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    PS 204B: Intermediate Game Theory Course Syllabus Spring 2015

    Uploaded by

    Barbara Zatara
    This document provides the syllabus for an intermediate game theory course taking place in the spring of 2015. The course will be taught by Professor Leslie Johns and will cover theoretical tools and common political science applications of game theory. Students will complete weekly problem sets worth 50% of their grade, a final 5-10 page research proposal worth 25% of their grade, and a final exam worth 25% of their grade. Topics to be covered include static and dynamic games of incomplete information, costly signaling games, cheap talk games, bargaining games, stochastic games, and global games.

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    PS 204B: Intermediate Game Theory Course Syllabus Spring 2015

    Uploaded by

    Barbara Zatara
    32 views3 pages
    This document provides the syllabus for an intermediate game theory course taking place in the spring of 2015. The course will be taught by Professor Leslie Johns and will cover theoretical tools and common political science applications of game theory. Students will complete weekly problem sets worth 50% of their grade, a final 5-10 page research proposal worth 25% of their grade, and a final exam worth 25% of their grade. Topics to be covered include static and dynamic games of incomplete information, costly signaling games, cheap talk games, bargaining games, stochastic games, and global games.

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    political science 30 UCLA

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    polisci30

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    This document provides the syllabus for an intermediate game theory course taking place in the spring of 2015. The course will be taught by Professor Leslie Johns and will cover theoretical tools and common political science applications of game theory. Students will complete weekly problem sets worth 50% of their grade, a final 5-10 page research proposal worth 25% of their grade, and a final exam worth 25% of their grade. Topics to be covered include static and dynamic games of incomplete information, costly signaling games, cheap talk games, bargaining games, stochastic games, and global games.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    32 views3 pages

    PS 204B: Intermediate Game Theory Course Syllabus Spring 2015

    Uploaded by

    Barbara Zatara
    This document provides the syllabus for an intermediate game theory course taking place in the spring of 2015. The course will be taught by Professor Leslie Johns and will cover theoretical tools and common political science applications of game theory. Students will complete weekly problem sets worth 50% of their grade, a final 5-10 page research proposal worth 25% of their grade, and a final exam worth 25% of their grade. Topics to be covered include static and dynamic games of incomplete information, costly signaling games, cheap talk games, bargaining games, stochastic games, and global games.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 3

    PS 204B: Intermediate Game Theory

    Course Syllabus
    Spring 2015

    Professor Leslie Johns


    ljohns@polisci.ucla.edu
    Bunche Hall, office #3381

    Math mavens:
    • Bronwyn Lewis Bunche 3267 & 3288 bronwynlewis@ucla.edu
    • George Ofosu Bunche 3277 & 3288 george.ofosu@gmail.com

    LOCATION and TIME:

    BUNCHE 4276
    MW 9:30—10:45 am

    Office hours: Wednesdays 11:00am—12:00pm and by appointment

    COURSE DESCRIPTION:

    This is an intermediate-level game theory course. Students are assumed to have already
    completed PS 204A (introductory game theory). Students who have not completed this
    training should consult with the professor before enrolling.

    ASSIGNMENTS and GRADING

    Your grade in this course is based on the following components.

    Weekly problem sets: 50%

    Problem sets will be distributed each week and due the following Tuesday at the
    beginning of class. Late assignments will not be accepted. There will be no
    make-up assignments.

    Final project: 25%

    Students will write a 5-10 proposal for an applied game theory paper on a
    research topic of their choice. Details for this assignment will be distributed in
    class.

    Final exam: 25%

    1
    TEXTS

    Required text:

    Gibbons, Robert. (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton, NJ:
    Princeton University Press.

    Many copies of this book are floating around Bunche Hall. If you don’t want to buy a
    copy of your own, you can surely borrow a copy from someone else.

    Supplemental texts:

    Readings from various texts will be assigned and available on the course website.
    However, you might wish to purchase the following books if you are particularly
    interested in the relevant topics or want supplemental readings. These vary greatly in
    their level of technicality. So talk to me first if you have any questions about which (if
    any) you should buy.

    Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. (2000) Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT
    Press.

    Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. (1995)


    Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.

    McCarty, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. (2007) Political Game Theory: An


    Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Muthoo, Abhinay. (2002) Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge:


    Cambridge University Press.

    Myerson, Roger B. (2004) Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA:


    Harvard University Press.

    Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford


    University Press.

    Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein. (1994) A Course in Game Theory.


    Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Simon, Carl P. and Lawrence Blume. (1994) Mathematics for Economists. New
    York: W.W. Norton & Company

    Articles:

    These will be made available on the course website at:


    https://moodle2.sscnet.ucla.edu/course/view/15S-POLSCI204B-1

    2
    TOPICS, READINGS, and SCHEDULE

    The class will be altered to suit the needs of enrolled students. However, the following
    is a preliminary plan.

    Theoretical Tools

    Static games of incomplete information: March 30—April 8 (weeks 1—2)


    • Gibbons, Chapter 3

    Dynamic games of incomplete information: April 13—22 (weeks 3—4)


    • Gibbons, chapter 4.0—4.1, pages 173—183

    Common Political Science Applications

    Costly signaling games: April 27—May 6 (weeks 5—6)


    • Gibbons, chapter 4.2, pages 183—210
    • Gilligan, Johns, and Rosendorff (2010)
    • Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011)
    • Gordon and Hafer (2005)

    Cheap talk games: May 11—13 (week 7)


    • Gibbons, chapter 4.3.A, pages 210—218
    • Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)

    Bargaining games: May 18 (week 8)


    • Muthoo, chapters 2 and 3

    Stochastic (Markov) games: May 20—27 (weeks 8—9)


    • Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)

    Global games: June 1—3 (week 10)


    • Morris and Shin (1998)

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