation should not be taken into required to pass. Discussion of course proceeds
consideration as a mitigating circumstance unless it primarily upon the assumption that where the parties
appears that the offense was provoked by prior unjust act independently, each actor is responsible only for
and improper acts. (U. S. vs. Taylor [1906], 6 Phil., the consequence of the act or acts committed by
162, following decisions of the supreme court of himself. (U. S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. Rep., 386.)
Spain.) In the case at bar, so far as we know, the
offense was merely provoked by a chance remark. In applying this principle it is necessary to take
The proper penalty is therefore reclusion temporal in account of two wholly different classes of cases,
its minimum degree. namely: (1) Where the wound or wounds which cause
death are inflicted by one or the other, but not all, of
The defendants and appellants are each sentenced to two or more persons; (2) where two or more wounds
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with are separately inflicted by each of two or more
the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay persons. In the case first supposed there can of
one-half of both instances, and are jointly and course be no conviction until the actual perpetrator of
severally made liable to the heirs of the deceased the crime is identified. (People vs. Woody, 45 Cal.,
Anacleto Cudiamat in the amount of P1,000. So 289; Campbell vs. People, 16 Ill., State vs. Goode,
ordered. 132 N. C., 982.) Thus, where two persons fire at
another but only one bullet hits the victim neither of
Arellano, C. J., and Araullo, J., concur. the assailants can be convicted until it is shown that
his shot killed the deceased. Of course it is different if
Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur in the result. conspiracy or concert is shown. In the principal
opinion it is suggested that the doctrine of these
decisions is unsound. We believe that this doubt must
disappear when the particular situation involved in
these cases is considered.