London Gazette 38183 Despatch On The Far East 1940 Oct. 17-1941 Dec. 27, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief, Far East PDF

IRumb.
38183 535
SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the 2oth of JANUARY, 1948
Registered as a newspaper
THURSDAY, 22 JANUARY, 1948

The War Office,
January, 1948.
OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, FROM I7TH OCTOBER 1940 TO 27
DECEMBER 1941
The following Despatch was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Wavell,
British Chiefs of Staff on 2&lh May, 1942, on the methods of operating has headquarters,
by AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ROBERT and especially why he found such a big expan-
-BgOOKE-POPHAM, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., sion from his original staff necessary.
C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Commander-in- At Delhi I stayed with the Viceroy, and estab-
Chief in the Far East. lished contact with the Commander-in-Chief,
I.FORMATION OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and their
FAR EAST. respective staffs, and with certain civil officials.
1. This despatch, covers the period from the At Rangoon I stayed with the Governor,
date of my appointment as Commander-in- Sir Archibald Cochrane, and reached agree-
Chief, Far East, the iyth October, 1940, to the ment over the constitutional problems raised by
date on -which I handed over to Lieutenant- the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Far
General Sir Henry Pownall, the 27th December, East. I met the General Officer Commanding,
1941. Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir K.
McLeod, visited various establishments, includ-
My original staff consisted of seven, exclusive ing the oil refinery at Syriam, and established
of my personal assistant. Of these seven, the contact with many of the civil officials.
Chief .of Staff, Majpr-General Dewing, the
Senior Royal Adr Force Staff Officer, Group- Instructions and General Policy.
Captain Darvall, as well as any personal assis- 3. My Directive is given in Appendix A.
tant, travelled out with me.
On my arrival in Singapore it was agreed
The Naval Liaison Officer, Captain Back, that, should I become a casualty, the Com-
met me on my arrival at Singapore, and the mander-in-Chief, China Station, should take
Army G.S.O.i, Colonel Fawcett, met me in my place until my successor was appointed.
Burma.
With reference to paragraph 2 of mj~
Before leaving England I saw the Chief of Directive, the meaning of the term " operational
the Imperial General .Staff, Chief of the Air control " was explained as being higher direc-
Staff and Major-General Ismay individually, tion and control as distinct from detailed opera-
but did not meet the Chiefs of Staff collectively tional control.
at one of their meetings.
fii addition to this Directive, I had two main
2. I left London on Sunday, the 27th guides for action: first, that if was the policy
October, and started 'by air from Plymouth on of 'His Majesty's Government to avoid war
the 28th October. I spent two clear days in with Japan, and, secondly, that, uiitil a fleet
Cairo, three in Delhi and three in Rangoon, was available; our policy 'in the Far East should
arriving at Singapore on Thursday,' the 14 th be to rely primarily on .ajrjpower'in conjunction
November. General Headquarters', Far East, with such naval forces "as could be made avail-
started to operate on .Monday, ; the ' i8th able. The first was confirmed during 1941 in
November, 1940. many telegrams, e.g., in March, " Avoidance
During the journey I was able to ses the of war with Japan is basis of Far East policy
working of the Headquarters of both the Army and provocation must be rigidly avoided,"
and Air Force in Cairo, and to consult with the. and again in September, " Our policy in the
536 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948
Far East is still to avoid war with Japan." The Far East is usually examined on a small-
The second was. laid down by the Chiefs of scale map, so people are rather apt to get a .
Staff in August, 1940. false idea of distances. From Singapore to
4. It was pointed out to me that the require- Alor Star at the North End of Malaya is a good
ments of Home Defence, the Battle of the deal further than from London to Aberdeen.
Atlantic, and the Middle East, must take pre- Rangoon to Singapore direct by air is about
cedence over those of the Far East; at a later i,iop miles; Singapore to Hong Kong, via
date Russia also took precedence, and, at one Manila, ds 2,000 miles, about the distance from
time, Iraq and Iran. Realising this, it was Gibraltar to Alexandria; and from Singapore
obviously our duty to be content with the essen- to Melbourne about 4,100, which is only slightly
tial minimum, to consider what we could do less than the distance from London to Aden,
without rather than what we would like to have, via Malta and Cairo.
. and to imake the fullest use of local resources.
But we always regarded the strength of 336 Size of General Headquarters Staff.
aeroplanes as an irreducible minimum. {See 7. Although it was obvious that Singapore
para. 79 below.} In January, 1941, we were was a key 'position, and -therefore that tbf
cautioned against over-estimate of the Japanese defence of Malaya was of the greatest impor-
forces. tance, it was evident that, apart from my Direc-
I was also informed that the defence organi- tive, the size of -my Staff rendered it quite
sation in Malaya was apparently not working impossible to exercise any form of direct opera-
smoothly or efficiently, and that this would tional control, except in the widest sense. I
necessitate early investigation and action. therefore decided that, although the fact of
5. To carry out the directions outlined above, my headquarters happening to be situated at
it was evident that the following steps were Singapore would naturally involve my dealing
necessary: with more details in Malaya than elsewhere,
(a) To avoid any action that might be the Commands of Hong Kong, Malaya and
deemed provocative by Japan, but at the Burma must be regarded as of equal status.
same time to try and convince her that our Each General Officer Commanding would have
strength was too great to be challenged suc- to control the operations in his own area, and1
cessfully; the initiative of the Air Officer Commanding,
(6) To strengthen our defences in the Far Far East, must not be cramped; the operational
East, and especially to build up our air forces, control of my headquarters would be limited
not only by obtaining new aircraft but also mainly to the movement. of reinforcements,
by making all preparations to ensure mutual principally air, within my command and to the
reinforcement in the Far East area; issue of directives.
(c) To ensure effective co-operation in The staff of General Headquarters, Far East,
Malaya, not only between the Royal Navy, was very small for the work it had to carry-
the Army and the Air Force but also between out, and immediately on its formation in
them and the civil services; Singapore it was found necessary to add three
(d) To stiffen the Chinese so that thev duty officers of junior rank in order to ensure
could contain the maximum Japanese effort keeping a twenty-four-hour watch in the office.
(see paras. 70 and 71 below); and Requests for an increase in staff at General
(e) To establish as close co-operation as Headquarters were made on more than one
possible with the Dutch and Americans, as occasion, and finally it was agreed by the
well as with Australia and New Zealand, the Chiefs of Staff, in August, 1941, that the total'
main object being to ensure that, should an establishment should be raised to the;
attack be made on any part of the Far East following:
area, all the nations concerned would simul- Commander-in^Ghief: i.
taneously enter the war against Japan, thus Chief of Staff: i.
avoiding the risk of defeat in detail, as had Staff Officer, ist Grade: Navy i; Army 2^
happened in Europe. R.A.F. 2.
6. A very brief study of the area comprised Staff Officer, 2nd Grade: Navy i; Army 3;
in the Far East Command shows that the R.A.F. 3.
defence of the whole area is essentially one Staff Officer, 3rd Grade: Navy i.
single problem. Burma, Siain, Indo-China, Total, 15.
Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, In addition to this, there were:
Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand, Personal Assistant: i.
all inter-connect and operations or preparations Cipher Officers: 2.
in any one of these areas affect all the others. Signal Officer: i.
In view of the above, I regarded it as one of Chief Clerk: i.
my principal duties to make personal contacts
in these places. During 1941 I visited Australia, Making a total in all of 20. This establish-
twice, in February and October, Manila three ment was not completed by the time war broke-
times and the Netherlands East Indies five out.
times. I also visited Hong Kong in December, The result of the smallness of the Staff was-
1940, and April, 1941; and Burma in June and that individuals were overworked, and this,
September, 1941. in conjunction with the Malayan climate, led
Another point that stands out is that the to sickness. The most serious case was that,
problem is (fundamentally a naval one, and of my Chief of Staff, Major-General Dewing,1
that, although the Army and Air Force in com- who went into (hospital on the 8th April, and
bination may defend areas of land and repel remained there until he started for England in
an enemy, his definite defeat cannot be brought May. General 'Playfair arrived to take his*
about unless control of sea communications is place on the 2ist June, but for a period of
obtained. This control will necessitate air some ten and a half weeks I was without a.
superiority. Chief of Staff.
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948 537
This sickness was largely attributed by the In Malaya, as in Burma and Hong Kongv
medical authorities to the effects of overwork. there was a 'War Committee, which sat under.
In addition, Wing-Commander Yarde had to the Governor.
be sent away sick, other officers were in hos- The main reason for the defence of Malaya
pital for shorter periods, and when war with was to preserve the facilities of the Naval
Japan broke out Colonel Scott, who had taken Base at Singapore. The port and rubber and
Colonel Fawcett's place as the Army G.S.O.&, tin production were also important, but on a.
was in- India on sick leave, having been seiit different plane from the Naval Base. It was,,
there from hospital. of course, not sufficient to have a close defence-
Intelligence. of the area round the Naval Base itself. It
8. For intelligence I relied almost entirely was of great importance to keep enemy aircraft
on the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, known as far away from the Base as possible, on
for short as! F.E.C.B. This consisted of account of the danger of bombing; this meant
branches of Naval, Army and Air Force in- extending the defence right up to the Northern;
telligence, and was under the administrative end of Malaya-.. It may be noted that this was
control of the Admiralty, the officer in charge not dependent upon the policy of defending.
of the Naval Section acting as head of the Malaya by means of air power. Had the
Bureau. At the date of the formation of any policy been to defend Malaya by means of Army
headquarters, F.E.C.B. was somewhat un- forces, the dispositions" might have been;
balanced in that attention was mostly concen- different, but it would still have been essential
trated on Naval intelligence, while Army and . to hold the greater part of Malaya in order
Air intelligence took a minor place, the latter to deny aerodromes or their possible sites to-
especially being quite inadequate. This, how- the enemy. Singapore Island was to be pro-
ever, was steadily corrected, and I consider visioned for 180 days.
that F.E.C.B. fulfilled its functions and showed Communications.
that a combined intelligence staff of the three 12. The main roads in Malaya are weir-
Services is a workable proposition. Wihat was metalled, and the railways are single-track
needed, however, was a real chief of F.E.C.B., metre-gauge. Down the centre of Malaya runs
and not merely one whose main duty was acting a range of hills rising to some 7,000 feet, and
as head of his own 'branch. The difficulty was there are no east-to-west communications north
in finding a really suitable individual, and this of latitude 4, i.e., about the latitude of Kuantan,
we had not succeeded in doing at the time war The central (backbone of hills dies away soon
with Japan broke out. after crossing the frontier with Siam, and good
Attachments to General Headquarters Staff. lateral communications were available in the
g. A branch of the Ministry of Economic neighbourhood of Singora, where, also, there
Warfare known as the O.M. Section, was started were suitable sites for aerodromes. Generally
on the arrival of Mr. Killery at Singapore in speaking, communications in the west are good
May, 1941. He and his staff were keen and and on the east poor.
capable, but they had no experience and very The defence of the east coast was simplified!
little knowledge of how to set about their by the lack of communications, since it was.
work. Further, as in the case of intelligence, only necessary to hold those places from which
this is work that requires a great deal of pre- roads ran into the interior.. This meant that
paration-., In consequence of this, but through the key points to hold were Mersing and
no fault of 'Mr. Killery or his staff, the O.M. Kuantan. Kota Bharu in Kelantan was held
activities really never got functioning properly because of the aerodrome at that place and two
by the time that war with Japan broke out. others a few miles further south, these being
There was also a curious reluctance on the part necessary in order to enable us to strike, with
of many people to have anything to do with aircraft, as far as possible into the Gulf of
these activities, or to help on the work. This Siam and into Indo China. (See para. 5.2:
was particularly noticeable in the case of in- below.)
tended activities in Siam. The only existing land communication1,
10. Colonel Warren arrived in Singapore between Kelantan and the rest of Malaya is the
early in 1941 to assist in starting Independent railway, there being no through road.
Companies. The obvious disadvantage of .Attempts were made to use the railway for
these Companies is that they form a drain on motor transport, tout as the rails were spiked'
infantry units, which were already depleted of and no chairs were available the damage
many of their best non-commissioned officers caused to tyres, was so excessive that the pro-
and officers owing to the expansion and de- ject was given up as impracticable; This meant
mands of other organisations.. As a result, it that communications with any force at 'Kota
was finally decided to limit these Independent Bharu were precarious, since everything had to-
Companies to twoone for Burma and one for move ;by the single line of railway, which iit
many parts was highly vulnerable to bombing..
Malaya. I laid down that the road policy in Kelantaoi-
II.FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFENCE OF should -be not to develop any road on or near
MALAYA AND BORNEO. the coast, but as soon as practicable to con-
11. Air Vice-Marshal Pulford became Air struct an internal road running north and south,
Officer Commanding, Far East, vice Air Vice- following more or less the line of the railway.
Marshal Babington on the 26th April, 1941, The only communication overland with
and Lieutenant-General Percival took over the Kuantan was a single road, also very vulner-
duties of General Officer Commanding, Malaya, able in places to air bombing.
from Lieutenant-General Bond on the i6th May, Co-operation between the services and with the1
1941. civil authorities.
The strength of the Army and of the Air 13. For some time before November, 1940,
Force in Malaya in November, 1940, is given the relations between the Army and the Air
in Appendices D and I respectively. Force were not happy; there was some jealousy
A2
between them, co-operation left a great deal to I informed the Governor of North Borneo that
be desired, and it was some months 'before this his territory could not be defended, and that
could 'be considered satisfactory. Every opera- the volunteers and police at his disposal were to
tion should have been looked upon as a com- be utilised for purposes of internal security.
bined operation of 'two, or very often the three, No attempt was made to defend Labuan,
services; for a long time there was a tendency though it was a cable and wireless station.
for one of the services to work out a plan on The State of Brunei was of some importance
its own and then see how one or both the other owing to the oilfield at Seria in the South,
services could come in. which, in addition to Miri, supplied crude oil
A great step in advance was made by getting to the refineries at Lutong in Sarawak. Although
the headquarters of the Army and Air Force on one company of the 2nd/i5th Punjab Regi-
the same site. This entailed a good deal of ment less one platoon to Kuching, had been
building, but before war started there was a moved to Lutong in December, 1940, and two
single combined Operations Room functioning 6-inch guns had been mounted there, it was
and the whole of the Army General Staff were finally decided that it was useless to attempt to
located on the same site as Royal Air Force defend the refinery or either of the oilfields.
Headquarters. A naval section joined the Consequently, a partial denial scheme was
Operations Room at the start of the war as carried out before war broke out, whereby the
planned previously. oil output was reduced by some 70 per cent.,
14. The local tradition of inter-service and only a small number of items were left to
jealousy had some effect for the first few months complete the denial scheme when war broke
on the working of General Headquarters. Per- out. According to reports, the work was
sonal relations with Army Headquarters were completed satisfactorily.
good, but my staff had to ibe scrupulously care- The 2nd/i5th Punjab Regiment, less the one
ful in dealing with matters that touched on the company referred to above, left Singapore for.
province of the General Officer Commanding. Kuching on the loth and nth May, 1941. Steps
Co-operation (between the Navy and Air were also taken to develop local forces, i.e.,
Force was good, and it continually improved volunteers and a body of native troops known
between the Navy and the Army, for instance, as the Sarawak Rangers.
on such matters as getting advice from naval III.FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFENCE OF
officers as to the probable sites of landings from BURMA.
the naval point of view. Authorities.
15. Relations between the Commander-in- 17. Sir Reginald Dorman Smith replaced the
Chief, China Station, and myself were close Hon. Sir Archibald Cochrane as Governor of
and friendly throughout. Our offices were Burma on the 6th May, 1941, and Lieut.-
adjoining after the move of my headquarters General Hutton took over the duties of General
to the Naval Base and I had luncheon with him Officer Commanding from Lieut.-General
in his house nearly every day. McLeod at midnight the 28th-29th December,
Relations between the commanders in Malaya 1941.
and the Governor were good. I always found The War Committee in Burma included
the Governor ready to help, and our personal Burmese Ministers as well as the two British
relations were very friendly. Counsellors and the General Officer Command-
As regards the Colonial Service generally, ing. The Governor was President and the
our relations in most cases were0 satisfactory, Premier of Burma Vice-President.
and much help was received from many Sir R. Dorman Smith established a military
Departments, especially the Survey and the liaison officer on his personal staff. There were
Government Posts and Telegraphs. But, obvious advantages in this, and it would doubt-
partly owing to the complicated system of gov- less have worked well had the facts and figures
ernment, delays sometimes occurred and on always been obtained from the responsible
certain matters it was difficult to get full and authorities. As it was, information was some-
accurate information. I feel it would be of times sought through other channels, with the
great value to the Colonial Service if its officers result that at times inaccurate or incomplete
could attend some college on the lines of the information was 'given to the Governor, leading
Military Staff Colleges at some time in their to misunderstandings.
career.
There was an interchange of liaison officers Communications.
with the Dutch, first Navy and Air and later 18. The main factor affecting the defence of
Army as well. Observers from the American Burma was that of communications. The total
Army and Navy were also posted to Singapore. length of frontier facing Japanese-occupied terri-
tory in December, 1941, was nearly 800 miles.
Borneo. There were good roads, as well as railways,
16. Unless we obtained command of the sea, running north and south up the valleys of the
it was impossible to defend British Borneo as a Sittang and Irrawaddy. Roads in the
whole with the forces available. But through Tenasserim Peninsula were ibad.
communications in the island were practically Working north from the southern end of the
non-existent; consequently, any defence could Tenasserim Peninsula, there were only
be limited to holding the important points. The mountain tracks leading eastwards from Siam
only place which it was decided to hold was until reaching the road from Raheng through
Kuching, the reason for this being not only that Mesod towards Moulmein, which crossed the
there was an aerodrome at that place, but that Burma frontier at Myawadi. Even this road
its occupation by the enemy might give access was not continuous, and there was a section
to the aerodromes in Dutch Borneo at the of fifty miles reported to be not much better
North-Western end of the island, these aero- than a pack track. From the Japanese point
dromes being only some 350 miles from Singa- of view, it had 4he disadvantages that we
pore, i.e., much nearer than any in South Indo- should be able to operate from close to our
China. railhead at Martaban, and that, so long as we
held command of the sea, advance beyond Engineering Programme,
Moulmein by the Japanese would be open to 21. There was a great shortage of engineers,
a British flank attack. both civil and military. In planning the engi-
Continuing north, there were again only neering programme, priority was given first to
tracks until reaching the road leading from the aerodrome construction and accommodation for
Bangkok-Chieng Mai railway,' through Chieng the Royal Air Force; secondly, to road con-
Rai and thence via Kentung to Taunggyi. On struction for strategical and tactical purposes,
the Siamese side of the frontier this road was including ferries; and then accommodation for
good; on our side it was fair-weather only for troops and stores, including ammunition.
part of the way. In the time available there was no opportu-
There were only tracks leading from Burma nity to complete elaborate concrete defence lines;
into Northern Indo-China, and these involved all that could be done was to construct field
the crossing of the River Mekong. Into China defences on the probable lines of approach.
itself there was a fair track from Kentung to There were limitations even to this: first, the
Puerhfu, and, secondly, the main road from difficulty of working and the prevalence of
Lashio to Kunming. A road from Bhamo joined malaria in the rainy season; secondly, the num-
the latter near the frontier. ber of troops available; and thirdly, the lack of
Westwards, a start had been made on a road Mechanical Transport, until the Autumn of
communication with India, but this was by no 1941, which severely limited the number of men
means complete when war broke out. that could be maintained near, and east of,
the Salween River.
Landing grounds had been established in the
Tenasserim Peninsula with the object of facili- Strength of Forces.
tating the movement of aircraft between Burma 22. The composition of the military forces in
and Malaya; the main ones were at Tavoy, Burma when war broke out is shown in Appen-
Mergui and Victoria Point. The last was very dix G, and the situation regarding Anti-Aircraft
isolated, and it was realised that it probably guns in Appendix F.
could not be held for long if war with Japan As will be seen, the organisation was some-
broke out. what complicated from the desire to make every
19. It was estimated that the total force possible use of local resources. Originally, the
which the Japanese could bring against Burma, Burma Frontier Force had been independent
using land communications only, would be of the General Officer Commanding in peace,
about two divisions, of which one division and only came under him in time of war: His
would be on the road running* through Chie'ng Excellency Sir Reginald Dorman Smith decided
Rai. The Chiefs of Staff considered in January to put the Burma Frontier Force under the
1941 that, although four enemy divisions could General Officer Commanding's control in peace
be maintained at railhead on the Bangkok- as well, thus simplifying the organisation. The
Chieng Mai railway, it was unlikely that even change was effected on the loth November,
one division could be maintained on the Burma 1941.
side of the frontier, owing to the limited road The -Independent Company was abolished
communications. The situation would, how- before war with Japan broke out, the British
ever, be completely altered should the Japanese portion being used mainly for additional squads
get control of sea communications in the Bay of for Chinese guerillas, and the Burmese return-
Bengal. In that case, their capture of Mergui, ing to their original units.
and possibly Tavoy, would only be a question 23. In the Singapore Ccnference of October
of time. They would be able to outflank our 1940 it was recommended that ,as regards the
positions at Moulmein, and our line of com- Army, the force immediately required for the
munication thence with Rangoon; and, should defence of Burma was as follows:
Singapore fall or be invested, would be able to
bring by sea against Burma a force much 5 infantry brigades and two additional
greater than two divisions. battalions;
1fieldregiment and i battery;
20. Turning to the Chieng Rai line of 2 mountain batteries;
advance, owing to the indifferent road on our i anti-tank battery;
side of the frontier and the shortage of Mechani- i-heavy A.A. regiment (24 guns);
cal Transport, it was impracticable to maintain i light A.A. battery, non-mobile d6 guns);
a big force east of the Salween. The policy, i light A.A. battery, mobile; and
. therefore, was to fight delaying actions as far 1 company light tanks.
forward as possible, and to make the Salween This was exclusive of the Burma Frontier
the main line of defence. Force and of the Territorial and Auxiliary
Owing to the. heavy growth of trees along forces allotted to internal security duties. It
the Japanese lines of advance, conditions were was also staled that an additional requirement
not generally favourable for air reconnaissance. for the long-term problem was: one Division,
On the other hand, there were certain open less certain units, which made the fighting
defiles against which air bombing would portion of this Division as follows:
probably have been very effective, and it was 2 infantry brigades, each 'of 3 battalions;
hoped that sufficient air force would be avail- i reconnaissance unit;
able to deter the Japanese advance to a great i field regiment (24 guns);
extent. For this purpose aerodromes were i medium re^jment (16 guns);
constructed with the object of being able to con- i light A.A. regiment (48 guns);
centrate either on Central or South Burma, and i anti-tank battery; and
against either the Mesod road or the Chieng i machine gun battalion.
Rai road. In their comments of January 1941, on the
Demolitions were prepared along the enemy Conference, the Chiefs of Staff stated that they
lines of advance, especially on the Chieng Rai considered both the threat of attack, and the
road. demands for land forces, had been overstated.
Comparing the Conference recommendations going to face this, they would be much more
with the total Army strength available in Burma likely to start attacking Singapore than Burma.
in December 1941 (see Appendix G), and Admittedly, we were working on probabilities
omitting the Burma Frontier Force and the and not certainties, but, in view of the weakness
Territorial and Auxiliary forces, the shortages of our air forces, it was essential to concentrate
were approximately the maximum effort and not try to be equally
3 field batteries; strong in two places.
i anti-tank battery; and The American Volunteer Group.
i company light tanks 26. The American Volunteer Group consisted
out of the immediate requirements, and the of three single-seater fighter squadrons which
whole of the additional requirement. were equipped with Tomahawks up to the time
Apart from this, up to the outbreak of the
war with Japan, Burma remained short of: I handed over command.
Doubtless the United States will not forget
Rifles; the help that was freely given to the American
Mechanical transport vehicles; Volunteer Group by the Burma Government
Officers for the General Officer Command- and by the Royal Air Force. They were given
ing's staff and services; and the sole use of the Royal Air Force aerodrome
Medical personnel. at Toungoo, allowed to use Mingaladon aero-
24. A Burma Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve drome, near Rangoon, for testing Tomahawks
under the command of Commander K. S. Lyle, after erection, and were offered the use of further
R.N., had been raised in 1940. It had two or aerodromes if required. Permission from
three patrol boats operating off the Tenasserim London was given on the 22nd August, 1941,
Peninsula, and was also responsible for mine- for the American Volunteer Group to carry out
sweeping the Rangoon approaches and for operational training in Burma, and they were
examination services. There were several other given assistance in many other directions.
craft building at Rangoon, but these had been On the 3ist October, 1941, the British
help up mainly owing to the delay in obtaining Ambassador, Chungking, represented to the
engines and fittings from England. The force Foreign Office that the situation in China was
was under the Commander-in-Chief, China, for very serious. We were asked what we could do
operations, and under the Governor of Burma to help, and suggested that we might form a
for administration. It was not under the British fighter squadron with volunteers from
General Officer Commanding, though co-opera- the Royal Air Force to form part of the Inter-
tion was very satisfactory. national Air Force, and possibly a bomber
squadron as well. It was pointed out that this
25. In November 1940, air strength in proposal would mean a reduction in our own
Burma was practically non-existent. The effective fighting and bombing strength. The
Singapore Conference had recommended the suggestion was approved by the Chiefs of Staff,
following: provided I was satisfied they would be able to
1 general reconnaissance squadron; operate effectively as part of the International
2 bomber squadrons; and Air Force and that I could accept the detach-
ifightersquadron. ment from the Malaya defences. These
No. 60 Squadron, equipped with Blenheim squadrons would have been largely dependent
bombers, arrived from India in February 1941; on the American Volunteer Group
in August 1941, one flight was reorganised as organisation for their maintaintence. Pending
a fighter flight and equipped with Brewster a detailed examination of the maintenance
Buffaloes. Later, a complete Buffalo squadron, arrangements in China, volunteers for these
No. 67, was sent from Malaya in November squadrons were not called for and actually they
1941, and the whole of No. 60 Squadron re- were never formed, but many preliminary steps
verted to bombers. There was a Burma were taken, including the movement of vehicles,
Volunteer Air Unit, but this had not got further spares and bombs. A telegram to the British
than a small training organisation. This liaison mission in Washington, and a personal
merely gave Burma two squadrons, which telegram from me to General MacArthur in
was admittedly very weak, and, actually, when Manila, resulted in a very fair stock of spares
war broke out, most of the Blenheim squadron, being received by the American Volunteer Group
No. 60, was in Malaya for bombing practice. before war broke out. But for this, it is very
On the other hand, the American Volunteer doubtful if they could have gone on working for
Group of the International Air Force started more than two or three weeks.
to train in Burma in August 1941, and there was I found that the pilots of. the American
an understanding, amounting practically to an Volunteer Group were not satisfied with their
agreement, with General Chiang Kai-shek that, Tomahawks when I visited them in September
if Burma was attacked, part, or the whole, of 1941. This was largely corrected before war broke
this American Volunteer Group would be out, partly Iby giving details of the successes of
detailed for the defence of Burma. Actually, the Tomahawks in the Middle East, and partly
two of the American Volunteer Group by a test carried out between a Buffalo and a
squadrons were sent to Kunming when war with Tomahawk, which showed the latter to be con-
Japan ibroke out, and one to Mingaladon, near siderably superior in speed, climb and in
Rangoon. manoeuvrability over some 10,000 feet.
It was my opinion that the defence of Burma
depended largely upon holding Malaya, and Aircraft Warning System.
that the defence of the latter must have 27. There was an air observation corps under
priority. I also considered it unlikely that the General Officer Commanding, organised in five
Japanese would attack Burma solely in order groups, each under an ex-inspector of police,
to cut the Burma Road to China. They knew the observers being local Burmans and Anglo-
that this must involve war with Great Britain, Burmans. This Observer Corps did good work,
and in all probability with the Dutch and and, according to later reports, warnings of
perhaps also the United States. If they, were the attacks on Rangoon were received in time
for the fighters to take off and get up. An Hong Kong grew as their war developed and
R.D.F. set at Moulmein was just starting to their difficulties increased. Hong Kong was
operate in December 1941. ' very valuable to China as a port of access and
With regard to A.R.P., the original policy had they not been convinced of our determina-
in Rangoon had been evacuation. Sir Reginald tion to stand and fight for its defence, and been
Dorman Smith decided to change this, and taken into our confidence and given opportu-
to construct air raid shelters. There had .been nities to inspect the defences and discuss plans
no time to complete these shelters before war for defence, the effect on their war effort would
broke out. in all probability have been serious. A with-
Political Factors. drawal of the troops in Hong Kong coinciding
with the closing of the 'Burma Road might have
28. The internal situation in Burma gave had a marked effect on Chinese determination
rise to much anxiety, and it was realised that to fight on. Our policy for the defence of Hong
in time of war it might become necessary to Kong, therefore, in all probability played an
reinforce the police with military units. There important part at a critical period in China's
were doubtless many reasons for this potential war effort.
unrest, but two were particularly evident. The
first was the influence of the Buddhist priest- As regards the Philippines, according to infor-
hood, especially from Mandalay. In Burma mation available in Singapore, it was doubtful,
itself, the priesthood was numerous and at any rate up to the middle of 1941, whether
powerful; it had been brought largely under the Americans intended to defend the islands,
the influence of the anti-British political party, or whether they did not. It is therefore possible,
and. consequently preached the doctrine of that had we demilitarised Hong Kong, or
Burma for the Burmese and complete indepen- announced our intention of not defending it,
dence. Many efforts were being made to o the Americans might have adopted a similar
counteract this, and were partially successful. " policy with regard to the Philippines. In this
Apparently, in the Shan States, the native rulers case, they -might have ceased to take direct in-
had kept a tighter control over the Buddhist terest in the Far East, and confined themselves
priests than we did in Burma proper, and had to the Eastern half of the Pacific. Should this
limited their numbers. supposition be correct, then the attempted
The second reason was the anti-Indian feeling. defence of Hong Kong was justified for this
The Indians in Burma were much more clever reason alone, even though it did ultimately lead
than the Burmese in business transactions, and, to the loss of six battalions and other troops.
amongst other things, lent money out on mort- Strength of Defences.
gage, with the result that they owned a large
proportionabout one-halfof the best agri- 32. The strength of the Hong Kong garrison
cultural land in Burma. We were looked upon is given in Appendix H. The official period for
to some extent as protectors of the Indians, and which Hong Kong was to be provisioned, iboth
consequently attracted to ourselves part of the in military stores and food reserves, was 130
hatred that was felt by the Burmese for the days.
Indians over this land problem. The main defence of Hong Kong was on the
Transfer of Command to Commander-in-Chief, Island. Whilst the enemy were to be delayed
as long as possible in any advance over the
India. leased territory on the mainland, the troops had
29. On the I2th December a telegram was orders to retire if attacked in force, as they
received from the Chiefs of Staff stating that the
were required for the defence of the Island
defence of Burma was to be transferred from itself. The Gin Drinkers line was naturally a
Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to Commander- strong one, and much work had .been done on
in-Chief, India, including all relations with it, -but it would have required two divisions
China. The transfer was effected as from 0630 or more to hold properly.
hours on the I5th December, 1941.
Two Canadian battalions arrived in Hong
IV.FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFENCE OF Kong on the i6th November, 1941. This extra
HONG KONG. force was of greater value than the figures would
Authorities. indicate. Whilst there were only four batta-
30. In November 1940, General Norton was for lions in Hong Kong, only one could be spared
Acting Governor of Hong Kong. Sir Geoffrey meant the Gin Drinkers line, which practically
Northcote resumed his post as Governor on the o lion was merely a thin outpost line. As this batta-
I3th March, 1941, and handed over to his also essential for the defence of Hong
successor, Sir Mark Young, on the loth Kong Island, it would not have been able to
September, 1941. Major General Maltby took put up any resistance, but would have had to
retire before the advance of even a weak force,
over the duties of General Officer Commanding since
from Major-General Grasett on the igth July, defenceheavy casualties would prejudice the
of the Island, and could not >be faced.
1941. With the arrival of these two Canadian batta-
General Policy. lions, three could be put into the Gin Drinkers
31. Hong Kong was regarded officially as an line, and a far stronger resistance could -be put
undesirable 'military commitment, or else as an up, not merely because of the increased
outpost to be held as long as possible. It must, strength, but because casualties would not
however, be considered in relation to the whole cripple the subsequent defence of Hong Kong
defence of the Far East, especially China and Island. Even a few days' delay in the occu-
the Philippines. The withdrawal of our troops pation of the mainland by the enemy was of
irom Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai in the great value, enabling steps to -be completed
summer of 1941 after the collapse of France which it was impracticable to take before the
was recognised by General Chiang Kai-shek and outbreak of war, for instance, the movement
the Chinese as being an inevitable and wise of the fishing fleet and waterborne population
move, but the Chinese interest in the defence of out of Hong Kong waters.
33. A great deal of work had been done in of months was difficult. In December 1941 the
preparing the island for defence, and the con- stocks of food were not much short of that
struction and concealment of pill-boxes and ob- required for the period laid down, i.e., 130
stacles showed much originality and initiative. days. The local supply of firewood was in-
Preparations were also made for offensive opera- sufficent, and some was being imported from
tions against islands near Hong Kong, should North Borneo.
the Japanese seize them, and for " left-behind " 38. The A.R.P. organisation in Hong Kong
parties on the mainland. Every advantage was good, and some 12,000 A.R.P. workers of
was taken of any local resources available for one sort or another had been enrolled before
defence. war broke out. In addition, tunnels were made
34. There were two Walrus amphibians and into the granite hills behind the town of Vic-
four Vildebeeste aeroplanes at Hong Kong, toria; these provided admirable shelters which
located at Kai Tak aerodrome on the mainland. should have been proof against any type of
The former might have been of some value for bomb. The limitation here was the number of
reconnaissance; in war it had been intended to pneumatic drills that could be obtained to
operate them from Aberdeen Harbour, on the enable the necessary blasting to be carried out.
South side of Hong Kong Island, but this was It was a slow process but by the time war broke
apparently found impracticable. The latter out there was shelter accommodation in the
would have had to remain at Kai Tak since no tunnels, concrete splinter-proof shelters and
possible site for an aerodrome could be found strengthened houses for about 300,000.
on the Island "itself. It was realised that these Provision was made for the movement of the
aeroplanes could not last for long in time of war, balance to hutments outside the town.
and that the Kai Tak aerodrome would, in fact,
be quite unusable unless the Gin Drinkers line 39. Most of the European women and children
could be held. had been moved away from Hong Kong by
July 1941, the total leaving being approxi-
.Civil Population Factors. mately i,680 women and children belonging to
the Navy, Army or Air Force, and 1,824 civi-
35. One of the main problems in the defence lian. This left about 918 European women and
of Hong Kong was the large Chinese popula- girls in Hong Kong. Of these, 595 were nurses
tion. This had nearly doubled during the three and medical staff, 60 held key duties in A.R.P.
years previous to December 1941, owing to the and the majority of the remaining 263 were
influx from China. The population in April employed in clerical and other duties. The
1941 was Governor's order for the movement of women
Hong Kong 709,006 and children away from Hong Kong had been
Kowloon 581,000 disputed, but was upheld in a test case in the
Water population 154,000 courts.
Total 1,444,000 V.PROBLEMS AND WORK OF GENERAL
This is exclusive of the population of what is HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST.
known as the New Territories on the mainland. Site of General Headquarters.
The great increase above the normal popula-
tion led to many problems, e.g., civil hospital 40. General Headquarters started to function
accommodation and medical staff, police con- at 0800 hours on Monday, the i8th November.
trol, supply of water, food and firewood. In The order issued to the three General Officers
addition, this increase, combined with the con- Commanding and the Air Officer Commanding
stant movement taking place between the Island outlining their relations to General Head-
and the mainland, rendered it very difficult to quarters is given in Appendix B.
keep complete control of the Chinese, and made One of the first problems I had to decide was
it easy for the Japanese to acquire information. the site of my Headquarters. The Army Head-
36. The reservoirs on Hong Kong Island were quarters was at Fort Canning and the Air
partly filled by rain water and partly by a Force Headquarters was in newly-built hut-
supply from the mainland. It was, of course, ments about five miles away. The Governor
realised that this latter supply might be cut, and other civil authorities were in Singapore
calculations showed that the rain, added to the town. The Naval Commander-in-Chief had his
capacity of the reservoirs, was normally suffi- Headquarters at the Naval Base, which was
cient to meet the essential requirements of Hong some 35 minutes by road from Singapore. It
Kong Island, so long as the whole Island , was important for my Headquarters to keep in
remained in our hands. If there was a dry0 touch with all these. I hoped at one time that
spell during the winter, the supply might have the Commander-in-Chief, China, would move
to Singapore, but he felt very strongly that he
been short in February and March, and there had to remain in the Naval Base, where the
might not have been sufficient to supply water F.E.C.B. was also located. A compromise
to deal with outbreaks of fire. Although fire might .have been possible but would have en-
engines could draw on sea water, the higher tailed dividing F.E.C.B. After much considera-
levels of the town of Victoria could not be tion, I decided that the dominant factors were
reached in one lift. This difficulty was largely to ensure close touch with the Commander-in-
overcome, however, by the installation of ser- Chief, China, and to keep the F.E.C.B. intact.
vice' tanks at medium levels, which it was in- Accordingly, my Headquarters moved to the
tended to keep filled with sea water by separate Naval Base in January, 1941, but I continued
pumps. to reside in Singapore, which enabled me to
37. As regards food, rice was a constant have interviews with the General Officer Com-
anxiety, since most of it had to be imported manding, Air Officer Commanding and the
from Siam or Burma. In addition, what was Governor, either before I went to the office or
known as the rice supplement was a problem, on my return. This was not a perfect solu-
since fish would not be available in case of tion, but it was Ihe best one in all the circum-
war, and storage of alternatives over a period stances.
Another factor which influenced me in com- Slates observers in attendance, held in Singa-
ing to this decision was the danger of my Head- pore in February 1941, resulting, in what is
quarters becoming intimately involved in the known as the A.D.A. agreement. This
defence of Malaya if I remained at Singapore, agreement included plans for mutual rein-
to the neglect of the wider problems of the de- forcements, principally of air forces and sub-
fence of the Far East. marines. (See para. 44 below.)
(e) The Conference between the Ameri-
Relations with Commander-in-Chief, China cans, Dutch and British, including Australia
Station. and New Zealand, together with representa-
41. From about June 1941 onwards an intel- tives of India and the East Indies Station.
ligence conference was held at'ten o'clock every This was held at Singapore in April 1941,
morning, and was attended^by the Commander- and resulted in what is known as the A.D.B.
in-Chief, China, and myself, and our senior agreement. (See para. 45 below.) It was fol-
staff officers. Generally speaking, the division lowed by a snorter agreement between the
of responsibilities was clear, and in other cases British and the Dutch, which dealt almost
they were divided up without any difficulty. entirely with Naval matters, and was really
The Commander-in-Chief, China, had been a modification of the agreement reached in
dealing with Free French problems, and con- A.D.A., bringing the latter into line with
tinued to do so after my Headquarters was A.D.B. It .was known as B.D.
formed. As our relations with French Indo- (/) Arising out'of A.D.B., a detailed plan
China were largely concerned with economics for naval and air operations, known as
and shipping, he dealt with most of the prob- Plenaps was drawn up..
lems of that country, whilst my Headquarters No political commitment was involved by
dealt mainly with Siam. He also agreed to these agreements, and A.D.A. and A.D.B. re-
take over responsibility for control of the Press mained subject to ratification by the respective
and continued to do so up to the beginning of Governments.
December, when Sir Tom Phillips arrived and 43. In the case of the conference leading to
I took over this responsibility. the A.D.A. and A.D.B. agreements, I felt that
Other questions, such as food supplies, we[ the representation was somewhat unbalanced.
dealt with together. In this case also shipping In the former, the Naval representation of the
was largely involved, and as the Commander- Dominions was weak since the Chief of the
in-Chief, China, had a representative on the Naval Staff in Australia, Admiral Colvin, was
Food Committee, he generally represented our unable to come, and New Zealand was repre-
combined views at meetings of the War Com- sented by Australia. In the A.D.B. Conference,
mittee. the Naval representation was strong but that
The Commander-in-Chief, China, took over of the Dominion Army and Air Force was com-
from me the control of the Miri oil denial paratively weak. Further, in A.D.B. the
scheme. This was found more convenient since United States representatives were somewhat
the problems of oil supply were more closely junior, and there was no representative of the
connected with the Navy than with the Army Pacific Fleet, but only of the Asiatic.
or Air Force, and the evacuation of both
material and personnel from Miri was essen- '44. In A.D.A. the necessity for collective
tially a Naval matter. action was emphasised, it being pointed out
Agreement was reached in regard to surface that Japanese aggression against any one coun-
sea patrols near the coast, and it was decided try would be of vital importance to the others.
.that the Naval authorities would be responsible Agreement was reached on the particular
for patrolling in the open sea and the Army actions by Japan which would necessitate the
would be responsible for similar work on the Naval and Military authorities concerned ad-
rivers. One or two estuaries were dealt with vising their respective Governments to take
as special cases, but generally came under the active military counter-action. A suggestion
Naval authorities. was made that Commanders-in-Chief on the
spot might be allowed to take measures in such
Conferences at Singapore. circumstances without prior reference to
42. Many conferences were held .in Singa- London.
pore both before and after the formation of The principle of mutual reinforcement was
General Headquarters, Far East. These were agreed, the Dutch undertaking to provide sub-
as follows: marines for operation in the South China Sea,
(a) The Franco-British Conference held in as well as one Fighter and three bomber
June 1939. ihe report of tnis comerence con- squadrons to reinforce Malaya; whilst it was
tained some useful observations on the estimated that four Bomber squadrons would
general problems, but the basic assumption be available from Malaya to reinforce the
of active French collaboration from Indo- Netherlands East Indies. Australia was pre-
China vanished with. the;.collapse of France. pared to assist by the provision of Army units,
(6) The Singapore Conference of October, and of an air striking force at Darwin to rein-
1940, with which should be included the force Ambon and Koepang. The necessary
Tactical Appreciation dated the i6th October, administrative arrangements to prepare for these
1940, prepared by the Commander-in-Chief, land and air reinforcements were to be under-
China Station, the General Officer Command- taken at once, and progress reports were to be
ing, Malaya, and the Air Officer Command- rendered monthly to G.H.Q., Far East. The
ing, Far East. (See paras. 79 and 90 below.) principles on which sea communications would
(c) The conversations with the Dutch in be defended were outlined, and emphasis was
December 1940, the principal object being laid on the importance of making the passage of
to obtain information and agreement on cer- the Northern line of the Dutch possessions as
tain matters raised in Appendix A of the Re- difficult as possible for the Japanese.
port of the Singapore Conference. The A.D.A. report was approved generally
(d) The Conference between British, Dutch by the Chiefs of Staff, the main exception being
and Australian representatives, with United that there could be no prior definition of an act
544 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY,. 1948
of war and automatic reaction without reference But, although signed by the representatives
to London. of the United States, the report was objected to
45. In the A.D.B. report it was stressed that in Washington, mainly on the ground that cer-
the Atlantic and Europe were the decisive tain political matters had been introduced. An
theatres of war, so that the forces employed in amended A.D.B. agreement, known as
other theatres must be reduced to a minimum. A.D.B. 2, was therefore drawn up in London
Our main strategy in the Far East for the time in August 1941, leaving all the main features
must, therefore, be defensive, but it was re- of A.D.B. practically unchanged, but putting
commended that preparations should be made the political matters into an appendix. This,
for air operations against Japanese-occupied however, did not entirely satisfy the United
territory and against Japan herself, both from States authorities in Washington, and eventu-
China and from Luzon. ally it was decided that a further conference
The necessity for collective action was re- should be held in the Far East to draw up a
affirmed as well as the particular actions by modified A.D.B. This information was con-
Japan which would necessitate the Commanders veyed to me on the 25th November, 1941, but
concerned advising their respective Govern- was received too late for any action to be taken
ments to take active military counter-action. before war started.
The importance of Luzon, especially from the mained In spite of this, A.D.B. and Plenaps re-
offensive point of view, was emphasised, and work before, the basis on .which we were able to
a recommendation made that its defence should break of war with and immediately after, the out-
be strengthened. It was suggested in this Japan, both with the Nether-
connection that Hong Kong might be of value lands East Indies and, to a lesser degree, with
as a subsidiary base. It was also recommended the Philippines. (But see para, in below.)
that the British and U.S.A. should support the Information from London.
Chinese Army, especially with finance and 46. I found on arrival in the Far East that
equipment, should assist the guerilla opera- there was considerable ignorance of modern war
tions in China, and organise subversive activity conditions, both in the Army and the Air Force.
in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories. This could not, of course, be made good entirely
It was recommended that the Commander- by documents; personal experience was essential.
in-Chief, China Station, should exercise For some months after the formation of my
strategical direction over all Naval forces, ex- General Headquarters there seemed to be con-
cluding those employed solely on local defence siderable delay in getting information from
or operating under Commander-in-Chief, United England with regard to the lessons of recent
States Asiatic Fleet. Similarly, it was recom- operations and developments in tactical ideas,
mended that the Commander-in-Chief, Far both as regards the Army and the Air Force,
East, should exercise strategical direction of the though A.R.P. pamphlets seemed to arrive
air forces in the Far East. The areas of res- regularly soon after issue. The situation im-
ponsibility were denned. The 'basis of a plan proved about July, 1941, but we were always
for Naval and air co-operation, both as regards uncertain whether we were being kept up to
reinforcements and reconnaissance, was laid date. This feeling of being neglected was
down. This included the movement of surface naturally, intensified by the distance of London
vessels of the United States Asiatic Fleet from from Singapore, and the whole position in this
Manila to Singapore if the former were attacked, respect would have been greatly improved if
and the despatch of two or more Dutch sub- visits by liaison officers from the War Office and
marines to the South China Sea, all operating Air Ministry had (been made from time to time.
under the Commander-in-Chief, China. This was actually started in .the case of the War
For purposes of planning, the iair forces Office, and the first liaison officer arrived in
available for mutual reinforcement were assumed Singapore in November, 1941. I believe it was
to be: intended to do the same in the case of the Air
c
From Malaya: 4 bomber squadrons; Ministry. It would have been a great help
From Netherlands East Indies: 3 bomber had this been done twelve months earlier.
and i fighter squadrons;
From Philippines: all available, but in case Training.
of evacuation only; and 47. As regards training, steps were taken to
From Australia: 2 bomber squadrons for ensure that troops were thoroughly acquainted
the Ambon-Timor Area. with the nature of the country in which they
In telegraphic comments by the Commanders- would have to operate. This was simple in the
in-Chief, Far East and China, two points were case of Hong Kong, where units knew exactly
specially stressed: first, the great importance the ground over which they were going to fight.
to the defence of the Far East of offensive opera- It was more difficult in the case of Malaya, as
tions by the United States Pacific Fleet, a point the nature of the country varied considerably,
that was deliberately omitted from the report; but here special attention was paid to move-
and, secondly, the importance of strengthening ments through jungle and the acquisition of
the defences of Luzon. jungle lore, and many units reached a high
The A.DJB. report was, with one or two stage of proficiency in this. The Volunteers in
exceptions, approved -by the Chiefs of Staff in Malaya were called up for training during
London. The exceptions were that, whilst they February and March 1941.
would welcome any strengthening of the Philip- Apart from minor Staff Exercises, two were
pines which could be effected otherwise than carried out under General Headquarters: the
at the expense of the United States effort in t!he first in December, 1940, to test out communi-
Atlantic, they were not prepared to press the cations and co-operation between the Army and
point in the United States: and that Hong Kong the Royal Air Force; and the second, a more
was unlikely to be of much value as an ambitious one, in March, 1941, to test out all
advanced base for operations iby United States the stages of a change-over from peace to war
submarines and naval aircraft against the for the civil authorities as well as for the three
Japanese sea communications. Services. This brought out many useful lessons.
A very successful exercise based on this second available hours was, drawn up, allowing a pro-
one was held in Burma in July, 1941, and Hong portion for training.1, a proportion for renewals,
Kong carried out two or three on similar lines. and the balance for "new work. As far as prac-
ticable, troops consiructed the actual defences
Defensive Preparations. in which they would normally fight. New works
48. The question of the best method of carried out included ;not only defensive prepara-
defending the important sectors of the East tions,- but facilities for making counter-attacks,
Coast of Malaya gave rise to much discussion. e.g., preparation of hidden paths fit for Bren
One school of thought argued that, as there Carriers.
were insufficient numbers to defend any great Looking back in the light of what actually
length of beach, the enemy would be able to happened, it is easy to point out that a lot of
land outside the defended portion, thus out- the preparation was wasted, and that the energy
flanking the defender\and possibly cutting them so taken up should have been expended else-
off. The best ca^se^7*?ction was, therefore, to where; for instance, a great deal of time was
fight on a prepared position in rear where the spent on the Mersing area, which was never
road.leading into the interior could be defended. heavily attacked. Mersing, however, was a very
This school also argued that attempts to hold important place, and, had the Japanese estab-
the beaches would result in a purely linear lished themselves here instead of at Kota Bharu,
defence with insufficient troops in hand for they would have been at once within a short dis-
counter-attack. tance of Singapore; and it is possible that, had
The view of General Headquarters, Far East, these defences been less strong, they might have
was that it was essential to hold the beaches, attacked the Mersing area at an early stage in
because it was during the period of landing the operations. I feel, however, that steps
that the enemy would be most vulnerable, and should have been taken before war broke out
if the beaches were given up he would be fight- to strengthen the defences on the Northern and
ing on equality with us. Again, it was during North-Western sides of Singapore Island.
this process of landing that outmost effective 49. We also had to be prepared for the possi-
oo-operation between the Army and Air, and bility of a break-through in the Mersing area,
possibly the Navy as well, could be effected. which would have isolated Southern and
Admittedly there was a danger of having a Northern Malaya from Singapore, and this con-
purely linear defence, but this was primarily sideration affected the siting of depots for stores
a question of adjustment between the forces and ammunition. Therefore, preparations were
retained in reserve and those detailed for hold- made to enable a force to be supplied, if neces-
ing the beaches themselves. sary, by a line of communication running
Another point was that of all-round defence. through Kuala Lumpur to Penang, so that they
It was difficult with the forces available to have would be able to operate quite independently of
units in a group of perimeter'posts and at the Singapore.
same time to protect an adequate length.of Another possibility that had to be considered
beach. .Further, the defenders must be pre- was that of a sudden descent without warning on
pared to hold on for a period to be reckoned a part of Singapore Island with the object either
by weeks raliher than by days, even if sur- of destroying some important place, such as the
rounded by the enemy and out off. There was main wireless station, or of establishing a foot-
but little object in this unless adequate reservesing, awaiting subsequent reinforcements. This
were available in rear to attack the enemy and possibility was met by having a portion of the
restore the situation. The 22nd Australian Singapore garrison ready to come into action
Brigade at Mersing found a satisfactory solution and move at very short notice.
to the problem in that they Jhad perimeter
defences for units,71 mutually supporting each Operation "Matador."
other and primarily defending the beaches. 50. The importance of the Southern end of the
But in their case -the 27th Australian Brigade Kra Isthmus, especially the neighbourhood of
was available in Johore for counter-attack on Singora, has already been referred to (see
a large scale. The problem was more difficult paragraph 12 above]. The possibility of an
at Kuantan and Kota Bharu for the reasons advance into this Isthmus, in order to hold a
indicated above. (See para. 12.) position North of Haad Yai Junction, was con-
Although it was my policy to allow the sidered soon after the formation of General
General Officers-in-Command as much freedom Headquarters, Far East. Detailed plans for
as possible, I found it necessary in the case of carrying out this operation were prepared, and
Malaya to issue orders that the first line of our the code word " Matador" was eventually
defence was to be the beaches. Previously, ex- given to it. It was from the start realised that
cept on Singapore Island and Penang, beaches the essential feature of this operation was fore-
were going to be occupied only by watching stalling the Japanese on a position near Sin-
posts, and the first lines of defence were sited gora; see, for instance my telegram to the
inland. This change involved a considerable Chiefs of Staff through the War Office, in which
amount of work and preparation of obstacles it is stated: " The success of this plan would
and defence posts at Mersing, Kuantan and depend on rapidity of execution in order to fore-
Kota Bharu. stall the Japanese on the Songhla line "; also
It was found at' one period that the work of my telegram from which the following is an ex-
preparing positions and putting up obstacles was tract: " I wish to emphasise the fact that the
taking up so much time that the training of the forestalling of the Japanese in Singora area is
troops was being hampered and, in addition, the essential to the success of ' Matador.' "
wire generally required renewing after about six This necessitated at least twenty-four hours'
.months. Also, I was always on guard .against . start before the Japanese landed, and rapid
.too much reliance upon water obstacles, barbed movement of our force once the order was given.
wire and pill-boxes, in case this should lead to It was realised all along that, if these conditions
a Maginot Line complex to the detriment of the could not be fulfilled, then the Matador opera-
offensive spirit. Consequently, a division of tion would be impracticable. The psychological
value of offensive movement at the start of the The total number of aerodromes prepared was.
war and the possibility of thereby upsetting the based on the figure of 336 Initial Equipment
Japanese plans were fully realised, but had to aircraft, and since this figure was. never reached.
be weighed against the fact that we should be we had in some areas more .aerodromes than,
leaving prepared ground with which the troops we were able to use, the surplus being a liability
were familiar, and that, unless we forestalled the rather than an asset. The forecasts of develop-
enemy, the fighting would be in the nature of ment of our air strength were admittedly uncer-
an encounter battle, quite possibly against tain, but in view of the long time taken to con-
superior numbers. Further, the attitude of the struct an aerodrome in Malaya we could not
Siamese was uncertain, and questions of secrecy afford to wait until we knew definitely that more
precluded any attempt to get prior agreement aircraft were coming. The Army dispositions
from Bangkok. Orders were issued that, should were largely influenced by the necessity for
Matador be ordered, any opposition from the protecting Royal Air Force aerodromes. As
Siamese was to be overcome at once, but we events turned out, owing to the weakness of
could never be certain in advance how much the Royal Air Force at the time war started,
delay might be caused to our movements by the defence of Malaya devolved largely upon
obstacles, destruction of bridges or active re- the Army, which meant that sites for aero-
sistance. A margin of time was necessary. dromes were not always the most suitable for
A total of thirty officers, two or three at a operations as they were actually carried out.
time, were sent over as visitors to the area in But it was impossible to have foreseen this, since
plain clothes in order to collect information, no one could have known in advance when the
especially on the topography of the country, and Japanese would start the war.
to have some individuals familiar with it. In the autumn of 1941, orders were issued
The preparations were completed before that four of the aerodromes in Malaya and two
the Autumn of 1941 as far as could be fore- in Burma were to be extended so as to be suit-
seen, including maps, arrangements for the dis- able for the operation of heavy bombers up to
tribution of rice to the population, the collec- the Boeing Fortress type. This meant runways
tion of a quantity of Siamese money, and writ- of 2,000 yards with a surface sufficiently strong
ing, ready for translation and printing, to bear the weight of tfeese aircraft fully loaded.
pamphlets of three varieties to suit the different Sufficient attention was not always given to-
attitudes which migHt be adopted by the the tactical siting of aerodromes from the point
Siamese Government. For reasons of secrecy, of view of their defence. There was rather a
knowledge of the plans was confined to a mini- tendency at one time to site them solely with
mum number of individuals, and for the same reference to their suitability for flying opera-
reason certain stepls could (not be taken an tions; and in one or two cases they were located
advance. For instance, it was considered too near the coast where they were a definite
dangerous to translate or print the pamphlets danger so long as the Japanese had command
before the operation was ordered. of the sea. This, however, was corrected, and
51. Up to the 5th December, Matador was not ir was laid down that no aerodrome was to be
to be carried out without reference to the War selected or planned except in conjunction with
Cabinet, but on that date a telegram was sent the staff officer of the Army organisation con-
to the effect that I could -order it without refer- cerned, a principle also applied to the siting of
ence to London in either of the following contin- buildings and aircraft pens. The buildings on
gencies : some of the original aerodromes in Malaya had
(a) If I had information that the Japanese been laid out entirely on a peace basis, for
expedition was advancing with the apparent they were not dispersed and were in straight
intention of landing on the Kra Isthmus; or lines; this was noticeably the case at Alor Star..
(b) If the Japanese violated any other part 53. We learned a lesson from the Dutch as
of Thailand (Siam). regards the siting of aerodromes. In Borneo,.
A few days earlier it had been impressed on the communications of which were undeveloped,
me that carrying out Matador if the Japanese they worked on the principle of locating aero-
intended to make a landing in Southern Siam dromes 25 to 50 miles from the coast in jungle
would almost certainly mean war with Japan, country with only one line of access, generally
and hi view of this I considered it my duty to a road, but sometimes a river.. This, of course,,
be scrupulously careful in acting on the tele- considerably simplified the problem of defence
gram of the 5th December. against overland attacks. It was practicable
only to a limited extent in Malaya, but it was
Aerodrome Policy. laid down that any future aerodromes required
52. The number and location of .aerodromes in in Sarawak and other parts of British Borneo-
Malaya was based on the principle of relying would be sited on this principle.
mainly on air power for defence. This also
applied, though in a somewhat smaller degree Aircraft Warning System.
to Burma. 54. There was no air observation system in
It meant, first having a sufficient number of Malaya when I arrived, and its organisation en-
aerodromes to make use of the mobility of air- tailed a large amount of work. The respon-
craft for concentrating a large proportion of our sibility was at first placed upon the G.O.C.
squadrons in any given area; and, secondly, and was later transferred to the A.O.C. Some
choosing sites as far forward as practicable so R.D.F. sets were received during 1941, and
as to enable us to reach out the maximum dis- before war brake out an air observation system,
tance both for reconnaissance and for offen- was working well as regards Southern' Malaya
sive operations. This was particularly import- and Singapore; it was not good up North,.
ant in the case of attacks on Japanese convoys partly owing to the lack of depth from the
in order to ensure having sufficient time to carry frontier and partly because we had not suffi-
out more than one attack before they reached cient R.D.F. sets to install any in the North..
our coast. Communications were difficult the whole time-
as we were short generally of signalling equip- Press Relations.
ment, especially material for the construction 59. It was realised in the Spring of 1941
of land lines; but the Government Post and that some organisation to deal with the Press
Telegraph Service was most helpful, and war would be necessary when war broke out, and,
es:perience proved that so long as the Japanese further, that it would be important before war
were kept out of Southern Malaya, Singapore during .periods of strained relations with Japan.
could always rely on half-an hour's warning of As a. result of a conference attended by all
hostile aircraft. This was, of course, reduced concerned, an organisation was worked out
after the Japanese advance had forced us to and brought into operation in the middle of
k
leave certain R.D.F. stations * May, 1941. The essential feature of it was that
Other Matters that Required Action. the Press relations of all three Services were
grouped under one head. As has been stated
55-.. Some special camouflage officers having above (in paragraph 41), Commander-m-Chief,
been sent out from England in the late summer China, agreed to be responsible for Press re-
of 1941, a Camouflage Committee was set up lations, and a Commander, R.N., who was
in Malaya and camouflage classes formed in called up from the 'Reserve, was put at the
Malaya for the Far East. Priority in camou- head of the Services Press Bureau. I was, and
flage work was given to the Naval Base and still am, of the opinion that this organisation
aerodromes, but work was also being done was workable. Unfortunately, there were some
for civilian establishments which were impor- discordant personalities, and, finally, after war
tant to the war effort. All this involved a broke out, a somewhat different organisation
period of years rather than months and was was adopted, with Sir George Sansom at the
by no means complete when war broke out. head.
The formation of Army Labour Units in I always found the Press ready to help when
Malaya was a matter that was delayed for they were asked (see, for instance, paragraph
various reasons. Finally, however, it was de- no below] and on many occasions we got
cided to recruit Chinese in Hong Kong, which good value from them. On the other hand,
had the- advantage not only of getting labour, some representatives, of the Press of other
but also of reducing the Chinese population of countries were difficult and required very tact-
Hong Kong, but, unfortunately, the project ful handling; and we were undoubtedly ham-
was not executed before war broke out. pered in the Far East through lack of officers
Arrangements were made for successive varia- experienced in dealing with the Press.
tions in the route to be followed by civil air- Complaints reached the Ministry of Infor-
craft between Australia and India in the event mation in London that Press correspondents
of war with Japan. were not being properly treated; in my reply
56. In December, 1940, there was a serious to one that was passed on to Singapore I stated:
deficiency in ammunition, especially for the " Should be most grateful for any assistance
4.5 and 3.7 A.A. guns, and in reserves for you can give to assure that we get out here
ordnance stores which were only sufficient for officers who have knowledge of the work and
90 days instead of 180. Anti-tank weapons can be trusted to work loyally as a team and
and mines, 3-inch mortars and ammunition were not for their own individual benefit." I feel
also short. that in this matter we should have had more
Aircraft bombs at this time were also quite help from England, principally in the way oL
insufficient to allow for the expected expansion, suitable and experienced personnel from the
and up to the autumn, of 1941, .5 ammunition beginning.
for the Buffaloes was difficult to obtain in I was reluctant to give Press interviews, but
adequate quantity. the importance of doing so from time to time
By December, 1941, some of these deficien- was frequently intimated to me. There was
cies had been made good. (See paragraph 92 one stock question I was -frequently asked:
below.} " Was I satisfied with the strength of the de-
fences of Malaya or the Far East generally? "
57. Although the Government Post and Tele- I always gave the same reply, that I was
graph Service was responsible for the communi- never going to be satisfied because defensive
cations on the mainland of Malaya, the lines preparations could always be improved, and,
on Singapore Island were mainly in the hands so far as I could, I was not going to allow
of a private company known as O.T.E.C. This any of my subordinates to be satisfied either.
caused some difficulties, e.g., as regards main-
tenance of stocks of spares. But it was de- 60. One of the steps taken to discourage the
cided that the situation in 1941 was not suitable Japanese from starting war was to emphasise
for making the big changes that would have the growing strength of our defences in Malaya.
been involved had the Government taken over (See paragraph 5 (a] above.} The Chiefs of
this company. Staff stated .in May, 1941, that they saw no
objection to this policy and we were aided by
58. I found the Malayan War Committee was directions from the Ministry of Information in
not on a satisfactory basis; though the pro- London to their representative in Singapore.
ceedings were recorded in the relevant files, The method adopted did not consist merely
there were no formal minutes, so it was often in extensive advertising of any reinforcements;
difficult at a meeting to find out quickly what sometimes when these were obvious they were
had been decided previously or who was respon- given only a small notice in the papers or
sible for taking action. This was corrected, broadcast. On the other hand, when reinforce-
a new Secretary for Defence was appointed, ments of Royal Air Force personnel arrived they
and three civilians were brought into the Wai- were merely referred to as Royal Air Force and
Committee with' good results. The Commander- no mention was made of the fact that no aero-
in-Chief, China, and I were not members of planes were with them. It is doubtful if the
this War Committee, but had a permanent in- effect was great, but it was probably ,not
vitation from the Governor to attend meetings. negligible.
In interviews with Press correspondents whom The custom had been to store this surplus ort
I could trust, I made no secret of the fact that the spot, and at one time there was some 50,000
the shortage of aeroplanes claused me great tons of rice stored as far North as Alor Star..
anxiety, but warned them that they were on no By the time war broke out, however, distribu-
account to mention it in their papers. A tion was satisfactory.
similar attitude was adopted with regard to On two occasions, the War Committee
tanks, of which we had none when war "troke decided that a scheme of food rationing in
out. time of war must be prepared. Committees
were formed to tarry this out, but on both
Meeting with British Far East Representatives. occasions reported that the difficulties were so
61. At the end of September 1941, Sir Earle great that food rationing was impracticable;
Page from Australia, the British Ambassador in and, on one occasion, that if it was necessary
Chungking Sir A. Clark Kerr, and the British from the military point of view, it was up to
Minister in Bangkok Sir J. Crosby, were all in the military to prepare a scheme. The position
Singapore. The opportunity was taken to have was certainly complicated, but I did not believe
a combined meeting together with Mr. -Duff that the difficulties were insurmountable.
Cooper and the Governor of Malaya in order The main source of supply for the water
that the two Commanders-in-Chief might reservoirs on Singapore Island was from the
discuss with them all the situation in the Far mainland of Johore. It was realised that this
East. A report was sent to the Chiefs of might be cut, and the matter was investigated
Staff. on my arrival. The result of this investigation,
The meeting agreed generally with the views showed that the rainfall was sufficient, with
expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, China, certain additional water mains, to supply
and myself, that Japan's principal asset in the enough water to meet the requirements of the
Far East was her foothold in Indo-China, which whole of the anticipated population of the
might be developed as a springboard from which island, except that water-borne sanitation-
to attack Malaya. Further, that Japan must would have to be stopped. The necessary steps-
be anxious to avoid war in the South for the were taken. A sea-water fire service already
next few months so the time was opportune for existed for part of Singapore City.
bringing pressure to bear on her to withdraw
from Indo-China. Air Raid Precautions.
The meeting emphasised that, in the absence 63. A.R.P. in Singapore had started, and
of a British fleet based at Singapore, there was before war broke out I was satisfied that the
little doubt that Japan could strike at her organisation, as regards fire precautions, demo-
selected moment and stressed the propaganda lition squads, rescue parties and first aid, was
value of even one or two battleships at Singa- good. Up to the time I handed over com-
pore. Various steps were recommended, mand, A.R.P. functioned well, with one
including the following: exception. (See para. 99 below.) Up-country,
The issue of a co-ordinated announcement progress was somewhat slower.
by the British, United States and Dutch Black-out in Malaya was difficult. Owing to>
Governments that they had a combined plan the construction of most of the houses, complete
for action in the event of a Japanese move black-out meant shutting off most of the ventila-
against any of their interests in the Far tion, which was extremely disagreeable in-
East; Malayan climate. Consequently, when black-
Urging the United States to reinforce the out'was enforced it meant most people living
Philippines, especially with submarines and either in darkness or in physical discomfort.
air forces; In consequence, a system was introduced of
Development of our aid to, and plans for having a " brown-out," a black-out beingf
operations in, China; and enforced as soon as warning was received of
Liaison with Russian forces in the Far the actual approach of hostile aircraft. The
East. brown-out allowed a certain amount of light,
sufficient with care to read by without closing-
VI.CIVIL DEFENCE PROBLEMS IN MALAYA. up the room. In my opinion, this worked
Food and Water. satisfactorily.
62. On my arrival in Singapore I found a 64. The provision of air raid shelters in-
large number of Civil Defence matters requiring Singapore was insufficient for the total popu-
attention. As regards food supplies, a six- lation, but the construction of these was not a\
months' supply for the whole population, as simple matter. The water-level was near the
well as for the Navy, Army and Air Force, surface, so that in most places the digging of
had been laid down as the minimum require- trenches was not only useless, but dangerous
ment. Rice was a constant source of anxiety. because they soon became filled with water and"
The yield of rice in Malaya was insufficient formed breeding places for mosquitoes. Many
for the whole population, and so some had to be of the streets were narrow, and there was little
imported mainly from Burma, and this again was room for the building of shelters. Quite apart
naturally dependent on shipping. As soon as from the blocking of traffic, the medical authori-
the year's crop was gathered, stocks were ties definitely advised against the building of
plentiful, but the consumption was large and shelters in streets, on the ground that the circu-
required constant watching. There was diffi- lation of air would thereby be stopped, thus
culty over the storage of rice for more than leading to epidemics.
six months, but this had been solved by the On the other hand, many of the streets of
introduction of the method of mixing a small Singapore had footpaths covered over by the
proportion of lime with the rice, which, so far first floors of the buildings, which were sup-
as tests went, preserved it for two years with- ported by pillars from the outside. Provided'
out deterioration. There was also the problem the houses were of fairly solid construction,
of the distribution of rice, some of the States filling up the spaces between the pillars with
producing an excess of their own requirements. stone or bricks afforded a good type of air-raid
shelter. Where none could be constructed, the Service and Civilian Communities.
policy was to provide accommodation in open 68. Relations between the Services and
spaces outside the town, where it was expected civilian communities were better up-country
that the population would move as soon as than in Singapore.
bombing started. Compulsory evacuation was The view held in the Colonial Office was that
not enforced. rubber* and tin output was of greater importance
than the training of the local forces; for instance,
Denial Schemes and Evacuation. a telegram, dated the 3ist December, 1940, to
65. A denial scheme was prepared early in the Governor, states: " The ultimate criterion
1941 for the event of an invasion of Malaya, for exemption should be not what the1 General
and necessary instructions issued. This scheme Officer Commanding considers practicable, but
was directed principally to the destruction or what you consider essential to maintain the
removal of everything that might facilitate the necessary production and efficient labour
movement of invading forces. It included such management.".
things as the removal of food stocks, or their
dispersal amongst the villages, the destruction Attitude of Non-British Population.
of any form of repair workshop, as well as 69. With regard to the other races in Malaya,,
the demolition of bridges and the removal or the most numerous were the Chinese. Many of
destruction of all forms of vehicle or boat. The them had no particular roots in.Malaya. There
plan did not envisage a complete " scorched was difficulty in filling the Chinese companies
earth " policy. (See para. 119 below.) For of the Volunteers up to establishment, nor could
instance, hi the case of tin mines it was only we get a sufficient number of Chinese motor
laid down that essential parts of the machinery drivers. This may have been partly the fault,
of dredges were to be removed and brought of the British, and there was not sufficient con-
away. A plan for the denial of British-owned tact between the British and the leading men of
tin mines in the Kra Isthmus was also worked the Chinese community. My experience of the
out by the O.M. Section of the Ministry of Chinese under air bombing was that they were
Economic Warfare, including arrangements with calm, and with no tendency to panic.
Commander-in-Chief, China, for the evacuation There were several thousand Indian labourers
of British personnel by sea after the denial in Malaya," mostly Tamils, who worked on the
scheme had been carried out. rubber estates. So long as they were kept free
66. Originally, civil officials were ordered to from agitators, these Tamils were a law-abiding,
remain at their posts in the event of invasion. community.
This, however, was modified in December 1941, Some probable fifth columnists were marked
enabling those who were suitable, physically tind down at Kuala Lumpur and rounded up. at the
otherwise, for service witn military units to be start of the war, but there was very little -fifth
column work or treachery. There was no diffi-
withdrawn, so that they could be used for culty in recruiting for the two battalions of the
defence. This also applied to a proportion of Malay Regiment, and young Malays who had
the civil medical staff. been specially trained in technical schools
67. The problem of British families in Singa- worked well in the aircraft maintenance unit on
pore and Malaya generally was somewhat Singapore Island, and were not unduly worried
involved. In the case of the Navy, families by bombing.
were permitted for those stationed ashore, i.e.,
officers in the light cruisers were1 not allowed to VII.NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.
bring their families out to Singapore. In the China.
Army and Air Force, families were allowed in 70. The late Major-General Dennys was
those units which were considered to be the appointed Military Attache in Chungking shortly
permanent garrison in Singapore, which in prac- after my arrival in Singapore, with the inten-
tice meant the units existing before September tion that, when war with Japan broke out, he-
1939. Units which arrived since that date were would become Head of the British Military
counted as reinforcements, and families were Mission with the Chinese, this being known as.
not allowed in their case. This gave rise to 204 Mission. Chiefly owing to his work,
anomalies, because some of the units, e.g., seconded by Wing-Commander Warburton and',
Headquarters, Malaya Command, and the backed by the Ambassador, Sir A. Clark Ken*,.
Royal Air Force Depot at Se'letar, had expan- our relations with the Chinese were very satis-
ded very considerably since September 1939, factory, and considerable progress was made in
although they were still counted as part of the plans for co-operation, and, .to some degree,
permanent garrison. In the case of the families in their execution.
of civil officials and civilians there were no Co-operation as regards air consisted mainly
restrictions. Apart from 50 W.R.N.S. at the in the preparation of aerodrome sites and the
Naval Wireless Station and a number of nurses, dispatch to China of stocks of aviation petrol'
many women were employed in the different and, finally, bombs, all for British squadrons-
services for clerical, cipher and other duties, which it was hoped to send up later. (See-
including intelligence work in F.E.C.B. Had Para. 26 above.) The aerodrome sites were-
all these been sent away, it would have meant in three groups: the first in'the area north
a large increase in the number of men absorbed. and west of Kunming, the object of which was
As it was, we were short of women to fill suit- largely to protect the Burma Road; the second,
abte posts and thus relieve men_ for the fighting an area north of Hong Kong, from which it was-
units. hoped to assist in the defence of that placer
On the other hand, the presence- of large and the third, an area further east, from which
numbers of women and children led, in Janu- it was hoped that one day it might be possible-
ary 1942, to hurried evacuation, with conse- to deliver air attacks on Japan. It was only
quent loss of personal belongings and dis- in the first group that these preparations could'
comfort, and, later, to casualties. (See para. be called complete when war 'broke out. Trans-
121 below.) port was one of the main difficulties, and it:
was nol until the i^th. November, 1941, that It was suggested in March, 1941, that we
permission was given to send up bombs. The should adopt a strong line with the Siamese.
petrol and bombs were consigned to the It is, however, at least doubtful whether, if
Chinese, who took charge of them. we had done so, the Siamese would have been
71. The second form of assistance to China willing or able to render any effective aid when
was with their guerillas. It was agreed that the Japanese attacked their country. As events
fifteen special Chinese guerilla companies should turned out, in spite of statements by the
be formed initially, and that each should have Siamese Prime Minister, the resistance offered
a squad of fifteen British and Indian personnel by the Siamese for us lasted only a few hours
attached to it. These squads would be specially at Battambang on the frontier east of Bangkok-,
trained in the use of explosives and hi carrying whereas British troops advancing into Southern
out demolitions, and would be kept supplied Siam were opposed by the Siamese after the
by us with the necessary material. It was Japanese had landed.
proposed eventually to double the number of 76. At the time of my arrival in Singapore,
guerilla companies, and consequently of the the Japanese had troops in Tongking, at the
squads. These squads went through a thorough northern end of Indo-China. This in itself
training in Burma, including living under the was no direct threat to Burma or Malaya. To
conditions they would experience when operat- some extent it was a threat to the Chinese
ing with the Chinese guerillas. section of the road from Burma to China, but
there seemed some reason to believe that the
72. The whole organisation for the supply original purpose for which these troops were
to the aerodromes and to the guerilla squads sent there was to extricate Japanese forces in
was based on Bftrma. It was known first as Kwangsi, who were malaria-ridden and in a
Chi Base and later as Tulip. Lieutenant^Colonel difficult position.
McFeat was in charge; his own headquarters
were at Rangoon, the training of guerilla squads - 77. In the latter part of 1940, Siamese
was carried out at Maymyo, and stores of all Ministers, possibly encouraged by the Japanese,
sorts were sent up to Lashio and to Bhamo. had stimulated their country to demand the
A mechanical transport organisation for for- return to Siam of certain areas that had been
warding stores and supplies was in progress, taken by the French some years before. This
but by no means complete in vehicles 'by the eventually led to a mild form of hostilities
7th December. Signalling and medical facili- between the two countries concerned.
ties were deficient for most of the guerilla Endeavours were made at Singapore by thf
squads. Tulip was directly under my head- Governor, Comm'andeor-in-Chief, China, and
quarters till war with Japan broke out, when myself to bring about a settlement without
it was transferred, as planned, to General posing as official mediators, but these en-
Officer Commanding, Burma. deavours were unsuccessful. By the end of
January, 1941, the Japanese had been recog-
73. On their part, the Chinese promised not nised as the mediators, and thus scored a diplo-
only to help in the defence of Burma with the matic success.
American Volunteer Group (see para. 25 78. We had concluded an economic agree-
above), but also to send troops to Burma if ment with the Vichy French authorities in Indo-
required, and to threaten the Japanese northern China, and they professed themselves anxious
flank should they advance against Burma via to develop friendly relations. In spite of this
Chieng Rai. They also promised to help in the an agreement between them and the Japanese
defence of Hong Kong by an advance towards was announced on the 24th July, 1941. Its
Canton. terms allowed the Japanese to maintain forces
They kept their promises. in the South of Indo-China. A Japanese con-
74. A Chinese Military Mission visited Burma voy began to arrive at Saigon on the 26th,
and Singapore in April and May, 1941,. and and by the end of July the Japanese were well
various Chinese officers also paid visits indi- established in that town. More important still,
vidually, including General Mow, of the Chinese this movement gave the Japanese complete
Air Force, who was in Singapore from the igth control of Camranh Harbour, and they quickiv
to the 25th June, 1941, and stayed in my started to make or improve aerodromes to the
house. Certain members of my staff visited South and West of Saigon. As was expected,
Chungking. the Japanese did not limit themselves for long
to the terms of the agreement, and the French
Siam and Indo-China. authorities made practically no effort to oppose
75. The dominating factor influencing the either the original terms or the successive en-
actions of the Siamese authorities was fear. croachments. The effect of this expansion on
Our attitude towards the Siamese was governed the defence of the Far East is indicated below
by the desire to keep on as friendly terms as (paras. 93 et seq.).
possible, and to encourage them to resist any
encroachment by Japan. The latter was some- VIII.DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH AIR
what difficult because it was quite impracticable FORCES IN THE FAR EAST.
for us to take any effective military action to General Position.
prevent Japanese penetration of Siam. Further, 79. In their paper of the I5th August, 1940,
as the Siamese quite rightly pointed out, they the Chiefs of Staff estimated the air strength
were very short of equipment, especially air- necessary for the Far East as 336 first-line a'ir-
craft and anti-aircraft, tank-and anti-tank, so craft, to which, of course, had to be added
that, if they could not get help from us or the reserves.
United States, there was little they could do but In the Singapore Conference of October,
to comply with Japanese demands. Definite 1940, the final strength of the Royal Air Force
proposals were made in October, 1941, for recommended for the Far East was 582 air-
giving the Siamese a few weapons, but nothing craft, an increase of sixteen over that given
was actually sent. in the appreciation dated the i6th October,
1940 (see para. 42 (b) above). The Chiefs 81. The Chiefs of Staff fully appreciated my
of Staff agreed that 582 aircraft was an ideal, anxiety about the smallness of the air forces
but considered that 336 should give a very fair at my disposal, but pointed out that they had
degree of security. The figure of 566 aircraft had to face .disappointments; in production,
given in the appreciation was stated 'by the had to reinforce the Middle East still further
Air Ministry to be far beyond the bounds of to -meet the probable scale of attack in the
practical possibility in the light of total re- Spring, and that the necessity for supporting
sources and vital requirements in active Russia was likely to impose a further strain
theatres at home and in the Middle East. on British and American resources. Further,
The strength of the Air Forces in Malaya in that in these circumstances it was clear that
November, 1940, is as shown in Appendix I, neither could the target programme for the Far
0
that in Hong Kong and Ceylon was negligible. East be completed, nor, indeed, could any
Of the total of 88 first-line aircraft, only 48, substantial reinforcements be sent before the
i.e., the Blenheims and Hudsons, could be end of 1941.
counted as modern, and the former suffered 82. This Chiefs of Staff's figure of 336 first
from lack of range. The Vildebeestes which line aircraft referred to in para. 79 above, was
we had at the beginning of .the war with Japan based on the assumption that Borneo would
were considered by the Chiefs of 'Staff in be defended, but took no account of the de-
August, 1940, as having -become an obsolete fence of Burma. Whilst the latter was a
type. greater commitment than the former, I
The replacement for the Vildebeeste was to accepted the figure of 336 as the target at
be the Beaufort. Manufacture of these had which to aim in view of two telegrams from
started in Australia and we were to get 'the .the Chiefs of Staff, in both of which the figure
first 90. Much of the raw material and cer- of 336 was confirmed.
tain complete parts of these aeroplanes had
to come from England and from the United Fighters.
States, and there was considerable delay in 83. Single-seater fighter aircraft, known as
supplying many of the items. The urgency the Brewster Buffalo, began to arrive in Singa-
of the matter was represented several times pore in cases frem the United States in Febru-
from Australia, and particularly at the begin- ary, 1941, and permission was given by the
ning of August, when the Prime Minister of Air Ministry to form two squadrons in the first
Australia sent a special telegram to the instance. These .were (formed mainly -with
Australian High Commissioner in London. In pilots taken from existing squadrons, who
spite, however, of every effort on the part of had a good deal of flying experience, and so
Australia, ;Vildebeesltes were (still in use in got up to the operational standard much
December, 1941 (see para. 86 below). quicker than the two new squadrons formed
The flying boats were not only obsolete, but later; though not up to establishment, the first
badly in need of complete overhaul, and the two squadrons would (have been able to fight
Wirraways could only be considered as train- by the middle of April, 1941. A total of 167
ing aircraft. Buffaloes in all were received in Singapore,
But the -great weaknesses were the absence and on the 30th May, 1941, permission was
of any fighters and the small size of the re- given by the Air Ministry to form two further
serves. This latter even necessitated restric- fighter squadrons.
tions on the numlber of flying hours in These new squadrons took a long time to
squadrons towards the end of 1940, and the become operationally efficient. The majority
first months of 1941. The importance of of the pilots (had to be brought from Australia
remedying these weaknesses was emphasised and New Zealand. They all came straight
very shortly after my arrival at Singapore, from the Flying Training Schools, and some
and the aircraft situation was elaborated in a from New Zealand had never flown anything
telegram three months later. In this latter tele- beyond a Hart, iand had no experience of
gram I estimated that, at the end of 1941, we retractable undercarriages, variable-pitch pro-
should be able to reckon, as an absolute pellors, or flaps. Under these conditions it
maximum; on a total of only 215 aircraft, in- took over four, months from the time that the
cluding anticipated reinforcements of 39 pilots arrived in Malaya before the squadrons
Dutch aircraft, or 176 exclusive of the Dutch. could be considered fit for operations; in fact,
they had not been passed as fit when war with
80. The general deficiencies in aircraft were Japan broke out. It would have helped a
.also emphasised in many other telegrams. great deal if we could have formed a proper
The following are extracts: operational training unit in Malaya, but I was
'' This means bluntly that at present not informed that neither personnel nor aircraft
only is our ability to attack shipping deplor- could be spared for the (purpose, and that all
ably weak, but we have not the staying- the training of pilots would have to be done
power to sustain even what we could now in the squadrons. As this would have
do. As our air effort dwindles (as it would seriously hindered the operational training of
if war came now) so will the enemy's chance squadrons, the nucleus of an O.T.U. was
of landing increase "; formed from our own resources.
and: After the formation of the third and fourth
" Nor do I know whether troops or air- Buffalo squadrons had been started, it was
craft will be the easier to provide but I have found that the re-equipment of the R.A.A.F.
no doubt what our first requirement here is. Wirraway Squadron was going to be delayed
We want to increase our 'hitting power indefinitely, and I was requested by Australia
against ships, and our capacity to go on to take any possible steps I could to ensure
hitting." that this Australian squadron was re-equipped
The need for more aircraft for the attack of with some form of more modern machine than
shipping had also been emphasised in a the Wirraway. The only possible course of
previous te]egram of the 23rd July, 1941. action was to re-equip it with Buffaloes. This
was sanctioned by the Air Ministry and carried squadrons were needed in Malaya alone, with-
out, tout five squadrons 'were definitely too out allowing for night fighters.
many for the total number of Buffaloes avail- Long-Range Bombers.
able, and overstrained the reserves. <
86. The need for long-range bombers had
84. The Buffalo proved disappointing, at any been constantly pressed from the time I was first
rate when up against the Japanese Zeroifighter. appointed Commander-in-Chief, Far East. At
This was due partly to technical reas'ons and that time I had merely felt that they would be
partly to incomplete training of pilots. With wanted without having any concrete proposals,
regard to the former the performance of the but as the Japanese advanced into Southern
Buffaloes at heights of 10,000 feet and over Indo-China, the object for which they would be
were relatively poor. (See Appendix " L "}. used became clear and definite. The targets
Whilst it had been realised that the Buffalo which we wished to reach in Southern Indo-
lacked speed, it had been hoped that, with good China were just within reach of Blenheim IV's
warning system and the comparatively small from the Northern end of Malaya, and of Hud-
area of important objectives, e.g., the Naval sons, but we had too few of the former and the
Base, it would 'be able to reach the height neces- latter were required for overseas reconnaissance.
sary before the arrival of enemy aircraft, and Six Beauforts were flown from Australia a
that its better armament would enable our few days before the war started, but as these
squadrons to give a good account of themselves. aircraft were not operational, and as the crews
Whether deliberately or not, the Japanese required considerable operational training in
appear to have sacrificed armour and armament their use, the Air Officer Commanding, with my
in their Zero fighters in order to save weight, concurrence, sent all bar one, which was re-
thereby obtaining the advantage of rate of tained in the hope of using it for photographic
climb and manoeuvrability at (heights. In the work, back to Australia in order that they might
case of these two particular types, the technical continue their training under suitable conditions.
advantage certainly lay with the Japanese.
Attempts were made to improve the perform- Other Requirements.
ance of the Buffalo by substituting .303 for the 87. Other requirements which were realised
.5. In addition some trouble was experienced too late were special aircraft for photographic
with the valve gear of the Cyclone engine in the reconnaissance and transport aircraft for facili-
Buffalo, and with the interrupter gear of the tating the rapid movement of squadrons. Photo-
two fuselage guns. The Buffalo was unsuitable graphic aircraft were first asked for in August,
for night flying owing to the exhaust flames, 1941, after the visit of a special photographic
flame dampers would have been essential for officer. The Dutch were ready to help us in the
night flying but were not available. Actually second requirement, but once war had started
this was not serious as I had laid down that the were making full use of their transport aircraft
Buffalo was to be used for day work only, and for their own purposes, and we felt the lack of,
that, by night, reliance was to be placed on having a few of our own available at very short
the A.A. guns assisted by Blenheim fighters. notice.
Pilots have been referred to in paragraph 83 It was also suggested at one time that a
above. What the R.A.F. lacked in Malaya was balloon barrage would be valuable for the pro-
a good proportion of pilots with practical war tection of Singapore, especially the Naval Base.
experience. Apart from forming a leaven when Experiments, however, proved that the climate
operations started, they could have taught the and meteorology of Malaya were quite unsuit-
new pilots those niceties of manoeuvre and aim- able for the use of kite balloons.
ing which just make the difference between miss- 88. The strength and location of the Royal
ing the enemy and bringing him down, the type Air Force in the Far East on the 7th Decem-
of training that can only be given as a result of ber, 1941, are given in Appendix J and a sum-
experience. Again all the Buffalo squadrons mary of serviceable aircraft in Malaya on
were formed in Malaya and there was no different dates in December in Appendix K.
squadron with practical war experience to set Our most serious deficiency at that time was
a standard, and it is possible that in some in reserves, partly of pilots, but principally air-
respects ours was not sufficiently high for craft. It was not only a stock of reserve aero-
modern conditions. planes we wanted, but also a continuous flow of
85. Apart from the fighter squadron in new aircraft to replace wastage, for aeroplanes
Burma, we had in Malaya in December, 1941, must be regarded as expendable material, and
a total of four Buffalo squadrons, one Dutch there must be a regular, continuous channel
fighter squadron, which arrived on the gth of supply. Without these it was impossible to-
December, and one Blenheim squadron, the last keep the squadrons up to their first-line estab-
principally for night fighting. This total was lishment. Apart from the material weakness,
considered adequate both by the Chiefs of Staff failure to keep up what is commonly known as
and by my own General Headquarters, but " a full breakfast table " always has an adverse
results showed that more fighter squadrons were effect on squadrons' morale.
required, largely because the scope of a fighter's 89. There were several civil flying clubs in
duties has widened. One Buffalo squadron was Malaya, and the Air Officer Commanding had
specially trained for Army co-operation, and we organised for these an Auxiliary Air Force,
really wanted two. I had also agreed with the which did useful work in communication and
Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, that one assistance to the Army in certain aspects of
squadron, which ought to have been a Buffalo, training.
should be trained in the duties of fighter pro-
tection for ships. Fighter squadrons are also IX.ARMY STRENGTH AND REQUIREMENTS,
the most efficient type with which to attack MALAYA.
enemy aerodromes. To carry out these func- 90. In the appreciation of the situation drawn
tions at all adequately, as well as the normal up by the Commanders in Malaya previous to
duties of a fighter, at least seven fighter the Singapore Defence Conference of October,
1940, an estimate was made of the total armed condition. Eventually Australia agreed to pro-
forces required on the supposition that 582 air- vide the necessary men and to train them up to
craft would be available for the defence of the a-^reasonable standard in Australia, this training
Far East. The estimate was as follows: to be completed by the ist January, 1942. On
26 infantry battalions, including 3 for the I3th November, 1941, 'however, Middle
Borneo. East reported to the War Office that they could
5 field regiments. not provide forty tanks for the Far East except
3 light tank companies. at the expense of operational requirements.
After war had broken out, War Office ordered
In'-addition anti-tank units, troops for local Middle East to send fifty light tanks to India
defence of aerodromes, volunteer units and an- their subsequent destination to be decided later..
cillary troops. This figure of 26 battalions was With regard to armoured cars, a model of
agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff in January, an armoured vehicle mounted on an American
1941. chassis was obtained from the Dutch and six
On his arrival, General Percival . went were 'made in Singapore, chiefly at the Naval
thoroughly into the question of the strength of Base; drawings were also made and sent to
the Army and, in August, 1941, sent his esti- Burma. No more, however, could be made
mate of the strength required, which he sum- owing to a shortage of boiler plate, which wasi
marised as: ' used for the armouring. By the 24th Novem-
48 Infantry Battalions. ber, 1941, a total of 84 Marmon-Harringtott
4 Indian Reconnaissance Units. armoured cars had been shipped from South.
9 Forward Artillery Regiments. Africa for Singapore. Some of these arrived:
4 Light A.A. Regiments. a few days -before war broke out, and the-
2 Tank Regiments. drivers had not become accustomed to thenr
3 Anti-Tank Regiments. before they had to go to the front.
2 Mountain Artillery Regiments. The number of anti-tank weapons had im-
12 Field Companies;. proved considerably by the time war broke
out, but there was still a shortage of the 0.5
This was based on my forecast of the strength anti-tank rifle in infantry units.
which our Air Forces would reach by December, The lack of mobile A.A. weapons was serious,
1941, namely 186 first-line aircraft as against the especially in view of the shortage of fighters.
accepted figure of 336. I was asked for obser- A constant anxiety to the General Officer Com-
vations and my general conclusion was that no manding, also, was the continual drain on the
drastic reduction in General Percival's estimate Army for men to protect aerodromes. Indian:
was acceptable until the strength of the Royal State troops were brought over to assist, but it
Air Force was materially increased not only in would have been a great help if we had had:
numbers but in quality of aircraft and in re- more armoured cars or even tanks of an obso-
serves of air crews and aircraft. Also that lete pattern for this duty. This would have en-
before General Percival's new target was abled us to have a mobile defence and to-
reached in Malaya, the question of increasing substitute mechanical vehicles for a large pro-
forces in other areas of my command, especially portion of the men required. The reserve of
Burma, would have to be considered. The small-arms ammunition was well below the:
Chiefs of Staff commented: " We accept esti- authorised figure. In November, 1941, General
mate by General Officer Commanding, Malaya, Headquarters informed the War Office that,
as reasonable figure for land forces required in with releases, in sight, we should be short of
present circumstances. Nevertheless, this tar- our authorised holding of 150 million rounds
get cannot be fulfilled in foreseeable future." by 57 million on the ist January, 1942. Aus-
91. In December, ' 1941, while the actual tralia, who were already sending us 3 million
strength of the Royal Air Force (see Appendix rounds per month, agreed to increase this to
/) approached very closely to my forecast, the 8 million.
Army strength (see Appendix E) fell far short X.EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WAR.
of the figure which it had been agreed was re-
quired to compensate for the deficiency in air- The Problem of Japanese Intentions.
craft. The main deficiencies were: 93. As the Japanese spread South into Cam-
17 Battalions; bodia and Cochin China, the potential danger
4 Light A.A. Regiments; and to Burma, Malaya, the South China Sea, and
2 Tank Regiments. even the Philippines, increased; this danger had
been realised from the start, and was referred
The strength in A.A. weapons in the Far East to in a telegram in December, 1940. But it
on the yth December, 1941, is given in Appendix was difficult to judge whether this movement
F. signified definite plans for an offensive against
92. The fact that we were entirely without us in the near future, whether it was merely
tanks in Malaya was a serious handicap to any the acquisition of a strategic asset to be used
offensive land operations, whether on a small in negotiation, or whether it was the first step
or a large scale. There were also very few towards occupation of Siam. This applied even
armoured cars. Many efforts were made to to the construction of aerodromes, of which
obtain both tanks and armoured cars from vari- we were kept fairly well informed; what we
ous sources. On the I4th August the War were particularly on the look-out for was any
Office offered forty light tanks from the Middle indication of movements of long-distance
East. These tanks were at the time being em- bombers, or of the Zero-type fighters fitted with
ployed for aerodrome defence, and they were detachable petrol tanks. These, of course,,
offered to the Far East on the condition that could be concentrated on the aerodromes at
they would be employed in an operational role, short notice.
and that we could man them from local re- 94. Another difficulty in getting any long;
sources. Some delay occurred at Singapore in warning of the Japanese intention was due to'
finding the best method of meeting the latter the restriction on exports to, and imports from,
Ba
Japan. So long as Japanese merchant shipping which they operated we were never able to
was being employed on its normal work, make contact and obtain definite identification.
F.E.C.B. could keep track of every vessel, and In view of the continued Japanese develop-
should it be found that an unusual number ments in Southern Indo-China, which gave
was being kept in home ports for no good them the facilities needed to attack Malaya, pre-
reason, it would indicate the possibility, or even cautionary steps were taken on the 22nd
probability, that the Japanese were 'refitting November, and orders were issued for vulner-
these ships as transports prior to an overseas able points to :be guarded, and on the ist
expedition. The effect of the embargo, how- December the Volunteers were mobilised. Cer-
ever, was to drive all Japanese shipping off tain movements of air forces were carried out,
the seas for purely economic reasons, and once and reconnaissances over the China Sea were
in Japanese ports they could be altered as instituted.
required without our being any the wiser. This During this time we felt great need of air-
applied especially to the fast vessels, i.e., round craft capable of doing high-altitude photo-
about 18 knots. graphic reconnaissance. This applied not only
to the aerodromes in Southern Indo^China, but
In spite of the preparations going on in particularly to Camranh Harbour, on which
Southern Indo-China there were some indica- we got no information whatever. We had no
tionsat any rate up to the end of November aircraft suitable for the purpose' since, though
that the Japanese did not intend immediate a Catalina could have flown the distance, it
hostilities. The first was a general one, namely, had neither the speed nor the necessary ceiling.
that if the Japanese intended to attack Malaya, It seemed highly undesirable to aggravate a
they would have been more likely to have done strained situation by sending over an aeroplane
so in 1940, when our forces were far weaker which would in all probability have been inter-
than they were at the end of 1941. Then the cepted and definitely identified as British. I
winter months, December to February, were less asked General MacArthur to carry out a photo-
favourable for an expedition against the East graphic reconnaissance from Manila with one
coast of Malaya and the Kra Isthmus than other of his Boeing Fortresses, which had the neces-
periods of the year owing to the North-East sary speed and ceiling, but he replied that
monsoon. (See also para. 134 below.) Finally, orders from Washington prevented him from
there was the visit of Kurusu to Washington. carrying out my request.
It seems now probable that Kurusu, though pos-
sibly innocent himself, was sent to Washington 96. Near the opposite end of the prospective
with the deliberate object of misleading the theatre of operations, the island of Timor was
United States and ourselves as to the Japanese important as being a definite .link in the air
intentions, and keeping us quiet until their communications between Australia and the
own preparations had been finally completed. Netherlands East Indies. Its occupation -by .the
But at the time it seemed to us in Singapore Japanese would also be a serious threat to Aus-
that this was a genuine attempt on the part tralia. The importance of Timor was noted in
of the Japanese to get relaxation of the restric- the A.D.A. agreement, and it was referred to in
tions that had been imposed, and possibly to A.D.B. Roughly half the island was Dutch
drive a wedge between Britain and the United territory and half Portuguese; it was the latter
States. I believe the same view was held in half which gave no small anxiety. The Japanese
England. had a consulate in Dilli, the capital of Portu-
guese Timor, and by November, 1941, had
95. In the latter part of November informa- received permission to run a regular flying-boat
tion accumulated to show that the Japanese service to Dilli, and were gradually getting an
were probably intending an offensive at an economic hold on Portuguese Timor. In
early date. Four Mogami class cruisers with a November, 1941, a small nucleus of Australian
few destroyers had been despatched from the troops was sent to Koepang in Dutch Timor,
Japanese Combined Fleet to the South China where there was an aerodrome and a flying-boat
Sea. Two squadrons of long-range Zero fighters base. On the I2th December one infantry
arrived in South Indo-China. The number of battalion, one independent company and a few
aircraft in Indo-China rose from a total of 74 coast defence troops reached Koepang from
at the end of October to 245 at the end of Australia. A combined Australian and Dutch
November. The 5th Japanese Division, which force occupied Dilli in the middle of December,
was highly trained in landing operations, was 1941. About the 7th December, in accordance
reported by the Chinese to have moved to South with the A.D.A. and A.D.B. agreements, two
Indo-China. There were large movements of flights of Hudsons of the Royal Australian Air
motor landing craft from Central China, though Force moved to Ambon hi the Netherlands East
there was no definite information as to where Indies. These were followed later by an in-
fantry battalion.
they had gone. In addition, a telegram was
received from the War Office to the effect that Order of the Day.
the United States Army commanders in the Far 97. The Commander-in-Chief, China, and I
East had -been informed from Washington that had agreed as far back as May, 1941, that it
the Kurusu negotiations might break down at was desirable to prepare an Order of the Day
any time and offensive operations be started before the war broke out, so that it could reach
by Japan against Siam, the Netherlands East Burma and Hong Kong in time to be translated
Indies or the Philippines; up to the receipt of into the different languages jspoken toy the
this telegram we had remained completely in troops in the Far East and be ready for issue
the dark on this matter except for Press reports. on the first day of war. Drafting this Order
Aeroplanes, almost certainly Japanese, occa- presented difficulty because it had to appeal
sionally flew over parts of Malaya in the latter to men of varying races and religions, e.g.,
part of November and early December, in all British sailors and Burmese troops. The main
probability carrying out photographic recon- object that I had in view when preparing it
naissance, but owing to the speed and height al was to make an effective appeal to the Indian
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON- GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948 555
troops, as I considered it would be necessary small Japanese ships which were then passing
to stimulate them rather than the British. Singora and heading south. This information
Through information that has reached me sub- reached me about 2100 hours. I met General
sequent to the outbreak of war I believe it Percival and we proceeded together to the
had the effect it was meant to. The order is Naval Base; I decided not to order
given in Appendix M-.. " Matador "; the main reason being that at
least 24 hours start was required before the
Approach of the First Enemy Expedition. anticipated time of a Japanese landing and
98. About 1400 hours on the 6th December this was most unlikely to be available, should
I received information that an air reconnais- the 3 ships seen turn out to be part of a
sance had sighted two Japanese convoys Japanese expedition. Further, the conditions,
escorted by warships about 80 miles East- for reconnaissance were bad, on the information;
South-East of Pulo Obi, an island off the South- then available there could be no certainty that
ern point of Indo-China, steaming West. One the Japanese were about to open hostilities, and
convoy consisted of 22 io,ooo-ton merchant on more than one occasion the British Minister
vessels escorted by one battleship, probably the to Thailand had stressed the serious conse-
Kongoo, five cruisers and seven destroyers; the quences that would ensue should we be the first'
other of 21 merchant ships escorted by two to break Thai neutrality. (See also paragraph
cruisers and ten destroyers. Further West, one 51 above.)
Japanese cruiser and three io,ooo-ton merchant It is pertinent to record that, until the
ships had been sighted steering North-West. Japanese had committed some definite act of
I consulted with Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton hostility against the United States, the Dutch .
and Admiral Palliser, Sir Tom Phillips' Chief or ourselves, permission had not been given to
of Staff, and we concluded that the probability attack a Japanese expedition at sea.
was that the convoy would not continue its
course due West, which would have brought it XLTHE START OF HOSTILITIES.
on to the Kra Isthmus, but that it would follow The Opening Day.
the first four vessels and round Cambodia Point. 99. Clear evidence that the Japanese had,
It was pointed out that there was a good in fact, taken the plunge into hostilities was
anchorage on the West Coast of Indo-China at soon forthcoming when, at 0130 hours on Mon-
Koh Tron, which they might be making for day, the 8th December, the Japanese started
as the next step towards Siam. to land from about ten ships at Kota Bharu.
Bearing in mind the policy of avoiding war I received this news at about 0200 hours in
with Japan if possiblea policy which had been my office at the Naval Base, Singapore, and
reaffirmed by the Chiefs of Staff as recently the necessary steps were at once taken to put
as the ^gth Novemberand the situation in the everything on a war footing, including the
United States with the Kurusu talks still going internment of Japanese. Later on, reports
on in Washington, I decided that I would not were received that the Japanese were landing
be justified in ordering " Matador " on this large forces at Singora and Patani in the South-
information, but orders were issued to bring all ern part of the Kra Isthmus.
forces to the first, i.e., the highest, degree of At 0300 hours on the 8th December Singapore
readiness. I also impressed upon the Air Officer was attacked by Japanese bombers, which, in
Commanding the urgent necessity for maintain- all probability, came from Southern Indo-
ing contact with the convoy, a point which he China. In one case, at any rate, they came
had already realised. over in a formation of nine at a height of be-
The location of these forces by Hudsons of tween 12,000 .and 14,000 feet, without dropping
No.. I Royal Australian Air Force Squadron, any bombs, apparently with the object of draw-
based on Kota Bharu, was a particularly good ing the searchlights and A.A. guns away from,
piece of work in view of their being at the a few other aircraft which, flying at 4,000 to
limit of their patrolling range, over 300 miles 5,000 feet, attacked objectives on Singapore
from the Malayan Coast. This same factor of Island, mainly aerodromes, with practically no
distance, however, made it impossible for them results. An attack was also made on the Eastern
to remain in contact until relieved, but a part of Singapore Harbour, possibly in mistake
Catalina Flying-boat was despatched to shadow for the aerodrome at Kallang; this attack caused
the convoy during the night. The Air Officer a number of casualties, killing about sixty,
Commanding also ordered a reconnaissance by mostly Chinese.
Hudsons starting early on the 7th December, The observation system worked 'satisfac-
fanning out from Kota Bharu on to the last torily, and thirty minutes' warning of the
known bearings of the convoy. No signal was approach of Japanese aircraft was received at
received from the Catalina, and, from infor- my headquarters. For some reason that I
mation received later, it is almost certain it was never ascertained, the Headquarters of the
shot down. A second Catalina failed to make A.R.P. organisation had not been manned, and
contact with the convoy. On the morning of it was only a few minutes before bombs were
the 7th December, visibility East and North- dropping on Singapore that contact was made
East from Kota Bharu was good. The recon- by Fighter Group Headquarters and the sirens
naissance found no ships in the area between sounded giving the warning for black-out. In
Kota Bharu and the Southern end of Indo- my opinion, the absence of black-out had but
China, thus confirming the supposition tihat the little effect, since there was a bright full moon,
convoy had rounded Cambodia Point, and had and the coastline and most of Singapore must
followed the four leading ships North-North- have shown up very clearly.
West into the Gulf of Siam. In this Gulf the Apart from this failure in Civil A.R.P., there -
visibility was very bad and no positive infor- was no tactical surprise, since as has been
mation was received from this area until the stated above, the troops were all in readiness,
evening, when a report was received that a and the black-out was carried out at all Naval*
Hudson had seen, through low clouds, three Army and Air Force establishments..
556 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON' GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948
100. In the morning of the 8tli December qth-iith December.
the weather was clear over the land and close 102. Broadly speaking, assaults on our aero-
to the coast, but out to sea there were clouds dromes, coupled with fresh landings in Siamese
down to 500 feet. No. i Squadron, Royal territory, continued to be the main feature of
Australian Air Force, at Kota Bharu, aided "by the Japanese operations for the first two days
the Vildebeestes of Nos.. 36 and 100 Squadrons, of the war. The enemy was greatly helped in
carried out a vigorous offensive against the them by the prompt use to which he put
Japanese vessels and landing craft. Reports Siamese aerodromes, our reconnaissances on the
showed that these attacks had a considerable 9th and loth December revealing concentrations
measure of success, many landing craft in the of some sixty aircraft at Singora and eighty to
Kota Bharu River being sunk, and a ship re- a hundred aircraft at Don Muang, Bangkok.
ported to have contained tanks being sent to On the gth December eleven Blenheims attacked
the bottom. Singora aerodrome, but they were met by a
No. 62 Squadron from Alor Star also went greatly superior force of enemy fighters and
out to attack the same target, but, owing prob- five of our aircraft were brought down; the
ably to being ordered too far from the coast, results of our bombing were not observed. Air-
failed to locate the enemy ships near Kota craft of No. 62 Squadron, which had moved
Bharu and proceeded to the neighbourhood ol back to Butterworth at dawn on the gth
Patani on the Kra Isthmus. Here it was met December, were also ordered to attack Singora,
by a greatly superior force of Japanese Zero starting at 1700 hours the same day. Butter-
fighters, and though Japanese ships were worth was attacked by Japanese aircraft just
located there and bombs dropped on them, the as ours were about to take .off, and, although
attack was probably ineffective. Buffaloes were up, considerable damage was
On the Western side in Kedah reconnaissance caused, with the result that only one Blenheim
forces of the nth Division crossed the Siam left. The pilot, Flight-Lieutenant Scarf, reached
frontier in the afternoon of the 8th December and attacked Singora, but was badly wounded;
and made contact with the enemy, who were he flew his aeroplane back, landed at Alor
already employing 10 A.F.Vs. After inflicting Star and died a few minutes later.
casualties, our forces withdrew in the afternoon, On the gth December our aircraft were forced
demolishing bridges on their way to the frontier. to vacate Kuantan owing to enemy bombing,
Further South a force known as Krohcol also though it was still used for refuelling. Already
crossed the frontier beyond Kroh in order to by this date it was clear that the success of
take up a position on the Siamese side of the the enemy's attack on our Northern aerodromes
border as originally planned. Both these forces would considerably handicap our own air action,
met with some opposition from the Siamese. and that this in turn would unfavourably pre-
Meanwhile, in spite of resistance on the judice our fortunes in the fighting on land. Inter-
beaches and further back, the enemy -had made ference with Singora landings was made diffi-
progress at Kota Bharu, until by 1600 hours cult, once our Northern aerodromes had suc-
the aerodrome was so threatened by Japanese cumbed, by our lack of bombers of adequate
troops that our aircraft had to leave and fly to range. In a telegram to London from General
Kuantan. Headquarters a warning was given that it was
unlikely we should find it practicable to main-
101. A feature'of the opening day of hostili- tain the existing air effort for more than two
ties was the enemy air attack upon our Northern or three weeks.
aerodromes. Gong Kedah, Machang, Penang, Dutch air reinforcements arrived in Singapore
Butterworth, Alor Star and Sungei Patani aero- Island on the gth; they consisted of three squad-
dromes were all attacked, the total scale of rons of Glenn Martin bombers, total 22 aircraft,
nemy effort for the day being estimated at and one squadron of nine Buffalo fighters. It
some 150 aircraft, of which probably 65 per was found necessary to send eight of the
cent, were fighters. Of these attacks, the most bombers back to the Netherlands East Indies
damaging were against Alor Star and Sungei to complete the training of their crews in night
Patani, several aircraft on the ground being flying.
rendered unserviceable in both cases and most
buildings at Sungei Patani destroyed. Both 103. The 8th Brigade, defending Kota
aerodromes were henceforth unable to operate Bharu, was pressed back on the gth, demoli-
and had to be vacated. tion being carried out before the aerodrome
The attack on Alor Star was made by a for- was evacuated. By the end of the day it was
mation of 27 twin-engine bombers of the Army forced back to a line in Kelantan running
type 97, and started about twenty minutes after Peringot-Mulong. The enemy was employing
the return of No. 62 Squadron from their attack infiltration tactics and working round the flanks
at Patani and whilst the aircraft were refuelling. of our forces wherever possible. The 8th
The Japanese attacked from a height of about Brigade had put up a stout resistance round
13,000 feet and used pattern bombing, the Kota Bharu, and its commander, Brigadier
bombs being partly high-explosive, mostly Key, was faced with a difficult problem in de-
about 150 lb., and partly incendiary. The ciding when retreat would become necessary.
attack was very effective; some ten of our Blen- (See para. 138 below.} The decision having
heims were put out of action, four being com- been made, the Brigade was disengaged skil-
pletely written off. The fuel dump and some fully.
buildings were set on fire, and, as the water Japanese Army reinforcements meanwhile
supply was put out of action, the fires were arrived on a considerable scale. A large force,
not extinguished till dusk. Casualties were consisting of transports escorted by a battle-
small, only seven men being killed. Alor Star ship, three cruisers and eleven destroyers, was
was defended by four 3-inch 2o-cwt. guns, but sighted by our aircraft between Kota Bharu
they failed to bring down any Japanese air- and the Penhentain Islands on the gth Decem-
craft, possibly owing to the height at which they ber. North of Kuantan the Japanese landed
were flying. in small numbers at Beserah during the night
9th-ioth December. These were driven off, 106. Admiral Phillips decided to take action
and by 0845 on the loth December all was with his two capital ships. So far as my Head-
quiet there. The general situation in regard to quarters was concerned he was put into direct
Japanese landings was thus that all successful touch with the Air Officer Commanding with
landings took place North of the Malaya-Siam regard to the air co-operation required, and
frontier, except that at Kota Bharu, which, asked for three things:
as already stated in para. 12 above, had no (a) Reconnaissance 100 miles to north of
road communications to Southern Malaya, and the force from daylight, Tuesday, the gth
depended for reinforcements from the South on December;
the railway alone. (b} Reconnaissance to Singora and beyond
By the loth December it was evident that the ten miles from the coast starting^ at first light
enemy's primary object was the establishment on the loth December; and
of air superiority in Northern Malaya, whilst at ' (c) Fighter protection off Singora at day-
the same time he was testing our defences on light on the zoth December.
a wide front. It was estimated that the Japanese The Air Officer Commanding gave tentative
were now employing about 30 Zero-type fighters replies that he could provide (a), hoped to be
from Patani and about 70 aircraft, mainly Zero able to provide (b), but could not provide (&).
fighters, from Singora. All but about 50 of It was decided that he should go thoroughly
the Japanese bombers previously based in into the problems involved and give definite
Southern Indo-China had presumably been replies to the Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet,
moved to Siam. Rear-Admiral Palliser, who was remaining.
A complication of the situation which gave behind. Air Officer Commanding later con-
some anxiety at this date was that our efforts firmed his tentative replies and this information
might be impeded by lack of support, or even was sent on by signal to Commander-in-Chief,
actively hostile measures, among native Eastern Fleet, in the evening of the- 8th
elements. Native .labour tended to disappear December. The doubt about (b) was due to the
for days after bombing, and non-British rail- fact that the reconnaissance would have to -be
way employees, including engine-drivers, de- provided by Blenheim IV's based on Kuantan
serted temporarily on a large scale; the Army aerodrome, and it was uncertain whether this
was able to replace the drivers to some extent. would be out of action or not. Actually, iboth
i the reconnaissances were carried out, though
104. By the nth December the 8th Brigade, one of the Blenheims doing (b) had wireless
in Kelantan, retiring along the road which meets troubles. .
the railway at Kuala Krai, was in a position The reason why (c} could not be provided
. covering Machang. In Kedah a new threat was was mainly'that the northern aerodromes were
opening in the form of enemy infiltration from either untenable or else had been badly
Siam, especially in the Chaglun area. This ad- damaged 'by 'bombing; this meant that the
vance into Kedah, coupled with the heavy air fighters would have to operate from aerodromes
attacks on Penang, indicated that the Japanese at considerable distance from Singora, and,
main attack would be down the road communi- owing to the short endurance of the Buffalo,
cations of Western Malaya. Advanced troops they would have .been alble to remain only a
of the nth Indian Division were in position very short tune over that area before having
South, of a line Chaglun-Kodiang, while Krohcol to return to refuel. The Dutch fighter squadron
sought to hold off the enemy in this more cen- had not arrived by the 8th; it was uncertain
tral region. Some of the demolitions that had whether it would (be available by the loth and
been prepared in Northern Kedah failed to be thus there was a shortage of fighter aircraft.
effective; this was not due to any failure to These factors meant that a Short patrol might
act in time, but to some technical fault either in possibly have been provided at intervals at
the fuses or explosives. All our serviceable air- Singpra, but that it was impossible to 'guarantee
craft had now been withdrawn from Northern continuous fighter protection.
Malaya. It was estimated that by the nth.
December the Japanese were employing in 107. The Prince of Wales and Repulse,
Malaya at least two divisions, supported by accompanied by four destroyers, left Singapore
250-300 aircraft. in the afternoon of Monday, the 8th December.
Early on the loth December a signal was made
to Singapore indicating that tihe ships would
H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse. return earlier than originally planned. Except
105. H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse for this, no communication was received and
arrived at Singapore on Tuesday, the 2nd theu: position remained unknown until, shortly
December, 1941, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips hav- after twelve noon on Wednesday, the loth
ing arrived by air two days before. He and December, a signal was received from Repulse
I -had no opportunity for full consultation over that she was being bombed in a position about
the situation before war broke out, partly 60 miles East-South-East of Kuantan. On re-
because he was taking over from Sir Geoffrey ceipt of the message a fighter squadron was at
Layton as Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, once despatched and reached the position of
and partly because he visited Manila by air to the ships in commendably quick time, but only
meet Admiral Hart. to see the Prince of Wales go down. No enemy
H.M.S. Repulse left to pay a visit to Port aircraft were spotted. Fighter cover, though
Darwin on the 5th December, and it was agreed only a weak one, was provided for the
she should proceed for the first 48 hours at com- destroyers that picked up the crews from the
paratively slow speed: She was recalled as soon sunken ships.
as the air reconnaissance report. of the 6th 108. I had been asked by 'Rear-Admiral
December was received, and arrived back in Palliser to give an indication of the strength of
Singapore on the 7th December. The naval the air force that the Japanese might bring
forces at Singapore on the 7th December are against these two ships from Indo-China, and
given in Appendix C. gave an estimate of between 50 and 60 bombers.
which might be expected to arrive five nours British and Dutch ships in the Java and South
after the ships had been first located by recon- China Seas in accordance with the A.D.B.
naissance. Whether this information was ever agreement. This Asiatic Fleet was, ;by orders
received by the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern from Washington, limited to operations between
Fleet, I do not. know. Sourabaya and Port Darwin.
109. The ships were attacked toy high-level As a final result, the command of the sea
bombers and torpedo bombers, the latter being acquired by the Japanese was greater than we
by far the more effective. It is possible that the had ever anticipated. We were, in fact, fighting
high-level bombers were used with the object under conditions of which the British Empire
of attracting any of our fighters that might had very little previous experience.
have been with the ships away from the tor- Penang.
pedo bombers. The Japanese would probably
have expected that such fighters would be flying H2. Penang Island was of no small import-
high, and that they would naturally attack high- ance for three reasons:
level (bombers in the first instance, thus giving (a) Very fair port facilities.
sufficient time for the torpedo bombers to get in (b) Stocks of ammunition and stores.
their attack before our fighters could get down (c) The point of departure of two Over-
to them. Admittedly, this is conjecture, but it seas cables.
is on similar lines to the bombing attack carried It was decided that the true defence of Penang
out on Singapore Island early on the 8th was on the mainland and that, should the forces
December. It also indicates the value of the in Kedah be driven south, direct defence oi
dive bomber as a third alternative method of Penang would be of no value. Tihis enabled
attacking ships, thereby giving greater facilities most of the garrison of Penang to be released
for surprise. to reinforce the mainland. One of the great
weaknesses of Penang lay in the fact that there
no. The (psychological effect on Malaya of were no A.A. guns, which was entirely due to
the loss of these two ships was somewhat miti- shortage of weapons. It had foeen laid down
gated by the fact that shortly after they arrived that the Naval Base, Royal Air Force aero-
I had summoned a Press conference, and talked dromes, Singapore Harbour and Kuala
to those present on the. following lines: Lumpur, had to have priority above Penang,
" The arrival of the two capital ships in and there were not enough to go round.
no way reduced the need for continuance of There was no analogy between Penang and
every effort being made to improve the de- Tobruk.. Even had the garrison of Penang held
fences of Malaya and Singapore; indeed, it out for some weeks, it would have been entirely
enhanced the importance of this effort. War- isolated both by land and by sea, and could
ships must not foe tied down to their base; not have carried out any'attacks against the
they must ibe free to operate to the full limit Japanese line of communications except
of their range of action and know that they possibly an odd spasmodic raid. Any troops
can still return to a safe base when necessary. that might have been utilised for a garrison
These ships would be of value to the Far East under these conditions would have been more
as a whole, but must not (be regarded in any valuable elsewhere.
sense as part of the local defences of Malaya
and Singapore. Further, in the same way as 113. The first attack on Penang was at iioo
these ships had arrived from distant stations, hours on the 8th December, when the aero-
so, if the situation changed and they became drome was bombed by Japanese aircraft, the
needed elsewhere, we had to be prepared for effect generally being small. At 1000 hours the
them to be ordered away." nth December, Georgetown was bombed and
Based on this, the local papers 'published good heavy casualties caused among the native popu-
leading articles, bringing out the particular lation; these were due not so much to any in-
points I made. In addition, Mr. Duff Cooper, adequacy of A.R.P. as to the fact that the
at niy request, gave an excellent broadcast on native population turned out into the streets
the evening of loth December, pointing out that to watch the sight, presumably under the im-
the loss of these ships must not lead to despond- pression that another attack was about to be
ency, but merely to a determination to fight all made on the aerodrome. As a result nearly
the harder and so avenge their loss. the whole native population left the town and
the labour problem became acute. Next day
Japanese Command of the Sea. the military authorities had to take over many
civil duties, including burial of the dead, and
in. From the point of view of the defence the naval authorities had to work the ferries
of the Far East as a whole, what was more between the Island and the mainland.
serious was the Japanese attack on the United
States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour. In 114. In view of the situation in Kedah, it
appreciations of the situation we had always was decided to move women and children, other
relied on the deterrent effect of the existence of than Malays and Chinese, from Penang on the
this Fleet, even if the United States were not I3th December. This was intended to apply
in the war from the start. It was expected that to Indians as well as Europeans, but owing to
this deterrent would prevent the Japanese from some misunderstanding the Sikh Police were
allotting more than a limited number of war- not given the opportunity to send their women
ships for escort duties, which fact would limit and children away, and in the end only the
the number of convoys sent into the South Europeans left, the total numbers being about
China Sea, and that it would also stop them 520.
from sending an expedition round the East side At 2030 hours, the I5th December, orders
of the Philippines towards the Netherlands East were received by the Military Commander at
Indies, especially the Eastern islands. Penang to destroy all military stores, etc., that
An indirect result of the Pearl Harboui could not be moved and to come away with
attack was to prevent the surface ships of the the remainder of the garrison and British
Asiatic Fleet from Manila co-operating with civilians. About half a dozen British residents
were left as they did not wish to move. The of Japanese air effort was part of our general
native Volunteers were given the option of air policy at this period, but our bomber effort
moving, but most of them decided to remain was painfully limited by our lack of aircraft.
with their families in Penang; the British per- Apart from deficiency of adequate A.A..
sonnel of the Volunteers were brought away. weapons, the defence of our aerodromes was
The coast artillery denial scheme was carried handicapped 'by lack of adequate warning in
out and all 6-inch guns destrc^ed. Approved the North. (See para. 54 above.) These
armament was withdrawn and most first-line formed two causes of our heavy losses of air-
transport. Electrical machinery and the oil craft on the .ground. The retention of our main
fuelling system of the Eastern Smelting Com- fighter strength for the defence of Singapore
pany were smashed, the river house, telephone (see para. 142 below) was a contributory cause
exchange, cable and wireless station and aero- and also reacted directly on our bombing effort,
dromes destroyed. The Singapore-Colombo since it was impracticable to provide fighter
and the Singapore-Madras cables were, how- escorts.
ever, connected by binding screws and left Two Buffaloes had been specially fitted for
working in the hope that the Japanese might photographic reconnaissance. To allow, of
not discover thema hope that proved vain. extra petrol being carried, and at the same
A reserve of food was opened for the civil time to reduce weight, all guns were taken out.
population, which had suffered some 600 killed Even then the Buffaloes were inferior in per-
and 1,100 wounded in air raids during the last formance to the Japanese Zero fighters. The
week. pilots of these specially fitted aircraft carried
The destruction of material was incomplete, out useful work under very difficult conditions.'
the most notable example being certain vessels From the start of hostilities the Dutch sub-
that were left intact. Efforts were made by marines -had been very active.. On the I2th
the naval authorities to immobilise these by December one of them reported sinking four
laying mines in the Southern Channel, the enemy troopships at Patani Roads.
Northern already having been mined by the
Japanese. Presumably this was not effective ri6. The difficulty of combating the
for long. Japanese attacks on our aerodromes resulted on
the i6th and i7th December in the evacuation
XII. THE RETREAT FROM NORTHERN MALAYA. and demolition of Butterworth, Taiping and
Kuantan aerodromes, and our aircraft were
I2th-i8th December. forced further South. Ipoh, too, was now being
115. By the I2th December enemy pressure bombed, and the aerodrome petrol dump was
on the Kedah front was becoming very severe-. hit.
The Kroh forces were being forced backwards On land, the enemy, having advanced in
over the frontier, while our right in Northern Kelantan (as far as the Sungei Nal) and in
Kedah was also driven back, necessitating the Kedah, was now also attacking detachments of
6th Indian Infantry Brigade withdrawing on our troops in Perak round about the Grik area.
the left to conform-and hold a line River Bukit The 3rd Indian Corps was accordingly autho-
(north of Alor Star) to Penang. Penang was rised to withdraw behind the line of the .Perak
the subject of daily air attacks at this period. River to protect the communications of our
Two days of heavy" fighting then saw our forces forces North of Kuala Kangsar.' The nth
pushed back twenty miles south of Alor Star, Indian Division began withdrawing from the
the nth Division taking up a position in the line of the River Muda Southwards behind
Gurun area. Some of the infantry units in River Krian, linking up with the 28th Indian
this division reported losses up to 50 per cent., Infantry Brigade and protected all the time
but this included missing, many of whom re- on the right flank by the I2th Indian Infantry
joined later. Brigade. During this period the Argyll and
The immediate preoccupation on our part at Sutherland Highlanders made counter-attacks
this moment was to co-ordinate the movement with gallantry and skill. This withdrawal was
of the nth Division with that of Krohcol. Un- carried out successfully, the enemy being re-
less this was done there was serious danger of pulsed with loss at his first attempt to cross the
the Japanese cutting off one of the two forces. river..
Krohcol was now back in Kedah just east of Inter-Allied Conference, i.8th December.
Baling and under the command of the I2th
Indian Infantry Brigade, which had been sent 117. On the i8th December a conference of
up from the south as reinforcements. But on inter-Allied representatives took place at Singa-
the i6th December the enemy drove in between pore, in accordance with proposals made by
the Kroh forces and the nth Division, and President Roosevelt. Owing to the time factor,
counter-attacks by two- battalions of the 28th China was not represented. Results of the
Indian Brigade proved unavailing to restore. conference were telegraphed to England. The
contact. It was now that the lack of adequate main conclusions were as follows:
reserves to relieve troops who had been fighting (a) The importance of Singapore to the
continuously for a week began to be felt. The war in the Far East, and to the world war,.
enemy were pressing home their attacks in spite could not be exaggerated;
of heavy losses. Troops from. Penang were (6) The immediate plan was to dispose our
sent up as reinforcements, while the 6th and combined forces then available in the Far
I5th Indian Infantry Brigades had been so East so as to
weakened in the fighting that they were ordered (i) Keep the enemy as far North in
to re-form into one composite Brigade. Malaya as possible and hold him in the
.The Japanese were inow employing Kota Philippines; and
Bharu aerodrome, reconnaissance revealing (ii) Prevent the enemy acquiring terri-
some forty of their fighters on the ground. To tory, and particularly aerodromes, which
attack Kota GBharu, Singora and Patani aero- would threaten the arrival of reinforce-
dromes with the object of reducing the scale ments;
(c) Our urgent and immediate need was Land
for reinforcements, which must be on a scale 2 Infantry Brigade Groups"}
not only to meet the present scale of attack, Reinforcements for gth- >-ex India.
but also that likely to be put in the field nth Divisions
against us; 85th Anti-Tank'
(d) It was recommended that the United Regiment complete
States convoy at present directed to Brisbane 6th Heavy A.A.
should proceed to Sourabaya, where aircraft Regiment (16 guns) ex Convoy W.S. I2.Z.
would be assembled and flown on to destina- 32nd Light A.A.
tion; Regiment (24 guns)
(e) It was desirable that the Chinese should Light tank squadron (17 Light tanks
be asked to maintain the maximum pressure and reserves) ex India;
on the Japanese in order to contain as many 53rd Infantry Brigade (i8th Division),
divisions as possible, and subsequently to guns and transport of which were to follow
provide bases for long-distance bombing after arrival of personnel;
attacks on Japan.
i Machine Gun Battalion and reinforce-
Finally the conference considered that the ments for the A.I.F. Brigades ex Australia;
situation, though serious, need not give rise Provision of further tanks was under dis-
to undue pessimism provided the necessary cussion, while 'General Headquarters, Far
reinforcements were supplied in the available East, was also pressing strongly for the com-
time, but time was the essential feature. plete i<8th Division.
Reinforcements. Five 'Blenheims from the Middle East and
118. From the 8th December, 1941, onwards four Hudsons from Australia arrived in
many requests for reinforcements had been Singapore on the 23rd December, 1941.
made from General Headquarters, Far East.
The time factor meant that reinforcements had' igth-2$th December.
to come from the Middle East, India and con- 119. In accordance with instructions from
voys already at sea rather than from the -United London, a scorched earth policy was ordered
Kingdom. Complicated quadrangular refer- at this period instead of the denial scheme
ences between 'Malaya, India, the Middle East referred to in para. 65 above.
and London were hence entailed, but Com-
mander-in-Chief, India, was most helpful in The general situation on land by the I9th-
appreciating the need for diversion to Malaya 2ist December was that our troops were trying
of forces originally intended for his own com- to keep the enemy West of the River Perak,
mand. A sub-committee of the Inter-Allied while at the same time preventing him advan-
Conference, having considered all the previous cing further South than the River Krian. To
requests for reinforcements, agreed on the fol- this end the nth Indian Division, which it
lowing immediate requirements for Malaya to was considered essential to maintain as a
stabilise the situation: fighting formation, was holding a line along the
Air River Kuran with the 28th Indian Infantry
4 Fighter Squadrons; Brigade, and also protecting Kuala Kangsar
4 Bomber Squadrons; with the i2th Indian Infantry Brigade, a de-
i Photographic Flight? tachment of which was also further North along
i Transport Flight; and the Grik road. The Division as a whole was
Reserves at 100 per cent, for fighters and suffering from exhaustion, damaged feet and
50 per cent, for bombers, plus aircraft to loss of equipment. The 6th and I5th Indian
complete existing squadrons and their re- Infantry Brigades were now re-formed at Ipoh
serves. as the composite I5th Infantry Brigade, while
a composite battalion of the 2nd/i6th and
Land 3rd/i6th from these two Brigades was in Corps
i Brigade Group; Reserve. The Kelantan forces, 8th Indian
1 Division; Infantry Brigade, gih Indian Division, had
Reinforcements for gth and nth Divisions; suffered about a hundred casualties in each
3 Light A.A. Regiments; battalion, and were now along the railway at
2 Heavy A.A. Regiments; Manik Orai. Of elements not thus far engaged
i Anti-Tank Regiment; in the main operations, the 22nd Indian Infan-
50 Light tanks; try Brigade (9th Indian Division) was at
350 Anti-tank rifles; Kuantan, while the Australian 22nd and 27th
Bofors ammunition; and Brigades were responsible for Johore, and
500 Tommy guns and ammunition; the ist and 2nd Malay Infantry Brigades for
Further large forces would be required Singapore Fortress. None of these last four
later hi view of probable Japanese reinforce- Brigades could be despatched North to relieve
ments. the hardl-pressed nth Indian Division, ifor
By the 27th December the following had been the reasons given below. (See para. 138 below.)
definitely promised:
Air 120. Heavy enemy.air attack was now falling
51 Hurricanes. (One fighter squadron ex on Ipoh aerodrome, and our own fighters were
convoy W.S. 12.Z with 18 additional pilots); driven further South to Kuala Lumpur
24 Blenheims. (One squadron from Middle (Selangor). Attacks on our road and rail
East) ; communications were becoming an increasing
52 'Hudsons (from United Kingdom); feature of the Japanese air operations. Recon-
While measures were in hand aiming at naissance revealed that the enemy was now
the release of a further 3 fighter squadrons making use of Sungei Patani aerodrome, where
from the Middle East, and for 80 4-engined thirty fighters were discovered. Our aircraft
United States bombers. were making night and dawn attacks on enemy
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948
aerodromes, and were very valuable for recon- ing, those 'responsible were taking steps to en-
naissance; reconnaissances were regularly -being sure the despatch of adequate reinforcements of
made men and material; and that it was up to every-
(a) 350 miles N.N.E. of Singapore; one to ensure that no effort was spared to hold
(b) along the East coast of Malaya; up the enemy until the necessary forces arrived.
(c) over the Rhio Archipelago; and On the 22nd December, a telegram was sent
(d) 10 the Miri and Kuching areasfrom to Mr. Duff Cooper to the effect that useless
Sinkawang; mouths were to be evacuated from Singapore
in addition to those over the fighting area. without racial discrimination and on a voluntary
'By'the 2ist-22nd December Kuala Lumpur basis so far as the general population were con-
was coming in for heavy air attack, though cerned.
little damage was at first inflicted. Against The total number of British women and
an attack by Ju. 87*5 on the 2ist December children evacuated from Malaya from the begin-
the Buffaloes were more successful, causing the ning of the war with Japan to the 3ist Janu-
Japanese bombers to break formation in dis- ary, 1942, was as follows:
order, but to deal with the Zero fighters it was 7,174 European;
apparent that only the speedy arrival of 2,305 Indian; and
Hurricane reinforcements, while we still held 1,250 Chinese.
sufficient air bases, could turn the tide.. According to a Japanese report, the number of
The land situation in the next few days (2ist- British women and children left in Singapore at
23rd December) witnessed further advances by the time of capitulation was about 200.
the enemy in all areas. Pressure along the Grik
road was heavy, in spite of severe losses inflicted XIII.THE ATTACK ON, AND FALL OF, HONG
during a successful clash on the night of the KONG.
I9th-20th December. 122. On the 8th December, at 0800 hours,
The Japanese floated troops down .the Perak hostilities began with the launching of a
River by night, and on the 22nd December the Japanese air attack on Kowloon. Frontier de-
12th Indian Infantry Brigade was forced back molitions were accordingly blown and our
South of Kuala Kangsar. The . 28th Indian troops withdrew according to plan as the
Infantry Brigade was also pressed in the same Japanese crossed the frontier on a broad front
direction, small detachments only being left during the course of the morning. It was esti-
North of Kuala Kangsar and West of -the Perak mated that the enemy were employing a force
River. Bridges were destroyed as the troops of one division, with the possibility of increasing
retired. While this was taking place on the this to two divisions with the troops then in the
Perak front, the Kelantan withdrawal was also area.
continuing, the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade There was no,, enemy action from the air or
retiring South of Kuala Krai along the railroad. sea during the night of the Sth-gth December,
A problem similar to that of Krohcol and the but heavy pressure was exerted against our for-
nth Division referred to above (see para. 115) ward troops along the Taipo Road. During the
now arose in regard to 8th Indian Infantry day of the gth December these troops were com-
Brigade and the main body of III Corps in pelled to withdraw within the Gin Drinkers' line
Perak, and, to a lesser degree, in regard to the 'in consequence of their left flank being turned.
force at Kuantan and the 8th Indian Infantry
Brigade, lit was therefore decided to withdraw Enemy air attacks during the day, directed
this 8th Brigade much further South into' mainly against the south coast of the island,
Central Malaya, and it took-up completely new did little damage. Leaflets, too, were dropped.
positions in the Kuala Lipis-Raub area. A The day closed unfortunately, since the Shing
small party known as " Macforce " was left Mun Redoubt, held by The Royal Scots, was
with an armoured train at Dabong to withdraw suddenly captured at 2300 hoursan unex-
down the railway, demolishing it as they went. pected blow in view of the difficulty of approach
The Kuantan force was ordered to prepare to over such country at night. It was considered
withdraw Westwards at short notice. On the that local fifth columnists must have guided the
23rd December all our fighters on the mainland Japanese in this attack. One company of
were withdrawn to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur Winnipeg Grenadiers was now despatched to re-
and Port Swettenham being kept as advanced inforce the Kowloon Brigade.
landing grounds. The enemy was also occupy- It was soon found necessary, in view of enemy
ing various points down the East coast of pressure, to readjust the line south-west of the
Malaya, and had proceeded from Kuala Treng- Jubilee Reservoir, where the enemy was making
ganu to Dungun. By the 25th December it progress, and to vacate Kai Tak aerodrome,
would be true to say that something like one- after the two remaining aircraft had been de-
half of Malaya had passed from our control. molished. During the morning of the nth
December, however, after the two left Com-
121. With the object of maintaining the panies (Royal Scots) at Kowloon had been
morale of the civil population of Malaya I held driven in, and reserves {including Winnipeg
a meeting on the 22nd December, attended by Grenadiers) had failed to effect more than a tem-
members of the Legislative Council, leading men porary halt, it was decided to withdraw from
of the different communities and the the (mainland, with the exception of Devil's
Press, the total number being about 120. Peak. This withdrawal was successfully carried
The main points I stressed were that the out, beginning at dusk on vhe nth, and included
available strength had proved inadequate; we howitzers, mechanical transport and armoured
had to remember that the aircraft, A.A. guns cars. Some interference by Kowloon Chinese
and tanks that might have come to Malaya were fifth columnists was experienced. Stonecutter's
not being wasted, but were being used with Island, which had been heavily bombarded and
great effect in Libyaand Russia; that there was had suffered damage to the military barracks,
every reason for confidence that, now the re- was also evacuated during the night of the nth-
quirements of the Far East had become press- I2th. Hong Kong Island itself was now also the
subject of bombardment, both from the air and was also dive-bombed. It was following this in-
by artillery, the main target being the naval tense activity that, after dusk, the Japanese
dockyard. effected landings at Quarry Bay and at Lyemun
in the north-eastern 'corner of the island.
123. During the night the I2th-i3th Decem-
ber, troops were withdrawn from Devil's Peak, The following day the Japanese infiltrated
our last post on the mainland. Coast defence over the hill to the Wong Nei Cheong and
guns were now used landwards for counter- Tytam Gaps with pack artillery and mortars.
battery work against the Japanese. It was noted Our artillery from the Collinson and D'Aguilar
that the evacuation of Kowloon had consider- areas (east and south-east of the Island) were
ably disturbed the morale of the Hong Kong successfully withdrawn to Stanley (south of the
civil population, and defeatist elements came to Island), but were compelled to destroy their
the fore. It became necessary to organise rice heavy guns and equipment. Our line ran now
distribution. The Japanese Commander-in- from Stanley Mound northwards, Stanley Mound
Chief demanded the surrender of Hong Kong, itself being held by one battalion of Canadians,
which was refused. two companies of Indian infantry and some mis-
cellaneous artillery and machine guns.
During the I4th December the Japanese shell-
ing of the island increased in severity, and During the afternoon of the igth a counter-
several of our gunposts were hit, as a result of attack was attempted, with the help of motor
which some Chinese gunners deserted. The torpedo boats, to regain possession of Mount
enemy was now enjoying the use of Devil's Parker and Mount Butler, but broke down
Peak as an observation post. On the same day through heavy enemy shelling, failure of inter-
Aberdeen was bombed from high-level, and the communications and the exhaustion of our
generating station was hit, though not put out of troops. Our motor torpedo boats were success-
ful in destroying landing craft in Kowloon Bay,
action. Considerable trouble was still being ex- but two were lost in the operations.
perienced with the civil population, the police
were unable to prevent robbery by armed gangs 125. On the 20th our line was still roughly
in the A.R.P. tunnels, and rice distribution was North from Stanley Mound. A communiqu&
a difficulty. Propaganda was accordingly cir- was again issued to inspire civilian morale with,
culated about the proximity of a Chinese ad- belief in near relief by Chinese forces. By the
vance to relieve Hong Kong; the Chungking 2ist the enemy was attacking strongly across
Government's representative was most helpful Mount Nicholson through Middle Gap, and our
in maintaining order. troops were suffering greatly from exhaustion,
During the night of the I4th-i5th December, the wet and cold of the night-time, and isola-
the Japanese continued their systematic shell- tion from food and ammunition stores. Counter-
ing, and gathered together a collection of small attacks on the enemy rear by the Royal
craft in Kowloon Bay. The Thracian entered Rifles of Canada came to nought, and Winnipeg
the Bay and sank two river steamers, while Grenadiers were also unsuccessful in an effort
a special agent succeeded in blowing up a third to retake Wong Nei Cheong Gap. The enemy
ship. The Thracian, however, in view of still paid attention from the air to the Dockyard
damage, had to be beached and dismantled.the area, and practically all Naval personnel were
following day. now ashore and took their place in the land
fighting. Japanese naval forces blockading the
On the r6th December, Aberdeen was heavily Island consisted of two cruisers, two destroyers
bombed, eight times in all, with resulting loss of and two torpedo boats.
one Motor Torpedo Boat and damage to the It was during the 2ist that the " Resist to the
dock. Most of our Auxiliary Patrolling Vessels end " message from the Prime Minister was re-
were now useless in view of desertion by Chinese ceived, followed by instructions from the Ad-
crews. The enemy landed parties on Lamma miralty to wreck all oil installations and
Island, and started concentrations of troops on storages.
the mainland at Customs Pass and Waterloo The 22nd December witnessed a fresh enemy
Road, but these were dispersed by our artillery. landing on the north-east coast of the Island.
During the night of the i6th-i7th mortar fire Part of our force was now cut off in Stanley,
damaged some of our machine guns along the while Various remnants were still holding out
water-front. in isolated positions. The Japanese were now
On the i7th December, Hong Kong Island virtually surrounding Victoria, where a great
was twice raided by fourteen Army light deal of damage had been inflicted by bombing
bombers, coinciding with heavy bombardment and shelling. Oil installations were destroyed,,
by artillery. After this raid the Japanese again but it was found impossible to do so at Lai Chi
came across with proposals of surrender, which Kok, since a large hospital would have been
were rejected. endangered. A telegram was received from the
124. The night of the lyth-iSth was very Admiralty giving the full text of Mr. Churchill's
quiet, but on the i8th decisive events took place. message, but also leaving to the Governor the
The North face of the Island was subjected to discretion of surrender when resistance could
continuous artillery, mortar and dive-bombing no longer be usefully continued.
attack, some of our infantry defence posts being 126. By the 23rd December the principal re-
struck three or four times. Hospitals were badly servoirs were in the hands of the enemy, and
hit and much damage was done to water mains, the connections of those that remained under
roads, cables and signal communications, also our control were damaged through shell-fire.
rice stores. Stanley and Murray Barracks were Great efforts were made to effect repairs, but,
bombed in two raids by nine and six bombers, in the absence of any substantial success in this
roughly 100 bombs being droppedthe largest direction, only one day's supply of water re-
number to that date. Much of the transport of mained to the beleaguered city. Food stores,,
the 2nd Battalion Royal Scots was destroyed, too, were greatly depleted. Our troops had be-
and C Battery Plotting Room O was demolished come more or less exhausted, though Royal
by a direct hit. The civil Government centre Marines managed to recapture ground on Mount
Cameron (protecting the South of Victoria), out to them, however, that many places in
which had been heavily bombarded by the England had stood up to 'bombing without any
Japanese, and the Middlesex Regiment beat off direct defence, and that they would be expected
an attack on Leighton Hill. The enemy, how- to do the same. It was evident, however, that
ever, penetrated through the A.R.P. tunnels the morale of the population of Kuching was
.and street fighting began at Wanchai. The con- in a bad way. This, in my opinion, was partly
duct of the civil population, which had thus far due to the fact that the ruler, Rajah Brooke,
.suffered some 4,000 casualties (1,000 killed), .was absentactually in Australia. He had a
was, however, good and had become increas- great deal of influence with the natives, and
ingly so since, the first depression after the in view of the situation he should have returned
.evacuation of the mainland. to his country immediately on the outbreak of
On the same day the forces isolated in the war, if not before. As it was, the Sarawak
South of the Island made an effort to counter- Rangers proved quite unreliable, and the 2/15
attack towards Stanley Mound, but to no avail. Punjab Regiment were left to carry out the
On the 24th December the Royal Scots, fol- defence by themselves.
lowing heavy enemy attacks, were driven off The complete control of the South China Sea
the top of Mount Cameron, and Leighton Hill exercised by the Japanese reduced the problem
was captured after bombardment. The posi- of the capture of Kuching to a mere calculation
tion in the South of the Island was unchanged. of the strength necessary to overcome the resist-
On the 25th December, in the early hours of ance that they would probably meet. They
the morning, street fighting took place as the appear to have attacked it with the equivalent
enemy fought his way towards the centre of the of one Brigade Group.
town, but another Japanese demand for sur- 129. Japanese naval forces were not long in
render was refused. Two hours later, how- appearing in strength before Miri. By the i6th
ever, the Governor was advised by the Military December, some ten warships had been sighted
and Naval commanders that further effective in company with a tanker off Miri and Lutong,
resistance could not be made, and, after carry- and these ships became the object of our attacks.
ing out a series of demolitions, our forces were On the I7th December, 6 Glenn Martins and 5
ordered to lay down their arms. The Chinese Buffaloes of the Netherlands East Indies Ah*
kept their word and had endeavoured to assist Force delivered an attack from Sinkawang, but
the defence of Hong Kong by advancing on scored neither hits nor near misses. The same
Canton, but their force was not strong enough day, Dutch bombers from Samiuwkoa located
to produce any serious effect on the Japanese. and attacked this force, a Dutch navy Dornier
XIV.OPERATIONS IN BURMA AND SARAWAK. scoring a direct hit on a destroyer. Encounters
between Dutch Buffaloes and the Navy Zero
Burma. fighters revealed the clear superiority of the
127. A fresh field of operations opened in Japanese aircraft. Reports of a Japanese land-
Burma on the gth December, when a landing ing at Lutong and Baram Point were received,
was reported at Prachuabkhirikun, a clear and on the i8th December renewed attacks on
threat to Mergui and the Tenasserim Peninsula. enemy shipping in this area were made, with-
On the nth December, Tavoy was bombed. out success, by a mixed force. . Eight Glenn
A further enemy landing at Chumporn (Siam) Martins from Sinkawang had to return without
gave access to the southernmost tip of Burma, delivering their attack owing to the bad
and an advance on Victoria Point threatened. weather. The following day 6 Netherlands East
In the next two or three days the Japanese Indies Glen Martins claimed a hit on a cruiser
advance materialised and coincided with raids and .some near misses. The igth December,
on Mergui by about fifty aircraft, propaganda however, was also marked by Japanese air
leaflets being dropped as well as bombs. An attacks, Kuching aerodrome and town being
effort was made to cut off the Japanese advance bombed by about 15 heavy bombers and one
southwards by crossing the Siam frontier to seaplane. Civilians suffered approximately 100
demolish the railway a few miles south of casualties, while the main material damage was
Prachuabkhirikun, but the strength of the op- the destruction of the Borneo Company Benzine
position and the heavy rains proved too great Stores. The air war was also carried to Dutch
for the success of this expedition. The situa- Territory by a heavy attack on Pontianak,
tion was still in an undeveloped stage, but with much of the city 'being destroyed.
a clear threat to Southern Burma, when on the An expedition clearly aimed at Kuching was
I5th December Burma reverted to the province then sighted on the 23rd December, and 5
of the Commander-in-Chief, India. (See para. Blenheim IVs, attacking this on the 24th
29 above.} December, scored one hit on a transport and
some near misses. Air support from Sinkawang
Sarawak. was no longer possible in view of the damage
128. The general problem of the defence of to the aerodrome from a Japanese attack, and
'Borneo was indicated in para. 16 above. The the Dutch aircraft were withdrawn to Palem-
oil denial scheme was put into operation at the bang.
outbreak of war and completed by the nth The 2/15 Punjab Regiment carried out
December. The landing ground at Miri was also demolitions on the aerodromes, held- up the
demolished and the forces at Lutong evacuated Japanese for a time, and eventually moved in
by sea to> Kuching in H.M.S. Lipis. accordance with orders, along a jungle path,
The Company of 2/15 Punjab Regiment re- to join up with the Dutch, though this necessi-
joined the rest of its Battalion, which formed tated abandoning practically the whole of their
the regular garrison of Kuching and the remain- equipment.
ing individualsfrom the 2nd Loyals and S.S. It was noteworthy that Malay labour at
Policewere 'brought on to Singapore. Kuching disappeared as the course of. opera-
Considerable anxiety and uneasiness was felt tions approached the area.
by the authorities in Kuching owing to the ab- According to later reports, some 800 of the
sence of Naval and Air Forces. It was pointed 2/15 Punjab Regiment joined the Dutch and
were still fighting with them at the end of Intelligence.
January, 1942. 132. Turning to intelligence, perhaps the
XV.SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS. most serious error was one involving the broad-
est aspect, namely, the intention of the Japan-
Changes in Commands. ese Government. From the tactical point of
130. A large number of changes took place view in Malaya there was no surprise, but from
shortly before or shortly after the war with the" wider point of view there was. Whilst in
Japan started. These were as follows: General Headquarters we always realised the
(a) Admiral Sir Tom Phillips replaced possibility of the extreme military party in
Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton on the 6th Japan forcing their country into war, we did
December. not believe, till the end of November, that
(6) On the loth December, after Sir Tom Japan might 4>e actually on the verge of starting
Phillips had gone down with the Prince of war. (See paras. 61 and 94 above.}
Wales, Sir Geoffrey Laytonwho was then As indicated in paragraph 75 above, there
actually on 'board his ship about to start for was also some error regarding the intentions of
Australia on his way homeresumed the Siamese Government.
command.
(c) On the 6th November I was informed 133. As regards the more local intelligence,
that " owing to recent developments in the the forces that the Japanese would have at the
Far East, it had been decided that the duties beginning for an attack on Malaya were esti-
of Commander-in-Chief should be entrusted mated with a fair degree of accuracy, but there
to an Army officer with up-to-date experi- was an under-estimate of the power of the
ence." My successor was to be Lieutenant- Japanese to attack several places simultane-
Generai Paget. This prospective change ously. Before the war it was considered that
became generally known in the Army and Air the Japanese might attack in force either the
Force in Malaya by the end of November. Philippines (with or without Hong Kong), or
(d) On the sgth November a signal was Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. It was
received from Whitehall to the effect that not anticipated that they would attack in force
General Pownall had been substituted for both the Philippines and Malaya simultane-
General Paget. ously; still less that they would also attack Pearl
(e) On the I5th December the responsi- Harbour. So far as I could gather from tele-
bility of the defence of Burma was transferred grams, this opinion was also held in England,
from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to at any rate up to the last few days before war
Commander-in-Chief, India. started, though I believe the Embassy in Tokio
(/) On the agth December General. McLeod held a more correct view of the Japanese power
was replaced by General Hutton as General to attack several places simultaneously.
Officer Commanding, Burma. 134. There was also an under-estimate of the
(g) On the loth December Mr. Duff Cooper efficiency of the Japanese Army and Air Force,
was appointed as Cabinet representative in particularly in the following points:
the Far East, and instructions were received (a) Their disregard of weather conditions,
by him that a War Council was to be formed especially their ability to land on beaches
under his leadership. in bad weather. Also they appear to have
These changes may have been inevitable, and been but little hampered by the flooded state
it could not, of course, have been foreseen that of the country in the Southern end of the Kra
they would coincide so closely with the start of Isthmus;
the war, but they did add to the difficulties of (6) Their mobility. This was due to several
the situation. causes. The Japanese Army seemed gener-
War Council. ally to depend less on mechanism than ours
131. The composition of the War Council, and to be content with a smaller proportion of
the formation of -which was started on the loth artillery. The men needed only simple food
December, was as follows: and were able to live largely on the country
Mr. Duff Cooper, Chairman; and apparently required nothing in the way
H.E. the Governor of Malaya; of comforts. In some cases they used lighter
C.-in-C., Far East; weapons including a mortar that was lighter
C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet; than our 2-inch mortar. As a result the
G.O.C. Malaya; Japanese Army was able to operate with less
A.O.C., Far East; mechanical transport than ours and so was
and later, Sir George Sansom, as being less dependent upon roads. The whole organi-
responsible for Propaganda and Press control. sation could be kept less complicated than
The Wax Council did useful work in several ours and more flexible;
directions, but as it was not formed until after (c) The individual initiative of the Japan-
the war began there had been no time to work ese soldier;
out its correct functions. Actually, the com- (d) The performance of the naval single-
position led to its dealing rather too much with seater fighter known as the Zero type. This
the details of what was happening in Malaya, had a detachable petrol tank under the fuse-
whilst it would have been more useful if it had lage and the Japanese got much value from
concentrated on the wider problems. the long range thus given to it. In spite of
On the i6th December a Civil Defence Com- this complication, its speed and manoeuvra-
mittee was set up to review and deal with all bility at heights of 10,000 feet and over were
measures affecting the defence of Singapore remarkably good; and
other than those of a purely military character. (e) The rapidity with which repairs were
Its composition was: carried out, in particular of bridges and aero-
Mr. Duff Cooper, Chairman; dromes. This last affected the strength of the
Fortress Commander; Japanese air force in the Singora area at the
Inspector-General of Police; and South end of the Kra Isthmus in the early
One civilian. days of the war.
These under-estimates were not attributable and men, and it was under these conditions that
solely to errors on the part of F.E.C.B., but young soldiers had to meet the first shock of
also to those of other bodies, including my own the Japanese attack.
General Headquarters. .?
138. A factor which had some effect on morale
Japanese Army Tactics and Training. generally was that, strategically, we were on the
defensive; everyone knew that it was to our in-
135. With regard to tactics, in general the terests to avoid war with Japan, which meant
Japanese endeavoured to infiltrate or outflank. that the initiative and especially choice of
They made use of certain novelties such as: moment for opening hostiHties rested with them.
(a) A type of light infantry screen acting As stated above, the 'Matador plan provided
in advance of their main body. The men for a tactical offensive, provided- adequate
were very lightly clad, had but little warning could be obtained. As events turned
equipment and were armed with a light auto- out, the execution of Matador was impractic-
matic weapon, the calibre of which was some- able, and later events confirmed that the deci-
thing under 0.3; they carried only about forty sion not to carry out this operation was correct.
rounds of ammunition and a few hand
grenades. These light infantry parties used Then, owing to the comparative weakness of
to work individually, would get round to the our forces in Malaya we could neither afford
Tear of our advance troops, and resorted to heavy losses oip North nor send up there more
such expedients as climbing trees from which than limited reinforcements, because of the
to fire their automatic or throw hand gren- necessity for retaining a force to defend
ades. Our men frequently mistook .these Southern Johore and in the last resort the
light troops for Malays or Chinese, but it is island of Singapore itself. This was not the
doubtful if the Japanese soldiers were de- result of a sort of fortress-complex, but because
liberately disguised as Malayan natives; the essential factor was preservation of the
(&) The use of noise, including Chinese repair and other facilities in the Naval Base.
crackers and strange cries at night; these The opinion held in London on this point was
tricks, though laughable when one knew made perfectly clear in the latter part of
about them, had a certain amount of moral December when the Chiefs of Staff telegraphed:
effect, especially on young Indian troops at " 'His Majesty's Government agree your
the commencement of the campaign; and conception that vital issue is to ensure security
(c) Inflatable rubber belts to enable men of Singapore Naval Base. They emphasise
to cross creeks and small rivers. that no other consideration -must compete with
To combat these tactics the General Officer this."
Commanding, Malaya, stressed the import- Holding Northern Malaya was not an end in
ance of discipline and steadiness, the necessity itself; it was with reference to the Naval Base
for alertness and cunning on the part of the that Northern Malaya acquired its importance.
individual, and that the way to defeat the This meant that Commanders in the North had
enemy was to attack or counter-attack him on to bear in mind the possibility of withdrawal in
every possible occasion. " Essentially war of the face of superior forces, .their actionat any
movement and attack, and too much digging rate until Johore was reachedbeing mainly a
creates defence complex." delaying one to gain time for the arrival of re-
inforcements from overseas. This applied par-
136. An anti-white campaign had started in ticularly to the Kelantan area, and to a lesser
Japan in 1936, and it was evident that for long extent, to Kuantan, since hi both cases (as
before the commencement of the war the spirit stated in para. 12 above) the line of communi-
of hatred of Europeans, particularly the British, cation was a single one and vulnerable to air
had constantly been inculcated into the Japan- bombing.
ese soldiers. They appear to have been taught
that the killing of Europeans by any method 139. It is easy to talk of the lack of an offen-
was a patriotic action. sive spirit and of a " retreat complex," but
It is possible that had we adopted the same under the conditions described above with-
course some men might have fought harder at drawals from the North were necessary; and
the start, but it is difficult to inculcate the spirit the adverse effect induced by having to carry
of hatred into the Englishman. This is partly out a continuous retreat over some hundreds of
due to his peculiar faculty of seeing a jest in miles starting from the early days of the cam-
the most depressing circumstances, and partly paign must be attributed to the general situa-
to the fact that hatred is ultimately based on tion rather than to any fault in the original
fear, which is not a natural characteristic of morale of the troops themselves.
our race. It is possible however, that the need for
offensive action even during a retreat had not
Factors affecting Morale of our Forces. been so stressed during the training of officers
137. The majority of the Indian regiments and men as to become a second nature. For
laboured under some disability on account of instance, there appeared to be a tendency to
the inexperience of most of their British officers. use reserves for supporting a weak portion of
As a rule, there would tie two or three senior a defensive position rather than retaining .them
officers, with fifteen or more years' experience, at all costs for bringing about a counter-attack.
then a gap until we came to officers who had Again, up to the time I handed over command,
joined after September, 1939. Somewhere about there was a tendency to use the Independent
half these officers had experience in India and Company in Malaya as a reinforcement and
could talk the language, but having only from not to carry out the functions for which it was
one to two and a half years' service they did specially intended. Further, officers and men
not carry the weight which more experienced must be taught that occasions will arise when
officers would have done. some parties have got to hold on to the last
In both British and Indian units there was man, even though the main body of the force
only a small leaven of war-experienced officers may be moving back.
Royal Air Force problems. over everything else except the A.A. defence
140. With regard to the Air Force, reference of the Naval Base.. It was decided that the full
has already .been made in paras. 79 and 88 scale of the defence would be eight heavy and
above to the obsolescence of our Vildebeeste eight light A.A. guns; this was altered after
aircraft and to the effect of lack of reserves. war broke out to four heavy and twelve light,
Apart from this, the necessity for rapid evacua- a scale that was hardly every approached.
tion of the Northern aerodromes had some 145. When our aerodromes had to be aban-
effect on the ground personnel, many of whom doned, steps were naturally taken to render
were young and inexperienced. There were in- them useless to the enemy, particularly toy
sufficient rifles or Thompson guns to equip explosives in runways and other parts of the
all Air Force personnel, but they must be pre- landing area. The effect of this action was
pared to fight, and, if necessary, sacrifice them- generally of disappointingly short duration. The
selves in the same way as the infantry; and Japanese were certainly quick in carrying out
further, must spare no effort to ensure that all repairs, but, even allowing for that, the re-
material than can possibly be moved is sults of many of the demolitions as carried out
despatched, or in the last resort destroyed, to seem hardly to have repaid the energy ex-
prevent its being of value to the enemy. pended and the adverse moral effect on troops
141. The Royal Air Force suffered from lack of hearing explosions behind them. A system
of staff. It was not so much that more officers of delay-action mines would probably have
were required at headquarters as that suffi- been effective provided they could have been
cient should have been available to form properly concealed; preparations would have
another Group Headquarters. A Fighter Head- been necessary for this at the time the aero-
quarters had been formed and operated well, dromes were constructed. A heavy tractor
but the rest of the operations had to foe carried drawing some form of deep plough or scarifier
out direct by Royal Air Force Headquarters, and working in between craters would have
with the result that practically all the head- been a very useful addition; it could not have
quarters air staff officers had to be employed gone on working to the last moment, unless
in the operations room, and, including the ii: was intended to abandon the tractor, since
Air Officer Commanding, were fully occupied these could only move very slowly and were
in working out details of bombing and recon- likely to block roads if left to the last.
naissance, leaving no one to plan and think At aerodromes located in wet or low-lying
ahead. This condition would have been im- areas, mines should be located with reference
proved had it been possible to form another to the drainage system with the object of dis-
group to operate the bombing squadrons, or, locating it and so putting the aerodrome out
possibly, naval co-operation and overseas of action for a long period. Aerodromes in our
reconnaissance as well as all bombing. possession were occasionally rendered unser-
142. As aerodromes in Northern Malaya viceable for about twenty-four hours by
became untenable there was a danger of those Japanese bombing of. runways; this would have
in the South becoming too few to allow of been much more effective had delay-action
adequate dispersal of the Royal Air Force bombs been used.
Squadrons. The possibility of this had also
been foreseen some months before war broke Left-Behind Parties.
out and it had been decided in such an eventu- 146. An attempt was made to organise left-
ality to move the bombing squadrons to Dutch behind parties in Northern Malaya with the
aerodromes in Sumatra, retaining most of the object of obtaining information and carrying
fighter squadrons on Singapore Island. Up to out sabotage of all sorts in the enemy's rear.
the time that war broke out this remained This duty was entrusted to the O.M. Section
little more than a project owing to the Royal of the Ministry of Economic Warfare under Mr.
Air Force staff being fully occupied with other Killery. It was, however, started too late and
work. At the end of December, however, the there was no time to organise it thoroughly.
plans were well advanced, not only for the This was in no way the fault of the O.M.,
move of these squadrons but also for the but was due to the factors mentioned in para.
possible establishment of an erecting depot in 9 above.
Java.
143. The need for preserving an adequate Question of a Military Governor.
force for the protection of the Naval Base 147. The appointment of a Military Governor
(see pam. 138 above) applied especially to the might have been desirable for Singapore Island
Royal Air Force. This accounts for the com- during the later stages, but I was of the opinion
parative weakness of the fighter strength in that such an appointment for the whole of
Northern Malaya at the start of the war and Malaya at the start of the war was not a prac-
for fighter escorts not being available for our ticable proposition. The mam reason was that
bombers. From the last week in December the organisation of the Colony, with the Fede-
air protection for reinforcement convoys rated and the Unfederated States, was very
absorbed most of our fighter strength. complicated and that it was not a practical
proposition for anyone to take it over at short
Defence and Denial of Aerodromes. notice. It would have been found far more
144. As indicated in para. 103 above, the practicable for Hong Kong.
primary object of the Japanese appears to have
been to get command of the air, principally by Australia's Assistance.
the attack on our aerodromes by aircraft, or 148. The Australian Government fully
by their capture. The weakness of our aero- realised the importance of Singapore to the
drome defence is referred to in para. 115 above. defence of the Far East and especially to
In regard to A.A. weapons, as a result of the Australia and did everything in their power to
experiences in Crete, I laid down that the help. In November, 1940, there were three
defence of aerodromes was to take precedence squadrons of the Royal Australian Air Force
in Malaya. In December, 1940, the Australian concerned, and General Headquarters Sitreps
War Minister visited Singapore. Largely as a communiques were confined to the situation as
result of his representations, the Australian a whole.
Government despatched the 22nd Brigade, Although my General Headquarters operated
Australian Imperial Forces, to Singapore in at the Naval Base at the beginning of the
February. The 27th Brigade followed later, war, it was found that, after the loss of the
and arrived on the 20th August. Besides these Prince of Wales and Repulse and the formation
valuable reinforcements, Australia supplied of the War Council, it was more convenient
officers for the Royal Air Force Volunteer Re- for my Headquarters to be located near the
serve for administrative work on aerodromes, Combined Operations Room. Preparations had
men for two reserve mechanical transport units been made for this some months before, and
in the spring of 1941 and for the forty tanks the necessary accommodation was available.
which we had hoped to get from the Middle The move was carried out about the I5th
East. The situation regarding Beaufort aircraft December*
has been mentioned in para. 79 above, and
small arms ammunition in para. 92. In addi- 151. After the transfer of the defence of
tion to this, Australia also supplied many items Burma to Commander-in-Chief, India, and the
of signalling equipment and special radio sets fall of Hong Kong, it was felt that the location
for coast defence guns-,. After the war started of General Headquarters should no longer be
four Hudsons from Australia reached Singapore in Malaya, since to keep it there would not
on the 23rd December and Army reinforcements only hamper its own work but cramp the
were promised. (See para. 118 above.) initiative of the General Officer Commanding
and Air Officer Commanding and make the
The Dutch. organisation in Singapore too 'top-heavy. It
149. The Dutch in the Netherlands East was decided before I left that the correct loca-
Indies faithfully executed their share of the tion of General Headquarters would be in
agreements and, indeed, went beyond them, Java, preferably near Bandoeng, and steps were
and co-operated wholeheartedly with us in' already in hand to effect this move. The
every way. They sent three bomber squadrons possibility of a move away from Singapore be-
and one fighter squadron in the early days coming necessary had been foreseen many
of the war in Malaya, although, owing to tech- months before.
nical troubles they were having at the time 152. The results of the campaign in the Far
with their engines, the bomber squadrons con- East naturally gave rise to some speculation
sisted of only six aircraft, the whole three, as to the advisability of forming what may be
therefore, being equivalent to little more than called Strategic Headquarters, devoid of all
one British bomber squadron. Their sub- responsibility for direct operational control or
marines operated with great gallantry in the administration. Commander-in-chief, -Middle
Gulf of Siam. They also gave me three of their East, at the time I passed through Cairo in
reserve flying boats to make good our losses, November, 1940, stated that, in his opinion,
and sent over a guerilla band to Northern such a General Headquarters was impractic-
Malaya to operate in the Japanese rear. able. My view is that, under special conditions
At a later stage in the operations I believe such as existed in the Far East, a strategic
they were somewhat critical of the amount of General Headquarters was a workable proposi-
assistance we were able to send to the Nether- tion,'- provided its limitations are fully recog-
lands East Indies, and of the length of time nized.
before it arrived; should this give rise to any In para. 5 above were indicated the measures
acrimony in the future, I hope that the prompt which it was expected to achieve iby the
and whole-hearted assistance they rendered to creation of a General Headquarters, Far East.
us will not be forgotten. We failed to convince the Japanese that our
strength was too great to ibe challenged with
Work of General Headquarters. success; the limitation of the forces, especially
150-.. In Malaya the operations of my own aircraft, that could be sent to the Far East
Headquarters were limited to the issue of certain was imposed by prior requirements elsewhere.
directives to the General Officer Commanding Co-operation in Malaya and co-ordination of
and Air Officer Commanding. These laid down effort with neighbouring countries, including
such matters as the withdrawal from Kelantan plans for mutual reinforcement, were, achieved.
and Kuantan, and priority of tasks for the
Royal Air Force. Apart from that, the main Farewell Order.
work was to secure the proper co-ordination of 153. I handed over Command of the Far East
air operations with the Dutch and Australians. to Lt.-jGeneral Sir Henry Pownall on the 27th
A great deal of the time of my small staff December, 1941, and left Singapore, in accord-
was taken up at the beginning toy the drafting ance with instructions, on the 3ist December.
of Sitreps telegrams and communique's, as well I end with my farewell order which was pub-
as preparing appreciations demanded from lished on the 28th December, 1941.
England. One of the problems regarding the
two former was the fact that they had to be To ALL RANKS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE,
sent to Australia as well as to England; their MALAYA.
timing was, therefore, a matter of fine adjust-
ment, since it was necessary to ensure, for On relinquishing the Far East Command 1
instance, that a communique should not be send to you all in the Army and Air Force in
printed in Australian newspapers before the Malaya a message of farewell, of admiration for
Sitreps telegrams arrived in England. Eventu- the way you have faced danger, fatigue and
ally, it was found simpler to hand over most of hardship, and of all good wishes for 1942.
this work to the combined Army and Air Force I know my successor well, and I turn over
operations room, in so far as Malaya itself was the command to good hands.
C
Remember that upon the issue of this war 4. It is intended that you should deal,
depends the welfare of the whole world, includ- primarily with matters of major military policy
ing our own families. Their eyes are upon and strategy. It is not the intention that you
you. Do your Duty unflinchingly, knowing should assume administrative or financial
that the resources of the Empire and of our responsibilities or the normal day-to-day func-
Allies are behind you, confident that, however tions at present exercised by the General Officers
hard the struggle now, our cause will triumph Commanding and Air Officer Commanding.
in the end. These Officers will continue to correspond as
R. BROOKE-POPHAM, at present with the War Office, Air Ministry,
Air Chief Marshal. Colonial Office and Burma Office, on all matters
on which they have hitherto dealt with these
departments, to the fullest extent possible con-
sistent with the exercise of your Command;
keeping you informed as and when you wish.
APPENDICES
A.Directive to the Commander-in-Chief, 5. Your staff will consist of the following
Far East only, and no expansion of this staff is contem-
plated:
B.Instructions issued to General Officers
Commanding and Air Officer A Chief of Staff (an army officer of the
Commanding, Far East rank of Major-Genera.1),
A Senior Royal Air Force Staff Officer,
C.His Majesty's Ships based at Singapore A Naval Liaison Officer,
and Hong Kong, December 7, 1941 An Army Officer of the -rank of General
D.Summary of Army Strength, Malaya, Staff Officer, ist Grade,
November, 1940
An officer from each Service of the equiva-
E.Order of Battle, Malaya, December 7, lent rank of General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade,
1941, and Summary together with the necessary clerical and cypher
F.Anti-Aircraft Position, December, 7, staff.
1941
G.Order of Battle, Burma, December 7, 6. You will, where appropriate, consult and
1941, and Summary co-operate with the Commander-in-Chief,
H.Order of Battle, Hong Kong, Decem- China, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies,
and the Commander-in-Chief in India. You
ber 8, 1941 will also communicate direct with the Defence
I.Strength of Air Force in Malaya, Departments of the Governments of the
November, 1940 Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand
J.Strength and Dispositions of the Royal on all routine matters of interest to them, -but
Air Force, December 7, 1941 on matters of major policy you will communi-
K. Summary of Operationally Serviceable cate to these Dominion Governments through
""" I.E. Aircraft in Malaya-. the appropriate Service Department of His
L.Performance of the Buffalo Single- Majesty's Government.
Seater 7. You will keep the Governor of the Straits
M.Order of the Day issued December 8, Settlements and High Commissioner for the
1941 \ Malay States, the Governor of Burma and the
Governor of Hong Kong closely and constantly
informed and will consult them as appropriate.
APPENDIX A.
8. The General and Air Officers mentioned in
DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, paragraph 3 above remain, subject to your
FAR EAST. general direction and supervision, in touch
1. You are appointed Commander-in-Chief, with the Governor of the Straits Settlements
Far East. and High Commissioner for the Malay States,
the Governor of Burma and the Governor of
2. You will be responsible to the Chiefs of Hong Kong. In the case of Burma you will
Staff for the operational control and general ensure that the constitutional relations between
direction of training of all British land and air the Governor and the General Officer Com-
forces in Malaya,* Burma and Hong Kong, and manding are not affected. This is of particular
for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of importance with regard to any movement of
these territories. troops which might affect internal security.
You will also be responsible for the opera- 9. You will, where appropriate, maintain
tional control and general direction of training touch with His Majesty's, (representatives in
of British Air Forces in Ceylon and of the Japan, China, the United States of America
general reconnaissance Squadrons of the Royal and Thailand, and with His Majesty's Consuls-
Air Force which it is proposed to station in the General in the Netherlands East Indies and
Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal for ocean Indo-China. The maintenance of touch with
reconnaissance in those areas. His Majesty's representatives and Consuls-
3. For these purposes, the following will be General in these countries will rest with you
under your command: exclusively and not with the General and Air
General Officer Commanding, Malaya. Officers referred to in paragraph 3.
General Officer Commanding, Burma. 10. The Far East Combined Intelligence
General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong. Bureau, in addition to keeping you informed of
Air Officer Commanding, Far East. current intelligence, will be charged with the
*Including the Straits Settlements, the Federated
duty of collecting such special intelligence as
and Unfederated Malay States, Brunei, Sarawak and you may require. The Bureau will remain
North Borneo. under the control of the Admiralty.
ii. You will normally communicate as neces- (8) You will submit short report of present
sary with the Chiefs of Staff, the Air Ministry state of training of units under your command
being used -as a channel of communication for and your programme of training for coming
telegrams, and letters being addressed to the months. Further instructions will be issued
Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee; but you on method by which Commander-in-Chief is to
have the right to correspond direct with an be kept informed of progress of training.
individual Chief of Staff on matters particularly (9) Chiefs of Staff have-made Commander-
affecting his Service. in-Chief, Far East, responsible for maintaining
touch with His Majesty's representatives in
Japan, China and Thailand, and with His
APPENDIX B. Majesty's Consuls-General in Netherlands East
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO GENERAL OFFICERS Indies and Indo-China. Your direct touch with
COMMANDING AND AIR OFFICER COMMAND- His Majesty's representatives or Consuls-
ING, FAR EAST. General in these countries should therefore be
restricted to matters immediately affecting your
Headquarters of 'Commander-inrChief, Far commands.
East, will open at Singapore at 0800 hours on
the i8th November. APPENDIX C.
(2) A prime function of staff of Commander- H.M. SHIPS BASED AT SINGAPORE AND HONG
in-Chief, Far 'East, will be to prepare, in con- KONG ON 7TH DECEMBER, 1941.
junction with Staff of Commander-in-Chief,
China, all joint plans that may be required Singapore
either by Chiefs of Staff organisation in London Capital Ships
or -by strategic situation in Far East. . The Prince of Wales.
Authority for such plans will be either Chiefs Repulse.
of Staffs in London or two Commanders-in-
Chief. Cruisers '
Danae.
(3) There will be no alteration in channels Dragon.
by which you correspond War Office, Air Durban.
Ministry, Colonial Office or Burma Office on
any matters other than questions of pjplicy Destroyers
affecting strategy or operations. On these ques- Jupiter.
tions of policy you will correspond direct with Electra.
this Headquarters, sending copies of your com- Encounter.
munications to appropriate Governor. Similarly, Express.
all communications from Commander-in-Chief, Tenedos.
Far East, to you on these questions will be Thanet.
repeated to appropriate Governor. Scout.
On other questions you will repeat to Com- Stronghold.
mander-in-Chief, Far East, such of your com- Ships from other Stations refitting at Singapore.
munications to War Office, &c., as you judge
of-sufficient importance. Cruiser
Mauritius (E.I. Station).
(4) You will ensure that intimate touch now
existing between yourself and Governor in your Destroyers
command is maintained. Isis (Mediterranean Station).
H.M.A.S. Vampire (Australian Station).
(5) You will submit to Commander-in-Chief H.M.A.S. Vendetta (Australian Station).
copies of your most recent appreciations and Submarine
plans which are now in operation and will keep Rover (Mediterranean Station).
him fully informed of any changes in situation
by signal if of immediate importance, other- Hong Kong
wise by periodical liaison letter. Destroyer
Thracian.
(6) You will submit location statement show-
ing present location of all forces within your This list does not include auxiliary minesweepers,
command. You will subsequently report major patrol vessels and small craft.
changes in location as they occur.
APPENDIX D!
(7) The Commander-in-Chief requires to be
kept informed of general administrative * con- SUMMARY OF ARMY STRENGTH, MALAYA,
ditions of forces under your command, includ- NOVEMBER, 1940.
ing position in respect of reserves of essential Infantry
commodities. Any major administrative 'diffi- 17 Battalions, viz.
culties which you may now be experiencing, British 6 (including I M.G.
or which arise subsequently, will be reported Battalion).
at once, in order that both extent to which Indian 10
they may affect operations .or policy may be Malay. ... . ... r
accurately gauged, and that representations
may be made direct by him to higher authority, Mobile Artillery
if such a course appears to be required. i Mountain Regiment, R.A.
570
APPENDIX E.
MALAYA COMMAND.
Order of BattleDecember 7, 1941.
H.Q., MALAYA COMMAND.

Singapore Fortress 3 Indiai Corps A.I.F. Malaya* O.C. Troops Sarawak O.C., R.A. Det., 12 Ind. Inf. Bde.
2/10 Fd. Regt. and Brunei Christmas Is. (one 122 Fd. Regt.
2/15 Fd. Regt. 2/15 Punjab Regt. 6-in. gun) 15 Fd. Coy. S. & M.
i Malaya Inf. Bde. 2 Malaya Inf. Bde. 4 A/T Regt. R.A. Det. 2 A. & S.H.
2 Loyals i Manchester (M.G.) (less one bty.) (two 6-in. guns) 5/2 Punjab
i Malay Regt. 2 Gordons 2/10 Fd. Coy. 4/19 Hyderabad
2/17 Dogras 2/12 Fd. Coy.
2/6 Fd. Park Coy.
Coast and A.A. Defences
7 Coast Regt., R.A.
9 Coast Regt., R.A. 22 A.I.F. Bde. 27 A.I.F. Bde.
16 Defence Regt., R.A. 2/18 Bn. 2/26 Bn.
35 Fortress Coy., R.E. 2/19 Bn. 2/29 Bn.
41 Fortress Coy., R.E. 2/20 Bn. 2/30 Bn.
3 A.A. Regt., R.A.
I Hy. A.A. Regt. (H.K.S.R.A.) . I 1 1
(less one bty.) H.Q., L. of C. Area Penang Fortress 9 Indian Div. ii Indian Div.
2 Hy; A.A. Regt. (H.K.S.R.A.) H.Q.; F.M.S.V F. ii Coast Regt. 5 Fd. Regt. 3 Cav. (less one sqn.)
(less one bty.) 36 Fortress Coy. 88 Fd. Regt. 137 Fd. Regt.
3 Lt. A.A. Regt. 5/14 Punjab One Bty. 80 A/Tk. Regt. 155 Fd. Regt.
H.K.S.R.A. 42 Fd. Park Coy. 80 A. Tk. Regt. (less one bty.)
i A.A. Regt., LA. 23 Fd. Coy.
5 S/L Regt., R.A. 43 Fd. Park Coy.
8 Ind. Inf. Bde. 22 Ind. Inf. Bde.
21 Mtn. Bty. One Sec. 21 Mtn. Bty. | |
(less one section) 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 6 Ind. Inf. Bde. 15 Ind. Inf. Bde. 28 Ind. Inf. Bde.
19 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 5/11 Sikhs 22 Mtn. Regt. 3 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 2/1 Gurkhas
2/10 Baluch 2/18 R. Garhwal Rif. (less 21 Mtn. Bty.) i Leicesters 2X2 Gurkhas
2/12 F.F. Regt. 17 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 2/9 Jat 2/9 Gurkhas
3/17 Dogras 2 Surreys 1/14 Punjab
i F.F. Regt. 1/8 Punjab 3/16 Punjab
27i6 Punjab
* The Australian Units of the A.I.F. Malaya shown here formed part of the 8th Australian Division.
Summary of Strength of Army in Malaya, December 7, 1941.

(Royal Engineers, Mechanical Transport, Signals and Ancillary Units not included.)
Infantry Battalions
British 6 (including i M.G. Btn.).
Indian 18
Australian 6
Malay
Total
Volunteer Battalions . 10
Johore Military Forces i
Indian State Forces 5
Artillery
Field Regiments 7 (5 of 24 guns; 2 of 16 guns).
Mountain Regiments 1 (24 guns).
Anti-Tank Regiments 2 (i of 48 guns; i of 36 guns).
Anti-Tank Batteries 2 (i of 8 Breda guns; i of 6 2-pounders).
Total Strength
Regulars
British 19,391
Australian 15,279
Indian 37,191
Asiatic 4,482
Total 76,343
Volunteers
British 2,430
Indian 727
Asiatic 7.395
Total 10,552
Grand Total 86,895
APPENDIX F.
FAR EAST.
Anti-Aircraft Position, December 7, 1941.
Approved En route. Allocated but

Holdings. not shipped.
Scale.
Malaya
Heavy 176 70
Light 100 (plus
144 field force)
78
12
28 }
3-in. Naval Nil 24 Nil
Burma
8
Heavy
Light
24
68 } (a) 8
Hong Kong
Heavy 32 14 4
Light 30 2 8
3-in. Naval Nil 2
(a) Of these 4 heavy and 8 light had only just reached Rangoon and had not been installed.
(6) A proportion was to be allocated to Burma by Commau'der-in-Chief, Far East.
APPENDIX G.
BURMA.
Order of Battle at Commencement of Hostilities.
(i) ist Burma Division
consisting of
Maymyo Brigade 2nd K.O.Y.L.I.
ist Burma Rifles.
6th Burma Rifles.
7th Burma Rifles.
i2th Mountain Battery.
56th Field Company (S. and M.).
Teriasserim Brigade 2nd Burma Rifles.
4th Burma Rifles.
5th Burma Rifles.
8th Burma Rifles.
2nd Mountain Battery.
Sec. Field Company.
I3th Indian Infantry Brigade 5th/ist Punjab.
2nd/7th Rajputs.
ist/i8th R. Garh Rifles.
23rd Mountain Battery.
5th Field Battery R.A., B.A.F.
(2) Rangoon Brigade ist Gloucesters.
3rd Burma Rifles.
Coast Defence Battery.
(3) i6th Indian Infantry Brigade ist/gth Jat.
4th/i2th F.F. Regiment.
ist/7th Gurkha Regiment.
5th Mountain Battery.
Headquarters, 27th Mountain Regiment.
5oth Field Company (S. and M.).
(4) Burma Frontier Force Bhama Battalion.
Chin Hills Battalion.
Myitkyina Battalion.
Northern Shan States Battalion.
Southern Shan States Battalion.
Kokine Battalion.
Reserve Battalion.
(5) Garrison Companies ist Garrison Company.
2nd Garrison Company.
3rd Garrison Company.
4th Garrison Company.
5th Garrison Company.
(6) Burma Rifles (Territorials) nth Burma Rifles.
i2th Burma Rifles.
I3th Southern Shan States
Battalion Burma Rifles.
I4th Burma Rifles (forming).
(7) Burma Auxiliary Force Rangoon Battalion.
Upper Burma Battalion.
Burma Railways Battalion.
Tenasserim Battalion,
i A.A. Regiment (forming). .
(8) Burma Rifles gth and loth Battalions (forming).
Six Anti-Tank Troops.
One Field Battery.
(9) Field Company Forming.
(10) Armed Police Three Battalions.
SUMMARY OF STRENGTH OF ARMY IN BURMA, DECEMBER 7, 1941.
Infantry
British 2 battalions.
Indian 6 battalions.
Burma Rifles (Regulars) 8 battalions (4 of these just formed).
Burma Rifles (Territorials) 4 battalions.
Garrison Company 5 battalions.
Burma Auxiliary Force 4 battalions.
Burma Frontier Force 6 battalions,
i reserve battalion.
Artillery
Indian Mountain Batteries ...... 3
Burma Auxiliary Force i field battery, i8-pounders.
Five mobile detachments Burma Frontier Force.
APPENDIX H.
HONG KONG.
Order of Battle at Outbreak of War.
At the outbreak of hostilities on the 8th December, 1941, the garrison comprised :
Hong Kong Infantry Brigade Arrived.
ist Battalion Middlesex Regiment (M.G.) August, 1937.
ist Battalion The Winnipeg Grenadiers November, 1941.
ist Battalion The Royal Rifles of Canada November, 1941.
Kowloon Infantry Brigade '
2nd Battalion The Royal Scots January, 1938.
2nd I4th Punjab Regiment November, 1940.
5th 7th Rajputana Rifles June, 1937.
Headquarters Fortress, R.E.
' i E. and M. Company.
i Field Company (3 British, i Chinese section).
i Bomb Disposal section. ' l
i Medium Regiment, H.K.S.R.A.
8th Coast Regiment, R.A.
I2th Coast Regiment, R.A.
5th A.A. Regiment, R.A.
Ancillary Units.
Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (strength about 2,000).
A Chinese machine-gun battalion was in process of being formed, but had not progressed
beyond the cadre stage.
Appropriate strengths of all personnel mobilised at the 8th December, 1941, were :
British ... .'. ... ... 3,652
Canadian 1,982
Indian 2,254
Local Colonial 2,428
Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps 2,000
Auxiliary Defence Units 2,112
Nursing Detachment 136
Total 14,564
APPENDIX I.
STRENGTH OF AIR FORCE IN MALAYA.

November, 1940.
Bombers : 2 squadrons Blenheim I24 aircraft.
Reconnaissance : 2 squadrons Hudsons (R.A.A.F.)24 aircraft.
Torpedo Bombers : 2 squadrons Vildebeestes24 aircraft.
General Purpose.:. i squadron Wirraways (R.A.A.F.)12 aircraft.
Flying Boats : i squadron Singapores4 aircraft.
X Total: 88 first-line aircraft.
APPENDIX J.
STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE R.A.F., DECEMBER 7, 1941.

Malaya.
Strength in
Aerodrome. Squadron No. Type. Aircraft.
AlorStar 62 Blenheim I (B) n
Sungei Patani 21 Buffalo 12
(R.A.A.F.)
Sungei Patani 27 Blenheim I (F) 12
Kota Bharu i Hudson 12
(R.A.A.F.)
Kota Bharu 36 Vildebeeste 6
Gong Kedah 100 Vildebeeste 6
Kuantan 60 (a) Blenheim I (B) 8
Kuantan 8 Hudson 8
(R.A.A.F.)
Kuantan 36 Vildebeeste 6
Tengah 34 Blenheim IV 16
Kallang 243 and 488 - Buffalo 32
Sembawang 8 Hudson 4
(R.A.A.F.)
Sembawang 453 Buffalo 16
Seletar . ... .. 100 Vildebeeste 6
Seletar 205 Catalina 3
; 158
(a) No. 60 Squadron had arived from Burma for Bombing practice, and was retained in Malaya on the start
of the war with Japan. About the middle of December the personnel were sent back to Burma by sea, the
aeroplanes being retained in Malaya to replace wastage in other squadrons.
There were two maintenance units, No. 151 at Seletar and No. 153 at Kuala Lumpur.
Reserve Aircraft.
Blenheim I and IV 15
Buffalo 52 (6)
Hudson 7
Vildebeeste 12
Catalina 2
Total 88
(6) Of these, 21 were temporarily out of action owing to trouble with the engine valve gear on a new mark
of engine.
Burma.
Strength in
Aerodrome. Squadron No. Type. Aircraft.
Mingaladon 60 Blenheim I (B) 4
Mingaladon 67 Buffalo 16
Reserve Aircraft.
Blenheim I Nil
Buffalo 16
Of the total of 32 Buffaloes in Burma, 24 were temporarily out of action owing to trouble with
the engine valve gear on a new mark of engine.
Ceylon.
Catalina 2
Total in Far East.

Initial Equipment 180
Reserves 104
Total :. ... 284
Of these aircraft, the Vildebeestes were obsolete, and if these are deducted the figures become :
Initial Equipment -" 156
Reserves 92
Total 248
** Requirements as laid down by the Chiefs of Staff were 336 Initial'Equipment. Reserves
for these on the basis of 50 per cent, for flying-boats and 100 per cent, for all other aircraft should
have amounted to 327, a total of 663.
Omitting the Vildebeestes, the total deficiency in aircraft was 415.
The Dutch sent over a total of 22 bombers and 9 fighters. If these are included, the net
deficiency becomes 384.
The figure of 100 per cent, for reserves of land-based aircraft was laid down in an Air Ministry
telegram of the 23rd February, 1941.
APPENDIX K.
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONALLY SERVICEABLE I.E. AIRCRAFT IN MALAYA.

Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec.
7. 12. 17. 19. 22. 24.
Bombers (including Torpedo Bombers)... 59 . 45 59 58 49 61
Fighters 72 53 58 53 45 50
Reconnaissance 24 7 12 n 12 13
Flying Boats 3 3 4 4 3 3
Total 158 108 133 126 109 127
The above figures do not include Dutch aircraft in N. Sumatra or in Borneo, which were
stationed North of the Equator and thus came under the command of the Air Officer Commanding,
Far East, under the terms of the A.D.B. Agreement. Nor do the figures include Immediate
Reserves with Squadrons, Reserves in the Maintenance Units nor Aircraft in the AA.C.U.
APPENDIX L.
PERFORMANCE OF THE BUFFALO SINGLE SEATER.

A report on the tests of a Buffalo was sent in from the A. & A.E.E., Boscombe Down, dated
the 3rd July, 1941. Comparison of this with the official intelligence figures of the Japanese Naval
fighter, Zero type, showed that the Buffalo was much inferior at heights of 10,000 feet, and over,
viz.:
Zero Fighter. Buffalo.
Rate of climb to 13,000 feet 4-3 minutes 6-1 minutes
Speed at 10,000 feet 315 270 (Approx.)
At 20,000 feet the performance, as indicated by the official figures, is more nearly equal,
i.e. :
Zero Fighter. Buffalo.
Speed at 20,000 feet 295 292
Actual experience in Malaya, however, showed that this speed of 292 for the Buffalo could
not be obtained. Whether this was due to the aeroplane, to the climate or to the pilots I cannot
say.
APPENDIX M.
MALAYA.
Order of the Day issued December 8, 1941.
Japan's action to-day gives the signal for the Empire Naval; Army and Air Forces, and those
of their Allies, to go into action with a common aim and common ideals.
We are ready. We have had plenty of warning and our preparations are made and tested.
We do not forget at this moment the years of patience and forbearance in which we have borne,
with dignity and discipline, the petty insults and insolences inflicted on us by the Japanese in the
Far East. .We know that those things were only done because Japan thought she could take
advantage of pur supposed weakness. Now, when Japan herself has decided to put the matter
to a sterner test,'she will find out that she has made a grievous mistake.
We are confident. Our defences are strong and our weapons efficient. Whatever our race,
and whether we are now in our native land or have come thousands of miles, we have one aim
and one only. It is to defend these shores, to destroy such of our enemies as may set foot on our
soil, and then, finally, to cripple the power of the enemy to endanger our ideals, our possessions
and our peace.
What of the enemy ? We see before us a Japan drained for years by the exhausting claims
of her wanton onslaught on China. We see a Japan whose trade and industry have been so dislocated
by these years of reckless adventure that, in a mood of desperation, her Government has flung
her into war under the delusion that, by stabbing a friendly nation in the back, she can gain her
end. Let her look at Italy and what has happened since that nation tried a similar base action.
Let us all remember that we here in the Far East form part of the great campaign for the
preservation in the world of truth and justice and freedom; confidence, resolution, enterprise
and devotion to the cause must and will inspire every one of us in the fighting services, while from
the civilian population, Malay, Chinese, Indian, or Burmese, we expect that patience, endurance
and serenity which is the great virtue of the East and which will go far to assist the fighting men
to gain final and complete victory.
R. BROOKE-POPHAM, Air Chief Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief, Far East.
G. LAYTON, Vice-Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief, China.
LONDON
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
To be purchased directly from H.M. Stationery Office at the following addresses:
York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2 ; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh, 2;
39-41 King Street, Manchester, 2 ; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;
Tower Lane, Bristol, 1 ; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast .
OR THROUGH ANY BOOKSELLER
. . 1948 - -
Price Two Shillings net
S.O. Code No. 65-38183

London Gazette 38183 Despatch On The Far East 1940 Oct. 17-1941 Dec. 27, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief, Far East PDF

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The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the 2oth of JANUARY, 1948

THURSDAY, 22 JANUARY, 1948

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948

Summary of Strength of Army in Malaya, December 7, 1941.

Approved En route. Allocated but

STRENGTH OF AIR FORCE IN MALAYA.

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE R.A.F., DECEMBER 7, 1941.

Total in Far East.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONALLY SERVICEABLE I.E. AIRCRAFT IN MALAYA.

PERFORMANCE OF THE BUFFALO SINGLE SEATER.

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