05-Godinez v. Fong Pak Luen
05-Godinez v. Fong Pak Luen
05-Godinez v. Fong Pak Luen
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR. , J : p
The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father, now deceased,
to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since it
violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code. cdrep
"On August 18, 1966, the defendant Register of Deeds filed an answer claiming
that he was not yet the register of deeds then; that it was only the ministerial duty
of his office to issue the title in favor of the defendant Navata once he was
determined the registerability of the documents presented to his office.
"On October 20, 1966, the defendant Navata filed her answer with the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim alleging among others that the complaint does not
state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is
registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as has sole property he may
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dispose of the same; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of
limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on
November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a
result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144 (1) of
the Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10
years from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of action accrued on
November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30, 1966,
beyond the 10-year period provided for by law; that the torrens title in the name of
defendant Navata is indefeasible who acquired the property from defendant Fong
Pak Luen who had been in possession of the property since 1941 and thereafter
defendant Navata had possessed the same for the last 25 years including the
possession of Fong Pak Luen; that the complaint is intended to harass the
defendant as a civic leader and respectable member of the community as a result
of which she suffered moral damages of P100,000.00, P2,500.00 for attorney's
fees and P500.00 expenses of litigation, hence, said defendant prays that the
complaint be dismissed and that her counterclaim be granted, with costs against
the plaintiffs. On November 24, 1967, the plaintiffs filed an answer to the
affirmative defenses and counter-claim. As the defendants Fong Pak Luen and
Kwan Pun Ming are residing outside the Philippines, the trial court upon motion
issued an order of April 17, 1967, for the service of summons on said defendants
by publication. No answer has been filed by said defendants.
"'Both parties having agreed to the suggestion of the Court that they
submit their supplemental pleadings to support both motion and
opposition and after submittal of the same the said motion to dismiss
which is an affirmative defense alleged in the complaint is deemed
submitted. Failure of both parties or either party to submit their
supplemental pleadings on or about December 9, the Court will resolve the
case.'
"On November 29, 1968, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint
without pronouncement as to costs. (Record on Appeal, pp. 31-37). A motion for
reconsideration of this order was filed by the plaintiffs on December 12, 1968,
which was denied by the trial court in an order of July 11, 1969, (Rec. on Appeal,
pp. 38, 43, 45, 47). The plaintiffs now interpose this appeal with the following
assignments of errors:
The appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground that their cause of action has prescribed. While the issue raised appears to be only
the applicability of the law governing prescription, the real question before us is whether or
not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional
prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino
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citizen qualified to own and possess it.
The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents indicate fairly clearly how the question
should be resolved.
There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez of his residential lot
acquired from the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite to Fong Pak Luen, a
Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution which provided:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The meaning of the above provision was fully discussed in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila (79 Phil. 461) which also detailed the evolution of the provision in the public land
laws, Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Krivenko ruling that "under the
Constitution aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands"
is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy. Consequently, prescription may
never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no
necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale
executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen - whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or
merely prohibited. * It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned,
prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based
on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen
against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. The lower court
erred in treating the case as one involving simply the application of the statute of
limitations. LLpr
From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the
Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to
recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified
alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified
to acquire real property.
In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447), where the alien vendee
later sold the property to a Filipino corporation, this Court, in affirming a judgment
dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale of real property to the defendant Li Seng Giap
on January 22, 1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the
Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands, held:
"In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, 49 Off. Gaz., 4321; Talento vs. Makiki, 49 Off. Gaz., 4331;
Bautista vs. Uy 49 Off. Gaz., 4336; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee, 49 Off. Gaz., 4345 and
Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49 Off. Gaz., 5360, the majority of this Court has ruled that in
sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the
provisions of the Constitution (Section 5, Article XIII; Krivenko vs. Register of
Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471) both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts
will not afford protection to either party. (Article 1305, old Civil Code; Article 1411,
new Civil Code) From this ruling three Justices dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr.
Justice Alex. Reyes and the writer. See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, Talento vs. Makiki,
Bautista vs. Uy, Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee and Mercado vs. Go Bio, supra.
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"The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the
grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the action
of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for
annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II, on nullity of contracts, based on a
defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or
damages. (Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th
ed.) It is very likely that the majority of this Court proceeded upon that theory
when it applied the in pari delicto rule referred to above.
"In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified
to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and
has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of
alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee may hold it against the
whole world except as against the State. It is only the State that is entitled by
proceedings in the nature of office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared
against the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and
conveyed to him, (Abrams vs. State, 88 Pac. 327; Craig vs. Leslie et al., 4 Law, Ed.
460; 3 Wheat, 563, 589-590; Cross vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall, [U.S.] 513; 17 Law. Ed.,
515; Governeur vs. Robertson, 11 Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed., 488.)
"However, if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime
the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the State is deemed to have waived its right
to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and
valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him. (Osterman vs. Baldwin, 6
Wall, 116, 18 Law. ed. 730; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532;
Pembroke vs. Houston, 79, SW 470; Fioerella vs. Jones, 259 SW 782. The rule in
the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title
thereto, the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and is not
permitted to sue for the annulment of his contract, is also the rule under the Civil
Code. . . . Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: . . . Persons sui juris cannot,
however, avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; .
. .'
Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (1 SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring that where
land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot
be impugned.
The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA
52) which relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or successors-in-interest, in
appropriate cases, to recover that which their predecessors sold to aliens. LexLib
Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we had occasion to
pass upon a factual situation substantially similar to the one in the instant case. We ruled:
In the light of the above considerations, we find the second and third assignments of
errors without merit. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the
rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The orders dismissing the complaint and
denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Under the facts in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547), this Court stated
that "(t)here should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by
Epifania Sarsosa to Ong King Po was non-existent and void from the beginning (Art.
1409 [7], Civil Code) because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision
of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for
the Filipinos." In Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) the Court,
however, applied Article 1416 of the Civil Code, which refers to agreements not illegal per
se but merely prohibited, to justify the exception to the rule on pari delicto.