(2018) SGHC 04
(2018) SGHC 04
(2018) SGHC 04
[2018] SGHC 04
Banking — Accounts
4 January 2018
Kannan Ramesh J:
Facts
The parties
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1.1 Definitions:
...
“Instruction” means instructions in relation to any Account,
Transaction or Service which:
…
(c) We believe in good faith has been given by an Authorised
Person or are transmitted with such testing or authentication
as We may specify.
…
[emphasis added]
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(b) Mr Kamal and Mr Md Irshad Ali (“Mr Ali”) were the plaintiff’s
contact persons. Two Singapore telephone numbers belonging to Mr Ali
(“the Singapore Contact Numbers”) were provided to the Bank. Mr Ali
is a business associate of the plaintiff. He owns a
Singapore-incorporated company that assists in the plaintiff’s shipping
matters.
14 From the date on which the Account was opened until 6 June 2013, the
plaintiff withdrew a total of US$4,413,521.53 from the Account. The plaintiff’s
withdrawals from the Account are shown in the following table:
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15 Five of these withdrawals (S/Ns 2–4, 9 and 10) were effected pursuant
to instructions given by fax and/or email. The other withdrawals were effected
by cheque (S/Ns 1, 5 and 7), in person (S/Ns 6 and 8) and through the Bank’s
online banking platform (“the S2B platform”) (S/Ns 11 and 12). Mr Majnu gave
instructions for the last two transactions through the S2B platform on 6 June
2013, after meeting a colleague of Ms Poh at the Bank who taught him how to
use the S2B platform. The plaintiff had not used the S2B Platform before 6 June
2013.
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17 Upon receiving these emails from the Yahoo Account, Mr Lee Sien
Sing, also known as Desmond Lee (“Mr Desmond Lee”), and Ms Poh sent
several emails in reply, between 17 and 28 June 2013, to the Yahoo Account.
(Ms Poh was on leave between 17 and 21 June 2013. Mr Desmond Lee, who
also worked as a RM for the Bank, attended to her customers in her absence and
handled the 1st and 2nd Instructions.) It was undisputed that during this period,
ie, between 17 and 28 June 2013, Mr Majnu used the Yahoo Account to send
emails to various third parties. However, unsurprisingly he disavows any
knowledge of any of these emails sent from the Yahoo Account to the Bank and
the replies from Mr Lee and Ms Poh.
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device. Mr Majnu did not act on the 18 June SMSes, claiming unfamiliarity with
such notifications as the reason for not doing so.
22 The Four Instructions were thus executed and the relevant amounts (see
[19] above) were accordingly debited from the Account.
23 On 24 June 2013, after Ms Poh approved the execution of the 3rd and
4th Instructions, she sent an email to Mr Majnu requesting the latter to provide
the Bank with his updated contact details. She explained that the Bank had
attempted to contact Mr Majnu many times through the numbers originally
provided but had not succeeded in doing so most of the time.
24 In reply, on the same day, an email from the Yahoo Account was sent to
Ms Poh, purportedly from Mr Majnu (“the Health Problems email”). This stated
that Mr Majnu was receiving medical treatment for health problems and was
unable to receive phone calls. It also stated that Mr Majnu would update his
contact details on 1 July 2013. Ms Poh responded to the Health Problems email
later that day, acknowledging its contents.
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25 On 26 June 2013, the 5th and 6th Instructions were sent to the Bank.
Details of the 5th and 6th Instructions are set out in the following table:
26 The Bank did not execute the 5th and 6th Instructions. This was because
there were insufficient funds in the Account to do so. On 27 June 2013, there
was US$182,167.05 in the Account. Ms Poh sent an email to Mr Majnu to
inform him of this. She also invited the plaintiff to fund the Account and to
reissue the instruction(s), stating that the Bank would be cancelling the 5th and
6th Instructions.
27 On 27 June 2013, Mr Majnu logged onto the S2B platform and sought
to transfer a sum of US$503,386.00 to a third party (“the 7th Instruction”).
Mr Majnu’s unchallenged evidence was that the S2B platform indicated that the
transaction was successful although there were in fact insufficient funds in the
Account to process the transfer.
28 On 28 June 2013, Ms Poh sent an email to Mr Majnu stating that the 5th,
6th and 7th Instructions had been rejected because there were insufficient funds
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(c) Mr Majnu called Ms Poh later that evening. He stated that the
Four Transactions were unauthorised and asked Ms Poh to recall the
monies transferred out of the Account.
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plaintiff’s requests with him by telephone but did not do so for the Four
Instructions.
31 On 4 July 2013, Mr Alam and Mr Ali met Ms Poh and Mr Gareth Scully,
the Bank’s Director and Head of Sales and Relationship Management, to discuss
the Four Transactions. On that date, Mr Majnu also sent an email to Ms Poh
instructing the Bank not to execute any fund transfer requests in respect of the
Account except those made through the S2B platform. Notably, this email did
not indicate that the plaintiff had previously instructed the Bank not to remit
monies from the Account except pursuant to requests made through the
S2B platform. I return to this point at [84(a)(ii)] below.
33 The plaintiff’s case was that the Bank had breached several duties owed
to the plaintiff and thereby caused it to suffer loss of US$1,838,720.51, being
the total sum transferred out of the Account pursuant to the Four Transactions.
The Bank was accordingly liable to the plaintiff for this sum, interest and costs.
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(a) the Authorised Persons did not send the Four Instructions; and
(b) the Bank could not have believed in good faith that they had been
sent by the Authorised Persons given the “highly suspicious
circumstances surrounding [their] receipt”.
35 The plaintiff also contended that the Bank had breached its duty to use
reasonable care and skill under cl 3.1(a) of the Standard Terms (see [7] above),
or similar express or implied duties in contract or at common law, and thereby
caused the plaintiff to suffer loss. In this regard, the plaintiff averred as follows:
(a) The Bank effected the Four Transactions despite the highly
suspicious circumstances surrounding them.
(c) The Bank had been negligent or grossly negligent in the way it
attempted to verify the Four Instructions before executing them.
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36 The plaintiff also claimed the Bank had breached duties to take steps or
have the necessary facilities and/or system in place to prevent unauthorised fund
transfers. For completeness, the plaintiff also pleaded that there was an agreed
course of conduct, or an express or implied duty owed by the Bank, to verify
fund transfer instructions with the plaintiff before acting on them. However, as
the Bank noted, the plaintiff did not pursue this claim in submissions.
The defence
37 The Bank’s defence was threefold. First, the Bank claimed that it did not
breach any duty to the plaintiff for the following reasons:
(a) The Bank had the plaintiff’s authority or mandate to execute the
Four Instructions. In this regard:
(i) the Bank did not admit that Mr Majnu did not issue the
Four Instructions; and
(b) The Bank did not breach its duty to use reasonable care and skill
under cl 3.1(a) of the Standard Terms.
38 Secondly, the Bank averred that any loss suffered by the plaintiff was
wholly caused or contributed to by the plaintiff’s own negligence. Further
and/or in the alternative, the plaintiff was estopped and precluded from claiming
for any loss it suffered, and/or it was inequitable for the plaintiff to so claim.
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39 Thirdly, the Bank claimed that the exclusion clauses in cl 10.1 of the
Standard Terms and the LOI excluded its liability for the plaintiff’s loss.
The reply
40 In reply, the plaintiff claimed the Bank was not entitled to rely on the
exclusion clauses in cl 10.1 of the Standard Terms and the LOI for three reasons:
(a) First, the exclusion clauses did not apply because no reasonable
banker would have believed that the Four Instructions were genuine
and/or that the Bank had acted in good faith. In particular, the Bank was
required to verify the plaintiff’s payment instructions by way of a
telephone call before executing them. The Bank did not do this and
accordingly failed to act in good faith.
(b) Clause 10.1 of the Standard Terms and the exclusion clause in
the LOI breached the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev
Ed) (“the UCTA”) and were therefore ineffective.
(c) The Bank did not explain the terms of the Account Opening
Documents to the plaintiff.
41 The plaintiff also contended that the Bank waived or was estopped from
relying on the Standard Terms and the LOI to assert that it was not required to
call the plaintiff to verify its payment instructions before effecting the same.
The issues
(a) Did the Bank breach its duties to the plaintiff (“the breach
issue”)? In particular:
(i) Did the Bank breach cl 4.6 of the Standard Terms? This
required examination of two sub-issues:
(ii) Did the Bank breach any other duty to the plaintiff (“the
miscellaneous breaches issue”)?
(b) Did the exclusion clauses in cl 10.1 of the Standard Terms and
the LOI apply to exclude the Bank’s liability for the plaintiff’s loss (“the
exclusion of liability issue”)?
45 The plaintiff submitted that the definition of “good faith” for the
purposes of the Standard Terms and the LOI was “conditioned by its context”.
The context included (i) the other provisions of the Account Opening
Documents, in particular cl 3.1(a) of the Standard Terms, (ii) the Bank’s internal
procedures, and (iii) relevant banking practices in Singapore. It was necessary
for the Bank to act (a) with reasonable care and skill, (b) in accordance with
“the spirit of its own internal policies and procedures”, and (c) in accordance
with relevant banking practices in Singapore, before it could be said that it acted
in good faith.
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My decision
In sum, the concept of good faith encompasses both the subjective criterion of
acting honestly and the objective criterion of “observing accepted commercial
standards of fair dealing”. In relation to the latter requirement, Rajah JA noted
at [49] that what such standards of fair dealing require “will depend heavily on
the commercial nature and purpose of the contract in question”.
48 In this case, the parties did not dispute that the Bank had to act honestly
to be said to have acted in good faith. What divided the parties was the issue of
what the objective aspect of good faith required of the Bank. The Bank accepted
that it would not have acted in good faith if there had been gross negligence on
its part (see [46] above). Yet, the plaintiff argued that good faith required even
more of the Bank. According to the plaintiff, the Bank would not have acted in
good faith if it had acted without reasonable care (see [45] above). I did not
accept the plaintiff’s account of the meaning of good faith for the following
reasons.
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49 First, on its plain and ordinary meaning, “good faith” does not connote
reasonable care. Ordinarily, one who acts merely negligently may still act in
good faith. The phrase “good faith” is often used to express a standard that is
different from that of reasonable care. I therefore found it very difficult to accept
that the parties intended that, for the purposes of the Standard Terms and the
LOI, the Bank had to act with reasonable care in order to act in good faith. While
the concept of good faith has an objective component, interpreting good faith to
require reasonable care would appear to stretch that concept too far.
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(b) Further, I noted that cl 3.1(a) is a general provision that does not
specifically address the Bank’s rights, duties and liabilities in acting on
instructions – which is the context in which the phrase “good faith” has
application in the Standard Terms and the LOI. By contrast, the Standard
Terms and the LOI contain the following provisions:
(i) Clause (g) of the LOI provided that the Bank was entitled
to act on electronic instructions “provided that the Bank officer
concerned believed the instruction to be genuine at the time it
was given” [emphasis added] (see [11] above).
51 I therefore could not accept the plaintiff’s argument that the Bank would
not have acted in good faith if it had acted without reasonable care or skill.
Nonetheless, I accepted on the authority of Toshin that there is an objective
aspect of good faith. I was satisfied that it would not have been sufficient for
the Bank to have honestly believed that the Four Instructions came from the
plaintiff, to have held this belief in good faith or acted in good faith in executing
the Four Instructions. In my judgment, the Bank would not have believed in
good faith that the plaintiff issued the Four Instructions, or acted in good faith
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in executing them, if it was glaringly clear that a fraud was being perpetrated
and yet the Bank failed to realise this. In other words, the Bank would not have
believed in good faith that the plaintiff issued the Disputed Instructions if it was
grossly negligent or reckless in holding that belief. I came to this view for two
reasons:
(a) The plaintiff submitted that the meaning of “good faith” could
be gleaned from and should be consistent with the parties’ justified
expectations and the spirit and purpose of the contracts between them.
In my view, the interpretation of the objective component of good faith
I arrived at was consistent with the parties’ justified expectations and the
spirit and purpose of the Account Opening Documents.
52 I then considered the plaintiff’s argument that the Bank was required to
act in accordance with “the spirit of its own internal policies and procedures”
and relevant banking practices in Singapore to be said to have acted in good
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faith (see [45] above). The gist of this argument was that the Bank would only
have acted in good faith if it had obtained call-back confirmation of the
plaintiff’s payment instructions before acting on them. I could not accept this
argument. It was contrary to the clear terms of cl 5.5(a) of the Standard Terms
and cl (g) of the LOI:
(a) Clause 5.5(a) states that the Bank “may require [the plaintiff’s]
confirmation prior to acting on [its] Instructions” (see [9] above). The
Bank therefore did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to perform call-back
confirmation of its payment instructions. It was merely entitled, and not
required, to do so under cl 5.5(a) of the Standard Terms.
(b) Similarly, cl (g) of the LOI provides that the Bank was entitled
to act “without inquiry as to the identity or authority of the person giving
or purporting to give any instruction or the authenticity of … any other
form of electronic communication … notwithstanding any … fraud”
[emphasis added] (see [11] above). Clause (g) further provides that the
Bank was entitled to act “without requiring further confirmation or
authentication or separate independent verification in any form”
[emphasis added].
These provisions expressly provide that the Bank did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff to obtain call-back confirmation of payment instructions issued or
purportedly issued by the plaintiff’s representatives, before acting on those
instructions. To hold that the Bank nevertheless had such a duty, by virtue of
the meaning of “good faith”, would be to surreptitiously smuggle such a duty
into the parties’ contractual relationship, notwithstanding their express
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agreement that there would be no such duty. It was clear to me that this would
not be a legitimate interpretation of the term “good faith”.
53 In sum, I held that the concept of good faith in the Account Opening
Documents incorporated the subjective requirement of acting honestly, and the
objective element of a lack of gross negligence or recklessness by the Bank.
54 The plaintiff argued that Mr Majnu did not issue the Four Instructions.
Rather, the plaintiff was the victim of an unknown fraudster who had issued the
Four Instructions to the Bank. The plaintiff made the following submissions:
(a) First, Mr Majnu did not sign the Four Instructions. In this regard,
the plaintiff relied on the evidence of the Bank’s forensic document
expert, Ms Lee Gek Kwee. Her evidence was as follows:
(i) the signatures on the 1st, 3rd, and 4th to 6th Instructions
were “identical to and superimposable with each other …”; and
The plaintiff argued that the evidence indicates that the signatures on the
1st to 6th Instructions were a “cut-and-paste” of digital images of
Mr Majnu’s signature. Mr Majnu did not have a practice of using a
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(b) Secondly, the plaintiff claimed Mr Majnu did not send the Four
Instructions to the Bank for the following reasons:
(ii) The Four Emails were signed off as “Sent from Yahoo!
Mail on Android” (“the Default Signature”). This was the default
signature for emails sent from the Yahoo! email application for
Android mobile devices. Yet the emails were sent from the
Yahoo Account via the internet browser Google Chrome; and the
Default Signature would not have been automatically generated
when an email was sent via Google Chrome. The evidence thus
indicated that the author of the emails manually typed in the
Default Signature to create the impression that they were sent
from an Android mobile device.
(iii) The person who sent the Four Emails did not use the
same modus operandi as Mr Majnu. The Four Emails were sent
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via eFax, an Internet fax services provider that Mr Majnu did not
use; the attachments to the Four Emails were created using a
software Mr Majnu did not use; and the Four Instructions were
sent via email before being faxed to the Bank, contrary to the
Mr Majnu’s practice of faxing its instructions to the Bank before
following up (sometimes) with an email.
55 The Bank’s case, in gist, was that the plaintiff had to adduce clear and
convincing evidence of the fraud it alleged, and the plaintiff had failed to meet
this evidentiary threshold. The Bank made the following submissions:
(a) The plaintiff’s evidence of the alleged fraud was equivocal. The
principal point advanced by the Bank here was that the evidence noted
in [54(a)]–[54(b)] above was consistent with Mr Majnu having caused a
third party to send the Four Instructions to the Bank.
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(b) The plaintiff did not adequately explain two critical facts that
undercut its case that the Four Instructions were not authorised:
(i) First, the person who sent the Four Emails had logged
onto the Yahoo Account to send them. Yet Mr Majnu’s evidence
was that he had never shared the password to the Yahoo Account
with anyone else. Hence, the only reasonable inference was that
Mr Majnu had sent the Four Emails or caused them to be sent,
having given someone his password.
My decision
56 It is trite that a party must raise cogent and compelling evidence to prove
fraud. In this regard, the plaintiff accepted that it had to meet a higher evidential
threshold to make out its case that the Four Instructions were unauthorised and
used as the instruments of fraud. Nonetheless, it was undisputed that the legal
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standard of proof the plaintiff must meet remained that of the balance of
probabilities. With these principles in mind, I turned to consider the evidence.
59 The question which then fell to be answered was whether the third party
issued the 1st to 6th Instructions without Mr Majnu’s authorisation, or whether
Mr Majnu had participated in a scam to defraud the Bank. During oral closing
submissions, Mr Teo sought to maintain that it was not the Bank’s positive case
that Mr Majnu had caused the 1st to 6th Instructions to be issued and was now
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bringing a fraudulent claim against the Bank. However, no matter how Mr Teo
sought to clothe the argument, that was in effect the thrust of his submissions.
(a) The 5th and 6th Instructions were sent to the Bank on 26 June
2013. However, the Bank did not execute them as there were insufficient
funds in the Account to do so (see [25]–[26] above). The plaintiff argued
that this showed that the person who had sent the 5th and 6th Instructions
did not know how much money was in the Account. According to the
plaintiff, this conclusion was also consistent with two emails sent to the
Bank on 18 and 19 June 2013 in which Mr Desmond Lee was asked for
the balance of the Account. I accepted the plaintiff’s submissions in this
regard. Proceeding on that premise, ie, the person who sent the 5th and
6th Instructions was unaware of the balance of the Account, it seemed
very unlikely that Mr Majnu had participated in a scheme to defraud the
Bank. The key point was that Mr Majnu would have known or at least
been able to find out (without explicitly asking Mr Lee) the balance of
the Account. It appeared that there were three avenues to find out the
account balance: calling the customer service line, using the S2B
platform, or visiting a branch of the Bank. In that light, I found it
unlikely that Mr Majnu was party to the fraud. If he had taken part in the
fraud, he would have known that there were insufficient funds in the
Account to execute the 5th and 6th Instructions. Accordingly, the 5th
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and 6th Instructions would not have been sent to the Bank. The fact that
they were sent to the Bank suggested Mr Majnu was not party to the
fraud.
61 The Bank submitted that the issuance of the 5th to 7th Instructions may
have been “a smokescreen” to disguise the scam in which Mr Majnu connived.
This may be possible, but I did not accept that the plaintiff fell short of proving
fraud in view of that mere possibility, for the following reasons:
(a) First, it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to exclude every logical
possibility to prove that a fraudulent third party had issued the 1st to 6th
Instructions. It was sufficient for the plaintiff to raise cogent evidence to
establish fraud on a balance of probabilities. I was satisfied that the
plaintiff had fulfilled this requirement.
(b) Secondly, if the Bank were correct, the scam would have been a
carefully planned and well-disguised scheme to defraud the Bank. Yet
if so, it did not seem logical that a substantial sum of money,
US$182,167.05, would have been left in the Account (see [26] above).
Equally, it would have made sense for Mr Majnu to raise the alarm upon
logging onto the S2B platform on 27 June 2013, whereupon (as the Bank
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submitted) he would have been able to discover that the Account had
been depleted. The 7th Instruction would have been unnecessary. It
would not have made sense for Mr Majnu to have waited to raise the
alarm. That would have given rise to suspicion that he had been aware
of the fraud and yet acquiesced in it by failing to inform the Bank of the
fraud promptly. If a scam was indeed at play, the safest course of action
would have been to raise the alarm at the earliest possible opportunity.
But Mr Majnu only told the Bank that the Four Transactions were
unauthorised on 2 July 2013 which suggested that he only became aware
of the situation on or about that date. All this indicated that Mr Majnu
was not a party to an elaborate scam to defraud the Bank.
(c) Thirdly, it did not seem to me that Mr Majnu had a clear motive
to participate in a scam to defraud the Bank. There was no evidence, for
example, that he was in need of money at the material time.
62 Finally, I accepted that questions may be raised over the plaintiff’s case
given that (a) Mr Majnu did not share the password to the Yahoo Account with
anyone else, and (b) only three persons, including Mr Majnu, had access to his
signature (see [55(b)] above). However, I also accepted the plaintiff’s
submission that an unknown third party may have obtained the password to the
Yahoo Account without authorisation, eg, through a phishing attack. This would
address point (a) above. The third party would then have been able to obtain Mr
Majnu’s specimen signature from his previous emails. In this regard, I noted
that the signature on the 2nd Instruction was identical to an instruction that had
been sent to the Bank by email (see [54(a)(ii)] above). This would address point
(b) above.
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63 In view of the points made at [60]–[61] above, I also decided to give the
plaintiff the benefit of the doubt over the fact that Mr Majnu had caused the
hard disk of his work computer and the Mobile Phone to be “wiped” after he
discovered the alleged fraud (see [55(c)] above). Mr Majnu’s evidence was that
he had experienced difficulties with his work computer and the Mobile Phone,
which had “crashed” and “frozen” on several occasions. He had therefore
instructed an employee of the plaintiff’s Information Technology department to
repair the computer and the Mobile Phone. The employee reinstalled the
hard disk of the computer and performed a factory reset of the Mobile Phone. I
accepted Mr Majnu’s evidence on this point, and therefore did not draw an
adverse inference against the plaintiff in relation to the fact that Mr Majnu had
caused the hard disk of his work computer and the Mobile Phone to be “wiped”.
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66 At the outset, I note that while there were references to gross negligence
in the plaintiff’s pleadings, I did not understand its core position at trial and in
closing submissions to be that the Bank was grossly negligent. The plaintiff’s
case was put on the basis that the Bank was simply negligent. In conjunction
with this position, the plaintiff argued that good faith should be interpreted as
requiring reasonable care and skill, which argument I did not accept for the
reasons given at [49]–[50] above. It seemed that this argument might have been
advanced to avoid the difficulty that the exclusion clause in the LOI, which uses
the terminology of good faith, would otherwise exclude liability for any breach
of cl 3.1 of the Standard Terms. Thus, on one level, the plaintiff’s case on cl 4.6
of the Standard Terms fell away given my interpretation of good faith and the
fact that it did not advance its case on the basis of gross negligence.
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(v) The date of the 3rd and 4th Instructions was erroneously
stated as “24/6/3013” [emphasis added].
(ii) The Four Instructions were faxed via eFax, which the
Mr Majnu had not used before.
(iii) The Four Instructions were sent by email and fax to the
Bank notwithstanding that Mr Majnu had learnt to use the S2B
Platform as a more efficient way of transferring funds on 6 June
2013 (see [15] above).
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69 The plaintiff argued that despite these “red flags”, the Bank failed to
confirm, or use reasonable efforts to attempt to confirm, the Four Instructions
with the plaintiff before acting on them. Accordingly, the Bank could not have
believed in good faith that the Four Instructions had been given by an
Authorised Person.
70 In reply, the Bank contended that the “red flags” relied on by the plaintiff
did not constitute suspicious circumstances, either individually or cumulatively,
that would have put a reasonable banker on notice that the plaintiff did not send
the Four Instructions. The Bank relied on the evidence of its expert Mr Tan
Boon Hoo (“Mr Tan”) to this effect.
My decision
71 I found that the “red flags” relied on by the plaintiff were not sufficient,
either individually or cumulatively, to put a reasonable banker on notice that
Mr Majnu did not issue the Four Instructions. I shall deal with the “red flags”
by reference to the three categories set out at [68] above.
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For these reasons, the plaintiff claimed that the frequency and quantum of the
Four Instructions would have put a reasonable banker on notice of a possible
fraud.
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73 I did not find these arguments persuasive. First, I found that the factual
basis of these submissions was weak for the following reasons:
(a) The plaintiff did not establish on the balance of probabilities that
it had told Ms Poh, during the Account Opening Meeting, that its
remittance instructions would be in the range of US$400,000 to
US$600,000; or that there would only be one or two withdrawals from
the Account a month. Ms Poh’s consistent evidence was that the plaintiff
did not inform her of these matters during that meeting.
(b) It was not plain that the Four Instructions were unprecedented at
least in terms of quantum. While US$1,838,720.51 was withdrawn from
the Account by the Four Transactions, a total of US$4,413,521.53 had
been withdrawn from the Account between May 2012 and June 2013, a
period of slightly more than one year (see [14] above). Furthermore, I
also noted that more than US$1.5m had been withdrawn from the
Account on one day, 30 January 2013 (see S/Ns 5–6 in the table at [14]
above). When Mr Teo put this to Mr Aaron Lee in cross-examination,
the latter conceded that the mere fact that approximately US$1.75m was
sent to Silver Bird Ltd in four days was not in itself suspicious.
74 Secondly, I did not accept the key premise of the plaintiff’s arguments,
viz, that a bank should enquire into a customer’s payment instructions if the
frequency and quantum of those instructions depart from (a) estimates provided
during an account opening meeting, and/or (b) a pattern established by earlier
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I found Mr Tan’s reasons for his opinion to be cogent and accordingly accepted
his opinion. Mr Tan’s opinion was also supported by the evidence of the
plaintiff’s own witnesses. Significantly, there were five authorised withdrawals
from the Account in excess of US$600,000, including one for US$813,750.00
(see S/Ns 1 and 3–6 in the table at [14] above). Mr Majnu accepted that the
plaintiff did not expect the Bank not to execute these payments for the reason
that they exceeded the upper end of the range allegedly given to the Bank.
Mr Aaron Lee also agreed that it was not incumbent on the Bank to restrict
withdrawals from the Account based on estimates given when the Account was
opened.
As noted at [72(a)] above, it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not impose
any such restrictions on withdrawals from the Account. For all these reasons,
even if the frequency and quantum of the Four Instructions were unprecedented,
I did not accept that this would have put the Bank on notice of a possible fraud.
(a) First, the plaintiff had withdrawn monies from the Account in
favour of five different parties (excluding Mr Majnu) before the
Four Transactions were executed (see the table at [14] above). In my
view, it was therefore not a “red flag” that two new entities were
identified as the beneficiaries of the Four Instructions. I also did not
consider that the fact that the beneficiaries’ accounts were in the US and
China would have attracted suspicion. As Mr Tan observed, given the
international nature of the plaintiff’s business, which seemed to have
been explained to Ms Poh during the Account Opening Meeting, it
would not have been surprising for the plaintiff to remit monies to these
countries.
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
78 I found that the lack of a stated purpose for the Four Transactions on the
Four Instructions was not a “red flag” for the following reasons:
(a) First, Mr Aaron Lee’s opinion that this was a “red flag” was
premised on the claim that “the purposes of previous successful
TT instructions had been stated on the TT forms”. However, this was
not correct. Three of the plaintiff’s authorised OTT instructions did not
state the purpose of the relevant transactions (albeit two of these were
not executed for separate reasons). One of these instructions, which was
executed, was for the largest withdrawal from the Account.
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
Transactions did not fall into this category of transactions, and so did
not attract the heightened scrutiny as required under the MAS Notice.
79 I found that the misspellings of the plaintiff’s name were not “red flags”:
(a) First, Mr Majnu did not have a consistent manner of signing off
his emails to the Bank. Notably, it was undisputed that he had misspelt
the plaintiff’s name as “Major Shipping & Tagging”, the misspelling
relied on by the plaintiff here, in two emails to Ms Poh in February 2013.
Mr Tan opined that in this light, a reasonable banker would not have
found the misspellings of the plaintiff’s name suspicious. He also opined
that it was not unusual for banks to receive emails where representatives
of a (corporate) customer signed off referring to the name of a different
company, ie, one that was not the customer. I accepted Mr Tan’s
evidence on these points.
80 I also found that the erroneous statement of the year in the date on the
3rd and 4th Instructions (see [68(a)(v)] above) was not a “red flag”. Mr Tan’s
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
evidence was that it would have been reasonable for a banker to conclude that
this was an obvious typographical error. I accepted Mr Tan’s evidence.
The manner in which the Four Instructions were sent to the Bank
81 I found that the alleged irregularities in the way the Four Instructions
were sent to the Bank did not amount to “red flags”, for reasons to which I will
now turn.
82 I found that the fact that the Four Instructions were sent to the Bank by
email before being faxed thereto did not amount to a “red flag” for the following
reasons:
(a) First, Mr Aaron Lee did not state that this was a “red flag”. There
was thus no expert evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position here.
(b) Secondly, the plaintiff only pleaded this point in relation to the
1st Instruction, and not the 2nd to 4th Instructions.
(c) Thirdly, in relation to the 1st Instruction, Mr Tan noted that even
if the plaintiff had a practice of faxing payment instructions to the Bank
before emailing them, there was nothing suspicious about there being no
initial fax of the 1st Instruction. The plaintiff could, for instance, have
forgotten to fax the instruction. I found Mr Tan’s evidence cogent and
accepted it.
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
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83 I found that the fact that the Four Instructions were faxed to the Bank
using eFax did not amount to a “red flag”, for two reasons:
(a) During cross-examination, Mr Aaron Lee did not say that the use
of eFax was a “red flag” in itself. He said it was a “red flag” on the basis
that there was allegedly a pre-advised fax number for the plaintiff in the
Bank’s records. But he later admitted that there was no such number.
His evidence that the use of eFax was a “red flag” accordingly fell away.
(b) Mr Tan’s evidence was that (a) banks do not impose restrictions
on the devices used to fax instructions to them or the origin of those
instructions, and (b) it is not uncommon for customers to fax instructions
to banks using different fax devices. The source of a fax and the device
used to fax the instruction are thus immaterial to banks. Mr Tan further
noted that there were emails from the Yahoo Account, purportedly from
Mr Majnu, which corresponded to each fax instruction. In the premises,
the use of eFax would not have attracted suspicion. Again, I found
Mr Tan’s evidence on these points cogent and I accepted it accordingly.
84 I found that the fact that the plaintiff did not use the S2B Platform to
send the Four Instructions to the Bank did not amount to a “red flag”:
(a) First, I found that the plaintiff did not inform the Bank, before
the Four Instructions were sent to the Bank, that it would only use the
S2B Platform to issue instructions for the remittance of monies from the
Account. I made this finding for the following reasons:
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Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
Miscellaneous irregularities
86 Two emails were sent from the Yahoo Account to the Bank on 18 and
19 June 2013 respectively (see [60(a)] above). In these emails, Mr Desmond
Lee was asked for the balance of the Account. The plaintiff argued that these
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
emails were “red flags” because (a) Mr Majnu had never asked the officers of
the Bank for the balance of the Account before, and (b) Mr Majnu would have
been able to ascertain the balance of the Account by logging onto the S2B
platform.
88 I found that the Health Problems email (see [24] above), in which
Ms Poh was informed that Mr Majnu was ill and unable to receive calls, was
not a “red flag”. On 6 June 2013, less than two weeks before the 1st Instruction
was sent to the Bank, Mr Majnu sent an email to Ms Poh stating: “now I m in
singapore for treatment purpose”. I accepted Ms Poh’s evidence that this email
gave her the impression that Mr Majnu was receiving medical treatment. The
Health Problems email would have been consistent with this.
89 The plaintiff claimed that the Health Problems email was suspicious as
it stated that Mr Majnu was unable to receive calls; yet, Mr Majnu had
ostensibly been sending faxes and emails to the Bank. Ms Poh’s evidence,
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
however, was that Mr Majnu did not inform her of the nature of his health
problems and she had no reason to doubt what he conveyed to be his doctor’s
advice, ie, that he was unable to receive calls. Furthermore, Mr Tan opined that
it was not uncommon for customers to arrange for fund transfers before they
undergo medical treatment, especially if they may not be contactable after
treatment. I accepted Ms Poh’s and Mr Tan’s evidence.
Conclusion
90 For the reasons given above, I found that the “red flags” relied on by the
plaintiff were not sufficient, taken individually, to put a reasonable banker on
notice that Mr Majnu did not issue the Four Instructions. I then turned to
consider the plaintiff’s submission that, when these “red flags” were considered
in totality, a reasonable banker would have been put on notice that Mr Majnu
did not issue the Four Instructions. I did not accept this submission. The plaintiff
did not offer any theory or explanation of how factors that were not individually
suspicious would collectively give rise to suspicion to put the Bank on notice of
a possible fraud. Mr Aaron Lee’s opinion on the collective and cumulative effect
of the “red flags” was premised on the “red flags” being suspicious in and of
themselves. I rejected that premise. In the circumstances, there was no cogent
and credible evidence supporting the plaintiff’s submission that the “red flags”
collectively put the Bank on notice of a possible fraud.
91 I therefore found that the “red flags” relied on by the plaintiff were not
sufficient, either individually or cumulatively, to put a reasonable banker on
notice that Mr Majnu did not issue the Four Instructions. Accordingly, I found
that the Bank had not been negligent in (a) failing to detect the alleged “red
flags”, and (b) executing the Four Transactions despite the alleged “red flags”.
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
92 Given that a reasonable banker would not have been put on notice that
Mr Majnu did not issue the Four Instructions, I also found that the Bank was
not negligent in not obtaining call-back confirmation of the Four Instructions
before executing them (see [69] above). Mr Tan’s evidence was that to impose
such a requirement generally, for all OTT instructions, regardless of whether a
bank was put on notice of a possible fraud, would be unreasonable and
impractical, given the volume of instructions received by the Bank and the delay
and increased costs that would result from imposing such a requirement. I
accepted Mr Tan’s evidence.
93 Given this finding, ie, the Bank was not negligent in not obtaining
call-back confirmation of the Four Instructions before executing them, I also
found that the Bank was not negligent in the manner in which it sought to obtain
call-back confirmation of the Four Instructions. If the Bank’s duty of care did
not extend to obtaining call-back confirmation of the Four Instructions, I did not
see how it could extend to attempting to obtain such confirmation in certain
ways.
94 I therefore found that the Bank was not negligent, let alone grossly
negligent, in believing that Mr Majnu had issued the Disputed Instructions.
Hence, I found that the Bank believed in good faith that the instructions were
sent by Mr Majnu. It then followed that the Bank acted within its authority under
cl 4.6 of the Standard Terms in executing the Four Transactions, and I so found.
95 In its closing submissions, apart from the cause of action based on cl 4.6
of the Standard Terms, the plaintiff relied on two other causes of action.
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Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
96 The plaintiff claimed the Bank breached cl 3.1(a) of the Standard Terms
in executing the Four Transactions without obtaining call-back confirmation of
the Four Instructions, notwithstanding the allegedly suspicious circumstances
relating to the Four Instructions. For the reasons above, I found that the Bank
was not negligent in virtue of these matters (see [91]–[94] above). I thus found
that the Bank did not thereby breach cl 3.1(a) of the Standard Terms.
97 The plaintiff also argued that the Bank had breached implied terms to
(a) act in accordance with its internal risk management procedures, (b) take
steps and/or have the necessary facilities to prevent unauthorised fund transfers
and/or, (c) comply with the relevant MAS regulations and guidelines.
98 I did not accept that there were any such implied terms. In Sembcorp
Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal
[2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”), Sundaresh Menon CJ, delivering the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, laid down the following three-stage test for
the implication of terms at [101]:
(a) The first step is to ascertain how the gap in the contract
arises. Implication will be considered only if the court discerns
that the gap arose because the parties did not contemplate the
gap.
(b) At the second step, the court considers whether it is
necessary in the business or commercial sense to imply a term in
order to give the contract efficacy.
(c) Finally, the court considers the specific term to be implied.
This must be one which the parties, having regard to the need for
business efficacy, would have responded “Oh, of course!” had
the proposed term been put to them at time of the contract. If it is
not possible to find such a clear response, then, the gap persists
and the consequences of that gap ensue.
[emphasis added]
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
99 In my judgment, the terms that the plaintiff contended were implied did
not meet any of the three steps of the Sembcorp Marine test. First, the plaintiff
argued that there was a gap in the contracts because they did not make any
provision regarding the duties that the plaintiff contended for. In my view, the
Account Opening Documents extensively set out the duties owed by the Bank
to the plaintiff. There was no gap to be filled by an implied term. Secondly, I
found that it was not necessary in the business or commercial sense to imply the
duties that the plaintiff contended for. Finally, I found that none of the implied
duties that the plaintiff contended for satisfied the officious bystander test.
100 It followed from my findings above that the plaintiff failed to prove that
the Bank breached any duty owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s claim therefore
fell to be dismissed on this basis alone. However, for completeness, I proceed
to consider the exclusion of liability and the contributory negligence issues.
101 The plaintiff submitted that the Bank could neither rely on cl 10.1(a) of
the Standard Terms nor the exclusion clause in the LOI to exclude its liability
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff raised separate arguments for each exclusion clause
and I shall therefore examine them in turn.
102 The plaintiff submitted that the Bank could not rely on cl 10.1(a) of the
Standard Terms to exclude its liability to the plaintiff for several reasons.
103 Two of the plaintiff’s submissions fell away given my findings above.
First, for the purpose of this clause, the plaintiff argued that the Bank could not
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Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
104 The plaintiff also argued that the Bank could not rely on cl 10.1(a) as it
was inconsistent with cl 3.1(a) of the Standard Terms, which required the Bank
to exercise reasonable care and skill in providing its services. Therefore,
cl 10.1(a) had to be “rejected as repugnant”. In support of this argument, the
plaintiff relied on the proposition stated in Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation
of Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2011) at para 9.08:
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Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
106 Secondly, the plaintiff submitted that cl 10.1(a) was inconsistent with
the main object of the contracts between the parties. I struggled to understand
this submission. According to the plaintiff, the main object of the contracts
between the parties was “for the [Bank] to provide banking services to the
plaintiff”. I could not accept that the mere exclusion of liability for negligence
simpliciter in providing banking services was inconsistent with the very
provision of those services.
107 Thirdly, the plaintiff argued that cl 10.1(a) contravened ss 2(2) and 3(2)
of the UCTA on the basis that it unreasonably restricted the Bank’s liability for
negligent conduct, and was thus ineffective. Under s 11(1) of the UCTA, the
test for reasonableness is whether the term was “a fair and reasonable one to be
included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably
to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract
was made”. In my judgment, cl 10.1(a) satisfied this test of reasonableness. The
plaintiff is a commercial entity who entered into a contractual relationship with
the Bank in the course of its business. The banking experts agreed that cl 10.1(a)
was a clause which is “commonly found in the account opening documents and
standard terms of Singapore banks”. I saw nothing unreasonable in the Bank
seeking to exclude liability for negligence given the volume of transactions it
handles for various customers. In the circumstances, I found that cl 10.1(a) of
the Standard Terms did not contravene the UCTA.
108 In relation to the exclusion clause in the LOI, the plaintiff had pleaded
that the exclusion clause in the LOI also contravened the UCTA. However, the
plaintiff did not raise this point in closing submissions. Instead, it raised a single
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Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
argument in relation to the exclusion clause in the LOI. It argued that the Bank
could not rely on this clause because the Bank did not believe in good faith that
Mr Majnu had issued the Four Instructions. The exclusion clause was thus not
engaged on the present facts.
109 However, I found that the Bank did believe in good faith that Mr Majnu
issued the Four Instructions (see [94] above). Accordingly, I did not accept the
plaintiff’s argument that the Bank was not entitled to rely on the exclusion
clause in the LOI.
Conclusion
110 For the above reasons, I did not accept the plaintiff’s arguments that the
Bank could not rely on cl 10.1(a) of the Standard Terms or the exclusion clause
in the LOI to exclude its liability to the plaintiff. In any event, as noted above, I
found that the Bank was not liable to the plaintiff to begin with (see [100]
above).
111 The Bank submitted that any loss suffered by the plaintiff was caused
and/or contributed to by the plaintiff’s own negligence. This was because the
plaintiff knew or should have known that a third party was accessing the Yahoo
Account and sending the Four Instructions to the Bank without authorisation. In
this regard, the Bank made, inter alia, the following points:
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Major Shipping & Trading Inc v [2018] SGHC 04
Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd
(b) Between 17 and 28 June 2013, Mr Majnu would have known that
a third party was sending the Four Instructions to the Bank, upon seeing
the emails in reply from Mr Desmond Lee and Ms Poh (see [17] above).
(c) On 27 June 2013, Mr Majnu would have seen the balance of the
Account upon logging onto the S2B platform (see [27] above).
The evidence was that the Bank required about two to three days to process an
OTT instruction. Thus, if the plaintiff had informed the Bank on 17 or 18 June
2013 of the alleged fraud, after it knew or should have come to know about it,
the Bank would not have executed any or most of the Disputed Instructions. The
plaintiff’s loss was therefore due to its contributory negligence.
112 Having carefully considered the evidence, I found that the Bank did not
establish that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for the following
reasons:
(a) First, Mr Majnu’s evidence was that he did not see the 18 June
SMSes, the emails from Mr Desmond Lee and Ms Poh, or the balance
of the Account on 27 June 2013 upon logging onto the S2B platform.
There was no compelling objective evidence contradicting Mr Majnu’s
evidence. In this regard, RSM did not find evidence that the plaintiff’s
representatives had read or received Mr Desmond Lee’s and Ms Poh’s
emails before 2 July 2013 (or that they had not done so). I therefore
accepted Mr Majnu’s evidence.
Conclusion
Kannan Ramesh
Judge
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55