SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164673. January 15, 2010.]

SAMUEL U. LEE and MAYBELLE LEE LIM , petitioners, vs . KBC BANK

N.V. , respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO , J : p

The Case
This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition challenges the 10 February 2004 Decision 2 and 27 July 2004 Resolution 3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78004. The Court of Appeals set aside the 26
March 2003 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 58, Makati City, in Criminal Case Nos. 02-344-45. acEHCD

The Facts
Midas Diversi ed Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a $1,400,000
loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank). KBC Bank is a Belgian corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines. On 12 August 1997, Samuel U. Lee
(Lee), assistant treasurer and director of MDEC, executed a promissory note
in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC's
rights over Con rmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 to KBC Bank. Con rmed
Purchase Order No. MTC-548 was allegedly dated 15 July 1997, issued by
Otto Versand, a company based in Germany, and covered a shipment of girl's
basic denim jeans amounting to $1,863,050 .
MDEC obtained another loan, amounting to $65,000, from KBC Bank. On 14
November 1997, Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and assistant secretary of MDEC,
executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment
transferring all of MDEC's rights over Con rmed Purchase Order No. WC-128 to KBC
Bank. Con rmed Purchase Order No. WC-128 was allegedly dated 1 October 1997,
issued by Otto Versand, and covered a shipment of boy's bermuda jeans amounting to
$841,500.
On 23 December 1997, Lim renewed the 12 August 1997 promissory note and
issued a notice of renewal and drawdown certi cate to KBC Bank. On 29 December
1997, Lim executed an amended deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC's rights
over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 to KBC Bank.
MDEC was considered in default in paying the $65,000 loan on 30 January 1998.
Under a facility agreement between KBC Bank and MDEC, any default in payment of any
obligation under the agreement would render MDEC in default with regard to the
$65,000 loan MDEC defaulted in paying two other obligations under the agreement.
MDEC also failed to pay the $1,400,000 loan when it became due on 9 February 1998.
On 17 March 1998, KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity
of Con rmed Purchase Order Nos. MTC-548 and WC-128. On 19 March 1998, Otto
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 Versand sent a facsimile message to KBC Bank stating that (1) it did not issue the
purchase orders, (2) it did not order or receive the items covered by the purchase
orders, and (3) it would not pay MDEC any amount.
In a complaint-af davit 5 dated 21 April 1998, Liza M. Pajarillo, manager of the
corporate division of KBC Bank, charged Lee and Lim of estafa. In his Resolution 6
dated 27 November 2001, State Prosecutor Jose no A. Subia (State Prosecutor Subia)
found the existence of probable cause and recommended that two counts of estafa be
filed against Lee and Lim. State Prosecutor Subia stated that:
After a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the Bank, as well as of the
respondents, we nd the existence of a probable cause to indict respondents
Samuel Lee and Maybelle Lee Lim.

It is an established fact that the con rmed purchase order nos. MTC-548 and WC-
128 presented with the Bank by the Midas thru respondents Samuel Lee and
Maybelle Lee Lim were false and spurious, having been unequivocably repudiated
and/or disowned by Otto Versand, Germany, the foreign buyer who allegedly
issued the same, as evidenced by a telefax message sent to the Bank by Otto
Versand. Evidently, respondent Samuel Lee signed the following documents, to
wit: the "conforme" portion of the US$2.0 million short-term trade facility, the
promissory note and the corresponding deed of assignment both dated August
12, 1997, covering the con rmed purchase order no[.] MTC-548, while respondent
Maybelle Lee Lim signed in the promissory note and the corresponding deed of
assignment both dated Nov. 14, 1997, the renewed promissory note and the
notice of renewal and drawdown certi cate both dated Dec. 23, 1997.
Respondents Samuel Lee and Maybelle Lee Lim, thus cannot escape indictment,
aside from signing those relevant loan documents, as they also clearly helped one
another in fraudulently representing to the Bank that indeed said con rmed two
(2) purchased [sic] orders does [sic] exists [sic] and that Midas have [sic] their [sic]
rights, titles and interests thereto. With their fraudulent representation, they were
able to entice or induce the Bank to extend [to] them the loan of USD$1.4 million
and USD$ 65,000 under the short-term trade facility previously granted to them. 7

Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim were led with the
RTC. After nding probable cause, Judge Winlove M. Dumayas (Judge Dumayas) of the
RTC issued warrants of arrest against Lee and Lim.
Lee and Lim led a petition 8 for review dated 26 April 2002 with the Department
of Justice. Lee and Lim challenged State Prosecutor Subia's 27 November 2001
Resolution and 17 April 2002 Order denying their motion for reconsideration. They
claimed that:
I. THE RESOLUTIONS OF 27 NOVEMBER 2001 AND 17 APRIL 2002 MERELY
RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A
FINDING OF A PROBABLE CAUSE.
II. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS WERE ISSUED BASED ONLY ON THE
UNCORROBORATED ALLEGATIONS OF PAJARILLO THAT LEE AND LIM
MADE FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS TO [KBC BANK]. IcHTCS

III. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN HOLDING LEE AND LIM TO BE

CRIMINALLY LIABLE DESPITE THE TWO LOANS CREATING MERELY CIVIL
LIABILITY ON THE PART OF MIDAS. 9

In his Resolution 1 0 dated 12 July 2002, Secretary Hernando B. Perez (Secretary

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 Perez) directed the withdrawal of the informations led against Lee and Lim. Secretary
Perez held that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence:
The twin charges of estafa are primarily anchored on respondents' alleged
fraudulent representations to [KBC Bank] that the two purchase orders were fake
or sham. To prove this point, Ms. Pajarillo of [KBC Bank] claims that she received
a fax message from a representative of Otto Versand, stating that the latter
company did not issue the purchase orders mentioned. There was no sworn
statement from a responsible of cer of Otto Versand presented to attest to the
allegation that the subject purchase orders were fake. Since Ms. Pajarillo did
not have personal knowledge of the fact that the subject purchase
orders were in fact fake, her testimony cannot be the basis for nding
probable cause against respondents. Ms. Pajarillo can testify only to
those facts that she knew of her personal knowledge. Admittedly, she
derived knowledge of the supposed spurious character of the purchase
orders from a mere fax copy of a message that [KBC Bank] received
from a certain representative of Otto Versand in Germany, someone
who she did not even know personally. Unfortunately, this fax copy is
hearsay evidence and therefore, inadmissible to prove the truth of what
it contains (Pastor vs. Gaspar, 2 Phil 592). 1 1 (Emphasis supplied)

KBC Bank led a motion 1 2 for reconsideration dated 2 August 2002 with the
Department of Justice.
Lee and Lim had not been arraigned. In a motion 1 3 dated 18 October 2002 and
led with the RTC, Assistant City Prosecutor Nora C. Sibucao (Assistant City
Prosecutor Sibucao) prayed for the withdrawal of the informations led against Lee
and Lim. Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao stated that:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Trial Prosecutor, unto the Honorable
Court, most respectfully moves and prays for the withdrawal of Information led
in the above-entitled cases in view of the resolution of the Department of Justice
promulgated on July 12, 2002 reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City. 1 4

The RTC's Ruling

In his one-page Order 1 5 dated 26 March 2003, Judge Dumayas granted
Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao's motion to withdraw the informations against Lee
and Lim. Judge Dumayas held that:
This Court, after an in-depth scrutiny of the arguments raised by the prosecution
and private complainant, nds the contentions of the prosecution to be suf cient
and meritorious.

Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw Information led by the Prosecution is

hereby granted and the two (2) informations for the crime of Estafa penalized
under par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code are hereby withdrawn from the docket
of this court. 1 6

KBC Bank led with the Court a petition 1 7 for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. KBC Bank claimed that:
I.
The court a quo committed reversible error in issuing the questioned Order
without specifying its legal basis.
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 II.
The court a quo committed reversible error in prematurely acting upon the Makati
Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw of * Information.
III.

The court a quo committed reversible error in nding that no probable cause
exists to hold respondents for trial for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) and in
granting the Makati Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw Information. 1 8

In a Resolution 1 9 dated 23 June 2003, the Court referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 6, 2 0 Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. In his
Resolution 2 1 dated 19 November 2003, Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong denied KBC
Bank's 2 August 2002 motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In its 10 February 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside Judge Dumayas'
26 March 2003 Order. The Court of Appeals held that: DHEaTS

It has long been established that the ling of a complaint or information in Court
initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case,
which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the ling of the
complaint or information, a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the
trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or
was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
xxx xxx xxx

The trial judge practically concurred with the ndings of the Secretary of Justice
that the "fax copy is hearsay evidence and therefore, inadmissible to prove the truth that
it contains", contrary to the well-reasoned ndings of the investigating prosecutor. It is
emphasized that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
The issue of admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence is a matter of defense
that is best ventilated in a full-blown trial; preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the exhaustive display of presentation of evidence. 2 2
Hence, the present petition.
The Issues
In their petition, Lee and Lim raised as issues that:
I
THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF ESTAFA AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS, AN ISSUE THAT WAS PENDING BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE

xxx xxx xxx

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 II
QUESTION IS NOT ONE OF ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE BUT THE NEED IN
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FOR EVIDENCE OF VALUE TO ESTABLISH
PROBABLE CAUSE
xxx xxx xxx

III
RESPONDENT COURT DID NOT PREMATURELY ALLOW THE WITHDRAWAL OF
THE INFORMATIONS
xxx xxx xxx
IV

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABDICATE ITS DUTY TO DETERMINE THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION'S REASON FOR WITHDRAWING
THE INFORMATIONS . 2 3

The Court's Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.
Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it reviewed the ndings
of Secretary Perez. They stated that:
[T]he Court of Appeals cannot indirectly review the ndings of the Secretary under
the pretext of correcting the actuation of the trial court. . . .
[T]he only ruling before the Court of Appeals is the ruling of the trial court . . . .

But the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the case before it is not one for the
review of the nal order of the Secretary of Justice, acting as a quasi-judicial
of cer, which is governed by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The actual case led
with it was rather a petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order of the
trial court under Rule 45. 2 4

The Court is not impressed. The Court of Appeals reviewed Judge Dumayas' 26
March 2003 Order, not Secretary Perez's 12 July 2002 Resolution. The Court of Appeals
held that Judge Dumayas erred when he failed to make his own evaluation and merely
relied on Secretary Perez's recommendation that there was no probable cause. The
Court of Appeals stated that: EAIaHD

In a more recent case, the Supreme Court ruled that:

"A judge acts with grave abuse of discretion when he grants a prosecutor's
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against an accused on the basis
solely of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice his reliance on
the prosecutor's averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended
the dismissal of the case against the petitioner is an abdication of the trial
court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case in blatant
violation of the Court's pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul."

When the trial judge issued its Order of February 14, 2002 directing the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the respondents, he clearly found probable cause to
sustain the ling of criminal complaints against the latter. The issuance of a
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 warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of the court it calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.
If the trial court judge nds it appropriate to dismiss the Informations, the same
should be based upon his own personal individual conviction that there is no case
against the accused/respondents. To rely solely on the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice, to say the least, is an abdication of the judge[']s duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. What was imperatively required was
the trial judge's own assessment of just evidence, it not being suf cient for the
valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's
word for its supposed insufficiency. 2 5

Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
admissibility of the facsimile message is a matter best ventilated in a full-blown trial.
They stated that:
At any rate, the Court of Appeals also said in its decision that the issue of
admissibility of evidence assailed as hearsay is a matter of defense to be
ventilated in a full blown trial. It held that preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for exhaustive display of evidence and the issue of admissibility or
inadmissibility of evidence is a matter of defense to be ventilated at the trial.

But the Secretary of Justice's rejection of the "fax copy" of Otto Versand's letter as
hearsay evidence merely af rmed petitioners' right to due process in a preliminary
investigation. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Ms. Pajarillo authenticated it by stating under oath that she received it. The cause
for its rejection is the fact that its contents are purely hearsay since Ms. Pajarillo
who testi ed about them had no personal knowledge of the fact that the
purchase orders were false. The author of the fax message did not swear under
oath to the truth of the statement in the document contrary to what section 3 (e)
of Rule 112 mandates.
The Of ce of the Solicitor General agreed with the petitioners. In the comment
dated October 28, 2003 that it filed with the Court of Appeals, it said:
xxx xxx xxx
20. In this case, the Secretary of Justice's realistic judicial appraisal of
the merits of petitioner's complaint-af davit show that its evidence of
estafa is insuf cient for lack of proof of the requisite element of deceit. So
much so that if the case were tried, the trial court would be bound to order
an acquittal. 2 6

The Court is not impressed. Whether the facsimile message is admissible in

evidence and whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are
matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation. In
Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 2 7 the Court held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of
the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
In ne, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
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 admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level. 2 8 (Emphasis supplied)

Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that Judge
Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation and merely relied on Secretary Perez's
recommendation that there was no probable cause. They stated that:
Contrary to the Court of Appeals['] ruling, the trial court made an effort to evaluate
the merit of the prosecution's motion to withdraw the informations. It evaluated
the merits of both the prosecution's motion and respondent bank's opposition to
the motion. . . . HCITAS

Clearly, it cannot be said that the trial court abandoned its responsibility of
making an independent assessment of the suf ciency of the prosecution motion
[sic]. Indeed, it scrutinized the arguments of respondent bank just as it did the
arguments of the prosecution in order to determine for itself whether or not the
withdrawal of the informations was warranted. 2 9

The Court is not impressed. Judge Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation in
granting the motion to withdraw the informations. Judge Dumayas' 26 March 2003
Order states in full:
This Court, after an in-depth scrutiny of the arguments raised by the prosecution
and private complainant, nds the contentions of the prosecution to be suf cient
and meritorious.

Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw Information led by the Prosecution is

hereby granted and the two (2) informations for the crime of Estafa penalized under
par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code are hereby withdrawn from the docket of this
court.
In Co v. Lim, 3 0 the Court held that:
Once a case is led with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone
would be an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie
case. The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the
case based on the af davits and counter-af davits, documents, or evidence
appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor, which the court
may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced
before the court by the accused at the time the motion is led by the public
prosecutor.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]HE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT POSITIVELY STATE THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR A
PRIMA FACIE CASE, NOR DID THE AFOREQUOTED ORDER INCLUDE A
DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS OF THE CASE BASED ON AN EVALUATION
OR ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. IN OTHER WORDS, THE
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WAS BASED UPON CONSIDERATIONS OTHER THAN
THE JUDGE'S OWN PERSONAL INDIVIDUAL CONVICTION THAT THERE WAS NO
CASE AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS. THUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY
RELINQUISHED THE DISCRETION THAT HE WAS BOUND TO EXERCISE, AND THE
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 ORDERS DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2004 AND 29 JUNE 2004 ARE INVALID FOR
HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

In BALTAZAR V. CHUA, 3 1 THE COURT HELD THAT:

CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE POWER AND DUTY TO LOOK
INTO THE PROPRIETY OF THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO DISMISS, WITH
MUCH MORE REASON IS IT FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO EVALUATE AND TO
MAKE ITS OWN APPRECIATION AND CONCLUSION, WHETHER THE
MODIFICATION OF THE CHARGES AND THE DROPPING OF ONE OF THE
ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE JUSTICE
SECRETARY, IS SUBSTANTIATED BY EVIDENCE. THIS SHOULD BE THE STATE
OF AFFAIRS, SINCE THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE SUCH AS ITS
CONTINUATION OR DISMISSAL OR EXCLUSION OF AN ACCUSED IS REPOSED
IN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
IN THE CASE UNDER CONSIDERATION, THE CITY PROSECUTOR INDICTED
JAIME AND JOVITO FOR THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.
HOWEVER, UPON REVIEW, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DOWNGRADED THE
CHARGES TO HOMICIDE AND FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. THE SECRETARY ALSO
DROPPED JAIME FROM THE CHARGES. THIS RESOLUTION PROMPTED THE
CITY PROSECUTOR TO FILE A MANIFESTATION AND MOTION FOR THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATIONS FOR MURDER AND FRUSTRATED
MURDER AND FOR THE ADMISSION OF NEW INFORMATIONS FOR HOMICIDE
AND FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE AGAINST JOVITO ONLY, WHICH WAS GRANTED
BY JUDGE CRUZ IN HIS ORDER DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1997. JUDGE CRUZ,
HOWEVER, FAILED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE MERITS
OF THE CASES AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD OR IN THE POSSESSION OF
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR TO WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS, THE TRIAL COURT NEVER
MADE ANY ASSESSMENT WHETHER THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE WAS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. IT DID NOT EVEN
TAKE A LOOK AT THE BASES ON WHICH THE JUSTICE SECRETARY
DOWNGRADED THE CHARGES AGAINST JOVITO AND EXCLUDED JAIME
THEREFROM. 3 2 (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

IN ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS V. THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF MAKATI, 33 THE COURT

HELD THAT: STIcaE

IT IS SETTLED THAT WHEN CONFRONTED WITH A MOTION TO WITHDRAW AN

INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON A
RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
BOUNDEN DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT IS TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT
ASSESSMENT OF THE MERITS OF SUCH MOTION. HAVING ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND BY SUCH
RESOLUTION BUT IS REQUIRED TO EVALUATE IT BEFORE PROCEEDING
FURTHER WITH THE TRIAL AND SHOULD EMBODY SUCH ASSESSMENT IN
THE ORDER DISPOSING THE MOTION.
THE SUBJECT MTC ORDERS DO NOT SHOW THAT THE MTC MADE AN
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE MERITS OF THE MOTION TO
WITHDRAW INFORMATIONS. . . .

THE MTC SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND

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 EMBODIED ITS ASSESSMENT IN AT LEAST ONE OF ITS ASSAILED
ORDERS. 3 4 (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

IN LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 3 5 THE COURT HELD THAT:

ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, ANY DISPOSITION
OF THE CASE SUCH AS ITS DISMISSAL OR ITS CONTINUATION RESTS ON THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT. TRIAL JUDGES ARE THUS REQUIRED TO
MAKE THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING OR DENYING THE
APPEAL, SEPARATELY AND INDEPENDENTLY OF THE PROSECUTION'S OR THE
SECRETARY'S EVALUATION THAT SUCH EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT OR THAT
NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD THE ACCUSED FOR TRIAL EXISTS. THEY
SHOULD EMBODY SUCH ASSESSMENT IN THEIR WRITTEN ORDER
DISPOSING OF THE MOTION .
xxx xxx xxx
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR REPETITIVE CALLS
FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)
PRESENTED IN THE MOTION TO DISMISS. THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS TASKED TO
EVALUATE THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATION FINDING THE ABSENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PETITIONER CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR LIBEL. HE
FAILED TO DO SO. HE MERELY RULED TO PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL
WITHOUT STATING HIS REASONS FOR DISREGARDING THE SECRETARY'S
RECOMMENDATION. 3 6 (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

IN THE PRESENT CASE, JUDGE DUMAYAS, IN HIS 26 MARCH 2003 ORDER, DID
NOT (1) POSITIVELY STATE THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST LEE AND LIM IS
INSUFFICIENT, (2) INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS OF THE CASE, (3) ASSESS
WHETHER SECRETARY PEREZ'S CONCLUSION IS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, (4) LOOK
AT THE BASIS OF SECRETARY PEREZ'S RECOMMENDATION, (5) EMBODY HIS
ASSESSMENT IN THE ORDER, AND (6) STATE HIS REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS.
JUDGE DUMAYAS' FAILURE TO MAKE HIS OWN EVALUATION OF THE MERITS
OF THE CASE VIOLATES KBC BANK'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND CONSTITUTES
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. JUDGE DUMAYAS' 26 MARCH 2003 ORDER GRANTING
THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS IS VOID. 3 7
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DENIED . THE COURT AFFIRMS THE 10
FEBRUARY 2004 DECISION AND 27 JULY 2004 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 78004. THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 58, MAKATI CITY FOR
EVALUATION ON WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD THE ACCUSED FOR
TRIAL. EATCcI

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., * Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 6 January 2010.

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 1. Rollo, pp. 10-33.
2. Id. at 204-212. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate
Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring.
3. Id. at 243-244.
4. Id. at 77. Penned by Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.
5. Id. at 38-40.
6. Id. at 52-58.
7. Id. at 55.
8. CA rollo, pp. 78-88.
9. Id. at 82.
10. Rollo, pp. 59-62.
11. Id. at 60.
12. Id. at 63-76.
13. Id. at 296.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 77.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 78-116.
18. Id. at 90.
19. CA rollo, p. 240.

20. Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. Except as provided in section 3, Rule 122
regarding appeals in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
shall be dismissed.
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of
fact are involved shall be final.

21. Rollo, pp. 199-200.

22. Id. at 210-211.
23. Id. at 20-29.
24. Id. at 20-21.
25. Id. at 210-211.
26. Id. at 23-26.
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 27. 499 Phil. 36 (2005).
28. Id. at 49-50.
29. Rollo, pp. 29-30.
30. G.R. Nos. 164669 and 164670, 30 October 2009.
31. G.R. No. 177583, 27 February 2009, 580 SCRA 369.

32. Id. at 377.

33. 457 Phil. 189 (2003).
34. Id. at 203.
35. 344 Phil. 207 (1997).
36. Id. at 235-236.
37. Summerville General Merchandising and Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, 7
August 2007, 529 SCRA 274, 282.

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